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ABSTRACT 
 
GREGORY A. LIPTON: Making Islam Fit: Ibn ‘Arabi and the Idea of Sufism in the West 
(Under the direction of Carl W. Ernst) 
 
This dissertation explores how the medieval writings of the Andalusian 
metaphysician Muhyi al-Din Ibn ‘Arabi (d. 1240) have been read in light of particular 
Western interpretive assumptions that presuppose shared transhistorical and transcultural 
ideals of religious authenticity. Although Ibn ‘Arabi is commonly portrayed in the West as a 
premodern Muslim exemplar of religious pluralism who accepted all revealed religions as 
contemporaneously valid, a careful reading of his textual positions brings into focus an 
absolutist discourse of supersessionism based upon the exclusive superiority of Islam and its 
abrogation of all previous religious dispensations. By analyzing the discursive practices that 
have been anachronistically employed and normalized in contemporary universalist 
constructions of Ibn ‘Arabi and Sufism, this study aims to throw into relief how such 
practices are linked to deeper genealogies of modern European thought, how they create 
religious and ethnoracial difference, what kinds of religious subjectivities they authorize, and 
what kinds they exclude.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Modernity does not necessarily lead to a decline of religion. What it does lead to, 
more or less necessarily, is religious pluralism.1 
 
The following study can be situated as a comparative analysis of religious discourse 
broadly construed. It analyzes regnant discourses in the contemporary “Western”2 reception 
of the Andalusian metaphysician Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 1240)—or popularly Ibn 
ʿArabī—that portray him as a religious pluralist or universalist who accepted all revealed 
religions as contemporaneously valid.3 Following the analytical insight that discourse is 
determined by that which it excludes,4 this study is built upon a careful and historicized 
reading of Ibn ‘Arabi’s textual positions on the religious Other in comparison with prevalent 
claims made by some of his most important Western interpreters. Although the weight of 
                                                
1 Peter L. Berger, “Pluralism, Protestantization, and the Voluntary Principle,” in Democracy and the New 
Religious Pluralism, ed. Thomas Banchoff (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 21. 
2 Following Talal Asad and Walter Mignolo, I use “Western” and “the West” throughout this study to signify a 
critical ideological construct of modernity. As Asad notes, even though the West is not a “verifiable” object or 
integrated totality, it remains a global signifier for “innumerable intentions, practices, and discourses” that relate 
to a unique historicity claiming to be “the universal civilization.” More specifically, “[t]he West,” according to 
Mignolo, “refers to an economic and ideological configuration centered on capitalism, Christianity, and 
whiteness […].” See Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Disciplines and Reasons of Power in Christianity 
and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 18-19; and Walter Mignolo, The Darker Side of 
the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 
435. 
3 Ibn ‘Arabi’s full name is Muḥyī al-Dīn Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. al-ʿArabī al-Ḥātimī al-Ṭāʾī (560-
638 A.H./1165-1240 C.E.). The practice of omitting the definite article “al-“ from “Ibn al-ʿArabī” was 
supposedly adopted so as not to confuse him with his fellow Sevillian, the traditionalist Abū Bakr Ibn al-ʿArabī 
(d. 1148). See A. Ateş, “Ibn al-ʿArabī,” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 3 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), 
707. 
4 Marianne Jørgensen and Louise J. Phillips, “The Field of Discourse Analysis,” in Discourse Analysis as 
Theory and Method (London: SAGE Publications, 2002), 27. 
 2 
such a comparative analysis is brought to bear on individual authors, the chapters that follow 
are more concerned with the discursive formations that are (re)produced through their work. 
By offering revised readings of Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse on the religious Other, this study 
unfurls a new backdrop against which the discursive practices of his universalist interpreters 
are made to stand in sharp relief. The contours that surface enable such practices to be 
tracked to deeper lineages of modern European thought and the presuppositions they harbor. 
What follows, then, is an attempt to dig out buried formations of religious, ethnoracial, and 
civilizational difference that have been normalized within Western universalist discourses on 
Ibn ‘Arabi and their accompanying ideas of Sufism. Through critically analyzing the limits of 
pluralism imposed in such discourses, this study aims to bring into view how historically 
situated ideals frame universalist constructions of religious authenticity, what kinds of 
religious subjectivities such ideals authorize, and what kinds they exclude.   
Discourses in Play 
As the only medieval Muslim “mystic,” or Sufi, to have a Western society—and an 
attendant scholarly journal—established in his honor with branches in England and 
America,5 the enthusiastic Western reception of Ibn ‘Arabi is exceeded only by that of his 
celebrated contemporary Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (d. 1273), who is often cited as the “best-selling” 
poet in America.6 While Ibn ‘Arabi is also a revered poet made famous by his verses that 
claim to “follow the religion of love,” the bulk of his voluminous corpus is comprised of a 
highly specialized and recondite metaphysical prose, making him significantly less accessible 
                                                
5 I.e., The Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi Society; see www.ibnarabisociety.org/index.html. 
6 Carl W. Ernst, “Situating Sufism and Yoga,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 15, no. 1 (2005): 23. 
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than Rumi.7 Nevertheless, Ibn ‘Arabi’s monistic leaning “mysticism” has a long-standing and 
popular correlation with the so-called doctrine of “the unity of being” (waḥdat al-wujūd). 
While the term was never explicitly used by Ibn ‘Arabi himself, it has come to 
emblematically represent his unitive metaphysics, signifying God as the ontological reality of 
all things.8  
Yet more importantly for this study, Ibn ‘Arabi’s doctrine of “the unity of being” is 
often associated in the West with the ostensibly similar concept of “the transcendent unity of 
religions”—the emblematic phrase associated with the discourse of the Swiss-German 
esotericist Frithjof Schuon (d. 1998) and also the title of his first major work.9 In the second 
half of the twentieth century, Schuon not only served as the leader of the first organized 
“traditional” European Sufi order (ṭarīqa),10 but upon the death of his French Traditionalist 
predecessor René Guénon in 1951, he became the foremost representative of the Perennial 
Philosophy (philosophia perennis).11 The Transcendent Unity of Religions (De l’Unité 
                                                
7 Current estimates on the total number of Ibn ‘Arabi’s works range between 300 to 400 works of varying size 
that span only a few pages to his multivolume al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya (The Meccan Openings). The 2004 Dār 
Ṣādir edition of the Futūḥāt that I refer to in this study comprises a total of 2949 pages in small Arabic type. See 
Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya, 9 vols. (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 2004). See also Alexander D. 
Knysh, Ibn ‘Arabi in the Later Islamic Tradition: The Making of a Polemical Image in Medieval Islam (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1999), 9. 
8 See William Chittick, “Rūmī and waḥdat al-wujūd,” in Poetry and Mysticism in Islam: The Heritage of Rūmī, 
ed. Amin Banani, Richard Hovannisian, and Georges Sabagh (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
71, 75, 87, passim. 
9 E.g., see Eric Geoffroy, Introduction to Sufism: The Inner Path of Islam (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 
2010), 184, 187. See also Thierry Zarcone, “Rereadings and Transformations of Sufism in the West,” Diogenes 
47, no. 187 (1999): 116. 
10 Under the Muslim name of ʿlsa Nūr ad-Dīn, Schuon headed a European branch of the Shādhiliyya-ʿAlāwiyya 
tarīqa founded by Ahmad al-ʿAlāwī in Mostaganem, Algeria. See Mark J. Sedgwick, “The ‘Traditionalist’ 
Shâdhiliyya in the West: Guénonians and Schuonians,” in Une voie soufie dans le monde: la Shâdhiliyya, ed. 
Eric Geoffroy (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2005), 461-64.  
11 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Frithjof Schuon and the Islamic Tradition,” in The Essential Sophia, ed. Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr and Katherine O’Brien (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006), 258.  
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transcendante des Religions, 1948) argues that a transhistorical religious essence—which 
Schuon would later identify as the Perennial Religion (religio perennis)—unifies all religious 
traditions beyond the limits of exoteric absolutism and thus embraces all contemporary 
“orthodox” religions as universally valid means to the divine. According to Perennialist 
thought, such religious universalism forms the basis of the most ancient wisdom and is the 
sacred inheritance of all great mystics from every religious tradition.12 
Echoing self-critical discussions in the field of religious studies over the past 
decade,13 Tomoko Masuzawa notes that “[t]he idea of the fundamental unity of religions—or 
what may be reasonably termed liberal universalism—has been in evidence in much of the 
comparative enterprise since the nineteenth century […].”14 Yet, Masuzawa reasonably 
submits that “many of today’s scholars would likely contest, rather than accept, this 
presumption that the unity of ‘religious experience’ should be the basis of religion as an 
academic discipline.”15 While such a position may be less common in religious studies today, 
it still plays a critical discursive role in the academic study of Ibn ‘Arabi.16  
                                                
12 The concept of a perennial philosophy (philosophia perennis) was first introduced by Agostino Steuco (d. 
1548) in his work De perenni philosophia (1540). Although a Catholic bishop who served as the librarian at the 
Vatican Library, he adhered to a type of “Platonic monism” and believed that true theology “is nothing other 
than the revealed truth which has been known to mankind from the earliest times.” Charles B. Schmitt, 
“Perennial Philosophy: From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz,” Journal of the History of Ideas 27, no. 4 (1966): 
515, 518. As Hanegraaff notes, since Leibniz made reference to the term perennis philosophia without 
attributing it to Steuco, it was loosened from its original Catholic moorings in the Renaissance and entered into 
more generalized usage. Wouter J. Hanegraaff, “Tradition,” Dictionary of Gnosis and Western Esotericism, ed. 
Wouter J. Hanegraaff (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 1130. 
13 E.g., Russell T. McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the 
Politics of Nostalgia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); and Timothy Fitzgerald, The Ideology of 
Religious Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
14 Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism was Preserved in 
the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 316n6. 
15 Ibid., 316. 
16 Wouter Hanegraaff calls this position the “religionist perspective,” which he associates with Schuonian 
Perennialism and the “transcendent unity of religions.” See Wouter J. Hanegraaff, New Age Religion and 
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Although Schuon’s large corpus of over thirty works remains relatively obscure, his 
Perennialist framework commands one of the most dominant knowledge regimes in the 
contemporary Western reception of Ibn ‘Arabi. Indeed, James Morris, a leading Western 
expert on Ibn ‘Arabi, has recently acknowledged Schuon’s ubiquitous influence in 
interpreting and transmitting Ibn ‘Arabi’s thought to “academic specialists in the spiritual 
dimensions of religious studies.”17 Yet, up until the present study, there has been no 
discursive analysis of Western universalist constructions of Ibn ‘Arabi in terms of Schuonian 
discourse and little critical analysis of Schuon’s discursive practices outside the boundaries 
of his own language-game.18  
In addition to continued associations with the Schuonian concept of the transcendent 
unity of religions, Ibn ‘Arabi has also been portrayed as a premodern representative of 
secular-liberal religiosity. In discourses that repeatedly appear after the tragic events of 
September 11, 2001, Ibn ‘Arabi has emerged as the premodern progenitor of a “European” 
Islam notable for his rational pluralism in contradistinction to the irrational exclusivity of 
fundamentalist Islam.19 Here, Ibn ‘Arabi’s unitive metaphysics, and the Sufism it represents, 
has been reduced to the mystical source of a proto-European universalism. While not directly 
                                                                                                                                                  
Western Culture: Esotericism in the Mirror of Secular Thought (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 5n17, 52n38. 
Regarding the presence of Traditionalist thought in current modalities of Islamic studies generally, see Carl W. 
Ernst, “Traditionalism, the Perennial Philosophy, and Islamic Studies” Middle East Studies Association Bulletin 
28, no. 2 (1994): 176-81. 
17 James Winston Morris, “Ibn ‘Arabi in the ‘Far West,’” Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi Society 24 
(2001): 106, 106n23. 
18 While recently there have been a few important critical treatments of Schuon, these are primarily socio-
cultural and historical analyses that mainly focus on his life and works, spiritual claims, personal cult, and the 
scandal that surrounded him in Bloomington, Indiana; yet, for the most part they do not offer sustained analyses 
of his discourse itself in terms of a broader politics of knowledge outside of the discursive field of Perennialism. 
For an overview of current scholarship on Schuon including these works see chapter 3, p. 169, 169nn27-28. 
19 E.g., Stephen Schwartz, The Other Islam: Sufism and the Road to Global Harmony (New York: Doubleday, 
2008), 90. 
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affiliated with Schuonian Perennialism, this Kantian mode of liberal universalist discourse 
shares important overlapping practices with Schuonian discourse that are brought to light in 
the second half of this study.  
While Ibn ‘Arabi’s ultimate soteriological vision is informed by a radical hermeneutic 
of mercy acknowledging that even those in eternal damnation will eventually find 
contentment and bliss, close readings of his positions on the religious Other reveal an 
absolutist religious discourse based upon the abrogation (naskh) of Islam over all previous 
religions and the textual corruption (taḥrīf al-naṣṣ) of pre-Qur’anic scripture. Although Ibn 
‘Arabi’s so-called monism is submersed within a metaphysics of love that is often taken in 
the West to be opposed to religious exclusivism, this study foundationally argues that the 
entire structure of his anthropology, cosmology, and cosmography is built upon an exclusive 
and absolute supersession of the Prophet Muhammad.  
The Framing Tension: Religious Absolutism and the Mystical Exception   
In the contemporary West, religious absolutism is often understood to be the bane of 
global religious flourishing and a leading cause of intolerance and violence.20 Such a 
conviction has a long history in modern thought and often situated in the so-called “wars of 
religion” of sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe. It is the exclusivity of competing 
religious doctrines, so the argument went, and still goes, that instills within their adherents an 
uncanny and eager willingness to kill their rivals. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau (d. 1778) 
concisely summarized: “It is impossible to live at peace with people whom we believe to be 
                                                
20 E.g., John Hick argues that “religious absolutism” that claims to “absolute validity and to a consequent 
superiority” has led to intolerance and violence not only in Christianity, but in “almost every tradition.” John 
Hick, “The Non-Absoluteness of Christianity,” in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic 
Theology of Religions, ed. John Hick and Paul F. Knitter (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1987), 17. For a critical analysis of 
the argument that religious absolutism causes violence see William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious 
Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 19-26. 
 7 
damned; to love them would be to hate God who punishes them.”21  
Yet, the commonly held notion that religious absolutism caused the so-called wars of 
religion (and thus the rise of the modern state resolved them) is historically untenable. 
Rather, as William Cavanaugh forcefully argues, the very distinction between religion and 
politics was itself instigated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the transference of 
power from the church to the new sovereign state. The so-called wars of religion were thus 
“fought by state-building elites for the purpose of consolidating their power over the church 
and other rivals.”22 While the church was deeply involved in such violence, the birth of the 
modern state was the real catalyst for such upheavals rather than religious fanaticism.23 
Nevertheless, the assertion that the European wars of religion are evidence that public 
religiosity and its attendant absolutism causes violence has been, in Cavanaugh’s words, a 
“creation myth for modernity”—a myth not only used as justification for Western secularism, 
but one also “inextricably bound up with the legitimation of the state and its use of 
violence.”24 In the face of the myth of religious violence, the Enlightenment impetus to 
relegate religion to a mode of private belief secluded from the socio-political realm was 
sanctioned as critical for Western progress. As Grace Jantzen notes, in response to the “wars 
of religion,” seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers such as Locke, Hume, and 
Kant were compelled to separate religion from politics and economics. As such, the modern 
                                                
21 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and The First and Second Discourses, trans. and ed. Susan Dunn 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 253. 
22 Cavanaugh, The Myth, 162. 
23 Ibid., 166, 177. A major proof for this assertion is that much of the violence was carried out against members 
of the same church, while those of different denominations often collaborated (ibid., 142). 
24 Ibid., 123-24. 
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turn towards the subject along with the increasing privatization of religion produced a 
particular conception of religious experience   
as essentially a private, inner state, having nothing to do with outer, public realities. It was, 
instead, a strictly personal matter. It could, however, be cultivated; and could produce states 
of calm and tranquility which would enable return to those public realities with less anxiety 
and inner turmoil. Understood in these terms, mysticism becomes domesticated, is rendered 
unthreatening to the public political realm.25 
 
Through such domestication, Jantzen concludes, mysticism has thus “become safe.”26 
Indeed in the twentieth century, the category of “mysticism” emerges as a discursive 
site carrying with it the aura of authentic religiosity that is often called upon as a refuge from 
the discord of religious rivalry and absolutism. Thus, no less of a scholar than Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith would claim in his late work Towards a World Theology that while a 
pluralistic world community based upon a “theology of comparative religion” was only now 
just beginning to emerge, “[t]he mystics have seen, and felt, and indeed known, that 
community all along.”27 Indeed, as Smith specifically notes elsewhere regarding Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
“metaphysical monism”—in opposition to communal and “formalist” Islam—“to believe in 
the ultimate unity of the world and the universe is to believe also in the unity of 
humankind.”28 Yet, such dichotomies between religious absolutism and premodern 
mysticism have proven increasingly difficult to sustain.29 
                                                
25 Grace Jantzen, Power, Gender, and Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
345. 
26 Ibid., 345 (emphasis mine). 
27 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Towards a World Theology: Faith and the Comparative History of Religion 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1981), 125-26 (emphasis original). 
28 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, On Understanding Islam: Selected Studies (The Hague: Mouton, 1981), 190. Here, 
Smith specifically contrasts the Indian Naqshbandī Sufi Aḥmad Sirhindi’s “supersession of Ibn al-ʿArabī’s 
waḥdat al-wujūd by his new waḥdat al-shuhūd.” Smith also identifies Sirhindi’s new movement as “promoting 
a rigid, structured, systematic communalism” (ibid., 189). Elsewhere Smith notes: “The Ṣufī poet and mystic, 
on the one hand […] has been sensitive to faith wherever it be found, and has given expression to his humane—
and divine—vision […]. The systematizer, on the other hand, whether conceptually (mutakallim) or morally-
 9 
Orientations: Constructing the Discursive Image 
In her Foucauldian interrogation of Christian mysticism, and its hegemonic legacy of 
patriarchal domination, Jantzen notes that the Western conception of “mysticism” is “a 
constantly shifting social and historical construction.”30 The construction of what counts as 
“mysticism” is thus reflective of “the institutions of power in which it occurs.”31 Although 
such a constructivist frame is hardly new, it nevertheless serves as the theoretical fulcrum 
around which this study pivots by attending to Western constructions of Ibn ‘Arabi and the 
concurrent idea of Sufism as products of particular knowledge regimes involved in the 
ideological projection, universalization, and regulation of “truth.”  
While the chapters that follow are thus concerned with the reception of Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
thought rather than his biography, the image of Ibn ‘Arabi as constructed through interpretive 
discourse overlaps in important ways the hagiographical construction of a discursive icon—
what Frank Reynolds and Donald Capps call a “biographic image” that combines select 
                                                                                                                                                  
legally (faqīh), has been largely exclusivist.” Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Faith and Belief: the Difference between 
Them (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1998), 207n41. 
29 While such characterizations of the dichotomy between Ibn ‘Arabi and Sirhindi (as noted directly above), and 
their respective doctrines, were common during Smith’s day, they have since been considerably rethought. One 
of the most salient examples countering Smith’s claim is that of the Indian Chishtī-Ṣabirī Sufi ʿAbd al-Quddūs 
Gangōhī (d. 1537) who was not only a famous adherent of Ibn ‘Arabi’s waḥdat al-wujūd in the Indian Sufi 
tradition, but was equally renown for his appropriation of Nathapanthi Yogic traditions. Yet, as David Damrel 
points out, Abd al-Quddūs was also notable for his staunch attachment to the sharia and his religious 
absolutism. This is most clearly expressed in a letter he wrote to the Mughal emperor Bābur (r. 1526-1530) in 
which he not only calls upon him to enforce the sharia, but prohibits him employing any non-Muslim (kāfir) in 
his administration. Moreover, he demands that non-Muslims should be forced to pay the poll-tax (jizya) and 
should not dress like Muslims or practice their faith in public. David W. Damrel, “The ‘Naqshbandī Reaction’ 
Reconsidered,” in Beyond Turk and Hindu: Rethinking Religious Identities in Islamicate South Asia, ed. David 
Gilmartin and Bruce B. Lawrence (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 177-79, 183-84. Abd al-
Quddūs’s letter to Bābur is significant in its similarity to Ibn ‘Arabi’s letter to the Seljuk Sultan of Anatolia, ʿIzz 
al-Dīn Kaykāʾus I (r. 1211-20) discussed at the start of chapter 1. For an excellent survey of Islamic 
universalism in the Indian context see Carl W. Ernst, “The Limits of Universalism in Islamic Thought: The 
Case of Indian Religions,” The Muslim World 101 (2011): 1-19. 
30 Jantzen, Power, 24. 
31 Ibid., 14 (emphasis mine). 
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biographical facts with the ideals of a religious tradition.32 As Tony Stewart notes, the 
discursive memory of a shaykh written by a hagiographer is “shaped by what is deemed 
relevant by the author.”33 The shaykh is thus, according to Stewart, “only the ‘ostensible 
subject,’ providing the opportunity to articulate the religious ideal.”34 It is through this sense 
of an “ostensible” subject that I approach Ibn ‘Arabi as a Western “discursive image”—i.e., 
as an ideological construction of a “religious ideal.” 
While Ibn ‘Arabi’s discursive image in the West has varied since his initial reception 
in the late nineteenth century—either as an antinomian thinker or more recently as an 
“orthodox” Muslim—he has been, for the most part, received by Western scholars in a 
positive light.35 As Alexander Knysh notes, “the Western audience has been presented with a 
thoroughly sanitized (and generally sympathetic) portrait of the Sufi thinker and his 
teaching.”36 Indeed, Knysh’s monograph Ibn ʿArabi in the Later Islamic Tradition, which 
analyzes the medieval Arab construction of Ibn ‘Arabi’s polemical image, is a rare exception 
                                                
32 Frank E. Reynolds and Donald Capps introduction to The Biographical Process: Studies in the History and 
Psychology of Religion, ed. Frank E. Reynolds and Donald Capps (The Hague: Mouton, 1976), 4.  
33 Tony K. Stewart, “The Subject and the Ostensible Subject: Mapping the Genre of Hagiography among South 
Asian Chishtis,” in Rethinking Islamic Studies: From Orientalism to Cosmopolitanism, ed. Carl W. Ernst and 
Richard C. Martin (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2010), 229. 
34 Ibid., 237. 
35 Ibn ‘Arabi gained prominence early on in the Western study of Sufism through the translation of his lexicon 
of Sufi terms. As Alexander Knysh notes, Gustav Flügel’s (d. 1870) early Latin translation of Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
lexicon along with Aloys Sprenger’s critical edition of the Sufi lexicon of Ibn ‘Arabi’s commentator ʿAbd al-
Razzāq al-Qāshāni (d. 1329), formed a major component “for the subsequent advancement of Sufi studies in 
Europe.” Alexander Knysh, “Historiography of Sufi Studies in the West,” in A Companion to the History of the 
Middle East, ed. Youssef M. Choueiri (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 109. 
36 Knysh, Ibn ‘Arabi, 18ff. Knysh presents an invaluable survey of Ibn ‘Arabi’s critical premodern Arab 
reception and those who rather than finding him to be the “Shaykh al-Akbar” (the Greatest Master), considered 
him a dangerous heretic whose thought posed nothing less than a threat to the entire moral edifice of Muslim 
society. Such criticism was most notably propounded early on by Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), al-Dhahabi (d. 
1348), Ibn Khatib (d. 1375), and Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406). See ibid., 96-106; 116, 179-97, passim. 
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within Western scholarship on Ibn ‘Arabi.37 For the most part, such scholarship has paid 
scant attention to Ibn ‘Arabi’s discursive reception and has instead focused primarily on 
translating and interpreting his metaphysical ideas based upon a small group of his 
premodern followers.38 The only full length work to offer a critical analysis of Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
contemporary reception in the West to date is Suha Taji-Farouki’s Beshara and Ibn ‘Arabi. 
In this socio-cultural analysis, Taji-Farouki explores the nexus between New Age thought 
and the Beshara spiritual movement, which she situates as a new religious movement 
founded on a highly essentialized version of Ibn ‘Arabi’s metaphysics.39  
Although Taji-Farouki’s careful work is a valuable scholarly contribution to the 
understanding of Beshara as a spiritual movement, her analysis of the movement’s discursive 
appropriation of Ibn ‘Arabi lacks a critical evaluation of its involvement within a wider 
politics of knowledge—what Richard King has called a “cultural field of power relations.”40 
As such, the present work is the only study to date to offer a sustained analysis of Ibn 
‘Arabi’s discursive reception in the West in relation to broader lineages of European 
knowledge regimes and their attendant discursive practices of subject formation.  
Like the discourse that I analyze in this study, the Beshara movement emphasizes Ibn 
                                                
37 Of note in this genre is Omid Safi’s preliminary study of Ibn ‘Arabi’s biographical image presented in Shams 
al-Dīn Tabrīzī’s Maqālāt-i shams-i tabrīzī. See Omid Safi, “Did the Two Oceans Meet?: Connections and 
Disconnections between Ibn al-ʿArabī and Rūmī,” Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn ʿArabi Society 26 (1999): 55-
88. 
38 Knysh, Ibn ‘Arabi, 18. 
39 Suha Taji-Farouki, Beshara and Ibn ‘Arabi: A Movement of Sufi Spirituality in the Modern World (Oxford: 
Anqa Publishing, 2007), 194-206. The Beshara movement and its attendant esoteric school was founded by the 
Turkish spiritual leader Bulent Rauf (d. 1987) in the early 70s. The above mentioned Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi 
Society and scholarly journal is attached to the movement.  
40 Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and ‘The Mystic East’ (London: 
Routledge, 2002), 1. The reasons for Taji-Farouki’s restrained critique may be due in part to the fact that her 
study was published by Anqa Publishing, which is run by students of Beshara and affiliated with the Muhyiddin 
Ibn ‘Arabi Society. See: www.ibn-arabi.com/aboutanqa.htm. 
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‘Arabi’s universalism. Yet unlike the material I explore, which ostensibly acknowledges the 
importance of Islam in Ibn ‘Arabi’s thought, the Beshara movement explicitly denies that Ibn 
‘Arabi held Islam, or any other religious orientation, as metaphysically important. Indeed, as 
Taji-Farouki puts it, the Beshara movement’s “projection of Ibn ‘Arabi’s teaching assigns no 
role to religion in its actualisation and in the fulfilment of man’s spiritual evolution […].”41 
Such a perspective, as Taji-Farouki herself notes, is “antithetical” to the Perennialist/ 
Traditionalist perspective, where 
the great orthodox religions represent forms of divine gnosis adapted providentially to 
different circumstances. As embodiments of perennial Truth they constitute the valid 
framework for the spiritual path and ultimately, through their initiatic traditions, for the 
highest form of spiritual realisation.42 
 
Thus, the Perennialist discursive image of Ibn ‘Arabi projects him as a “traditional” Muslim 
who adheres to the sacred law, i.e., sharia, of Islam. Yet importantly, such “adherence” is 
consistently construed within a universalist ideal that is opposed to religious absolutism and 
its political excrescences. Such double framing of Ibn ‘Arabi as both a so-called “traditional” 
Muslim and one who disavowed religious absolutism is of primary concern to this study and, 
as the final chapter shows, has wider implications on Western discourses of Islamic reform.  
Yet, while this study is concerned to show that Ibn ‘Arabi’s metaphysical thought was 
rooted within an absolutist religious doctrine, it is not arguing that he was an “orthodox” 
Muslim. Indeed, the oft-mentioned inadequacy of the term “orthodoxy” as an analytical 
category for the study of Islam reaches its apogee with Ibn ‘Arabi.43 At the height of the 
                                                
41 Taji-Farouki, Beshara and Ibn ‘Arabi, 181; see also 206-7. 
42 Ibid. 
43 For a survey of the scholarly problematization of the term in Islamic studies beginning with Ignaz Goldziher 
in the early twentieth century see Brett Wilson, “The Failure of Nomenclature: The Concept of ‘Orthodoxy’ in 
the Study of Islam,” Comparative Islamic Studies 3, no. 2 (2007): 169-94.   
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intellectual fluorescence of the Islamic Middle Period when Ibn ‘Arabi was writing, as 
Marshall Hodgson importantly notes, scholars were no longer tied to “the particular insights 
of their own immediate tradition […].”44 Rather, diverse opinions and ideas were available 
from multiple currents of knowledge, schools, and doctrines. In such a fecund intellectual 
environment, scholars commonly held several doctrinal commitments simultaneously.45  
As will be discussed more in chapter 1, it is from within the medieval context of such 
an atomistic collective paradigm of religious thought that the importance of a legal discourse 
emerges. While philosophical and theological frameworks present absolute truth claims, 
Islamic jurisprudence addresses questions of praxis that can more flexibly entertain opposing 
views.46 Thus, “the entire religious order of classical Islam,” according to Sherman Jackson, 
“was the product of a legal rather than a philosophical discourse.”47 Yet, part of the assumed 
foundation of such unitive legal discourse, and its political corollaries, was an absolutist 
conception of the Islamic dispensation as superseding all previous religious law. As John 
Burton notes, “To Muslim scholars, the abrogation of Judaism and Christianity by Islam was 
obvious.”48  
Just as medieval Christians understood Christianity as superseding Judaism, medieval 
Muslim scholars understood Islam as superseding the dispensations of the People of the 
                                                
44 Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, vol. 2 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 154. 
45 As Hodgson notes, “A person could maintain a given viewpoint on the imâmate, one on questions of 
metaphysics or kalâm, and one on fiqh law; he could be, for instance, a Jamâʿî-Sunnî, a Muʿtazilî, and Ḥanafī.” 
Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol. 1, 67. 
46 Sherman A. Jackson, “Islam(s) East and West: Pluralism between No-Frills and Designer Fundamentalism,” 
in September 11 in History: A Watershed Moment?, ed. Mary L. Dudziak (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2003), 129-130. 
47 Ibid., 129 (emphasis original). 
48 John Burton, “Abrogation,” in Encyclopedia of the Qur’ān, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill,  2001), 11-12. 
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Book. As I argue in chapter 1, this was not only Ibn ‘Arabi’s position, but was characteristic 
of his entire intellectual milieu. Indeed, even the irenic Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm al-
Shahrastānī (d. 1153), who has been described as an early proponent of “an ecumenical 
Muslim worldview,”49 staunchly held to the doctrine of abrogation (naskh). At the end of his 
theological treatise Nihāyat al-aqdām fī ʿilm al-kalām (The Furthest Lengths in the 
Knowledge of Theology), Shahrastānī’s description of the progressive abrogation of each 
revealed religion until the advent of Muhammad is a classic example of such discourse and 
worth quoting here. In what follows, Shahrastānī concludes a lengthy rebuttal against the 
Jewish claim that it is impossible for God to change His mind and abrogate the Jewish 
dispensation after He has given the Jews the Torah.50 Shahrastānī thus states: 
Each revealed law is abrogative (nāsikha) and clothes itself in another form until it ends at 
the perfection of all of the revealed laws, and they are all sealed by the Seal of the Prophets. 
There is nothing after the perfection and rectitude (al-istiqāma) except for the Hereafter (al-
maʿād) and the Resurrection (al-qiyāma): “My advent and the hour is as (close) as these two 
(fingers).”51 So, the creation is completed there and the command is completed here. Just as 
the creation is sealed by the perfection of the state of the sperm as a complete human being, 
so to is the revealed law (al-sharīʿa) sealed by the perfection of the state of the first revealed 
law (al-sharʿ al-awwal) as a completely perfect religion (dīnan tāmman kāmilan): “Today I 
have perfected your religion for you, completed My favor upon you, and sanctioned for you 
Islam as a religion.”52 We are contented with God as a lord, with Islam as a religion (dīn), 
with Muhammad the chosen one (al-muṣṭafā), may God bless him and grant him peace, as a 
prophet, with the Qur’an as a book, with the Kaaba as a kiblah, and with the believers as our 
brothers.53   
                                                
49 Bruce Lawrence, “Shahrastānī, Al-,” Encyclopedia of Religion, 2nd ed., vol. 12 (Detroit: Macmillan Reference 
USA, 2005), 8267. 
50 Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī, Kitāb nihāyat al-aqdām fī ʿilm al-kalām, ed. Alfred Guillaume 
(Baghdad: Maktabat al-Muthanna, 1964), 499. As Jacques Waardenburg notes, “The principal argument used 
specifically against Judaism concerned the doctrine of naskh (abrogation). […] Jewish theologians, by contrast, 
held that it is impossible for God to change his mind, as God does not change his decree and dispensation.” 
Jacques Waardenburg, “The Medieval Period 650–1500,” in Muslim Perceptions of Other Religions: A 
Historical Survey, ed. Jacques Waardenburg (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 52. 
51 Bukhārī, al-Riqāq, 98. 
52 Qur’an 5:3 
53 al-Shahrastānī, Kitāb nihāyat al-aqdām, 503. 
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Thus, rather than arguing for Ibn ‘Arabi’s “orthodoxy,” this study argues for Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
intellectual participation in a juridical field of discourse that served as a formative hub 
around which more abstract discourses issued.  
Although Ibn ‘Arabi consistently enunciates Islamic absolutist frameworks, the 
Western discourse that I analyze in this study variously denies or disregards them. As a 
result, a universalist ideal is historically instantiated, thus creating a type of biographical 
image. Such anachronistic instantiation is what Wendy Brown has called a “buried order of 
politics”—i.e., a mode of “identity production and identity management in the context of 
orders of […] marginalization in which the production, the management, and the context 
themselves are disavowed.”54 In other words—and this is the larger point—constructions of 
Ibn ‘Arabi’s discursive image as a universalist who accepted all religions as 
contemporaneously valid are discursively hegemonic and ideological in that they furtively 
impose a religious ideal beyond the purview of its original intellectual context.55  
As the second half of this study brings to light, a critical corollary to this 
anachronistic portrayal is that such discursive practice is inevitably traceable to historically 
situated, Eurocentric categories of religious authenticity made through a dichotomy between 
autonomous and heteronomous subjectivity. Here, “authentic” religiosity is associated with 
an autonomous “intellect” (in both Neoplatonic and Kantian forms), while religion that is 
heteronomously derived is thus inauthentic and irrational. In such discourse, late eighteenth 
                                                
54 Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), 14. 
55 As Hugh Nicholson notes, the attempt to regulate identity in this way is hegemonic in that it attempts to 
extend the influence of an idea of religion “beyond the circle of those whose basic outlook it expresses.” Hugh 
Nicholson, Comparative Theology and the Problem of Religious Rivalry (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 5.  
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and nineteenth century Indo- and Greco-European ethnoracial superiority is posited against a 
Semitic Other—i.e., both Jewish and, increasingly, Muslim.  
As such, this study argues that Western assertions seeking to unite Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
thought with religious pluralism and universalism discursively echo modern European 
ideological and hegemonic attempts to defang Semitic difference. In such discourse, Ibn 
‘Arabi’s medieval recourse to revealed heteronomy is tolerated as long as he is 
anachronistically understood to “transcend” religious form and thus pluralistically 
acknowledge the contradictory truth claims and practices of other traditions by situating them 
as secondary and accidental. This particularly modern mode of religious universalism claims 
to pluralistically accept “the essential core” of every religion, but at the cost of religious and 
socio-historical difference. As Brown notes, such a mode of European universalism 
dissociates autonomous rationality from notions of heteronomous belief and practice where 
such external modalities are deemed “contextual rather than constitutive.”56  
Although absolutist notions of religious supersessionism and socio-political authority 
are relegated as accidental to Ibn ‘Arabi’s contemporary Western discursive image, the 
Andalusian Sufi’s own self-image was one clearly forged within the medieval crucible of 
religious rivalry and exclusivism. Thus following Nicholson’s recent disavowal of “a 
nonrelational and nonpolitical core of religious experience,”57 I argue that the wider religio-
political absolutism of Ibn ‘Arabi’s intellectual milieu cannot be dissociated from his own 
metaphysical anthropology, cosmology, and cosmography. Ibn ‘Arabi’s monistic discourse 
                                                
56 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 152 (emphasis mine). 
57 Nicholson, Comparative Theology, 11 (emphasis mine). As Nicholson further states: “The modern 
theological project of freeing religious conviction from the manifestations of social antagonism can be 
understood, in fact, as simply a ramification of the larger cultural processes of neutralization and 
depoliticization […], i.e., “the displacement of religion as the controlling domain of culture” (ibid., 50). 
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purposefully blurs the dialectical boundaries between the human and the divine, thus marking 
attempts to decisively distinguish between his religious, mystical, and socio-political nodes 
as reflective of Western religious ideals and sensibilities—and their ideological strategies of 
persuasion—rather than the original ideas of Ibn ‘Arabi himself.  
While the need for religious tolerance in global modernity is a truism, the use of 
universalism to sanction Eurocentric categories of religious authenticity has been so 
normalized within modern European history it is often overlooked. As Elizabeth Castelli 
warns, “the double-edged character of the ‘universal’ […] needs to remain both fully in view 
and under continued interrogation.”58 Like “religion” and “mysticism,” those in positions of 
discursive power define the “universal” to fit their own ideological ideals of “truth,” while 
those who hold to alternative viewpoints are adjudicated enemies of such ideals and thus 
made intolerable.59 As detailed in the latter part of this study, when Western ideals of what 
counts as religious authenticity are uncritically dissociated from their sociohistorical contexts 
and universalized, they side-slip into hegemonic models of cultural and religious reform. 
Indeed, such a paradigm of universalization, as Brown notes, was evinced in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth century European process of Jewish emancipation where  
[t]he anomalous status of Jews in Europe during the medieval and early modern periods—
“in” but not “of” various European nations—had to be resolved. And to that end, Jews had to 
be brought within the ambit and orbit of the state, a process that involved incorporation into 
a nation increasingly defined through abstract, universal citizenship.60 
 
                                                
58 Elizabeth A. Castelli, “Theologizing Human Rights: Christian Activism and the Limits of Religious 
Freedom,” in Nongovernmental Politics, ed. Michel Feher, Gaelle Krikorian, and Yates McKee (New York: 
Zone Books, 2007), 685. 
59 As Wendy Brown notes: “When a tolerant civilization meets its limits, it says not that it is encountering 
political or cultural difference but that it is encountering the limits of civilization itself. At that point, the 
tolerant civilization is justified not only in refusing to extend tolerance to its Other but in treating it as hostile 
[…].” Brown, Regulating Aversion, 203. 
60 Ibid., 53 (emphasis mine). 
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Thus to enter into the privilege of such universal citizenship, Jews had to dissociate from the 
Jewish nation and its attendant laws and practices. In other words, “Jews had to be made to 
fit,” and as Brown trenchantly notes, “for that they needed to be transformed, cleaned up, and 
normalized, even as they were still marked as Jews.”61 
Chapter Outline 
This study proceeds in two overlapping parts. The first analyzes contemporary 
Western imaginal formations of Ibn ‘Arabi by comparing his original textual discourse with 
regnant claims made by his universalist interpreters, while the second part traces the 
discursive rules that inform such claims to broader genealogies of Western knowledge 
regimes and their attendant practices of subject formation.  
The tension that undergirds this study is set by chapter 1 and is framed by two 
seemingly opposite discursive examples: (i) Ibn ‘Arabi’s (in)famous letter to the Seljuk 
Sultan of Anatolia calling on him to impose the rigor of Islamic law upon Christians in his 
realm, and (ii) Ibn ‘Arabi’s celebrated verses from the Tarjumān al-ashwāq that claim to 
follow “the religion of love.” As such, this chapter seeks to show that although Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
metaphysics is usually noted for its expansive monistic theology of love, it is also based upon 
an overarching mode of Islamic supersessionism and its attendant doctrine of abrogation 
(naskh).  
While scholars have argued that Ibn ‘Arabi’s continual discursive recourse to Islamic 
law is merely a political expedient, chapter 1 historicizes Ibn ‘Arabi’s work within his larger 
discursive milieu of the Islamic Middle Period and the intellectual predominance of sharia 
consciousness. Through close readings of Ibn ‘Arabi’s texts in comparison with 
                                                
61 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 53. 
 19 
contemporary universalist readings, this chapter argues that the outward importance of the 
sharia, and its attendant absolutism, cannot be separated from the rest of Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
“mysticism.” Although chapter 1 definitively disproves Perennialist assertions that Ibn 
‘Arabi did not believe that Judaism and Christianity were abrogated by Islam, it adds nuance 
to this issue by showing that through obedience to the Qur’anic command of 9:29 and the 
payment of the poll-tax (jizya) the People of the Book retain a mode of inferior validity as 
metaphysically subsumed within the broader cosmography of Ibn ‘Arabi’s conception of 
Islam and the absolute cosmological authority of the Prophet Muhammad. Rather than a 
statement of religious universalism, Ibn ‘Arabi’s “religion of love” thus emerges first and 
foremost as a “religion” based upon the metaphysical triumph of the Muhammadan saint and 
his comprehensive theophanic totality. 
Chapter 2 throws into relief the rules of formation that have sustained Schuonian 
Perennialism as a dominant discursive regime in the Western construction of Ibn ‘Arabi and 
Sufism. Divided roughly in two parts, the first historicizes Schuonian Perennialism and 
establishes its prominence within the contemporary Western interpretation of Ibn ‘Arabi. 
Through a comparison with the religious discourse of Friedrich Schleiermacher, Schuonian 
Perennialism is thus situated within a modern “experiential-expressivist” model of religious 
universalism notable for its essentializing recourse to a transcendent religious a priori and 
self-conscious “Copernican” turn away from premodern models of religious exclusivism.  
The second part of chapter 2 resumes close readings of Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse on the 
People of the Book in comparison with the assertions made by his foremost Schuonian 
commentators. Building upon the more generalized Middle Period intellectual historicization 
offered in chapter 1, this chapter historicizes Ibn ‘Arabi’s positions on the People of the Book 
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from within the local context of his Andalusian home of Seville and his intellectual 
engagement with the Andalusian polemicist and Ẓāhirī scholar Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064). The 
remainder of this chapter thus explores traditional polemical debates regarding the “validity” 
of pre-Qur’anic scripture and Ibn ‘Arabi’s subsequent position on the corruption (taḥrīf) of 
previous revelation. Here, I show that Ibn ‘Arabi holds that the scriptures of the People of the 
Book are textually corrupted and not simply wrongly interpreted as the Schuonian 
Perennialists claim. This chapter concludes by returning to the issue of the “validity” of the 
People of the Book brought up in chapter 1, and shows that Ibn ‘Arabi concedes to the 
possibility of their redemptive felicity (saʿāda) through obedience to the Qur’anic command. 
Such discourse thus directly challenges the Perennialist notion that for Ibn ‘Arabi religious 
achievement is attained through a gnostic response to a “valid” set of revealed symbols that 
ultimately transcends heteronomous frameworks of external authority.  
Chapter 3 begins the second part of this study with a sustained analysis of Schuon’s 
Perennialist discourse and his portrayal of Ibn ‘Arabi and Sufism. Through a detailed 
comparison of Schuon’s discursive practices to that of nineteenth century Aryanist discourse, 
this chapter argues that although Schuon’s discourse claims to recognize the universal 
validity of all religions beyond the limits of exoteric exclusivity, it consistently presents as 
self-evident the metaphysical superiority of a so-called Aryan spiritual typology over that of 
the Semitic. Here, Ibn ‘Arabi’s own exclusive association with Islam and the Prophet 
Muhammad is rejected by Schuon as a heteronomous, and therefore less authentic, mode of 
spirituality in contrast to the more “essential” and autonomous religious truth of “pure 
metaphysics.” As such, Schuon de-Semitizes and further Aryanizes Ibn ‘Arabi in order to 
legitimize his own Aryan ideal of universal “authentic” religion, i.e., the religio perennis.  
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Chapter 4 concludes the second part of this study with a broader genealogical analysis 
of the Western discursive construction of rational Islamic mysticism, or what I call 
“reasonable Sufism,” that has been present since its initial European “discovery.” Here, I 
heuristically employ Kant’s own “Copernican” mode of religious subjectivity—i.e., the 
“universal true religious faith”62—as representative of what David Pacini has called the 
“modern religion of conscience” that marks religious subjectivity as self-legislative rather 
than dependent upon a divine ontological order.63 I thus argue that “Sufis,” and increasingly 
the contemporary image of Ibn ‘Arabi, serve in the discourse of reasonable Sufism as part of 
the fulfillment of a Kantian teleology of universal religion and its metaphysics of autonomy. 
In such discourse, an autonomously rational Sufism—specifically notable for its proximity to 
Greco-Christian humanism—serves as the reflected image of a Western imaginary of 
universal reason as juxtaposed to an irrationally heteronomous and Semitic Islam(ism). This 
chapter thus brings to light how the discourse of reasonable Sufism has been increasingly 
mobilized, especially post-9/11, as a model of reform that seeks to efface a heteronomous 
and irrational Muslim Other through a universalization of sameness. 
In an integrative conclusion to this study, I link the discursive formations fleshed out 
in chapters 3 and 4 to a deeper genealogy of Western universalism. In contradistinction to Ibn 
‘Arabi’s heteronomous absolutism explored in the first part of this study, I track how Kantian 
and Schuonian universalist discourses functionally converge in their insistence on the 
“transcendent” primacy of individual autonomy in opposition to a “slavish” Semitic Other. 
                                                
62 Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing  Company, 2009), 154. 
63 David S Pacini, Through Narcissus’ Glass Darkly: The Modern Religion of Conscience (New York: 
Fodrdham University Press, 2008), 6-7. 
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While both Kantian and Schuonian universalist cosmologies reflect a similar “Copernican” 
turn to the subject, they also reflect the imperial subjectivity of the Copernican age itself and 
its attendant ideological conceit of a universal perspective that claims to transcend its own 
ethnocentric situatedness. I thus argue that it is precisely the discursive practices that form 
this Eurohegemonic tradition of universalism—and its attendant religious, racial, and 
civilizational superiority—through which the ideal of autonomous religious subjectivity has 
been normalized within the universalist discourses on Ibn ‘Arabi and Sufism analyzed here.  
I conclude by suggesting that the overlapping discursive formations of Kantian and 
Schuonian universalism conceal absolutist modalities of supersessionism that are ironically 
similar to those openly posited by Ibn ‘Arabi. The exclusivism inherent within such discourse 
not only calls into question the Western ideal of “transcendent” universalism and the 
accompanying programs of liberal reform it authorizes, but also throws into relief the 
historically constituted and situated nature of religious discourse itself. 
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PART ONE 
IMAGINAL FORMATIONS   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
IN THE TRIUMPHANT LIGHT OF THE SUN:  
THE PEOPLE OF THE BOOK AND IBN ‘ARABI ’S DISCOURSE OF QUALIFIED SUBJUGATION  
 
 
Polite civilization, and the moral order it entrenches, can easily become lived as a 
self-sufficient framework within which to find the standards of our social, moral and 
political life; the only transcendent references admitted being those which underpin 
the order and do not justify infringing it.1 
 
In a famous letter written in the year 1212 to the Seljuk Sultan of Anatolia, ʿIzz al-
Dīn Kaykāʾus I (r. 1211-20), Ibn ‘Arabi advised the newly enthroned king not to allow the 
Christians under his protection more socio-religious freedom than legally mandated by 
Islamic law (sharīʿa) for the “protected people” (ahl al-dhimma).2  At the start of the letter, 
the Andalusian Sufi urges the king to “take care lest some day I find you among the most 
debased of Muslim leaders—those whose actions ‘led them astray in the life of this world 
while they considered what they were doing to be good’ [Qur’an 18:104].”3 Ibn ‘Arabi 
sternly rebukes Kaykāʾus for persisting in violating divine prohibitions (ḥudūd) and further 
warns him not to mistake God’s “respite” (imhāl) for his “inattention” (ihmāl), for at his 
                                                
1 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 238-39. 
2 See Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya, vol. 8 (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 2004), 296-97 (Fut. IV, 547-
48). As Claude Addas notes, Ibn ‘Arabi was most likely introduced to Kaykāʾus by his friend Majd al-Dīn Isḥāq 
b. Yūsuf al-Rūmī, who was the father of Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī perhaps as early as 1205 when Kaykāʾus’s father, 
Kaykhusraw (r. 1192-1196 and 1205-1211) was king. Regardless, Ibn ‘Arabi seems to have developed a 
friendship with Kaykāʾus and served as an advisor in some capacity. See Claude Addas, Quest for the Red 
Sulphur: The Life of Ibn ʻArabī  (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1993), 225-34. 
3 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 8, 296 (Fut. IV, 547). 
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death regret will be of no avail.4 Ibn ‘Arabi then turns to the abject state of the Sultan’s 
kingdom:  
The calamity that Islam and Muslims are undergoing in your realm—and few address it—is 
the raising of Church bells, the display of disbelief (kufr), the proclamation of associationism 
(shirk), and the elimination of the stipulations (al-shurūṭ) that were imposed by the Prince of 
Believers, ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (may God be pleased with him), upon the protected people 
(ahl al-dhimma).5   
 
Not only does the Andalusian Sufi refer to Christians here as guilty of disbelief, or infidelity, 
(kufr) and associationism (shirk), he details a long litany of discriminating provisions that the 
Sultan should enforce.6 Commonly referred to as “the Pact of ‘Umar” (shurūṭ ʿUmar), this 
legendary accord traditionally ascribed to the Umayyad caliph ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (r. 
717-20)—and not to ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb as Ibn ‘Arabi does in the above passage—
stipulates that in exchange for protection and partial socio-religious freedom, the ahl al-
                                                
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 The text continues: “From among them are: the prohibition of establishing in the city or the surrounding area a 
church, convent, cell, or hermitage for monks; that they not rebuild that which has fallen into disrepair of those 
remaining; that they not prohibit their churches from sheltering Muslims for (up to) three nights while feeding 
them; that they not harbor spies; that they not secretly conspire against the Muslims; that they do not teach their 
children the Qur’an; that they do not manifest their associationism (shirk), that they do not prohibit their 
relatives from embracing Islam if they desire it; that they show reverence towards Muslims and give them their 
seats if they [Muslims] desire to sit; they do not try to imitate Muslims in anything from clothing, cap, turban, 
shoes, and parting of the hair; they should not be named by the names of Muslims or their sobriquets; that they 
do not ride on saddle nor gird a sword or take up any kind of arms; that they do not engrave their signets with 
Arabic; that they do not sell wine; that they do not cut their forelocks; that they must keep their manner of 
dressing the same wherever they are; that they must fasten sashes around their waists; that they must not display 
a cross or anything from their books on the path Muslims; that they do not put their dead near the vicinity of the 
Muslims; that they only strike bells lightly; that they not raise their voices by reciting in their churches near the 
presence of Muslims; that they do not go out in processions; that they should not raise their voices and display 
fires [in procession] with their dead; and that they should not buy slaves that have been apportioned for 
Muslims. If any thing from among what has been thus stipulated is violated, then there is no protection for them 
and it is permitted for the Muslims to deal with them as people of rebellion and sedition.” Ibn ʿArabī, al-
Futūḥāt, vol. 8, 296-97 (Fut. IV, 547-48). For a similar version (expressed in the voice of the Christians) see 
Jacob Rader Marcus, The Jew in the Medieval World: A Source Book, 315-1791, rev ed. (1938; Cincinnati: 
Hebrew Union College Press, 1999), 14-16. 
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dhimma submit to an extensive list of restrictions designed to show their subordinate status 
within Muslim society.7  
While this passage has not gone altogether unnoticed by scholars who study Ibn 
‘Arabi, it is most often explained away by the insistence that such religiously exclusive 
statements are somehow separate from “authentic” mysticism. A typical example can be 
found in the introduction to R. W. J. Austin’s now classic translation of the Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam 
(The Bezels of Wisdom), where he notes that Ibn ‘Arabi’s reply to Kaykāʾus “is very 
reveling of the nonmystical side of his character, since he advised Kay Kaus to impose on 
them the full rigor of Islamic Law […].”8 Even William Chittick, who is one of the foremost 
Western experts on Ibn ‘Arabi and noted for “boldly reclaim[ing] him for Islam,”9 downplays 
the significance of such comments (although he does not acknowledge them directly) as 
juridico-religious lip service given to the powers that be in order to avoid the detection of his 
“real” metaphysical positions.10 Chittick states: 
                                                
7 As Milka Levy-Rubin notes, “Although it has been claimed (without due evidence) that some of these 
prohibitions may have been ascribed to ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAziz anachronistically, it seems quite unmistakable 
that the regulations of the ghiyār [distinguishing marks] were a product of his policy and ideology.” Milka 
Levy-Rubin, “Shurūṭ ʿUmar: From Early Harbingers to Systematic Enforcement,” in Beyond Religious 
Borders: Interaction and Intellectual Exchange in the Medieval Islamic World, ed. David M. Freidenreich and 
Miriam Goldstein (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 33. Moreover, Levy-Rubin argues 
that by the second half of the ninth century these restrictions had become the norm rather than the exception in 
the treatment of the dhimmīs (ibid., 32). See also Milka Levy-Rubin, Non-Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire: 
From Surrender to Coexistence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 88-98.  
8 R. W. J. Austin, introduction to The Bezels of Wisdom, by Ibn al-‘Arabi, trans. R. W. J. Austin (Mahwah: 
Paulist Press, 1980), 10 (emphasis mine). 
9 Alexander D. Knysh, Ibn ʿArabi in the Later Islamic Tradition: The Making of a Polemical Image in Medieval 
Islam (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 20. 
10 Such an approach is often found among Orientalists and Muslim modernists who suspect Ibn ‘Arabi of bad 
faith. For example, Affifi decidedly called Ibn ‘Arabi’s use of “Islamic dogma” and “orthodox garb” a “sham.” 
See A. E. Affifi, The Mystical Philosophy of Muḥyid Dīn-ibnul ʿArabī (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1939), xi, 151. Following Affifi’s lead, Landau notes: “Conscious of the dangers threatening an 
unorthodox thinker setting his views against those of the theologians representing authority, Ibn ‘Arabi 
deliberately complicated his style. He would try to make an outrageously heterodox piece of argumentation look 
irreproachable by expressing it in the language or imagery of orthodoxy.” Rom Landau, The Philosophy of Ibn 
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One would expect to find among the Sufis a clear exposition of the universality of revealed 
truth without reservations expressed by most other Muslims. But the Sufis had to take into 
account the beliefs of their contemporaries. Even Ibn al-‘Arabī, who was not afraid to attack 
the limitations of the juridical and theological mentalities, often defends a literal reading of 
the Koranic criticisms of the People of the Book, without suggesting that by “Christians” or 
“Jews” the Koran means anyone other than the contemporary practitioners of those 
religions.11 
 
Thus according to Chittick, Ibn ‘Arabi’s criticism of the People of the Book is simply 
formal and employed in order to appease the ulama: what qualms the Qur’an might have had 
against the People of the Book should be understood as part of a particular socio-historical 
context, and therefore Ibn ‘Arabi did not view such criticism as doctrinally related or relevant 
in other times and places.12 Moreover, Chittick claims that Ibn ‘Arabi rejects the classical 
Islamic juridical position of abrogation (naskh), which asserts that Islam superseded all 
previous revelation. Instead, Ibn ‘Arabi, according to Chittick, recognizes the simultaneous 
and contemporaneous validity of all revealed religions.13 
If the ideas regarding Christians enunciated in the missive to Kaykāʾus were an 
anomaly in Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse, it would perhaps be easier to dismiss them; yet in this 
chapter, I posit that a careful reading of his writings reveals that even though Ibn ‘Arabi’s so-
called monism is submersed within a theology of interminable love and mercy, it is 
                                                                                                                                                  
‘Arabi (London, 1959), 24. Similarly, Fazlur Rahman has noted that the Sufi “lack of integration, indeed 
positive dislocation, between the Inner and the Outer leads to the suspicion that their insistence on the Sharīʿah 
is formal and even hypocritical. This dislocative attitude […] found its authoritative formulation in Ibn al-
ʿArabī and his followers.” Fazlur Rahman, introduction to Intikhāb-i Maktūbāt-i Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī, by 
Ahmad Sirhindī (Karachi: Iqbal Akadami, 1968), 51.  
11 William C. Chittick, Imaginal Worlds: Ibn al-ʿArabi and the Problem of Religious Diversity (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1994), 125 (emphasis mine). 
12 Yet, Chittick has been taken to task for not even mentioning the Andalusian Sufi’s letter to the Seljuk Sultan 
in his study on Ibn ‘Arabi and religious diversity, Imaginal Worlds, quoted above. According to Carl-A. Keller, 
such an omission makes his “otherwise very penetrating observations […] rather one-sided.” Carl-A. Keller, 
“Perceptions of Other Religions in Sufism,” in Muslim Perceptions of Other Religions: A Historical Survey, ed. 
Jacques Waardenburg (New York : Oxford University Press, 1999), 189. 
13 Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 125. 
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nevertheless built upon foundations strongly grounded within a medieval Islamic discursive 
tradition of abrogation and supersessionism that colors the entire edifice of his metaphysical 
cosmography. Moreover, Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse does not depict such supersessionism as 
incommensurable with his theology of love; on the contrary, it provides its necessary 
foundation. 
Rather than simply an extra-mystical component of his thought, I argue that Ibn 
‘Arabi’s supersessionism and its attendant doctrine of abrogation should be understood as 
components within Ibn ‘Arabi’s larger metaphysical anthropology and cosmology of the 
Prophet Muhammad as the personification of the “logoic”14 Muhammadan Reality (ḥaqīqa 
muḥammadiyya) and Ibn ‘Arabi’s assumed role as its saintly vicegerent. As such, Ibn 
‘Arabi’s above assertion that Kaykāʾus follow the restrictions of the “the Pact of ‘Umar” is 
perfectly consistent with what I refer to below as his doctrine of “qualified subjugation” 
regarding Jews and Christians and their subordinate status within his metaphysical 
cosmography of Islam. While recent “revisionist” attempts have been concerned to bring out 
what Alexander Knysh calls “the more conventional aspect of his legacy,”15 they have 
neglected to flesh out the contours of such integrated and coherent supersessionism within 
Ibn ‘Arabi’s metaphysics.16  
                                                
14 I use the neologism “logoic” as an adjective of the Greek term Logos. Precedence for its academic use can be 
found in the works of the phenomenologist Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, who uses the term extensively. E.g., A. 
T. Tymieniecka, Logos and Life: Impetus and Equipoise in the Life-Strategies of Reason (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
2000). 
15 Alexander Knysh calls these recent attempts “revisionist” in their attempt to revise “the stereotyped view that 
portrays him as a thoroughgoing esotericist who was completely oblivious to the external aspects of Islamic 
religion.” Knysh specifically mentions James Morris, Michel Chodkiewicz, and William Chittick in this 
context. See Knysh, Ibn ʿArabi, 10, 20-21, 281 n31.  
16 While these treatments do acknowledge such “supersessionism” in various ways, they inevitably dismiss it as 
inconsequential to Ibn ‘Arabi’s overall religious universalism and deny his doctrine of abrogation. Yet, Michel 
Chodkiewicz is a notable exception in that he does acknowledge the metaphysical significance of such 
supersessionist discourse in Ibn ‘Arabi’s work. Chodkiewicz’s Seal of the Saints frames Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
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Approaching Ibn ‘Arabi’s Absolutism: Revisiting the Idea of “Proper” Mysticism  
Besides the varying degrees of disavowal by Western scholars that authoritarian and 
exclusionary positions actually exist in Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse in any meaningful way, his 
correspondence with the Anatolian Sultan has also engendered strong condemnation, albeit 
more rarely in contemporary Western contexts. For example, the Spanish Roman Catholic 
Priest and scholar of Sufism Miguel Asín Palacios (d. 1944) referred to the letter to Kaykāʾus 
as exuding “political hatred for the Christians.”17 Commenting more recently on the same 
issue, Carl-A. Keller asserts: “It is the tragedy of [Ibn ‘Arabi’s] faithfulness toward Islam that 
he was unable to work out different practical consequences of his spiritual insight.”18 
Similarly, Giuseppe Scattolin observes that it is precisely such types of stipulations as that of 
“the Pact of ‘Umar,” which enforce the sharia over non-Muslims, that are fundamental to 
Islamist discourse today. As such, Scattolin calls Ibn ‘Arabi’s Sufism “a type of ‘simplified 
and reductive’ mysticism, based as it is on a ‘simplified and reductive’ vision of other 
religions […].”19  
                                                                                                                                                  
supersessionism within the concept of “verus propheta” as “the long pilgrimage of the Muḥammadan Light 
through the aeons […].” Here, Chodkiewicz contextualizes the teleological process of the Muhammadan 
Reality (ḥaqīqa muḥammadiyya) as a formative doctrine for Ibn ‘Arabi’s thought. As Chodkiewicz notes, 
according to this doctrine “the successive prophetic messages, as multiple manifestations of the one Truth, are 
so many stages leading up to him who will bring the ‘full sum of the Words’ (jawāmiʿ al-kalim), simultaneously 
perfecting and abrogating the previous Laws.” Although Chodkiewicz importantly notes Ibn ‘Arabi’s doctrine 
regarding the People of the Book in passing (what I call “qualified subjugation”), he does not flesh out the 
details that I am concerned with in this chapter. See Michel Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints: Prophethood and 
Sainthood in the Doctrine of Ibn ʿArabī, trans. Liadain Sherrard (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1993), 
64-65, 79.  
17 Asín Palacios quoted in Addas, Quest for the Red Sulphur, 234. See Miguel Asín Palacios, El Islam 
cristianizado: estudio del “sufismo” a través de las obras de Abenarabi de Murcia (Madrid: Editorial Plutarco, 
1931), 94. 
18 Keller, “Perceptions of Other Religions,” 189 (emphasis mine). 
19 Giuseppe Scattolin, “Sufism and Law in Islam: A Text of Ibn ‘Arabi (560/1165-638/1240) on ‘Protected 
People’ (Ahl al-Dhimma),” Islamochristiana 24 (1998), 47, 51. 
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Although coming from the opposite side of the spectrum from those who offer 
apologies for Ibn ‘Arabi, such readings at bottom carry similar presuppositions of what a 
“true” mystic should be, i.e., a universalist who celebrates the religious differences of the 
Other. Indeed, Sufi texts that engender authoritarian and exclusionary attitudes to the 
religious Other can be difficult for Western audiences (scholarly included) to accept, 
especially when such discourse comes from so-called “mystics” who are looked upon as 
enlightened representatives of the Islamic tradition—and even more so in terms of Ibn ‘Arabi 
who has been called “one of the greatest of all mystics.”20 Not only does such discourse call 
into question commonly accepted portrayals of individual Sufis, but it also challenges 
positions that seek to interpret Sufism, and mysticism more broadly, as “good” religion—i.e., 
private, psychological, experiential, non-coercive, non-political, non-institutional, universal, 
etc.21 Yet, such presuppositions have much more to do with the conceptual categories of 
religion produced within the socio-historical matrix of Western Christianity, the European 
Enlightenment, and post-Enlightenment thought than they do with “universal” categories of 
truth or the views and practice of premodern mystics themselves.22  
Indeed, as Sherman Jackson notes, the “romantic” idea that what many today in the 
West identify as “extreme” or “substantively repugnant” religious views held by Muslims as 
                                                
20 Martin Lings, “Preface to the 1978 Edition,” in The Tarjumán al-Ashwáq: A Collection of Mystical Odes, by 
Muḥuiʾddīn Ibn Al-ʿArabī, trans. and ed. Reynold A. Nicholson (1911; reprint, London: Royal Asiatic Society, 
1978), xiii (emphasis mine). Lings goes on to note that Ibn ‘Arabi’s thought is “basically identical with the Sufi 
perspective in general […]” (ibid). 
21 For an excellent discussion of the Western conception of “good” religion see Robert A. Orsi, Between Heaven 
and Earth: The Religious Worlds People Make and the Scholars who Study Them (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), 177-204. 
22 This idea has perhaps now become a truism in religious studies and has been stated in various ways by many 
scholars over the past several decades. See for example, Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and 
Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Jantzen, 
Power, Gender, and Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Richard King, 
Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and ‘The Mystic East’ (London: Routledge, 2002).  
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“the exclusive preserve of modern ‘fundamentalist’ interlopers who are insufficiently trained 
in or committed to the classical tradition cannot sustain scrutiny.”23 Yet, it is important to 
recall that the so-called Islamic classical tradition is not alone in such a “problematic” history 
of religious views or practice. The early and medieval Christian tradition has many examples 
of mystics who believed and acted in ways that are considered morally problematic today. 
For example, Augustine (d. 430) believed that wars waged against heretics were charitable 
acts, and Bernard of Clairvaux (d. 1153) and Catherine of Siena (d. 1380) strongly supported 
the Crusades. Bernard himself is often considered to be the first inquisitor, and Teresa of 
Ávila (d. 1582) was an advocate of the Inquisition.24  
Indeed, one of the most forceful insights in the postmodern study of religion is simply 
that “politics as a category of human endeavor independent of religion is a distinctly modern 
concept.”25 As Carl Ernst notes: 
Those who consider mysticism a private affair and who view Sufism primarily through poetry 
or theoretical treatises may feel that military and economic activities do not fit the picture of 
inner mystical experience. From this point of view, any accommodation with political power 
constitutes a fall from purity. It is difficult, however, to reconcile such a purely otherworldly 
perspective with either the history or the teachings of Sufism. […] The prescriptive ethics that 
are bound up in Sufi rhetoric cannot be put into effect by isolated hermits. Sufis are 
constantly reminded of this by the model of the Prophet Muhammad, who plays for them the 
role of social and political leader as well as mystical exemplar.26 
 
                                                
23 Sherman A. Jackson, “Islam(s) East and West: Pluralism between No-Frills and Designer Fundamentalism,” 
in September 11 in History: A Watershed Moment?, ed. Mary L. Dudziak (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2003), 123 (emphasis mine). 
24 Richard H. Jones, Mysticism and Morality: A New Look at Old Questions (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004), 
282, 358. 
25 William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 61. As Cavanaugh notes, this insight was systematically discussed for 
the first time in the 1962 publication of Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s groundbreaking work, The Meaning and End 
of Religion. Ibid. 
26 Carl W. Ernst, The Shambhala Guide to Sufism (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1997), 211 (emphasis 
mine). 
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Thus, while the presence of communal supremacism in Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse counters 
commonplace Western readings of Ibn ‘Arabi as a model for ecumenical dialogue,27 it does 
not appear to controvert the discursive location of Ibn ‘Arabi’s lifeworld. As Margaret 
Malamud notes: 
the [Sufi] model of dominance and submission that structured relations between masters and 
disciples replicated the way in which power was constructed and dispersed in medieval 
Islamic societies: namely, through multiple dyadic and hierarchical relationships of authority 
and dependence that were continuously dissolved and reformed. This pervasive pattern was 
operative in the spiritual, the political, and the familial realms.28 
 
Malamud thus asserts that medieval Sufi discourse and practice affirmed and consecrated 
“hierarchy and inequality in the mundane world by connecting them to the divine will and 
order.”29 Yet as Ovamir Anjum has recently argued, such hierarchical models found in 
Sufism played a critical role in medieval Muslim societies as  
a means of social cohesion and organization. In a social arena in which political (discursive 
or coercive) means of ordering and distribution were lacking, society came to rely on 
authoritarian relationships grounded in esoteric doctrines to discipline and control the desires 
of its subjects.30 
 
Indeed, as the seminal historian of Islam Marshall Hodgson theorizes, Ibn ‘Arabi’s own 
conception of spiritual hierarchy and the idea of a cosmic axial saint (quṭb) filled the political 
gap left by the disintegration of caliphal power beginning in the tenth century: “There might 
no longer be a caliph with power in the ordinary political sense. But there remained a true 
                                                
27 E.g., Dom Sylvester Houédard, “Ibn ʿArabi’s Contribution to the Wider Ecumenism,” in Muhyiddin Ibn 
‘Arabi: A Commemorative Volume, ed. Stephen Hirtenstein and Michael Tiernan, (Shaftesbury: Element Books, 
1993), 291-306. See also chapter 2, pp. 94n13 and 119n107 for more recent works that read Ibn ‘Arabi in this 
light. 
28 Margaret Malamud, “Gender and Spiritual Self-Fashioning: The Master-Disciple Relationship in Classical 
Sufism,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 64, no. 1 (1996): 102. 
29 Ibid., 90. 
30 Ovamir Anjum, “Mystical authority and governmentality in medieval Islam,” in Sufism and Society: 
Arrangements of the Mystical in the Muslim World, 1200–1800, ed. John Curry and Erik Ohlander (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 86. 
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spiritual caliph, the immediate representative of God, who bore a far more basic sway than 
any outward caliph.”31 It was thus the authority of such an “invisible caliph” that, according 
to Hodgson, provided the “personal and social and imaginative complex [that] became the 
starting point for the creative works in philosophy and literature that Sufism inspired and 
carried with it throughout Islamdom.”32 Moreover, Hodgson importantly observes that the 
intellectual traditions of the Middle Periods “were relatively interdependent.”33 As such, the 
lines between intellectual traditions such as theology (kalām), jurisprudence (fiqh), 
philosophy (falsafa), literature (adab), and mysticism (taṣawwuf) blurred.34 Hodgson also 
importantly points out that the controlling concept that enabled such a diverse intellectual 
mix to coalesce together was the concept of divine law, i.e., sharia. Indeed, such “Sharî‘ah-
mindedness” was so central for Hodgson’s understanding of the flowering of Islamicate 
civilization at the end of the eleventh century that he referred to it as “Shar‘î supremacy.”35  
It is precisely from within this intellectual predominance of sharia consciousness that 
Ibn ‘Arabi’s thought emerges—where not only the lines between the various sciences 
disappeared, but where all such sciences were embedded within a juridical consciousness that 
understood history from within an absolutist metanarrative of revelatory events—what 
                                                
31 Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, vol. 2 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 228. As Chodkiewicz notes, Ibn ‘Arabi was not the first to think 
up the idea of a quṭb and his attendant spiritual hierarchy, but he was the first to organize such ideas within a 
coherent doctrine of sainthood (walāya). See Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints, 91-92. 
32 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol. 2, 228-29. 
33 Ibid., 153. Hodgson’s Middle Period division follows: the Earlier Middle Period 950-1250 / Later Middle 
Period 1250-1500 CE. Interestingly, Ibn ‘Arabi lived almost halfway in-between. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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Hodgson refers to as a “kerygmatic” mode of piety.36 Thus, within such a kerygmatic 
historical view 
[t]he status of the other prophets could not be denied. But in practice, pious Muslims could 
not acknowledge that the traditions derived from the moments of revelation granted to those 
other prophets had more than a limited legal validity as compared with the tradition arising 
from the revelation to Muḥammad. The others were all quite hopelessly corrupted. […] The 
messengership of former prophets was but a pale corollary of Muḥammad’s […].37 
 
Yet, for Hodgson such a “kerygmatic orientation in which the historical development of the 
Islamic Ummah played a major role” distinguished itself from what he refers to as “a more 
individualistic piety” that “became frankly mystical […].”38 Hodgson continues to note that 
such mysticism  
was inspired, above all, by subjective inward awarenesses emerging as the selfhood matured, 
and the historical, the political role of the Muslim Ummah came to play a minimal role in it. 
This less historically-oriented Muslim movement was called Ṣûfism.39 
 
Indeed, according to Hodgson, it was Abū-Ḥamid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) who assigned 
to Sufis “a function in validating a kerygmatic, historical vision	  as well as a more properly 
inward mystical role.”40 As will be discusses below, Ghazali served as a precursor for Ibn 
‘Arabi’s cosmography in important ways. Yet, Hodgson held Ibn ‘Arabi’s hermeneutical 
approach to be distinctly non-kerygmatic, i.e., geared towards “the mystical relationship of 
the soul to the divine, and particularly with the relationships implied in the term ‘love’” 
without undue concern for an absolutist Islamic teleological history.41 Yet, as I will show 
                                                
36 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol. 1, 363. 
37 Ibid., 365-66. 
38 Ibid., 393 (emphasis mine).  
39 Ibid. (underline mine). 
40 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol.  2, 185 (emphasis mine).  
41 Ibid., 242-43. 
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below, such a kerygmatic perspective, as well as Hodgson’s idea of “mysticism,” is fully 
present within Ibn ‘Arabi’s metaphysical cosmology and cosmography.  
Even though it is true that Ibn ‘Arabi emphatically asserts that his apocalyptic 
predictions must always be understood in inner, experiential terms, he never denies their 
external implications—rather, quite the opposite.42 Thus, while Hodgson’s insight regarding 
the Sufi validation of “kerygmatic historical vision” is critically important in terms of 
situating Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse, his reluctance to locate Ibn ‘Arabi’s “mysticism” within 
such kerygmatic terms echoes the common Western conceptions of Hodgson’s day that 
privileged “high” mysticism as “more properly inward”—i.e., transcendently dissociated 
from the metanarratives of power found within institutionalized religion. 
Omid Safi has recently challenged such constructions of Sufism and the Western 
tradition of scholarship that has consistently privileged Protestant categories of the “quest for 
a personal experience of God” over larger social, political, and institutional frameworks of 
power in medieval Persian Sufism.43 Here, Sufis 
were intimately involved in the task of using their sanctity to rearrange, improve, challenge, 
and remain responsible for the affairs of the visible universe. Their social interactions far 
from nullify their credentials as “mystics” but in fact reinforce their status as holders of both 
wilāya (power and authority) and walāya (intimacy with God).44 	  
                                                
42 Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints, 121-22. See also Gerald T. Elmore, Islamic Sainthood in the Fullness of 
Time: Ibn al-ʿArabī’s Book of the Fabulous Gryphon (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 5-6, 11. 
43 Omid Safi, The Politics of Knowledge in Premodern Islam: Negotiating Ideology and Religious Inquiry 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 127. See also Omid Safi, “Bargaining with Baraka: 
Persian Sufism, ‘Mysticism,’ and Pre-modern Politics,” The Muslim World 90 (2000): 259-288. 
44 Safi, The Politics of Knowledge, 128. 
 36 
As Safi thus importantly notes, “if our understanding of mysticism is based on a private 
experience of the Divine held in isolation from a social life, then we are bound to 
misconstrue the social significance of premodern Muslim mystics.”45  
Thus, while Ibn ‘Arabi’s metaphysical orientation is certainly conspicuous for its 
insistence upon the inner (al-bāṭin) meanings of external or outward (al-ẓāhir) realities,46 Ibn 
‘Arabi also insists upon the supremacy of the outward over the inward. Thus, in a discussion 
on the spiritual station of “secret longing” (al-raghba al-sirrīya) in his magnum opus, al-
Futūḥāt al-makkiyya (The Meccan Openings), Ibn ‘Arabi states that “secret longing is 
connected to the Real (al-ḥaqq), and we mean by ‘the Real’ here what manifests for people 
in prescribed actions (al-aʿmāl al-mashrūʿa).”47 Here, Ibn ‘Arabi suggests that there is a 
particular manifestation of “the Real” (i.e., God as “Reality” or “Truth”) within people who 
follow the revealed law. Indeed, he goes on to relate that this process of manifestation 
happens because there is “divine knowledge (al-maʿārif al-ilāhiyya) that is contained within 
the prescribed rulings (al-aḥkām al-mashrūʿa), and it is not unveiled (lā takshifu) except 
through the implementation of the rulings themselves.”48 In other words, it is only by 
obeying the “prescribed rulings” of the sharia that people are able to attain to this particular 
“divine knowledge.” While such an assertion is in itself extremely significant, Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
further explanation is even more so. He continues:  
                                                
45 Ibid., xxxi. 
46 For example, in his early treatise ʿAnqāʾ mughrib, Ibn ‘Arabi states: “When I speak in this book, or in 
another, of an event in the external world, my intention is simply to establish it firmly in the hearing of the 
listener and then to set him face to face with that which corresponds to it within man…. Turn your eyes towards 
your inner kingdom” Ibn ‘Arabi quoted in Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints, 122. 
47 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 4, 184 (Fut. II, 533). 
48 Ibid. 
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This is so since the outwardly manifest (al-ẓāhir) is stronger than the inwardly hidden (al-
bāṭin) by virtue of its greater comprehensiveness; that is, the outwardly manifest relates to the 
station of both people and the Real, while the inwardly hidden only relates to the station of 
the Real, not people. At the same time, the Real is not hidden to itself—it is (fully) 
manifest.49 
 
In this passage, Ibn ‘Arabi completely inverts the stereotypical idea of “mysticism” 
itself. Instead of claiming that the esoteric is more important and spiritually significant than 
the exoteric, he claims the opposite. Here, the most heteronomous conception of piety, i.e., 
obedience to the exoteric law, is taken to be the most “spiritual” means to God as a door to 
hidden “divine knowledge” (al-maʿārif al-ilāhiyya). Yet, rather than a curious anomaly in 
Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse, such emphasis on the outward as spiritually more significant than the 
inward marks an extremely important element of his metaphysics that is not often fully 
appreciated. Moreover, this particular inversion paradoxically frames his ideas regarding 
divine love—what Hodgson above notes as being particularly “inward.”  
Thus, what is especially significant and nuanced in the passage above is Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
inclusion of human beings as an explanation of why the “outwardly manifest” (al-ẓāhir) is 
more comprehensive than the “inwardly hidden” (al-bāṭin). As we will see below, this idea 
relates to the reverence that Ibn ‘Arabi gives to the form of the human being as the perfect 
reflection of God. Indeed, such an idea evokes one of Ibn ‘Arabi’s favorite sacred traditions 
(ḥadīth qudsī), which he partially recounts in the Fuṣūṣ as “I was a hidden (lit. ‘unknown’ 
lam uʿraf) treasure, so I longed (lit. ‘loved’ aḥbabtu) to be known.”50 Ibn ‘Arabi thus states: 
“If it were not for this love, the world would not have manifested (ẓahara) in His essence.”51 
                                                
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, ed. Abul Ela Affifi (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1966), 203. Although this 
oft-quoted hadith is considered fabricated, Ibn ‘Arabi authenticates it by “unveiling” (kashf). See Ibn ʿArabī, al-
Futūḥāt, vol. 4, 33 (Fut. II, 399). 
51 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 203. 
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While the doctrinal import of this hadith is one of the most discussed aspects of Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
metaphysics, it is not commonly mentioned in discussions related to the concept of the 
sharia.52 Yet, Ibn ‘Arabi’s above passage on the “station of secret longing” and its attendant 
idea of the sharia as an “outwardly manifested” (ẓāhir) form of “divine knowledge” (al-
maʿārif al-ilāhiyya) takes on a particular significance if viewed from within the context of 
this hadith. Rather than a means of appeasing the ulama, Ibn ‘Arabi’s metaphysical 
conception of the sharia—which as we will see, includes a Hodgsonian notion of kerygmatic 
absolutism—emerges as inherently tied to his metaphysical anthropology and cosmology of 
love.   
While chapter 2 will be concerned, in part, to historicize and flesh out the details of 
Ibn ‘Arabi’s “polemical” approach to Judaism and Christianity from within his Andalusian 
context, in what follows I wish to situate Ibn ‘Arabi within his larger Ghazalian discursive 
milieu. Through close readings and comparative analyses of Ibn ‘Arabi’s original texts 
against the current background of universalist claims made by some of his most important 
Western commentators, this chapter brings into relief the discursive contours of Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
supersessionism. The distillation of such contours—which have been largely disregarded, 
dismissed, or disallowed in contemporary treatments—will set the stage for a revised 
understanding of Ibn ‘Arabi’s metaphysical cosmology and cosmography that will serve as a 
new discursive backdrop for the remainder of this study. By reconfiguring the background in 
this way, the historically situated presuppositions that have been normalized (and thus 
rendered invisible) around Ibn ‘Arabi’s Western image will be brought into sharper focus. 
                                                
52 E.g., Reza Shah-Kazemi recently referenced this hadith in an essay on interfaith dialogue. See Reza Shah-
Kazemi, “The Metaphysics of Interfaith Dialogue: Sufi Perspectives on the Universality of the Quranic 
Message,” in Paths to the Heart: Sufism and the Christian East, ed. James S. Cutsinger. (Bloomington: World 
Wisdom, 2002), 153-54. 
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Interpreting the Tarjumān: Ibn ‘Arabi’s “Religion” and its Muhammadan Triumph  
A substantial part of Ibn ‘Arabi’s Western aura of “enlightened” universalism has 
much to do with the first European publication of his Tarjumān al-ashwāq (The Interpreter of 
Desires), a collection of “mystical odes” translated into English by the British Orientalist 
Reynold Nicholson (d. 1945) and published in 1911. It was here that Ibn ‘Arabi’s most 
“celebrated verses” first took on a literary life of their own as a manifesto for the universality 
of religious truth within every religion: 
My heart has become capable of every form: it is a  
pasture for gazelles and a convent for Christian monks, 
And a temple for idols and the pilgrim’s Kaʿba and the  
 Tables of the Tora and the book of the Koran.  
I follow the religion of Love: whatever way Love’s  
camels take, that is my religion and my faith.53  
 
As Annemarie Schimmel notes, the above lines are quoted by “everyone who tries to 
underline the ‘mystical ideal of tolerance’ and indifference to exterior forms and rituals 
[…].”54  Indeed, Nicholson himself showcases these very same verses on the first page of his 
1911 publication, stating: “They express the Ṣúfí doctrine that all ways lead to the One 
God”55 and that for Ibn ‘Arabi “no form of positive religion contains more than a portion of 
the truth.”56 Regarding the same verses in his 1914 work The Mystics of Islam, Nicholson 
states, “Love is the essence of all creeds: the true mystic welcomes it whatever guise it may 
assume.”57 Yet, Schimmel disputes such a reading, and instead of “tolerance” finds “a 
                                                
53 Muḥuiʾddīn Ibn Al-ʿArabī, The Tarjumán al-Ashwáq: A Collection of Mystical Odes, trans. and ed. Reynold 
A. Nicholson (1911; reprint, London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1978), 67 
54 Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1975), 271. 
55 Nicholson, “Preface to the 1911 Edition,” in The Tarjumán al-Ashwáq, vii. 
56 Ibid., vii (emphasis mine). 
57 Reynold A. Nicholson, The Mystics of Islam (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2002), 75 (emphasis mine). 
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statement about the author’s own lofty spiritual rank […]. It is highest self-praise, 
acknowledgement of an illumination that is far beyond the ‘illumination of the names,’ but 
not tolerance preached to the rank and file.”58 Elsewhere, Schimmel notes that not only are 
these verses not a call for tolerance, but they are “a glowing tribute to Islam.”59  
Yet, Michael Sells forcefully opposes Schimmel’s reading of these verses, noting that 
in an Islamic historical context “tolerance” is really a socio-political term and as such is 
defined and demarcated by the sharia.60 As a mystic concerned with “the inner 
transformation of the individual's heart,” Ibn ‘Arabi, according to Sells, was not interested in 
socio-political change.61 Moreover, such mystical transformation would make the rather 
“weak” virtue of tolerance irrelevant anyway since “we tolerate those whom we refuse to 
understand.” Rather than a call for toleration, Sells asserts that the Tarjumān verses are “a 
call for universality,” i.e., “for the complete embracement of all forms of belief and 
manifestation.”62 
 Sells also contests Schimmel’s claim that in these verses Ibn ‘Arabi asserts a mode of 
Islamic triumphalism.  Here, Sells refers to Ibn ‘Arabi’s own commentary of these verses 
(translated by Nicholson in the same volume), and notes that he mistranslated the term 
“Muhammadians” for “Moslems.” The Muhammadian, or in what follows “Muhammadan,” 
is a type of saint that specifically inherits from the logoic reality of Muhammad, the ḥaqīqa 
                                                
58 Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 272. 
59 Annemarie Schimmel, As Through a Veil: Mystical Poetry in Islam (New York : Columbia University Press, 
1982), 39. 
60 Michael A. Sells, “Ibn ʿArabī's Garden among the Flames: A Reevaluation,” History of Religions 23, no. 4 
(1984): 311-12n37. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. (emphasis mine).  
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muḥammadiyya.63 Such a saint is understood by Sells as only peripherally connected to the 
formal religion of Islam since “the term does not refer to Muslims but rather to those who 
have achieved the station of no station and who refuse to bind themselves to any one 
prophetic wisdom.”64 Sells concludes: 
The verses are a tribute to the religion of the Muhammadian, the religion of the heart that is 
receptive of every form. Schimmel, who relies on Nicholson in her interpretation, has 
mistakenly identified the “religion” referred to in the verses with Islam when, in fact, as is 
made clear throughout Ibn ʿArabī’s writings, very few Muslims are Muhammadians.65 
 
Thus according to Sells, Muhammadan saints do not identify with Islam as a 
“religion,” since their religion is “of the heart,” and as quoted above they “refuse to bind 
themselves to any one prophetic wisdom” and thus embrace “all forms of belief.” The 
argument that Sells makes here draws on his exposition in the same article of Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
discourse on “belief” (iʿtiqād) as expressed in the Fuṣūṣ. Here, Ibn ‘Arabi states: “Whoever 
binds Him [in a belief] denies Him in any belief other than that in which he has bound Him. 
[…] But whoever liberates Him from binding, denies Him not at all.”66 Thus, Sells’s above 
contention that the Tarjumān verses are “a call for universality” rests upon the notion that 
Muhammadan saints “refuse to bind themselves to any one prophetic wisdom” because they 
refuse to “believe” in a particular revealed religion; i.e., their “religion of the heart” 
transcends the formal limits of any particular revelation and thus embraces “all forms of 
belief.” As typical in this mode of universalist interpretation, Sells subtly equates “belief” 
                                                
63 Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints, 72. 
64 Sells, “Ibn ʿArabī's Garden,” 311n37 (emphasis mine). 
65 Ibid., 312 (311n37 continued). 
66 Ibn ‘Arabi (Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 121) quoted in Sells, “Ibn ʿArabī's Garden,” 299.  
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(iʿtiqād) with revealed religion. Yet, these two concepts are not analogous in Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
thought. 
Here it will be helpful to pause and further discuss Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse on belief or 
what he refers to with various terms to mean “the God created in the beliefs” (al-ḥaqq al-
makhlūq fī al-iʿtiqādāt) or “the divinity of beliefs (al-ilāh fī al-iʿtiqādāt).67 As one of Ibn 
‘Arabi’s “doctrines” most commonly associated with religious pluralism and universalism, 
throughout the history of Western scholarship on Ibn ‘Arabi there has been a tendency to 
anachronistically read “the divinity of beliefs” as a doctrine on the “divinity of religions.”68 
Its original meaning is most succinctly explained by Ibn ‘Arabi himself in the Futūḥāt: “The 
one who reflects (al-nāẓir) on God creates in himself, through his reflection, what he believes 
(yaʿtaqiduhu). For he has only worshiped a god he created by his reflection; he said to it 
‘Be!,’ so it was.”69 Yet, this projected “creation” of the believer, although limited and 
incomplete, is not altogether unreal, for it is through the believer’s particular conception of 
God that God discloses Himself—what Ibn ‘Arabi calls “divine theophany in the form of 
beliefs” (al-tajallī al-ilāhiyya fī ṣurat al-iʿtiqādāt).70  
Ibn ‘Arabi’s deployment of “belief” (iʿtiqād)—as derived from the root ʿ-q-d 
denoting a “knot”—is used in such discourse to describe how rational convictions, as mental 
                                                
67 See Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 178, 113; and also: al-ilāh al-muʿtaqad (ibid., 225). 
68 This reading appears to have begun with implications made by Affifi, and more specifically suggested by 
Corbin as the “God created in the faiths” (al-ḥaqq al-makhlūq fī al-iʿtiqādāt) and in Izutsu as an outright 
substitution of “belief(s)” (iʿtiqād/ iʿtiqādāt) for “religion(s).” See Affifi, The Mystical Philosophy, 151; Henry 
Corbin, Alone with the Alone: Creative Imagination in the Sūfism of Ibn ʿArabī, trans. Ralph Manheim 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) [first published 1958], 124, 195-200, 268, 269; and Toshihiko 
Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), 129, 254. 
69 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 7, 162-63. (Fut. IV, 143). 
70 Ibid., vol. 3, 361 (Fut. II, 311). 
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“knots,” construct a “believer’s” experience or perception of God.71 Although Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
discourse on belief is commonly taken as a pluralist discourse on “religion,” he importantly 
does not include other religious communities in his expositions of this idea. In fact, this 
discourse points to an exclusory foundation.  
As mentioned above, Ibn ‘Arabi refers to the “the divinity of beliefs” as the “divine 
theophany in the form of beliefs.” This phenomena is repeatedly described by Ibn ‘Arabi in 
partial narrations of what he refers to as the “hadith of theophany” (ḥadīth al-tajallī), where 
on the Day of Resurrection God manifests Himself to those who worshiped Him in various 
forms in which He is either recognized or denied, thus evincing the notion that God is only 
acknowledged in the particular forms of belief that people hold of Him and denied in forms 
outside of their belief. A critical aspect of this hadith that has not been discussed in the 
context of Ibn ‘Arabi, however, is that it begins by recapitulating Qur’an 9:30 and thus 
narrates that both “the Jews” and “the Christians” are summoned before God and asked what 
it was that they had worshiped, in which they respond “ʿUzair” and “the Messiah” 
respectively, both groups claiming each as the “son of God.” In the hadith, God then calls 
them liars, and they are thrown into the Fire of Hell. Indeed, it is only those who “worshiped 
God, the righteous and the wicked” who remain to witness the various theophanies of God, 
accepting and denying them.72   
After a detailed discussion on divine theophany (al-tajallī al-ilāhiyya) in the Futūḥāt, 
Ibn ‘Arabi quotes the above “hadith of theophany” in its entirety without any comment or 
                                                
71 While Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse on belief retains its theological underpinnings of the term iʿtiqād in relation to 
its derivation of aqīda (meaning tenet or article of belief), it is strongly tied to its philosophical usage of 
“convictions rationally acquired” as used in Kitāb al-Amānāt wa’l-iʿtiqādāt of the Jewish theologian Saʿadyā 
Gaon (d. 942). See L. Gardet, “Iʿtiḳād,” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 4 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1997), 279. 
72 Muslim, al-Īmān, 352. 
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qualification regarding its reference to Qur’an 9:30 and its subsequent consignment of the 
People of the Book to Hell.73 Even though “the Jews” and “the Christians” are presumably a 
synecdoche in this hadith for those particular people of the People of the Book who 
worshiped false gods, Ibn ‘Arabi’s tacit acceptance of its polemic evinces how his discourse 
is circumscribed within the theological boundaries of its foundational tradition. Moreover, as 
I will discuss below, it is in allusion to this very Qur’anic polemic that Ibn ‘Arabi chastises 
the Jews and the Christians in the Futūḥāt. It is the presence of such criticism of the People 
of the Book in Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse that makes the attribution of religious pluralism to his 
thought more problematic than is commonly acknowledged. 
Rather than mentioning other religious communities, when Ibn ‘Arabi invokes the 
discourse on belief he repeatedly mentions scholastic theological positions, like those of the 
Ashʿarīs and Muʿtazilīs, as competing rational discourses that limit a limitless God.74 To take 
only one example, in the Futūḥāt Ibn ‘Arabi invokes the “hadith of theophany” mentioned 
above and states: 
Every faction (ṭāʾifa) has believed something concerning God. If He manifests (tajallā) 
Himself to them differently, they reject Him. But when he has transmuted (taḥawwala) 
Himself in the distinguishing characteristic that this faction has ascribed to God in 
themselves, then they recognize Him. For example, when He manifests to the Ashʿarī in the 
form of belief (ṣūrat iʿtiqād) of a rival whose conviction about God is different than his and 
                                                
73 See Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 5, 52-53 (Fut. III, 44-45). 
74 When mentioned in Ibn ‘Arabi’s discussions on belief, the Ashʿarīs and Muʿtazilīs are symbolic of two 
opposing positions regarding the nature of God: “similarity,” or anthropomorphism, (tashbīh) and 
“incomparability,” or transcendence, (tanzīh) respectively. While each group tends to emphasize one of these 
positions regarding God’s nature over the other, Ibn ‘Arabi insists that both aspects are true. E.g., see Ibn al-
ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 123; al-Futūḥāt, vol. 3, 135, 371 (Fut. II, 116, 319); ibid., vol. 6, 103 (Fut. III, 384). 
Compared to the lengthy literature perpetuating the universalist appropriation of Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse on 
belief, this point has not been given its due. For a non-universalist treatment of this topic as intra-religious 
critique see Alexander Knysh, “‘Orthodoxy’ and ‘Heresy’ in Medieval Islam: An Essay in Reassessment,” The 
Muslim World 83, no. 1 (1993): 58-59; and Ian Almond, Sufism and Deconstruction: A Comparative Study of 
Derrida and Ibn ʻArabi (London: Routledge, 2004), 15-20. 
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likewise He manifests to the Ashʿarī’s rival in the form of belief of the Ashʿarī, then each one 
of the two factions will reject Him. And it is thus with all factions.75 
 
Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse on belief thus appears to be an intra-religious critique on speculative 
theology (kalām) and the metaphysical hazards of rational conceptions of the divine more 
broadly. The basis of this idea, like much of Ibn ‘Arabi’s thought, seems to have been 
prefigured by Ghazali, who referred to untying “the knot of beliefs” (ʿuqdat al-iʿtiqādāt) as a 
means to attaining experiential knowledge (maʿrifa) of the outward tenets of faith.76 
Yet, as mentioned above, Ibn ‘Arabi does positively acknowledge “beliefs” as 
constructive since within his monistic economy, such conceptions are partial reflections of 
divine reality. Thus in the Fuṣūṣ, Ibn ‘Arabi famously states that “there are only beliefs and 
all are correct (muṣīb),” and similarly, if a person truly “understood al-Junayd when he said 
‘the color of water is the color of its vessel,’ then he would grant every believer their belief 
and perceive God in every form and every belief.”77 From just these examples it becomes 
apparent how easily such statements can be read within the context of religious pluralism. To 
categorize Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse in universalist terms, however, assumes that he defines 
“religion” in the same way that it has come to be construed in the modern West, i.e., as “a set 
of beliefs to be confessed.”78 Yet, Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse does not present “religion” (dīn) as 
a set of beliefs; rather, he defines dīn more in alignment with premodern conceptions of 
                                                
75 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 1, 321 (Fut. I, 266).  
76 Ghazālī additionally notes that only through assiduous religious observance and remembrance of God (dhikr) 
is such “untying” accomplished. Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, Fayṣal al-tafriqa bayna al-islām wa al-zandaqa 
(Beirut: Dar al-Fikr al-Lubnani, 1993), 79-80. 
77 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 114, 226. 
78 Cavanaugh, The Myth, 73. 
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religion as “obedience” (inqiyād).79 Thus, at the start of the chapter on the prophet Jacob in 
the Fuṣūṣ, Ibn ‘Arabi states: 
Religion (al-dīn) is equivalent to your obedience (inqiyādika), and that which is from God, 
Most High, is the revealed law (al-sharʿ) to which you are obedient. So religion is obedience 
(al-inqiyād), and the Law (al-nāmūs) is the revealed way (al-sharʿ)80 that God, Most High, 
has prescribed (sharʿa).81 
 
While the definition of dīn as obedience follows a normative Ashʿarī position,82 Ibn 
‘Arabi’s interpretation of the ontological nature of obedience is decidedly less so. Here, Ibn 
‘Arabi categorically states that “The divine command (al-amr) demands obedience.”83 This is 
a comprehensive statement that summarizes the divine-human relationship. Because Ibn 
‘Arabi assumes that the command of God is absolute, regardless of whether the human being 
obeys or transgresses the command, both responses are submission to God—which according 
to Ibn ‘Arabi is analogous to “obedience”84—either in what pleases or displeases God as 
necessarily determined by His “rulings” (al-aḥkām) in the sharia.85 On the outward (ẓāhir) 
level, if a person “submits” to God in what is not pleasing, then God either responds by 
pardoning or sanctioning them. Thus, in all cases, God “obeys” the actions of the person by 
rewarding, pardoning, or punishing.86 From a deeper level—i.e., the “secret” (sirr) or “inner” 
                                                
79 Such a definition parallels the original Latin term religio and its notion of being bound (from religare) to God 
in terms of obligation or duty. See Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1991), 20, 102, 204n5. 
80 This translation of sharʿ is not without precedent in the Fuṣūṣ, as in the chapter of Moses where Ibn ‘Arabi 
specifically glosses shirʿa as “way” (ṭarīqa). See Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 201.  
81 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 94 
82 See Louis Gardet, “Dīn,” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), 294. 
83 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 95. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid., 96. 
86 Ibid. 
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(bāṭin) perspective—Ibn ‘Arabi states that it is the essences (dhawāt) of human beings that 
determine whether they obey or transgress, not God.87 From this theodicean viewpoint, God 
is entirely passive. In his typical discursive style, Ibn ‘Arabi takes this path to its “logical” 
monistic conclusion and “the secret that is even beyond this”: since contingent beings are 
non-existent in the first place, “there is no existence except the existence of the Real […].”88 
In other words, it is only God who obeys/transgresses and rewards/pardons/punishes. 
The important point in all of this is that, for Ibn ‘Arabi, the lynchpin that keeps all of 
these shifting relationships in play within the context of earthly existence is the sharia where 
the nexus of divine rulings (al-aḥkām) are located for each prophetic dispensation. As Ibn 
‘Arabi specifically states here: “The servant institutes religion, while the Real puts into place 
the rulings (al-aḥkām).”89 As such, the idea of religion in Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse has very 
little to do with “belief” and much more to do with law. Indeed, this explains why Ibn ‘Arabi 
prefers to refer to religion in the plural as “laws” (sharāʾiʿ), as opposed to “religions” 
(adyān), since it is the actual set of rulings that change with each prophetic dispensation that 
serves as the criteria from which “obedience” can be assessed within any given community.90 
As we will see below, because Ibn ‘Arabi views the dispensation of Muhammad as a 
“universal messengership” (ʿumūm risāla), he views its attendant divine law as abrogative 
and thus controlling in a totalizing manner. 
                                                
87 Here “essence” (dhāt) is analogous to the “immutable essence” (ʿayn thābita) of each person, which 
according to Ibn ‘Arabi is in relationship with God as a distinct intelligible entity or form (ṣūra) within God’s 
knowledge. Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 96. 
88 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 96. 
89 Ibid. 
90 In the Futūḥāt Ibn ‘Arabi only uses adyān to refer to religions in the plural in one passage; see p. 79 below. 
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Returning now to Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse on belief, in the Futūḥāt he notes that only a 
person with “perfect composition” (al-kāmal al-mizāj) encompasses all beliefs.91 As I will 
discuss in more detail momentarily, the idea of “perfection” (kāmal) here is tied to the 
Prophet Muhammad as the locus for all of the divine names. Yet importantly, in Sells’s 
above treatment he decenters the Prophet’s position as such a locus. He states: “Ibn ʿArabī 
deconstructs the entire Sufi hierarchy by speaking of a Muhammadian pole (a pole modeled 
on the Muhammadian rūḥ or spirit-logos), the pole of transformation, the station that is no 
station.”92 Yet, Ibn ‘Arabi’s idea of the Muhammadan pole, and its attendant “station of no 
station,” is far removed from a deconstruction of “the entire Sufi hierarchy.” Rather, it is the 
apex of all hierarchies of creation and thus the subsumption of all stations. This point is 
crucial in understanding Sells’s above slide from Ibn ‘Arabi’s embrace of all “beliefs” to an 
embrace of “religions” in the modern sense. Such an anachronistic drift not only connotes 
religions as sets of beliefs, but it also assumes a modern egalitarianism—i.e., all the religions 
are equally “deconstructed” and relativized within an underlying religious core beyond any 
particular form. Yet, this could not be farther from Ibn ‘Arabi’s totalizing conception of the 
“religions” and Muhammad’s place in relation to them. Not only does Ibn ‘Arabi hold that 
the cosmic modality of the Prophet subsumes all of the other prophets and their religious 
laws, but he is their original ontological source. In other words, all of the prophets are 
contained within Muhammad, who is their perfected sovereign and whose religious law they 
must follow. 
                                                
91 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 3, 256 (Fut. II, 219-20). 
92 Sells, “Ibn ʿArabī's Garden,” 304. 
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This idea is clearly presented in Ibn ‘Arabi’s commentary on his famous verses 
quoted above from the Tarjumān. After noting that “I follow the religion of Love” refers to 
the Qur’anic verse “Say: If you love God, follow me, then God will love you” (3:31)—a verse 
the classical exegetes variously understood as depicting an instance where Muhammad 
invited either a group of idolaters, Jews, or Christians to Islam93—Ibn ‘Arabi states that the 
verse “whatever way Love’s camels take, that is my religion and my faith” means (here 
translated by Nicholson): 
‘I accept willingly and gladly whatever burden He lays upon me. No religion is more sublime 
than a religion based on love and longing for Him whom I worship and in whom I have faith’. 
This is a peculiar prerogative of Moslems, for the station of perfect love is appropriated to 
Muḥammad beyond any other prophet, since God took him as His beloved.94 
 
The word Nicholson translates as “Moslems” is as Sells rightly notes the “Muhammadans” 
(al-muḥammadiyyīn). Yet, Nicholson does not translate the entire passage, as was his method 
for Ibn ‘Arabi’s commentary.95 Most critically, he leaves out the larger part of Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
description of Muhammad, which states: 
And this is a special prerogative for the Muhammadans—for indeed Muhammad, may God 
bless him and grant him peace, is alone from among all of the prophets in the station of 
perfect love. He is pure (ṣafī), delivered (najī), and a friend (khalīl), as well as all of the other 
meanings (maʿānī) of the stations of the prophets; yet, he is beyond all of them. Indeed, God 
took him as a darling (ḥabīb), that is, (both) lover (muḥibb) and beloved (maḥbūb), and the 
inheritor of His way.96 
                                                
93 ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad al-Wāhidī (d. 1075) states in his Asbāb al-nuzūl (Occasions of Revelation) that Ibn ʿAbbas 
reported that this verse was revealed when Muhammad witnessed some of the Quraysh worshiping idols in the 
Kaaba and called on them to follow him instead. al-Wāhidī also narrates another report from Ibn ʿAbbas that 
this verse was revealed to the Jews, while he finally states that ibn Isḥaq reported from a different source that it 
was addressed to the Christians.  See ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad al-Wāhidī, Asbāb al-nuzūl (Dammam: Dar al-Islah, 1992), 
103-4. As a “traditional” scholar with formidable training and transmission in hadith and tafsir, Ibn ‘Arabi was 
certainly aware of these traditions, and it’s clear he is making an allusion to them through his commentary on 
this verse via the previous two famous verses that reveal his “heart capable of every form” including the sites of 
worship for idolaters, Jews, and Christians. See Addas, Quest for the Red Sulphur, 97-98. 
94 Ibn ʿArabī, The Tarjumán al-Ashwáq, 69. 
95 Nicholson notes, “The English version of the commentary is usually very much abridged, but I have rendered 
the interesting and important passages nearly word for word.” The Tarjumán al-Ashwáq, 9. 
96 Ibn ʿArabī, Dhakhāʾir al-aʿlāq, ed. Muhammad al-Kurdi (Cairo, 1968), 50-51. 
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Besides the unsurprising connection between the Muhammadan saints and 
Muhammad, Ibn ‘Arabi notes here that Muhammad has achieved a unique perfection out of 
all the prophets in the station of love as one who is “pure (ṣafī), delivered (najī), and a friend 
(khalīl), as well as all of the other meanings of the stations of the prophets.” These three 
qualities directly relate to traditional attributes used in association with Adam, Moses, and 
Abraham respectively—what Ibn ‘Arabi refers to as “meanings” (maʿānī).97 As such, 
Muhammad is presented here as the embodiment of all of the prophetic meanings, or 
attributes, that were manifested in the prophets before him. Such a concept, moreover, is a 
seminal and recurring one in Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse. Thus early on in the Fuṣūṣ, Ibn ‘Arabi 
explains how the spiritual “reality” of Muhammad (i.e., the ḥaqīqa muḥammadiyya) serves as 
the source of knowledge for all the prophets and Muhammad’s abiding prophetic existence:  
Every single prophet from Adam to the Final Prophet takes only from the niche of the Seal of 
the Prophets (khātam al-nabiyyīn), even though his physical existence comes last—indeed, by 
his own reality he is (abidingly) existent—as his words relate: “I was a prophet when Adam 
was between water and clay.”98   
 
Indeed, each of the twenty seven chapters of the Fuṣūṣ is named according to a specific 
divine “wisdom” (ḥikma) that is related to a “word” (kalima) of God manifested by a 
particular prophet who therefore is understood to manifest an aspect of the Muhammadan 
Reality. As the “Seal of the Prophets” Muhammad is for Ibn ‘Arabi the fulfillment or locus 
of manifestation of all of the divine names, thereby forming the archetype of the “Perfect 
                                                
97 These are reported in a hadith in Tirmidhī, al-Manāqib, 1.  
98 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 63-64. For a discussion of the authenticity of this hadith and Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
usage of it see Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints, 60-61. 
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Human Being” (al-insān al-kāmil) whose physical manifestation is cosmographically 
situated as the spiritual “pole” or “axis” (quṭb) of the universe.99   
The cosmogonic role of the Muhammadan Reality as analogous to the Hellenic 
concept of the “Word” or Logos was systematically treated in a seminal 1939 study by A. E. 
Affifi, who called Ibn ‘Arabi’s metaphysics “the first Muslim Logos-doctrine.”100 While 
Affifi maintains that Ibn ‘Arabi’s logoic conception of the Muhammadan Reality as the 
generative and rational cosmic principle of the universe is distinguishable from the historical 
Prophet,101 such differentiations are not always so clear-cut within Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse 
itself.  
Indeed, in the Futūḥāt Ibn ‘Arabi interweaves the historical and logoic realities of 
Muhammad together within the logoic matrix of the Qur’an itself by enunciating three 
specific points: (i) the report of the Prophet’s wife ‘A’isha that Muhammad was “the 
character of the Qur’an” (kāna khulquhu al-qurʾān), (ii) the Qur’anic verses that call both the 
character of the Prophet and the Qur’an “tremendous” (ʿaẓīm),102 and (iii) the theological 
tenet that the Qur’an, as the speech of God (kalām allāh), is one of God’s attributes.103 Thus, 
elsewhere in the Futūḥāt Ibn ‘Arabi asserts that because Muhammad is the corporal location 
of Qur’anic manifestation, he is the enlightened embodiment of all scriptural knowledge: 
                                                
99 See Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints, 71, and Affifi, The Mystical Philosophy, 71-73. 
100 Affifi, The Mystical Philosophy, 86. For a contextualization of this doctrine in terms of Avicennan ontology 
and its conceptual evolution in Ibn ‘Arabi’s later school see G. A. Lipton, “The Equivalence” (Al-Taswiya) of 
Muhibb Allah Ilahabadi: Avicennan Neoplatonism and the School of Ibn ‘Arabi in South Asia (Saarbrücken: 
VDM Verlag, 2009), 36-48.  
101 Affifi, The Mystical Philosophy, 70, 72. 
102 I.e., Qur’an 68:4, 15:87. 
103 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 7, 68-69 (Fut. IV, 60-61). Qur’an 4:80. 
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The Qur’an unveils all of the sciences contained within the revealed books, while it (also) 
contains what is not in them. So he who was given the Qur’an has been given complete 
enlightenment (al-ḍiyāʾ al-kāmil) that includes every knowledge, as the Most High stated: 
“We have not neglected a thing in the Book.”104 And it is a Mighty Qur’an that “no falsehood 
approaches it from the fore or behind.”105 Hence by it, it is true that Muhammad, may God 
bless him and grant him peace, possesses “the comprehensive words” (jawāmiʿ al-kalim).106  
 
Since the Qur’an qua God’s uncreated speech is itself “comprehensive,” it contains 
all knowledge, including but not limited to that contained within all past revelations.107 
Moreover, since Muhammad was given the Qur’an, he too has such “comprehensive” 
knowledge and possesses the logoic “comprehensive words” (jawāmiʿ al-kalim), signifying 
the perfected knowledge of the Muhammadan Reality as the locus of the divine names.108 
Indeed, Ibn ‘Arabi further blurs the boundaries between the Qur’an as an attribute of God and 
the person of Muhammad by stating “Muhammad was an attribute of the Real (al-ḥaqq), 
most high, in his totality, ‘so whoever obeys the Messenger has obeyed God’ [Qur’an 
4:80].”109  
In Ibn ‘Arabi’s metaphysical anthropology and cosmology, it is precisely such 
indeterminacy between the divine and its logoic Muhammadan “reflection” that forms the 
fulcrum around which the idea of the Perfect Human Being pivots. In his recent work Sufi 
                                                
104 Qur’an 6:38. 
105 Qur’an 41:42. 
106 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 3, 126 (Fut. II, 107).  
107 Regarding the Ḥanbalī (and qualified Ashʿarī) conception of the Qur’an as equivalent to the attribute of 
God’s speech, see Nader El-Bizri, “God: Essence and Attributes,” in The Cambridge Companion to Classical 
Islamic Theology, ed. Tim Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 122-131. 
108 Classically understood in the sense of an extraordinary succinctness with the widest possible meaning, this 
phrase comes from the hadith narrated by Abu Huraira “I was sent with jawāmiʿ al-kalim” (Bukhārī, al-Taʿbīr, 
32; see also Bukhārī, al-Iʿtiṣām, 6). As James Morris notes, this hadith “is cited repeated by Ibn ‘Arabî to 
summarize the totality of spiritual knowledge or divine ‘forms of wisdom’ (hikam) making up the 
‘Muhammadan Reality’ […].” James W. Morris, “Ibn ‘Arabî’s Spiritual Ascension,” in The Meccan 
Revelations, vol. 1, ed. Michel Chodkiewicz (New York: Pir Press, 2002), 352n188. 
109 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 7, 69 (Fut. IV, 61). 
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Aesthetics, Cyrus Ali Zargar compellingly argues that Ibn ‘Arabi’s “religion of love” (dīn al-
ḥubb) has close parallels to the Persian “School of Passionate Love,” i.e., the madhhab-i 
ʿishq, which emphasized the contemplation of God through the “witnessing” (shuhūd) of the 
human form, i.e., shāhid bāzī.110 As Zargar notes, according to Ibn ‘Arabi “the greatest 
witnessing of existence is that which is most comprehensive.”111 Indeed, in his discussion on 
Adam in the Fuṣūṣ, Ibn ‘Arabi establishes that the human being is superior to all created 
things in comprehensiveness, and thus “serves as the supreme mirror in which God witnesses 
himself […].”112 As Ibn ‘Arabi notes in the Fuṣūṣ above, it is Muhammad who is the “Seal of 
the Prophets” and thus the perfect locus of the divine names and most complete reflection of 
God. In other words, he is the most comprehensive of all human beings.113  
Just as Ibn ‘Arabi acknowledges this position of comprehensiveness within 
Muhammad as the “Seal of the Prophets,” he famously situates himself as the “Seal of the 
Saints” (khātam al-awliyāʾ), i.e., the supreme “spiritual” manifestation of the Muhammadan 
                                                
110 Zargar notes that while Ibn ‘Arabi clearly categorized the female form as the most perfect locus of divine 
beauty, he did indeed approve of the famous practice of gazing on “beardless youths” or in Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
terminology “recent ones” (al-aḥdāth)—as “fresh from their lord”—for “the accomplished gnostic.” Thus, as 
Ibn ‘Arabi states: “In their companionship is a recollection of their newness by which one discerns his 
eternalness—may he be exalted.” Yet, Ibn ‘Arabi does note that in terms of “novice wayfarers [al-muridun] and 
Sufis [al-sufiyah], the companionship of recent ones is forbidden to them, because of the predominance of 
animal desire in them.” Cyrus Ali Zargar, Sufi Aesthetics: Beauty, Love, and the Human Form in the Writings of 
Ibn ‘Arabi and ‘Iraqi (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2011), 73-74. Although Claude Addas 
records Ibn ‘Arabi’s stern prohibition of the practice for “Sufis” (along with samāʿ), she interestingly notes 
elsewhere that Ibn ‘Arabi entrusted the advanced spiritual education of his own stepson and disciple, Ṣadr al-
Dīn Qūnāwī (d. 1274), to  Awḥad al-Dīn Kirmānī (d. 1238). Significantly, Ibn ‘Arabi was aware that Kirmānī 
was affiliated with the school of Aḥmad Ghazālī and the practice of both samāʿ and shāhid bāzī. As Addas 
notes, “doubtless, he, like Jāmī, considered that in the case of Awḥad al-Dīn it was a question of a genuine 
mode of spiritual realization.” Addas, Quest for the Red Sulphur, 163-64, 229. 
111 Zargar, Sufi Aesthetics, 71. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
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Reality qua the highest Muhammadan saint.114 Thus, directly after the passage quoted from 
the Fuṣūṣ above that identifies Muhammad as “the niche” from which all the prophets derive 
their knowledge, Ibn ‘Arabi states that the Seal of the Saints was likewise “a saint while 
Adam was between water and clay.”115 As such, Ibn ‘Arabi notes that the Seal of the Saints 
“takes from the Origin and is the witness (al-mushāhid) of all degrees (of reality).”116  
It is precisely from this sense of witnessing divine theophanies and thus “containing” 
the logoic meanings—i.e., the above mentioned “comprehensive words” (jawāmiʿ al-kalim) 
of Muhammad as a manifestation of “the speech of God” (kalām allāh)—that Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
Tarjumān verses above should be understood. When Ibn ‘Arabi claims that his heart is 
“capable of every form” (qābilan kull ṣūra) like “the Tables of the Tora and the book of the 
Koran,” he thus asserts that as the Seal of the Saints he is like Muhammad in his 
comprehensive capacity to witness all of the names, meanings, and forms that make up the 
“form” (ṣūra) of the divine itself.117  
                                                
114 See Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 64. See also Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints, 170, 128-146, passim. 
115 See Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 64. 
116 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 64. Ibn ‘Arabi is often criticized for ranking the perfected saint over that of 
the prophet. While this position is often explained away as simply Ibn ‘Arabi’s assertion that sainthood 
(walāya) as conceived of here is simply the hidden (and divine) attribute of outward prophethood (nubuwwa), 
and as such Muhammad is himself the “real” Seal of Sainthood. Yet, according to Ibn ‘Arabi, since he is the 
historical Seal of Sainthood, when Jesus descends he will be under the “authority” of Ibn ‘Arabi himself. See 
Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints, 125. 
117 The idea that the human being was created by God as the comprehensive configuration of the divine 
names—and thus reflective of God’s “form”—in order for God to witness Himself is the initial subject of Ibn 
‘Arabi’s first chapter of Adam in the Fuṣūṣ. See Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 48-50. As Zargar notes, 
according to Ibn ‘Arabi “the gnostic heart, on account of the superiority of human knowledge and the 
comprehensiveness of human existence, is transformed to reflect the divine self-disclosures in a manner more 
accurate than the cosmos.” Zargar, Sufi Aesthetics, 35. See also Zargar’s specific discussion of Adam in terms 
of Ibn ‘Arabi’s concept above in the Fuṣūṣ (ibid., 71-72, 183n50). 
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As such, Ibn ‘Arabi often refers to the hadith: “God created Adam in His form 
(ṣūratihi).”118 Indeed, after invoking this hadith in his treatise al-Tanazzulāt al-mawṣiliyya 
(Angelic Descents of Mosul), Ibn ‘Arabi enunciates strikingly similar verses to those of the 
Tarjumān above. Thus, in a chapter regarding the obligation of ritual purification for prayer, 
and the use of water for it, Ibn ‘Arabi states: 
God created (faṭara) my form (ṣūratī) upon his,  
so I am every form.  
God put in me his command until 
 I became what is in-between his origin and form. 
In my outward (ẓāhirī) there is distress and punishment 
 Yet, in my inward (bāṭinī) there is hidden mercy. 
I contain His Torah and His Gospels 
 His Qur’an and His Psalms.119 
 
As in the Tarjumān where Ibn ‘Arabi claims that his “heart has become capable of every 
form,” here too he is all forms. Yet in the Tanazzulāt verses, Ibn ‘Arabi makes a distinction 
between his outward (ẓāhir) and inward (bāṭin) states; externally he suffers, but internally he 
contains the wisdom of all of God’s revelations. Ibn ‘Arabi thus claims: “I am everything 
with Him!” 120 Indeed, he goes even further: “When I claim that I am a lord (rabb), God lets 
down (asdala) his veils (sutūrahu) over my face!”121 But then, he immediately adds:  
Yet, His law (sharʿuhu) comes and addresses my very essence (dhātī),  
Oh heedless one, you have been ignorant of His commands! 
God has made obligatory grace and punishment, 
 according to the outward actions of humanity.122  
 
                                                
118 E.g., Bukhārī, al-Istiʾdhān, 1. 
119 Ibn ʿArabī, Tanazzul al-amlāk min ʿālam al-arwāḥ ilā ʿālam al-aflāk (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1961), 
61. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. Here, Ibn ‘Arabi alludes to the idea of “infidelity” (kufr) in the positive sense of “covering,” although 
he does not specifically use the term kafara. See discussion of the “people of blame” (malāmiyya) and their 
“infidelity” on p. 63 below. 
122 Ibn ʿArabī, Tanazzul al-amlāk, 61. 
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It is this dialectical tension between ecstasy and sobriety, immanence and transcendence, that 
indelibly marks Ibn ‘Arabi’s thought. Yet, Ibn ‘Arabi is no Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj (d. 922), who 
ultimately was unable to reconcile between the theophanic self-identification of lordship and 
the outward sharia. As Ernst notes, “Hallajian infidelity” was marked by the insistence on the 
“full application of legal discrimination on the social level; anyone who follows the path 
taken by Hallaj must himself be prepared to accept the legal consequences.”123 Thus, Hallaj’s 
“self-blame and desire for martyrdom” was the result of an apparent incongruence between 
ultimate reality (ḥaqīqa) and the sharia.124 In the section of the Tanazzulāt above, however, 
Ibn ‘Arabi seeks to balance the “infidelity” of ḥaqīqa alongside of the law within a dyadic 
tension.125 Yet even more boldly, Ibn ‘Arabi claims that for attained mystics like himself, 
there is in reality no such tension; i.e., such theophanic self-witnessing is completely within 
the bounds of the law. He states:   
If someone like me says “I am a lord,” 
Oh my friend—is that a major sin (kabīra)? 
No, it is my right, for I and He are one! 
 I did not even commit a minor sin (ṣaghīra). 
How can I commit a minor or major sin, 
when I am holy (al-quds) and possessor of exaltation (al-ʿlā) and sovereignty (al-
sarīr)?126 
 
Indeed, in one of his two ascension narratives contained in the Futūḥāt, Ibn ‘Arabi 
offers an account of his attainment of the “Muhammadan Station” (muḥammadī al-maqām). 
After spiritually recapitulating Muhammad’s famous “nocturnal voyage” (isrāʾ) and 
                                                
123 Carl W. Ernst, Words of Ecstasy in Sufism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 71. 
124 Ibid. 
125 As Ibn ‘Arabi says in the Futūḥāt, “The essence of the sharia is the essence of ultimate reality (al-ḥaqīqa)” 
and “the sharia is itself ultimate reality.” Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 4, 219 (Fut. II, 563). 
126 Ibn ʿArabī, Tanazzul al-amlāk, 62. 
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heavenly ascension (miʿrāj) through the seven heavens, Ibn ‘Arabi arrives at “the Lote-Tree 
of the furthest boundary” (sidrat al-muntahā) (Qur’an 53:14), where the Qur’an claims that 
Muhammad himself attained to the presence of God. Here, Ibn ‘Arabi states that God “sent 
down” (anzala) upon him, in revelatory fashion, verse 3:84 of the Qur’an: 
Say: we have faith in God and what has been sent down upon us, and in what was sent down 
upon Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac and Jacob, and the tribes (of Israel), and in what was given to 
Moses, Jesus, and the prophets from their Lord; we do not distinguish between any of them, 
and to Him we surrender. 
 
Ibn ‘Arabi then immediately asserts: 
So in this verse, He gave me all of the verses and brought the affair home to me, and He 
made this verse the key to all knowledge for me. Thus, I knew that I am the totality of those 
(prophets) who were mentioned to me (majmūʿ man dhukira lī). By this, the good news came 
to me that I had attained to the Muhammadan Station (muḥammadī al-maqām) and was 
among the heirs of the comprehensiveness of Muhammad (jamʿīat muḥammad), may God 
bless him and grant him peace.127 
 
Thus, like his assertions in the Tarjumān and the Tanazzulat above, Ibn ‘Arabi here claims to 
have attained to the Muhammadan comprehensiveness and the subsumption of all of the 
previous prophets and the totality of their knowledge. 
Similarly, in the prologue to the Futūḥāt, Ibn ‘Arabi relates another visionary 
attainment of the “purest Muhammadan station” (al-maqām al-muḥammadī al-aṭhar),128 
where he states that at that time he was granted “the gifts of wisdom” (mawāhib al-ḥikam) 
and that which resembled “the comprehensive words” (jawāmiʿ al-kalim).129 But what is 
more, in this account Ibn ‘Arabi states that as the heir to this station: “the Real sent him to 
protect the sanctity of the divine law (al-sharīʿa).”130 Thus, in his assumed role of the Seal of 
                                                
127 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 6, 65 (Fut. III, 350). 
128 Ibid., vol. 1, 16 (Fut. I, 3). 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
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the Saints, Ibn ‘Arabi saw himself as heir not only to the perfection of the Muhammadan 
comprehensive wisdom, i.e., all of the prophetic words/meanings, but also as the protector of 
the law in its outward, communal, and supersessional sense. In other words, as the Seal of the 
Saints who had attained to the highest Muhammadan Station Ibn ‘Arabi saw himself as heir 
to the Muhammadan roles of both saint and prophet.131  
It is such a clear embrace of the Muhammadan role of “lawgiver,” in addition to 
saint, that Sells neglects to acknowledge above when he suggests that Ibn ‘Arabi’s verses in 
the Tarjumān are an illustration of the path of “the Muhammadan” as somehow dissociated 
from the juridico-religious and socio-communal aspect of Islam. It is true that in the Futūḥāt 
Ibn ‘Arabi mentions the ability of Muhammadan saint—who is “without qualification” (i.e., 
who has attained what Sells refers to as “the station of no station”)—to call to God through 
all of the prophetic “languages” in toto, as opposed to prophetic messengers (rusul) who are 
bound only to that with which they have been sent.132 Yet, such Muhammadan polyglotism is 
for Ibn ‘Arabi simply a reflection of Muhammad’s prophetic comprehensiveness and, as will 
be shown below, his “universal message” directed to all of humanity.133 It does not mean, 
however, that such Muhammadan saints are beyond all religions—and thus beyond religious 
law and its attendant absolutism—since Ibn ‘Arabi categorically states that they are bound to 
the prescriptions of the Muhammadan sharia. He thus adds: 
                                                
131 In the Fuṣūṣ, Ibn ‘Arabi states that sainthood (walāya) is the domain of “general prophethood” (nubuwwa 
ʿāmma), even though “law-giving prophethood” (nubūwat al-tashrīʿ) came to an end at the death of 
Muhammad. Yet, such “law-giving” continues through legal reasoning (al-ijtihād). According to Ibn ‘Arabi, 
this is the meaning of the hadith: “The ulama are the inheritors of the prophets” (e.g., Bukhārī, al-ʿIlm, 10). See 
Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 134-35.  
132 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 5, 192. (Fut. III, 167). 
133 I.e., as opposed to the previous prophets who were sent to specific communities in particular times (al-
azmān). See Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 1, 320 (Fut. I, 265). 
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The Muhammadan saint keeps to a specific revelation (waḥy khāṣṣ) only in the ruling of what 
is permissible and forbidden (al-ḥukm bi al-ḥalāl wa al-ḥurma). As for his summoning in 
terms of what there is silence about or what there has been nothing revealed in the revelation 
of Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him peace, admonishing him to leave it, then he 
does not leave it if it has been revealed to any of the prophets, upon them be peace.134 
 
In light of this passage directly prescribing the rulings of Muhammad’s sharia upon 
the Muhammadan saint, Sells’s above claim that the Tarjumān verses “are a tribute to the 
religion of the Muhammadian” as “a call for universality” (and thus somehow distinct from 
Islam as a formal “religion”) is strongly misleading. Thus, Sells notes at the end of his essay: 
I suggest that the theory of the heart that is receptive of every form may offer insight into a 
methodology of comparative study. Ibn ʿArabī’s discussion of the “gods of belief” is based 
on a logic which sees unity and difference not as mutually exclusive but as dialectically 
reinforcing. Such a dialectic may offer a richer mode of inquiry than the present argument 
about whether or not religions or mystical experiences are essentially the same or essentially 
different.135 
 
Here, Sells asserts that Ibn ‘Arabi’s theory of belief may be helpful for comparative study 
because it goes beyond normative conceptions of religious exclusivity. As I have argued 
above, Sells makes such an assertion based upon a conflation of Ibn ‘Arabi’s idea of the 
“gods of belief” and the secular-liberal notion of “religion” as a private set of beliefs. 
Importantly, such a (Protestant) conflation relegates any notion of revealed law, i.e., the 
sharia, as inconsequential to Ibn ‘Arabi’s so-called universalism. Yet, as I have shown 
above—and will demonstrate more forcefully below—Ibn ‘Arabi’s entire cosmology and 
cosmography are based upon the hierarchical superiority of Muhammad as both “spiritual” 
exemplar and “prophetic” lawgiver. Indeed, Ibn ‘Arabi succinctly articulates this idea in the 
same passage in the Fuṣūṣ cited above where he compares himself as the Seal of the Saints to 
Muhammad as the Seal of the Prophets. Here, Ibn ‘Arabi notes that his “inherited” perfection 
                                                
134 Ibid., vol. 5, 192-93 (Fut. III, 167). 
135 Sells, “Ibn ʿArabī's Garden,” 314 (emphasis mine). 
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of the Seal of the Saints as the “Saint-Heir” (al-walī al-wārith) is only one of the perfections 
of Muhammad, who is “Saint-Messenger-Prophet” (al-walī al-rasūl al-nabī).136 As 
exemplified in his own ecstatic utterance in the Tanazzulāt above, and his subsequent 
qualification, the outward importance of the law—and as we shall see its attendant 
absolutism—is for Ibn ‘Arabi an integral part of his hierarchical metaphysics and religious 
cosmography.   
If read in the context of his own commentary on the Tarjumān verses above, Ibn 
‘Arabi’s clear identification of the Muhammadan saint with the revealed law of Muhammad 
makes Schimmel’s reading of metaphysical and religious triumphalism appear much more 
compelling than Sells’s claims for universality. It is thus evident that the Muhammadan saint 
whose “heart is capable of every form” and whose religion is the “religion of love” is a saint 
who inherits the particular comprehensive perfection of the prophet Muhammad as God’s 
beloved. Rather than articulating prophetic equivalence or the universal transcendence of 
outward form, such perfection is a subsumption of all revealed knowledge and thus a forceful 
assertion of the spiritual sovereignty of Muhammad in both socio-historical and logoic terms. 
Yet, these insights can only be brought into stark relief against the background of Ibn 
‘Arabi’s specific discursive positions regarding the People of the Book. It is thus to such 
discourse that this chapter now must turn. 
Ibn ‘Arabi and the “Infidelity” of the People of the Book  
In a recent article entitled “Interreligious Dialogue: Ibn ‘Arabi and Meister Eckhart,” 
the distinguished Iranian scholar of Ibn ‘Arabi Ghasem Kakaie also invokes Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
“religion of love” and the Tarjumān verses as an example of Ibn ‘Arabi’s “tolerance” of 
                                                
136 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 64. 
 61 
different forms of worship.137 In a section itself entitled “Religious Tolerance,” Kakaie 
situates the basis of his argument within the medieval context of the Crusades and the call he 
believes that mystics like Ibn ‘Arabi answered to address the obvious need for healing 
between the faiths: “It was during the time of these Crusades that the greatest Christian and 
Muslim mystics appeared and set in motion dialogue between religions, calling for religion to 
return to its essence.”138 Kakaie goes on to state that since Ibn ‘Arabi seems to support a 
Muslim victory over Christian crusaders, “[w]e would therefore expect Ibn ‘Arabi to regard 
Christians as unbelievers since they were waging war against Allah, and as polytheists since 
they believed in the Trinity and revered the Cross.”139 Yet, Kakaie notes that this is 
“surprisingly” not the case, and quotes the following passage from the Futūḥāt: 
But it may be hoped that the people of the Trinity, because of the state of being odd, which is 
hidden in the Trinity, will be saved. For odd is among the attributions of the One. They are 
therefore monotheists through the tawhid of combination. And it is to be hoped that they will 
be covered by combined mercy... it is likely that the people of Trinity will be included among 
the monotheists because they hold to this oddness in God and not because they hold to the 
oneness of God. I found them in this way through intuition and I was not able to make a 
distinction between monotheists and the people of the Trinity.140 
 
This passage is significant for several reasons. First and foremost, it is the only 
example that Kakaie offers to support his claim that Ibn ‘Arabi did not regard the Christians 
as “unbelievers” and “polytheists” (or associationists), even though we have already 
encountered both terms used for Christians in Ibn ‘Arabi’s letter to Kaykāʾus above. It should 
be noted, moreover, that this particular passage from the Futūḥāt remains on a very abstract 
                                                
137 Ghasem Kakaie, “Interreligious Dialogue: Ibn ‘Arabi and Meister Eckhart,” Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn 
‘Arabi Society 45 (2009): 53, 57. 
138 Kakaie, “Interreligious Dialogue,” 49 (emphasis mine). 
139 Ibid. 49-50. 
140 Ibid., 50. 
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level, and Ibn ‘Arabi never mentions “Christians” by name here, but refers only to the 
“People of the Trinity” (ahl al-tathlīth) in a discussion where he also mentions the “People of 
Oneness” (ahl tawhīd) and the dualists (al-thanawīyya).  
In the text that precedes the passage above, Ibn ‘Arabi states that the people of 
oneness are those who inhabit paradise since they have the attribute of oneness, and the 
dualists inhabit hell since they do not have such an attribute and are thus “the people of 
associationism” (ahl shirk). The People of the Trinity, according to Ibn ‘Arabi, are located 
between the former and the latter. Thus, when Ibn ‘Arabi states “it may be hoped” that the 
People of the Trinity will be “saved,” he uses the verbal noun al-takhalluṣ denoting 
purification; the verb itself (takhallaṣa) meaning to have been freed “from a thing,” such as 
“a gazelle, or a bird, from a snare” or “like spun thread when it has been entangled.”141 Thus 
in this passage, Ibn ‘Arabi hopes that the People of the Trinity will be purified within the fire, 
and thus eventually taken out, and not “preserved from” the fire, which is the sense 
commonly meant by the English term “saved” that Kakaie’s translation suggests. 
Finally, when Kakaie translates “And it is to be hoped that they will be covered by 
combined mercy…” he omits Ibn ‘Arabi’s following explanation: “that is why they [i.e., the 
People of the Trinity] are named ‘disbelievers’ (kuffār) because they have covered (satarū) 
the second by the third. Thus, the second becomes like an isthmus (al-barzakh) between the 
one and the third.”142 Although he does not mention it directly, Ibn ‘Arabi here clearly refers 
to the Qur’anic verse: “They have disbelieved (kafara) who say: ‘Indeed, God is the third of 
three.’ And there is no god except the one God. If they do not desist from what they are 
                                                
141 Edward William Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon (1877; reprint, New Delhi: J. Jetley, 1985), 786. 
142 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 5, 199 (Fut. III, 172). 
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saying, then a painful punishment will afflict those who disbelieved (kafarū) among them” 
(5:73). Thus, Ibn ‘Arabi’s commentary employs the term kuffār in its double sense, as both 
its common negative theological usage as “disbelievers” or “infidels” and also its more 
fundamental sense of “those who cover.”143 Therefore, God as “the third of three” conceals 
the second hypostasis and thus, according to Ibn ‘Arabi, makes the People of the Trinity’s 
theology indistinguishable from monotheism. Such an exegesis is indeed an example of Ibn 
‘Arabi’s hermeneutics of mercy, which he specifically strives to employ when encountering 
any Qur’anic notion of divine wrath and punishment.144 As Mohammad Khalil recently 
points out, the entire concept of “chastisement” for Ibn ‘Arabi is “therapeutic”—i.e., “it 
rectifies” because it is issued from God through the ruling property of divine mercy. In one 
of his more famous inversions, Ibn ‘Arabi takes the rectification of divine chastisement to its 
logical conclusion where the punishment (ʿadhāb) of Hell ultimately facilitates blissful 
“sweetness” (ʿudhūba) for its denizens.145 Indeed, elsewhere in the Futūḥāt Ibn ‘Arabi uses 
the term for “infidels” (i.e., kāfirūn and kuffār etc.) to describe the highest category of saints 
known as the “people of blame” (malāmiyya) who hide themselves from the public, since 
“they are those who cover their spiritual station” (wa hum al-sātirūn maqāmahum) and are 
thus like “farmers because they cover seed in the earth” (yasturūn al-badhr fī al-arḍ).146 
                                                
143 The Arabic root k-f-r means to cover or hide, and in the context of infidelity, that of the “Truth.” 
144 See Michel Chodkiewicz, An Ocean without Shore: Ibn ʿArabî, the Book, and the Law, trans. David Streight 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993) 51.  
145 Mohammad Hassan Khalil, Islam and the Fate of Others: The Salvation Question (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 66. See Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 94. 
146 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 3, 158 (Fut. II, 136). 
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Here, the association of “blame” and infidelity, as discussed above, can be understood as part 
of what Ernst has called “the Hallajian topos” of “mystical infidelity.”147 
Yet in the previous passage discussed by Kakaie, it is clear that the People of the 
Trinity inhabit a theological liminal realm somewhere between those who profess God’s 
oneness and dwell in paradise eternally and those who associate partners with God who are 
promised eternal damnation.148 Such a theological liminality is not enough to prevent them 
from being placed in Hell, but in the end, according to Ibn ‘Arabi’s revelatory exegesis (al-
kashf al-maʿnawi), their etymological link to “covering” as “infidels” (kuffār) will allow 
God’s similar attribute to “cover” them in mercy and save them from Hell, not because of 
their theology of oneness, but because of their theology of “singularity” (fardaniyya)—what 
Kakaie translates above as “oddness.”149   
Besides the fact that Kakaie’s claim that medieval Muslim and Christian mystics 
appeared during the Crusades to “set in motion dialogue between religions” is very difficult 
to sustain historically (while the converse has been compellingly argued),150 Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
revisionist hermeneutics of the doctrine of the Trinity further problematizes such claims even 
                                                
147 As Ernst notes, although not part of the Nishapur Malamati, Hallaj’s “desire for martyrdom, to suffer under 
the law, takes malamah to its extreme. It is not accidental that Hallaj has been called Sultan al-Malamatiyin, 
‘King of the Self-blamers.’” Ernst, Words of Ecstasy, 70, 71, 74, passim.  
148 Ibn ‘Arabi maintains the Qur’anic position that God forgives all sin except associationism, and those who do 
so are in Hell eternally. However, his conception of eternal Hell is quite unconventional since, as mentioned 
above, he believes that Hell will eventually become cool and pleasant for its inhabitants after they have been 
purified by it. See Khalil, Islam, 66-69. 
149 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 5, 199 (Fut. III, 172). 
150 As mentioned above, Bernard of Clairvaux (d. 1153) and Catherine of Siena (d. 1380) strongly supported the 
Crusades. Regarding the “spiritual” aspect of the Crusades from a Christian perspective see Thomas Merton, 
Mystics and Zen Masters (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1967), 102-107. For a treatment of Sufis as 
the “Prophet’s community-in-arms” in response to the Crusades see S. Abdullah Schleifer “Jihad and 
Traditional Islamic Consciousness,” The Islamic Quarterly 27/4 (1983): 188-191. 
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though he declares their ultimate salvation.151 Moreover, assertions of Ibn ‘Arabi’s doctrinal 
openness to Christianity also need to take into account his more well-known disavowal of the 
Christian doctrine of the incarnation (al-ḥūlul) as disbelief in the Fuṣūṣ. Here, Ibn ‘Arabi 
notes that because people witnessed Jesus give life to the dead, they believed he was God. 
Thus, he states: “This led some of them to the doctrine of incarnation and (the assertion) that 
he is God.”152 Here again, Ibn ‘Arabi expounds upon the etymology of the term kufr, but in a 
more negative sense: “For that, they are accused of disbelief (al-kufr), which is a covering 
(al-sitr), because they conceal God who (in reality) gives life to the dead in the human form 
of Jesus.”153 
 While mention of Jews and Christians specifically in the Futūḥāt is relatively rare,154 
there are several places besides his letter to Kaykāʾus where Ibn ‘Arabi refers to them by 
name as engaging in open disbelief/infidelity (kufr). While Ibn ‘Arabi’s “hermeneutics of 
mercy” often transmogrifies derogatory terms into their positive etymological usages, as in 
the example of the “infidelity” of the people of blame mentioned above and elsewhere,155 his 
                                                
151 In other words, few Christians would agree with Ibn ‘Arabi’s disavowal of their doctrine as something 
different than monotheism. 
152 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 141. 
153 Ibid. Here, it should be noted that Ibn ‘Arabi’s critique is uniquely colored by his particular “monistic” view, 
and thus demurs at the specific identification of God with Jesus, rather than a more traditional critique of 
identification of God with any form at all; i.e., simply saying that Jesus was God is not the problem, but the 
addition that he qua God was the son of Mary specifically. Corbin’s description of this difference as one 
between “theophany” and “hypostasis” is perhaps helpful. Not only is the theophany of God not limited to one 
particular person (i.e., Christ), but the “place of this Presence is the consciousness of the individual believer, or 
more exactly, the theophanic Imagination invested in him. […] The Incarnation, on the other hand, is hypostatic 
union. It occurs ‘in the flesh’ […].” Corbin, Alone with the Alone, 275, 313. 
154 I.e., naṣārā and yahūd and taken together as the People of the Book (ahl al-kitāb). For naṣārā as the 
Qur’anic term for Christians in general see J. M. Fiey, “Naṣārā,” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 7 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993), 970. 
155 This is perhaps most famously demonstrated in the chapter of Noah in the Fuṣūṣ, See Affifi, 73. See also 
Chodkiewicz, An Ocean without Shore, 50-52. 
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use of such terms does not always entail semantic inversion. Like the master of mystical 
infidelity himself, ʿAyn al-Quḍāt Hamadānī (d. 1131), Ibn ‘Arabi employs the idea of 
infidelity in different registers including its most common or “outward” (ẓāhirī) form.156 For 
example, in a discussion of how disbelieving speech (kalimāt kufr) returns to the people who 
utter such words and afflicts them on the Day of Resurrection, Ibn ‘Arabi in an apparent 
allusion to Qur’an 9:30-31 states that “such is the case with the disbelief (al-kufr) and 
blasphemy (al-sabb) spoken by the Jews and Christians with respect to God.”157  
Within a more metaphysical discussion elsewhere in the Futūḥāt, Ibn ‘Arabi asserts 
that God has “unqualified existence” (muṭlaq al-wujūd). In a typical example of how Ibn 
‘Arabi’s discourse stretches the limits of language to inversion, he then states:  
Yet, no qualification can prevent Him qualifying Himself. Rather, all qualifications are His—
He is unqualified qualification. Thus, no qualification imposes itself upon Him over another, 
i.e., the relation of non-qualification to Him. He whose existence is through this relationship 
has unqualified attribution, not one specific relation over another.158  
 
Perhaps out of concern that such a statement could be read as an argument for 
incarnationalism (ḥulūl), i.e. God qualifying Himself as a particular form, the passage here 
takes an unexpected turn. Ibn ‘Arabi thus refers to the Jews and Christians as perpetrators of 
the worst type of disbelief (kufr), since they “particularized” divine qualities specifically to 
themselves:  
So, severe disbelief (kufr) is attained only by particularism (takhṣīṣ) in this relationship like 
the Jews and the Christians said about themselves over others from the people of religions 
                                                
156 As Ernst notes, ʿAyn al-Quḍāt recognized four levels of infidelity. While the first, “outward infidelity” (kufr-
i ẓahir), is what is commonly understood as “infidelity” according to Islamic law and consists of denial of the  
truth or an aspect of the sharia, the other stages have to do with “the path of progressive self-annihilation.” 
These include: infidelity of the lower self (kufr-i nafs), Muhammadan infidelity (kufr-i muḥammadī), and real 
infidelity (kufr-i ḥaqīqī). See Ernst, Words of Ecstasy, 80, 81. 
157 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 1, 235 (Fut. I, 191).  
158 Ibid., vol. 5, 187 (Fut. III, 162). 
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and sects (al-milal wa al-niḥal): “We are the sons of God and His beloved ones.”159 Thus, 
they associated (themselves) with Him in what was (in reality) a universalized relationship, 
which was a mistake in the truth-in-itself (nafs al-amr). So God said to them: “So why then 
does He punish you for your sins? On the contrary, you are mortals from among those whom 
He created.”160 God, the most high, says the relationship is one, so why particularize 
yourselves in it over others?161 
 
The Qur’anic verse that Ibn ‘Arabi invokes here is indeed preceded by another famous 
Qur’anic verse that specifically calls the deification of Jesus disbelief (kufr), which Ibn 
‘Arabi also quotes in his above censure of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation in the 
Fuṣūṣ: “Those who say that God is the Messiah, son of Mary have disbelieved.”162  
As evinced by Ibn ‘Arabi’s comments surveyed above, the category of 
disbelief/infidelity (kufr) and who is to be considered a disbeliever or infidel (kāfir) can be 
found embedded within his highly abstract metaphysical discourse. In the Qur’anic context, 
the kāfirūn are those who refute the mission of Muhammad (e.g., 50:2) or that of previous 
messengers (e.g., 41:14), and in the systematic texts of jurisprudence the People of the Book 
are deemed to be among them, although occupying a special position in terms of their 
“protected” (dhimmī) status as witnessed in the Pact of ‘Umar above and discussed at length 
below.163 Thus, Ibn ‘Arabi’s above categorization of the People of the Book as kuffār should 
be contextualized not only within a longstanding tradition of Muslim polemics,164 but 
                                                
159 Qur’an 5:18. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 5, 187 (Fut. III, 162). Like Ibn ‘Arabi’s critique of the doctrine of incarnation in 
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163 W. Björkman, “Kāfir,” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 4 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 408. 
164 An important part of classical Muslim anti-Jewish and anti-Christian polemics focused on the Jewish 
anthropomorphism and conception of God and Christian incarnationalism (ḥulūl), as well as their exclusive 
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perhaps more foundationally within the context of the Qur’an itself and the medieval 
tradition of Islamic legal hermeneutics. 
Ibn ‘Arabi and the Idea of Sufism in a Ghazalian Age  
By the time Ibn ‘Arabi openly emerged as the Seal of the Saints at the turn of 
thirteenth century,165 the broad arc of the Islamic intellectual tradition was centered on legal 
discourse rather than upon more philosophical modes of thought. According to Jackson, the 
flexibility of legal praxis was particularly well suited to allow the Muslim intellectual 
community to “accommodate change and diversity across space and time […].”166 Because 
philosophical discourses deal in competing universal truth claims, as mentioned in the 
introduction to this study, it is much harder for them to simultaneously accommodate 
contradiction.167  
Thus, sharia oriented praxis gave the medieval Islamic intellectual tradition the 
grounding it needed to allow more abstract modes of thought, such as philosophy and 
speculative mysticism, to maintain a connection to the larger communal tradition while 
remaining to a relative degree semantically fluid and creative. As Hodgson notes, “provided 
certain rules were observed, Muslims were free to learn almost anything with only a minimal 
risk of penalization; much less risk, on the whole, than was run by their opposite numbers in 
the Occident.”168 Here, “[t]he esoteric did not claim to be in competition with the normal, 
                                                                                                                                                  
claims to salvation. See Vajda, “Ahl al-Kitāb,” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (Leiden: E. J. 
Brill, 1986), 265-66.  
165 I.e., 1198 CE. See Addas, Quest for the Red Sulphur, 160. 
166 Jackson, “Islam(s) East and West,” 129. 
167 Ibid., 129-130. 
168 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol. 2, 194 (emphasis mine). 
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generally accepted exoteric truth; rather, it was to complement it.”169 Thus, by the end of the 
eleventh century and the revalorization of mysticism initiated by Ghazali, Sufism “appeared 
as guarantor and interpreter of even the Shar‘î aspects of the Islamic faith.”170 Indeed, as 
Peter Awn notes, 
Rather than relegate the efficacy of religious law solely to the exoteric realm of the 
nonmystic, al-Ghazālī insists that legal observance keeps the Sufi immersed in the broader 
community that mediates spiritual power. To abandon the legal tradition is to abandon any 
link to the Islamic community (Ummah) and thus to be incapable of true spiritual growth. 
Sharīʿah, contrary to being a barrier or, worse, superfluous, is essential to progress along the 
Sufi path.171 
 
As such, the importance of Ghazali as a forerunner to Ibn ‘Arabi cannot be overstated, since 
the fusion of jurisprudence, theology, philosophy, and Sufism that he popularized would 
become the foundation upon which Ibn ‘Arabi would build a century later—indeed, as 
quoted above, Ibn ‘Arabi understood his given cosmic function as none other than the 
protector of “the sanctity of the divine law (al-sharīʿa).” Thus, as Hodgson asserts, Ghazali’s 
“intellectual synthesis […] as he expressed became, in effect, the starting point of the 
intellectual flowering of the Earlier Middle period.”172  
Even though Ghazali’s position regarding who can rightly be called a disbeliever or 
infidel (kāfir) is commonly acknowledged as being the most systematically magnanimous 
within classical Islam,173 he nevertheless categorized the People of the Book overall as 
                                                
169 Ibid., 195. 
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171 Peter Awn, “Classical Sufi Approaches to Scripture,” in Mysticism and Sacred Scripture, ed. Steven T. Katz 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 150. 
172 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol. 2, 192. 
173 E.g. the Hungarian Islamicist Ignaz Goldziher (d. 1921) described Ghazali’s Fayṣal al-tafriqa bayna al-islām 
wa al-zandaqa as “a special work on the idea of tolerance.” Goldziher quoted in Sherman A. Jackson, On the 
Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Islam: Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghāzalīʼs Fayṣal al-Tafriqa Bayna al-Islām wa 
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kuffār. In this juridical context, as Jackson notes, Ghazali’s understanding of belief—i.e., 
“faith” (īmān)—as the opposite of disbelief (kufr) is framed within a heteronomous tradition 
that necessitates the acceptance of prophetic transmission in toto along with an acceptance of 
God: 
On this understanding, one cannot reject the messengers without rejecting the message itself; 
for the messengership of the messengers is part and parcel of the message. Now, one can 
believe in God or the Creator in general without accepting the messengers. But such belief 
would provide no basis for belief in such notions as Paradise and Hell (not to mention 
specific duties such as prayer or fasting). Yet, from the perspective of revealed religion, this 
is the whole point of the matter, and al-Ghazālī is quick to note that kufr is a legal designation 
that is posited by scripture, its chief implication being eternal damnation in Hell. In other 
words, al-Ghazālī’s definition of kufr is both precise and restrictive. Accordingly, a person 
can believe in God in the ordinary sense but be an Unbeliever in legal/scriptural terms […].174 
 
Thus, in Ghazali’s early work on theology al-Iqtiṣād fī al-iʿtiqād (The Middle Course in 
Belief), he exposits on which groups will be damned as disbelievers because of their 
rejection of the prophethood of Muhammad. As such, Ghazali classifies six levels of denial, 
the first being 
the denial (takdhīb) of the Jews, Christians, and the people of all of the religious communities 
such as the Zoroastrians, the worshippers of idols, and others. Their disbelief is stipulated in 
the Book [i.e., the Qur’an] and agreed upon (mujmaʿ) by the Muslim community (al-
umma).175 
 
Ghazali would later qualify his legal definition of disbelief as it pertains to the People of the 
Book in his late work Fayṣal al-tafriqa bayna al-islām wa al-zandaqa (The Decisive 
Criterion for Distinguishing Islam from Masked Infidelity) by noting that such a charge 
could only be leveled on the condition that the conveyance (tablīgh) of the true nature and 
                                                                                                                                                  
al-Zandaqa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 40. Jackson also praises the Fayṣal for its overarching 
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174 Jackson, introduction to On the Boundaries, 58 (emphasis original). 
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message of Muhammad had transpired and was subsequently rejected.176 Nevertheless, such 
qualifications did not alter his compliance with the classical position that Jews and Christians 
were in principle disbelievers as cited in al-Iqtiṣād above (i.e., since they rejected—either 
entirely or only in part—the prophethood of Muhammad and the prophetic injunctions 
associated with the revelation of the Qur’an). Indeed, in the Fayṣal, Ghazali states: 
Disbelief (kufr) is the denial of the Messenger (blessings and peace be upon him) in anything 
from what he has brought. And faith (īmān) is the validation of all that he brought. So the Jew 
and the Christian are both disbelievers because they deny the Messenger, may God bless him 
and grant him peace.177   
 
Ghazali goes on to note that the Jews and Christians—as well as other groups such as the 
prophecy denying rationalists (al-barāhima),178 the dualists (al-thanawīyya), and the 
heretical philosophers (al-zanādiqa)—“are all associationists (mushrikūn) in that they all 
deny the Messenger; indeed, every disbeliever (kāfir) denies the Messenger, may God bless 
him and grant him peace.”179 It is thus the denial of Muhammad, according to Ghazali, that is 
                                                
176 Ghazali stipulated three possible categories: (1) those who never heard the name of Muhammad, (2) those 
who heard his name, but received incorrect, insufficient, or misleading information, and (3) those who heard his 
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Ghazali’s assertion seems more likely to be derived directly from the Qur’an. Besides Qur’an 9:31 which 
accuses the Jews and Christians of taking their rabbis and monks as lords besides God, the Qur’an also 
acknowledges “caprice” (hawan) as an internal force that people worship instead of God (e.g., 25:43, 28:50, 
45:23). 
 72 
tantamount to the denial of God.180  
 It is from within such a Ghazalian juridical milieu that Ibn ‘Arabi’s above claims that 
the Jews and Christians were guilty of disbelief or infidelity are best situated. Indeed, Ibn 
‘Arabi’s clear identification with Muhammad in his logoic comprehensiveness as both the 
spiritual heir of the “purest Muhammadan station” (al-maqām al-muḥammadī al-aṭhar) and 
divine guardian of the sharia appear to indicate that, like Ghazali, he identified an important 
aspect of his metaphysics as inherently linked to the hierarchical schema of medieval Islamic 
jurisprudence and its attendant “Muhammadan” supersessionism. Such supersessionism, as 
Hodgson notes, was normative to the classical “Sharʿî Islamic vision,” which saw the 
Muslim community “as one among many divinely guided communities such as the Jewish or 
the Christian, all (at their origin) equally blessed.”181 As such, 
Islam took explicitly the form that various Christian and Jewish bodies had implicitly been 
assuming under the confessional empires—an autonomous social organism with its own law 
for its own members. The difference between Islam and the other communities was that Islam 
was first to rule over and then to supersede all others. Islam was to bring the true and 
uncorrupted divine guidance to all mankind, creating a world-wide society in which the true 
revelation would be the everyday norm of all the nations.182 
 
Yet, because of Ibn ‘Arabi’s repeated emphasis on the Qur’anic notion that Muslims 
are to believe that all pre-Islamic revelations are sent as true divine messages from one God, 
it is often assumed that Ibn ‘Arabi believes all revelations to be contemporaneously “valid” 
and thus not superseded by Islam. Since Ibn ‘Arabi mentions Jews and Christians by name so 
infrequently, one can argue, as Chittick does in Imaginal Worlds (quoted in the introduction 
                                                
180 As noted above, Ibn ‘Arabi took the same view based upon Qur’an 4:80 and as such went so far as to 
categorize Muhammad as an “attribute” of God; see pp. 52 above. The Qur’an itself repeatedly associates 
obedience to the Messenger (al-rasūl) as obedience to God (e.g., 4:13-14; 4:59; 4:80; 24:52; 24:63; 47:33). 
181 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol. 1, 317. 
182 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
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to this chapter), that Ibn ‘Arabi only refers to them in terms of the historical context of the 
Qur’anic revelation. Such Qur’anic criticism, so the argument goes, was never meant to be 
more than the censure of specific groups during the life of Muhammad, since other Jews and 
Christians are indeed praised within the Qur’an.183 Thus in Imaginal Worlds, Chittick 
summarizes this position as follows: 
In short, the Koran declares that the essential message of every prophet is the same, while the 
details of each message is unique. Hence the universality of religious truth is an article of 
Islamic faith. It is true that many Muslims believe that the universality of guidance pertains 
only to pre-Koranic times, but others disagree […].184 
 
Although Chittick does not state which Qur’anic verses he is referring to here, Qur’an 
3:84—which as mentioned above was (re)revealed to Ibn ‘Arabi himself when he attained to 
the Muhammadan Station at the end of his spiritual ascension—is exemplary.185 As we 
recall, this verse exhorts Muhammad and those who follow him to assert faith in God and the 
Qur’an, while simultaneously asserting faith “in what was sent down upon Abraham, 
Ishmael, Isaac and Jacob, and the tribes (of Israel), and in what was given to Moses, Jesus, 
and the Prophets from their Lord.” Qur’an 3:84 thus categorically proclaims: “we do not 
distinguish between any of them.”  
In light of such Qur’anic assertions, in one of his major technical works on Ibn 
‘Arabi, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, Chittick states that Ibn ‘Arabi “frequently affirms the 
validity of religions other than Islam, and in so doing he is simply stating the clear Koranic 
                                                
183 A similar argument for the particularism of the Qur’anic critique of the People of the Book has been recently 
made by Fred Donner in Muhammad and the Believers: At the Origins of Islam (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), see esp. 68-71. See also Vajda, “Ahlal-Kitāb,” 264. 
184 Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 124 (emphasis mine). 
185 There are other similar Qur’anic verses, such as 2:136 and 2:285. 
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position.”186 The following example from the Futūḥāt is a good illustration of Chittick’s 
assertion. Here, Ibn ‘Arabi states: 
As for a revealed law (sharʿ) previous to us, it is not required of us to follow it except for 
what our law has confirmed from it, even though it is a true revelation for those it was 
addressed to. We do not say that it is false (bāṭil); rather, we believe in God, and his 
messenger and what was revealed to him and that which was revealed before him from the 
Book and the law.187 
 
In Imaginal Worlds, Chittick thus summarizes his position regarding Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
universalism in relation to the juridical idea of “abrogation” (naskh): 
The Koran never criticizes the prophetic messages as such, but it often condemns 
misunderstandings or distortions by those who follow the prophets. The Shaykh sometimes 
criticizes specific distortions or misunderstandings in the Koranic vein, but he does not draw 
the conclusion that many Muslims have drawn—that the coming of Islam abrogated (naskh) 
previous revealed religions. Rather, he says, Islam is like the sun and other religions like the 
stars. Just as the stars remain when the sun rises, so also the other religions remain valid when 
Islam appears.188 
 
It is thus Chittick’s claim that while Ibn ‘Arabi may criticize other religions, he does 
so only to correct particular “misunderstandings or distortions.” Yet, he does not, according 
to Chittick, believe—like the majority of his coreligionists—that Islam “abrogated” the other 
religions. While the category of abrogation (naskh) commonly denotes an intra-textual 
supersession of certain canonical textual prescriptions or prohibitions by other such texts 
within the Islamic discursive tradition itself, its usage here denotes an inter-scriptural process 
where the laws of an entire religious dispensation (e.g., Islam) supersede and cancel a 
previous one (e.g., Christianity). As noted in the introduction to this study, just as medieval 
Christians understood Christianity as superseding Judaism, medieval Muslim scholars 
unquestionably understood Islam as superseding the dispensations of the People of the 
                                                
186 William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-‘Arabi’s Metaphysics of Imagination (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1989), 171.  
187 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 3, 192 (Fut. II, 165). 
188 Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 125 (underline mine). 
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Book.189 Indeed Ghazali, like al-Shahrastānī (d. 1153) whose position on abrogation was 
quoted in the introduction, also unquestionably took this position as a manifestation of the 
divine will.190 Yet, Chittick categorically claims above that rather than holding such a 
normative concept of abrogation, Ibn ‘Arabi believes all prophetic religions are 
contemporaneously valid. It is thus to a deeper analysis of such a formidable assertion that 
we are finally prepared to turn. 
Ibn ‘Arabi and the Aporia of “Abrogation” (naskh)  
 In support of his claim that Ibn ‘Arabi did not hold that the previous revealed 
religions have been abrogated by the revelation of the Qur’an, and as such remain valid, in 
Imaginal Worlds Chittick translates the following passage from the Futūḥāt (i.e., Fut. III, 
153) as a proof-text: 
All the revealed religions [sharā’i‘] are lights. Among these religions, the revealed religion of 
Muhammad is like the light of the sun among the lights of the stars. When the sun appears, 
the lights of the stars are hidden, and their lights are included in the light of the sun. Their 
being hidden is like the abrogation of the other revealed religions that takes place through 
Muhammad’s revealed religion. Nevertheless, they do in fact exist, just as the existence of the 
light of the stars is actualized. This explains why we have been required in our all-inclusive 
religion to have faith in the truth of all messengers and all the revealed religions. They are not 
rendered null [bāṭil] by abrogation—that is the opinion of the ignorant.191 
 
Although the passage appears to relay the overall sense of Chittick’s argument—i.e., that the 
religions are still somehow valid after Muhammad’s religion—it also seemingly contradicts 
itself. The passage initially states that there is indeed something called “abrogation”: “Their 
being hidden is like the abrogation of the other revealed religions that takes place through 
                                                
189 See John Burton, “Abrogation,” in Encyclopedia of the Qur’ān, vol. 1 (Leiden: E. J. Brill,  2001), 11-12. See 
also Waardenburg, “The Medieval Period,” See also Jacques Waardenburg, “The Medieval Period 650–1500,” 
in Muslim Perceptions of Other Religions: A Historical Survey, ed. Jacques Waardenburg (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 52; and Vajda, “Ahl al-Kitāb,” 265. 
190 al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā min ʿilm al-uṣūl, cited in John Burton, “Abrogation,” 11. 
191 Ibn ‘Arabi quoted in Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 125 [Fut. III, 153] (underline mine). 
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Muhammad’s revealed religion.” Yet, Chittick’s proof-text goes on to claim that such 
abrogation does not actually cancel the laws of the previous religions: “They are not rendered 
null [bāṭil] by abrogation.” However, the apparent contradiction regarding the reality of 
abrogation that according to Ibn ‘Arabi “takes place through Muhammad’s revealed 
religion” is not addressed by Chittick here. Rather, Chittick’s above assertion that Ibn ‘Arabi 
“does not draw the conclusion that many Muslims have drawn—that the coming of Islam 
abrogated (naskh) previous revealed religions” proclaims a definitive resolution. Yet, this 
statement is not an argument; it is merely an assertion that does nothing to help us understand 
why Ibn ‘Arabi apparently contradicts himself. Indeed, there seems to be more to this story 
than can be gleaned from this passage alone.   
In 1996, Nuh Keller also had this sense. A popular American expatriate Sufi shaykh 
and translator known for his public defense of Ibn ‘Arabi’s “orthodoxy”192 (and criticized for 
his religious conservatism),193 Keller took Chittick to task for leaving out a critical part of the 
above passage—a passage that when read in tandem with Chittick’s above translation seems 
to imply a very different meaning. Keller’s translation of Ibn ‘Arabi’s subsequent passage, 
which begins a few lines before Chittick’s ends, reads as follows: 
This is why we are required by our universal law to believe in all prophetic messengers 
(rusul) and to believe that all their laws are truth, and did not turn into falsehood by being 
abrogated: that is the imagination of the ignorant. So all paths return to look to the Prophet’s 
path (Allah bless him and give him peace): if the prophetic messengers had been alive in his 
                                                
192 Keller is the head of the Hāshimī-Darqāwī tarīqa (in the Shādhilī ʿAlāwiyya line), and his shaykh, ‘Abd al-
Rahman al-Shaghouri (d. 2004), was a public defender of Ibn ‘Arabi in Syria. See Nuh Ha Mim Keller, Sea 
Without Shore: A Manual of the Sufi Path (Amman: Sunna Books, 2011), 7. For a brief biography of Keller and 
history of his order see Marcia Hermansen, “The ‘Other’ Shadhilis of the West” in Une voie soufie dans le 
monde: la Shâdhiliyya, ed. Eric Geoffroy (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2005), 493-94.  
193 Khaled Abou El Fadl goes as far as to claim that Keller follows Wahhābī “methodology” in his legal 
discussions. See Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority, and Women (Oxford: 
Oneworld Publications, 2001), 174. Yet, Keller for his part claims to be against Wahhābī methodology; e.g., see 
Nuh Ha Mim Keller, “Making the World Safe for Terrorism” (2001): www.masud.co.uk/ISLAM/nuh 
/terrorism.htm.  
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time, they would have followed him just as their religious laws have followed his law. For he 
was given Comprehensiveness of Word (Jawami‘ al-Kalim), and given [the Qur’anic verse] 
‘Allah shall give you an invincible victory’ (Qur’an 48:3), ‘the invincible’ [al-‘aziz, also 
meaning rare, dear, precious, unattainable] being he who is sought but cannot be reached. 
When the prophetic messengers sought to reach him, he proved impossible for them to attain 
to—because of his [being favored above them by] being sent to the entire world (bi’thatihi al 
‘amma), and Allah giving him Comprehensiveness of Word (Jawami‘ al-Kalim), and the 
supreme rank of possessing the Praiseworthy Station (al-Maqam al-Mahmud) in the next 
world, and Allah having made his Nation (umma) ‘the best Nation ever brought forth for 
people’ (Qur’an 3:110). The Nation of every messenger is commensurate with the station of 
their prophet, so realize this.”194 
 
Indeed, this passage that Chittick saw fit to leave untranslated reiterates the comprehensive 
logoic nature of Muhammad’s prophethood, as discussed above, and its incorporation of all 
prophetic paths and realities. As such, the one line that most plainly controverts Chittick’s 
above argument is Ibn ‘Arabi’s assertion here that: “all paths return to look to the Prophet’s 
path […]: if the prophetic messengers had been alive in his time, they would have followed 
him just as their religious laws have followed his law.” Clearly, this is a contradiction since 
Chittick argues above that Ibn ‘Arabi’s universalism is transhistorical, i.e., all religions are 
contemporaneously “valid,” whereas the section that Keller translates (and Chittick neglects) 
implies that Muhammad’s law has indeed superseded what came before it. 
 Yet, as if anticipating Keller’s refutation, Chittick offers the following qualification 
directly after his above translation of Fut. III, 153: 
If the Shaykh’s pronouncements on other religions sometimes fail to recognize their validity 
in his own time, one reason may be that, like most other Muslims living in the western 
Islamic lands, he had little real contact with the Christians or Jews in his environment, not to 
speak of followers of religions farther afield. He had probably never met a saintly 
representative of either of these traditions, and he almost certainly had never read anything 
about these two religions except what was written in Islamic sources. Hence there is no 
reason that he should have accepted the validity of these religions except in principle. But 
this is an important qualification. To maintain the particular excellence of the Koran and the 
superiority of Muhammad over all other prophets is not to deny the universal validity of 
revelation nor the necessity of revelation’s appearing in particularized expressions. Since all 
                                                
194 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 5, 177 (Fut. III, 153) translated by Nuh Ha Mim Keller in “On the validity of all 
religions in the thought of ibn Al-‘Arabi and Emir ‘Abd al-Qadir: a letter to ‘Abd al-Matin” (1996): 
www.masud.co.uk/ISLAM/nuh/amat.htm. See published version in Keller, Sea Without Shore, 322-25. 
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revealed religions are true in principle, the particular circumstances that lead one to suspect 
that they have been corrupted may change.195 
 
While chapter 2 will analyze in detail the underlying assertions in Chittick’s above passage 
that allude to the historical debate around so-called “corruption” (taḥrīf) of revelations prior 
to the Qur’an,196 here it is sufficient to note that Chittick seems to backpedal somewhat from 
his original position. While Chittick initially claimed above that Ibn ‘Arabi asserted that “the 
other religions remain valid when Islam appears,” he here qualifies this statement and 
suggests that even if Ibn ‘Arabi does “sometimes fail to recognize their validity in his own 
time” this is so because he “had probably never met a saintly representative of either of these 
traditions.” If Ibn ‘Arabi had, Chittick avers, he would have unequivocally accepted the 
forms of Judaism and Christianity that were practiced in his own time. In other words, 
Chittick claims here that while Ibn ‘Arabi may have thought that particular forms of Judaism 
and Christianity practiced in his own day were corrupt, he nevertheless maintained that they 
were “true in principle” and therefore essentially “valid.” Thus, Chittick asserts that even if 
Ibn ‘Arabi sometimes seems to admit to abrogation, he nevertheless rejects the normative 
position that Islam abrogates previous revelation in absolute terms. Thus, as Chittick states 
above: “Since all revealed religions are true in principle, the particular circumstances that 
lead one to suspect that they have been corrupted may change.” 
Yet, there remains an aporia that neither Chittick’s argument nor Keller’s refutation 
seems to resolve. If Ibn ‘Arabi’s position is indeed a recapitulation of the classical Islamic 
juridical position of abrogation of all previously revealed religion and their laws (as evinced 
by Keller’s translated passage above asserting that the previous prophets would have 
                                                
195 Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 125-26 (underline mine). 
196 See chapter 2, pp. 131-151. 
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followed Muhammad “just as their religious laws have followed his law”), then why does 
Ibn ‘Arabi state in the first part of the passage (as Keller himself translates): “we are required 
by our universal law to believe in all prophetic messengers (rusul) and to believe that all 
their laws are truth, and did not turn into falsehood by being abrogated”?  Indeed, if their 
laws are “truth” and have not been turned “into falsehood,” would not Chittick’s universalist 
argument that they remain valid as contemporaneous religions be reasonable? The answer 
must be yes. So how then is such an aporia to be reconciled?  
 The way through this paradox is found in an extended discussion within the Futūḥāt 
where Ibn ‘Arabi surveys the specific commands revealed by God from within each of the 
seven heavens.197 According to Ibn ‘Arabi, it is from the fourth heaven that the commands of 
abrogation of the other religions issue: 
And from the commanded revelation in the fourth heaven is the abrogation (naskh) of 
Muhammad’s revealed law (sharīʿa) over all of the (previous) revealed laws (jamīʿ al-
sharāʾiʿ) and the triumph (ẓuhūr)198 of his religion (dīn) over all of the religions (adyān) of 
each messenger who preceded him and each revealed book.199 
 
Indeed, this is the only place in the Futūḥāt that Ibn ‘Arabi uses the term “religion” (dīn) in 
the plural (i.e., adyān),200 and it is telling that he does so in order to express the superiority of 
Muhammad’s revealed law over them. He continues: 
                                                
197 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 1, 181-83 (Fut. I, 144-146). 
198 According to Lane, the infinitive ẓuhūr with the prep. ʿalā / bi is rendered in its first form perfect ẓahara 
ʿalayhi: “He overcame, conquered, subdued, overpowered, or mastered, him; gained the mastery or victory, or 
prevailed, over him.” See Edward William Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon (1877; reprint, New Delhi: J. 
Jetley, 1985), 1926. This is the same sense of the fourth form verb liyuẓhirahu in Qur’an 9:33, which Ibn ‘Arabi 
seems to refer to here: “It is He who sent His Messenger with guidance and the Religion of Truth to triumph 
over every religion, though the associationists are averse.”  
199 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 1, 182 (Fut. I, 145). 
200 In all other cases, Ibn ‘Arabi importantly prefers to refer to previous “religions” as “revealed laws” 
(sharā’iʿ), thus emphasizing in Ibn ‘Arabi’s normative conception how the “true” religion of God is continuous, 
while the rulings are what change according to the particular prophetic messenger and the times and conditions 
of the age they manifest within. 
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The only ruling (ḥukm) of God that remains from the religion of the (previous) religions is 
what Muhammad has firmly determined for it by his confirmation (taqrīr);201 so, it is (now) 
of Muhammad’s law and his universal messengership (ʿumūm risāla). If there remains a 
ruling other than this, then it is not from the ruling of God except for among the People of the 
Poll-Tax (jizya) in particular.202 However, as we said, it is not (in reality) a ruling of God, 
because He named it “invalid” (bāṭil).203  
 
Here, it is necessary to pause and note that Ibn ‘Arabi himself appears to contradict the 
passage above discussed by Chittick and Keller where he asserts that it is only the opinion of 
“the ignorant” that the religions previous to Islam are “invalid” (bāṭil). While the meaning of 
this apparent contradiction will be made clear below, for now let us focus on what proves to 
be the critical element of this passage, namely, Ibn ‘Arabi’s mention of “the People of the 
Poll-Tax (jizya)”—i.e., the People of the Book—as somehow encompassing an “exception” 
to the legal classification of “invalidity” assigned to previous religious laws after the coming 
of Islam. Thus, directly after Ibn ‘Arabi states that in fact God has named the remaining 
ruling “invalid,” he asserts: 
So, the (previous ruling) is against the one who has followed it, not for him (fa huwa ʿalā 
man ittabaʿahu lā lahu).204 This is what I mean by the triumph of Muhammad’s religion over 
all of the religions, like al-Nābigha205 in his panegyric said:  
                                                
201 Although the pronoun here can grammatically refer to God, it is perhaps better read as referring to 
Muhammad since in legal discourse the verb taqrīr refers to Muhammad’s approval of an action as the 
determination of permissibility in legal rulings. See “Sources of Law,” in Encyclopaedia of Islamic Law, ed. 
Arif Ali Khan and Tauqir Mohammad Khan, vol. 1 (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2006), 76. 
202 I.e., they can use their own rulings. 
203 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 1, 182 (Fut. I, 145). 
204 While this line connotes the idea of the People of the Book’s rulings bearing “witness” against them on the 
Day of Judgment, given Ibn ‘Arabi’s assertion that the People of the Book will gain “felicity” by following such 
laws, the prepositional binary “against/for” (ʿalā/li) is perhaps best understood as “in spite of.” In other words, 
although the People of the Book are an exception to the general rule of abrogation, their relative “success” as 
adopted members within the Muslim umma is afforded to them in spite of their own laws, not because of them. 
For more on Ibn ‘Arabi’s acknowledgement of the People of the Book’s “success” or “felicity” (saʿāda) see 
chapter 2, pp. 151-53. 
205 al-Nābigha al-Dhubyānī, one of the six preeminent pre-Islamic Arabic poets famous for his Dīwān. See 
Wilhelm Ahlwardt, The Divans of the Six Ancient Arabic Poets Ennabiga, ‘Antara, Tharafa, Zuhair, ‘Alqama 
and Imruulqais: Chiefly According to the Mss. of Paris, Gotha, and Leyden; and the Collection of their 
Fragments with a List of the Various Readings of the Text (London: Trübner and Company, 1870); and A. 
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Do you not see that God has given you such a superior rank (sura),  
that you see every king below you groveling (yatadhabdhabu)? 
For you are a sun, and the kings stars;  
when the sun rises, there is no longer a single star apparent.206  
 
This is the rank of Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him peace, and the rank of the 
revealed law that he brought among the prophets and their revealed laws, God’s peace be 
upon all of them.  
 
Indeed, the light of the stars is subsumed (indaraja) within the light of the sun. So, the day is 
ours, but the People of the Book only have the night, that is, if “they offer the poll tax (jizya) 
in a willing state of subjugation”207.208 
 
 In light of this passage, Chittick’s use of Fut. III, 153 in Imaginal Worlds as a proof-
text for Ibn ‘Arabi’s position on abrogation emerges as incomplete and thus overwhelmingly 
misleading. Here, it becomes clear that the sun and stars metaphor in Fut. III, 153 is only an 
allusion to the poem by al-Nābigha al-Dhubyānī (one of the six famous pre-Islamic Arabic 
poets) directly referenced in the passage above (Fut. I, 145). This “ur-passage” thus clarifies 
Ibn ‘Arabi’s doctrine of abrogation, which here asserts that all religious dispensations have 
been rendered “invalid” from “On High”—i.e., from the fourth heaven—by the manifestation 
of Muhammad’s revelation. Indeed, as noted above, Ghazali also held that the abrogation of 
the previous religions by Muhammad’s revelation was an expression of the divine will.209  
Yet, for Ibn ‘Arabi things are not so simple. He also asserts in his ur-passage above, 
that the legal classification of “protection” (dhimma)—as made operative through the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Arazi, “al-Nābigha al-Dhubyānī,” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 7 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993), 840-
42.  
206 From al-Nābigha’s Dīwān and composed for Nuʿmān b. Mundhīr, the king of Ḥīra. See Al-Nābigha al-
Dhubyānī, Le Dîwân de Nâbiga Dhobyânî, ed. and trans. Hartwig Derenbourg (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 
1869), 83 (Arabic), 126 (French translation). 
207 Qur’an 9:29. 
208 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 1, 182 (Fut. I, 145). 
209 See p. 74n190 above. 
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payment of the poll-tax (jizya) and its attendant humiliation and subjugation—does allow for 
the continuation of Jewish and Christian law, albeit in an impeded fashion. Thus, Ibn ‘Arabi 
can emphatically state (in Chittick’s rendering above) that the revealed religions, i.e., 
Judaism and Christianity, “are not rendered null [bāṭil] by abrogation.” Yet, the question 
remains just what kind of validity do such religions really have, if they can, according to Ibn 
‘Arabi, only function as subsumed—i.e., subjugated—within the sun of Muhammad’s 
dispensation? Indeed, as Ibn ‘Arabi asserts, “the day is ours, but the People of the Book only 
have the night.” Moreover, the allotment of even only “night” is, as Ibn ‘Arabi makes clear 
by quoting the final words of Qur’an 9:29, one that is only made viable through the 
humiliation of the poll-tax: 
Fight those who were given the Book—those who do not believe in God or in the last day, do 
not hold to be prohibited what God and His Messenger have declared to be so, and do not 
follow the religion of truth—until they offer the poll-tax in a willing state of subjugation.  
 
Ibn ‘Arabi’s reference to this Qur’anic call for the subjugation of the People of the Book by 
force of arms—in combination with his initial exaltation of “the triumph (ẓuhūr)” of 
Muhammad’s religion and al-Nābigha’s verse extoling the triumphant king over his 
groveling vanquished—renders contemporary constructions of Ibn ‘Arabi as a “universalist,” 
such as Chittick’s, deeply problematic. 
Rather than simply an anomaly in Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse, the idea that the People of 
the Book are allowed as the “the protected people” (ahl al-dhimma) to continue to follow 
their laws because of their willing subjugation, and thus subsumption, within the 
Muhammadan sharia emerges as a coherent element within Ibn ‘Arabi’s metaphysical 
discourse. This particular idea—what I refer to as the “qualified subjugation” of the People 
of the Book—is mentioned in several places in the Futūḥāt. In one particularly telling 
passage, Ibn ‘Arabi discusses the case of miraculously long-lived saints who were deputies 
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(auṣiyāʾ /s. waṣī) of past prophets, but were still alive during the time of Muhammad and 
were brought his revealed knowledge by the enigmatic figure of “Khiḍr, the companion of 
Moses.”210 As such, Ibn ‘Arabi relays the story of Ibn Barthalmā who reportedly testified to 
the prophecy of Muhammad in front of an envoy of the caliph ‘Umar, even though he was a 
saintly deputy of Jesus. Ibn ‘Arabi, referring to Barthalmā as a “monk,” thus states:  
Do you think that monk remained on the rulings of the Christians? No, by God, the sacred 
law (sharīʿa) of Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him peace, is abrogative 
(nāsikha)! For he states, may God bless him and grant him peace, “If Moses were alive he 
would not be capable of following anyone but me.” And similarly, when Jesus descends he 
will only lead us from us, that is, by our way (sunna) and he will only judge us by our law 
(sharīʿa).211 
 
Yet, Ibn ‘Arabi goes on to qualify this statement: 
 
This monk was of the Christ-like saints (ʿīsawiyyīn) who inherit from Jesus, upon him be 
peace, until the time of Muhammad’s mission. So when Muhammad, may God bless him and 
grant him peace, was sent, this monk worshiped God through Muhammad’s law (sharīʿa). 
But his knowledge (of Muhammad’s revelation) is from God’s presence (ladunhu) that was 
brought by His mercy, and he inherits the Christ-like condition again through Muhammad. So 
he remains a Christ-like saint (ʿīsawī) on two sacred laws (al-sharīʿatain). Do you not see 
that this monk had been informed about the descent of Jesus, may God bless him, and when 
he will kill the pig and break the cross?212 Do you think that he remains (on the opinion) that 
the meat of the pig is permissible (taḥlīl)? So this monk remains Christ-like on two laws, and 
has twice the reward—a reward for following his prophet and a reward for following 
Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him peace; he is waiting for Jesus to descend.213  
 
In these passages, Ibn ‘Arabi discusses a special situation of a saint who originally was 
Christian, but because of the appearance of Muhammad was obliged to adopt his law; thus, 
Ibn ‘Arabi here, as he repeats elsewhere, relates a hadith that asserts if Moses were alive he 
                                                
210 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 1, 274 (Fut. I, 225). 
211 Ibid., 273 (Fut. I, 224). 
212 There are several hadiths that assert Jesus will, upon his return, “break the cross and kill the pig.” See e.g., 
Bukhārī, al-Buyūʿ, 177. 
213 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 1, 274 (Fut. I, 225). 
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would follow Muhammad.214 Similarly, he states that when Jesus descends he will judge by 
the sharia of Muhammad. Yet, even though this saint becomes Muslim as it were—even, 
according to Ibn ‘Arabi, following Qur’anic dietary prohibitions—he remains a Christian but 
renews his status as an “heir” (wārith) of Jesus through the intermediary of Muhammad.   
Ibn ‘Arabi goes on to note that during the time when Ibn Barthalmā was seen by the 
Companions 
they did not ask him about his state in Islam and faith, nor did they ask from which of the 
sacred laws does he worship, because the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace, 
did not command them to ask such questions. We know for certain that the Prophet, may God 
bless him and grant him peace, does not acknowledge anyone upon associationism (shirk) 
and that he knew that God—out of His mercy and grace—took responsibility to teach (some) 
servants from His presence (ladunhu) knowledge that He revealed upon him, may God bless 
and grant him peace.215  
 
Here we can sense Ibn ‘Arabi’s apprehension regarding an imagined interlocutor questioning 
the theology of this Christian monk—was he an associationist (mushrik)? Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
attention to this concern shows that he took this question seriously, i.e., Christians were 
normally understood as such. Ibn ‘Arabi assures his readers that this could not have been the 
case since such a saint spiritually inherits directly from Muhammad and thus, apparently, 
must have the Prophet’s knowing permission, which would not have been granted had this 
been so. Moreover, God would not teach such a person directly from His presence. 
At this juncture of the passage, Ibn ‘Arabi begins to broaden the discussion to the 
People of the Book in general:  
If he is one who pays the poll-tax (al-jizya), we would say that the Muhammadan law (al-
sharʿ al-muḥammadī) acknowledges his religion as long as he gives the poll-tax—this is a 
specific matter of Muhammad’s universal messengership (ʿumūm risāla). Indeed, with 
                                                
214 E.g., Ibid., 170. (Fut. I, 135).  
215 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 1, 274 (Fut. I, 225).  
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Muhammad’s appearance the only law that remained was his law, which acknowledges the 
People of the Book’s law as long as they give the poll-tax.216 
 
Thus, when the discussion finally settles down to a more general conversation about the 
People of the Book, we find a succinct assertion of his doctrine of qualified subjugation 
found within the Nābigha passage above—i.e., that by obeying the Qur’anic command of 
subjugation through paying the poll-tax, the People of the Book are subsumed into the 
Muhammadan dispensation and allowed to remain upon their law.217  
Ibn ‘Arabi again makes recourse to the doctrine of qualified subjugation as part of his 
metaphysical cosmography of supersessionism in a section of the Futūḥāt elucidating how all 
of “the prophets in this universe” have been the deputies (nuwwāb) of Muhammad. Here, Ibn 
‘Arabi concisely recapitulates his entire metaphysical cosmology of Muhammad beginning 
with “his rank as a spirit (rūh) before the origination of his human bodily form,” when he 
was, according to the hadith as quoted above from the Fuṣūṣ, “a prophet when Adam was 
between water and clay.”218 Thus according to Ibn ‘Arabi, the “spiritual presence 
(rūḥāniyya)” of Muhammad “was with each prophet and messenger” during their prophetic 
career, and “he brought them assistance through his pure spirit, which manifested within their 
revealed laws (al-sharāʾiʿ) and branches of knowledge (al-ʿulūm) in the time of their 
                                                
216 Ibid. 
217 Ibn ‘Arabi’s treatment of Ibn Barthalmā above is briefly discussed by Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints 78-79. 
Chodkiewicz concludes by noting that Ibn ‘Arabi’s final recourse to the jizya serves as an exoteric way out for 
saints like Ibn Barthalmā who belonged to previous revelations abrogated by the advent of Muhammad. 
According to Chodkiewicz, through the payment of the jizya the People of the Book “are integrated into the 
Islamic order of things, and by this very fact their own Law, which theoretically has been invalidated by the 
coming of Islam, re-aquires for them a validity which is so to speak derivative. Nevertheless, as we may gather 
from the reference to the jizya, we are no longer speaking of anchorites, who by definition are outside the norms 
of a community, but of individuals who are, technically, ‘infidels’.” Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints, 79. 
218 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 1, 170 (Fut. I, 134). 
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existence as messengers.”219 Here, Ibn ‘Arabi explains that because Muhammad “did not 
exist in the sensory world in the beginning, each law is associated with whom it was sent. 
Yet in reality, each is the revealed law of Muhammad (sharʿ muḥammad).”220 Thus, Ibn 
‘Arabi clarifies that even though the Muhammadan Reality was in effect the source of these 
laws, they were still abrogated by the coming of Muhammad’s sharia when he physically 
manifested: 
As for God having abrogated all of the laws by Muhammad’s law, this abrogation has 
nothing to do (with the fact that) the previous revealed laws (sharāʾiʿ) were from his revealed 
law (sharʿ). For indeed, God has made us witness to his outward law as revealed to him, God 
bless him and grant him peace, in the Qur’an and the Sunna that abrogation (al-naskh) is with 
our (community’s) consensus, and we are also in agreement that the previous abrogated law 
was his law sent by him to us (through previous prophets). So that which comes later 
abrogated that which came before. Thus, this abrogation, as found in the Qur’an and the 
Sunna, alerts us to the fact that all of the previous revealed laws (sharāʾiʿ) that have been 
abrogated were not separate from Muhammad’s law.221 
 
Here, Ibn ‘Arabi’s conception of Muhammadan supersessionism emerges as a metaphysical 
tautology: while all prophetic laws are in essence Muhammad’s law, they are nevertheless in 
the end abrogated by Muhammad’s final dispensation. That is, of course, except for the laws 
of the People of the Book, which Ibn ‘Arabi again mentions here. Thus, he states that “when 
Jesus, peace be upon him, will descend at the end of time, he will rule by other than his own 
law, except for a portion of what he ruled with in the time of his own message.”222 As such, 
Ibn ‘Arabi asserts that Jesus’ “rule will be by the Muhammadan Law (al-sharʿ al-
muḥammadī) as established today,” but “the protected people (ahl al-dhimma) from the 
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People of the Book” will follow their own law as long as they “give the poll tax (jizya) in a 
willing state of subjugation.”223 
Conclusion 
It would be easy to speculate, as Ibn ‘Arabi’s preeminent Western biographer Claude 
Addas has, that the ongoing Crusades and the steady progress gained by Christian armies in 
Andalusia during Ibn ‘Arabi’s lifetime influenced his exclusivist attitudes towards the People 
of the Book. Indeed, in the same year that Ibn ‘Arabi penned his letter to Kaykāʾus the 
Almohads were defeated at Las Navas de Tolosa, marking a turning point for the 
Reconquista.224 Yet, as Talal Asad notes, “Meanings are never simply generated by a cultural 
logic; they belong variously to conventional projects, occasional intentions, natural events, 
and so on. For theologians such as Augustine and al-Ghazali, they also relate to all 
encompassing divine projects.”225 Thus regardless of its “origins,” which seems to entail all 
of the above (not least of which theological), this chapter has shown that such Islamic 
absolutism displayed in his letter to Kaykāʾus lies at the very discursive center of Ibn 
‘Arabi’s metaphysical anthropology, cosmology, and cosmography. 
As will be discussed in chapter 2, Chittick’s translation of (and accompanying 
commentary on) Fut. III, 153 as a proof-text for Ibn ‘Arabi’s rejection of abrogation has 
become a focal point for a post-9/11 universalist field of translation that claims Ibn ‘Arabi as 
rejecting the classical doctrine of Islamic abrogative supersessionism. Yet, as is evinced by 
                                                
223 Ibid., (Fut. I, 134-5). 
224 As Addas notes, Ibn ‘Arabi’s words to Kaykāʾus were addressed by “a Muslim who was quite justifiably 
disturbed by the conquests being made by the Christian armies, and was afraid of possible collusion with those 
armies on the part of their autochthonous co-religionists.” Addas, Quest for the Red Sulphur, 235. 
225 Asad, Genealogies of Religion, 13 (emphasis mine). 
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Ibn ‘Arabi’s reference to the panegyric verses of Nābigha elsewhere in the Futūḥāt, such 
claims are severely misleading. Indeed, Ibn ‘Arabi’s use of Nābigha’s metaphor of a 
triumphant solar king who subsumes the light of his rivals is representative of Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
entire metaphysical ethos and can even be found underlying his celebrated Tarjumān verses 
and their assertion of a heart “capable of every form.” From this perspective, Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
“religion of love”—with its attendant commentary noting Muhammad as God’s beloved who 
subsumes all prophetic “meanings”—surfaces as first and foremost a religion based upon the 
“triumph” of the Muhammadan heir as the comprehensive logoic witness of God’s 
theophanic form(s). Moreover, rather than holding exoteric religious form as secondary to 
such witnessing, Ibn ‘Arabi’s heteronomous focus on law frames his understanding of the 
Muhammadan Reality and its historical manifestation; such focus thus emerges as primary to 
his “mysticism.” 
In a synoptic passage found within the Futūḥāt, Ibn ‘Arabi summarizes the spiritual 
supremacy of the Prophet Muhammad in terms of Nābigha’s metaphor of a solar king. Here, 
Ibn ‘Arabi states:   
Know that since God made the station (manzil) of Muhammad—blessings and peace be upon 
him—that of lordship (sīyāda), he is master (sayyid). He who is other than him is of (his) 
subjects. We have thus understood that he is matchless, for indeed subjects cannot compare to 
their kings—they have a special station and (their) subjects theirs.226 
 
Ibn ‘Arabi goes on to state the now familiar assertion that Muhammad has held his sovereign 
station before the creation of Adam. He thus claims that through his particular station of “the 
comprehensive words” (jawāmiʿ al-kalim), Muhammad has been the source of “help (al-
mumidd) for every Perfect Human Being (insān kāmil),” beginning with Adam through “a 
continuous succession of vicegerents” until Muhammad’s historical appearance “in order for 
                                                
226 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 5, 164 (Fut. III, 142). 
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the wisdoms of his station to manifest by the confluence of his birth.” 227 As such, Ibn ‘Arabi 
asserts “When he appeared, it was like the sun subsumed in its light all light.”228 He thus 
concludes:  
So he confirmed from the revealed laws (sharāʾiʿ) of his (prior) deputies what he confirmed 
and he abrogated from them what he abrogated. Thus, his care for his community manifested 
through his appearance and presence—although the entire human and fiery (al-insānī wa al-
nārī)229 world is his community. But Muhammad’s community is attributed with special 
characteristics. God made them “the best community ever to be brought forth for 
humanity.”230 This grace was given through the bestowal of Muhammad’s birth (among 
them). So, it was because of the grace given to this community over the other communities 
that He gave His vicegerents their rank in the world before Muhammad’s appearance.231  
 
As I have attempted to show above, and will argue in the chapters that follow, 
discursive attempts to separate Ibn ‘Arabi’s so-called socio-political positions about the 
People of the Book (as represented by his letter to Kaykāʾus) from his “esotericism” should 
be more closely interrogated for embedded post-Enlightenment presuppositions about 
essential oppositions between the “esoteric” and the “exoteric,” the “mystical” and the 
“political,” the “religious” and the “secular,” and “law” and “belief.” While many have 
speculated that Ibn ‘Arabi’s sharia orientation that frames his metaphysics is simply a 
political expedient, I have shown here that his discourse itself is coherently otherwise.232 
Such fecund medieval Islamic thought cannot be dissociated from the socio-political 
environment that it was formed within, since such an environment is itself consequential of 
its own discourse. For in the “universe of representations,” as Daniel Dubuisson reminds us, 
                                                
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid. 
229 I.e., that of the jinn.  
230 Qur’an 3:110. 
231 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 5, 164 (Fut. III, 142). 
232 See p. 26n10 above. 
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“each thing is at one and the same time constituted by everything that surrounds it and is 
itself constituent […].”233   
Indeed, we do not have to travel far from home to see other examples of such 
mystical communalism. Ibn Sabʿīn (d. 1270), one of Ibn ‘Arabi’s immediate Andalusian 
metaphysical successors, has been heralded as working within an “interconfessional” mode 
because of his so-called “universal” Hermeticism. 234 Upon closer inspection, however, Ibn 
Sabʿīn displays a very similar supersessionist position to that of Ibn ‘Arabi, stating that 
“None of the outstanding qualities of this our religion has been heard of as accorded to more 
ancient religions, and nothing of the sort has been reported about them. The sciences of 
ancient religions have traced the ways toward our religion.”235 Not only does Ibn Sabʿīn 
praise Islam and Muhammad’s prophethood as superseding all former religions, he exhorts 
the Jews and Christians to acknowledge this fact.236  
While this chapter has fleshed out an argument against a particular universalist 
interpretation of Ibn ‘Arabi that has become regnant in the last several decades, its 
foundational insights are not altogether new. As I argue above, the preeminent scholar of 
Sufism Annemarie Schimmel’s perceptions regarding Ibn ‘Arabi’s “religion of love,” pace 
Michael Sells, prove perspicacious. Indeed, Schimmel seems to have well understood the 
                                                
233 Daniel Dubuisson, The Western Construction of Religion: Myths, Knowledge, and Ideology (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 38-39 (emphasis mine). 
234 Vincent J. Cornell, “The All-Comprehensive Circle (al-Iḥāṭa): Soul, Intellect, and the Oneness of Existence 
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situated and supersessionist nature of the metaphysical anthropology, cosmology, and 
cosmography that issued out of Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse. As such, she warns: 
One should […] never forget that even the most ardent defenders of waḥdat al-wujūd agreed 
that the person of the Prophet Muhammad was the locus of the manifestations of the Divine 
Names, the ‘Perfect Man’ par excellence, the highest model of humanity whom to imitate is 
the first and foremost duty of the believer. And Islam remained for all of them the last and 
most comprehensive Divine revelation which comprises in itself, and hence abolishes, the 
laws brought by every previous Prophet. The ‘tolerance’ of Islamic mysticism consists of its 
embracing all religions under the crown of the final revelation which was granted to 
Muhammad.237 
 
Yet, the reality of such mystical absolutism should not surprise since the bases of its 
supersessionism are to be found within the very foundations of the discursive position of 
medieval Islam itself. As Hodgson is quoted above: “Islam was to bring the true and 
uncorrupted divine guidance to all mankind, creating a world-wide society in which the true 
revelation would be the everyday norm of all the nations.” Thus Hodgson asserts, “The 
difference between Islam and the other communities was that Islam was first to rule over and 
then to supersede all others.” While, such a depiction of Islamic supersessionism seems to 
rest purely on “exoteric” socio-political power dynamics, it is clear that Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
metaphysics is infused with such totalizing cosmographic concerns. Indeed, the Andalusian 
Sufi’s monistic discourse blurs the boundaries between divine ocean and earthly shore, 
making modern attempts to decisively distinguish between religious, mystical, and socio-
political anchorage points not only anachronistic, but analytically misleading.
                                                
237 Annemarie Schimmel, Pain and Grace: A Study of Two Mystical Writers of Eighteenth-Century Muslim 
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CHAPTER TWO 
  
MAKING STARS SUNS:  
IBN ‘ARABI IN THE LIGHT OF SCHUONIAN PERENNIALISM 
  
 
One is not born traditional; one chooses to become traditional by constant 
innovation.1 
  
Is there not in all religions more or less of the true nature of religion […]?2 
It has become impossible to provide an effective defense for a single religion against 
all the others […]; to persist in doing so […] is a little like wishing to maintain the 
Ptolemaic system against the evidence of verified and verifiable astronomical data.3 
 
In his 1945 masterwork, The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times,4 the 
French Traditionalist René Guénon (d. 1951) footnotes Ibn ‘Arabi’s celebrated Tarjumān 
verses that boast of a heart “capable of every form” as an exemplary description of an adept 
who has “penetrated to the principal unity of all the traditions” and thus is “no longer tied to 
any particular traditional form.”5 Fifteen years later, Guénon’s intellectual and spiritual heir, 
Frithjof Schuon (d. 1998), would similarly reference the same verses in his best known 
                                                
1 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1993), 76. 
2 Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, trans. John Oman (London: K. 
Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., ltd., 1893), 216. 
3 Frithjof Schuon, Logic and Transcendence: A New Translation with Selected Letters, trans. Mark Perry, Jean-
Pierre Lafouge, and James S. Cutsinger, ed. James S. Cutsinger (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2009), 4. 
4 First published Le Règne de la Quantité et les Signes des Temps (Gallimard, 1945); The Reign of Quantity and 
the Signs of the Times (Luzac & Co., 1953). 
5 René Guénon, The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times, trans. Lord Northbourne, 4th ed. (Hillsdale: 
Sophia Perennis, 2004), 62-3, 63n1. 
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monograph on Islam, Understanding Islam,6 as a proof-text for what had become his 
signature idea, i.e., the universal validity of religions.7 Here, Schuon notes that each religion 
speaks an “exclusive language” because the differences between religions correspond to the 
differences between people. Thus, “if the religions are true it is because each time it is God 
who has spoken, and if they are different, it is because God has spoken in different 
‘languages’ in conformity with the diversity of the receptacles.”8 And as for the problem of 
each religion’s supposed absolute exclusivity? Schuon answers: “it is because in each of 
them God has said ‘I’.”9  
Anticipating the demurral of the “orthodox,” Schuon invokes the metaphysical 
authority of Ibn ‘Arabi and his Tarjumān verses as “Islamic” evidence for the Guénonian 
notion of “universal orthodoxy”: 
We know all too well, and it is moreover in the natural order of things, that this thesis is not 
acceptable on the level of exoteric orthodoxies, but is so on the level of universal orthodoxy, 
that to which Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi, the great enunciator of gnosis in Islam, bore witness in 
these terms: “My heart is open to every form: it is a pasture for gazelles, and a cloister for 
Christian monks, a temple for idols, the Kaaba of the pilgrim, the tables of the Torah, and the 
book of the Quran. I practice the religion of Love; in whatsoever direction His caravans 
advance, the religion of Love shall be my religion and my faith.”10 
 
After twenty years, Schuon would once again call upon the Andalusian Sufi to help exposit 
the Perennial Religion (religio perennis) and its epistemological method of “gnosis” by 
alluding to the same lines: 
                                                
6 First published Comprendre l’Islam (Gallimard, 1961); Understanding Islam (Allen & Unwin, 1963). 
7 This idea was originally put forth in Schuon’s first book: De l’ Unité transcendante des religions (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1948); The Transcendent Unity of Religions, trans. Peter Townsend (New York: Harper & Row, 
1975). 
8 Frithjof Schuon, Understanding Islam (Bloomington: World Wisdom Books, 1998), 36. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 36-37 (emphasis mine). 
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The religio perennis is fundamentally this: the Real entered into the illusory so that the 
illusory might be able to return into the Real. It is this mystery, together with the 
metaphysical discernment and contemplative concentration that are its complement, which 
alone is important in an absolute sense from the point of view of gnosis; for the gnostic—in 
the etymological and rightful sense of that word—there is in the last analysis no other 
“religion”. It is what Ibn Arabi called the “religion of Love” […].11 
 
While Ibn ‘Arabi and his ideas are often invoked by Guénon and Schuon as 
representative of the Primordial Tradition or the Perennial Religion, assertions that Ibn 
‘Arabi’s thought was formative in the creation of the Western Perennialist tradition under 
their successive leadership appear to be overblown.12 Yet, in the wake of 9/11 there has been 
a spate of Perennialist leaning articles and books that focus on the thought of Ibn ‘Arabi and 
its usefulness in the context of contemporary religious pluralism and interfaith dialogue. 
Many of these books specifically compare Ibn ‘Arabi with supposed pre-modern 
universalists of other faiths—most typically his assumed medieval Christian counterpart the 
Dominican theologian Meister Eckhart (d. 1327).13   
                                                
11 Frithjof Schuon, Light on the Ancient Worlds (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006), 120. Originally 
published as Regards sur les mondes anciens (Editions traditionnelles, 1980). 
12 Most recently, Thierry Zarcone asserted that “the doctrine of Ibn ‘Arabi clearly influenced” Guénon and 
Schuon through Balyānī’s Risālat al-aḥadiyya, as wrongly attributed to Ibn ‘Arabi by Ivan Aguéli (and others). 
Thierry Zarcone, “Rereadings and Transformations of Sufism in the West,” Diogenes 47, no. 187 (1999): 117. 
As will be discussed further in chapter 3, Schuon’s frustration with Ibn ‘Arabi’s Ashʿarism and “Semitic” 
literalism, in the final analysis, seems to inspire more of his distain than praise. While it is clear that Risālat al-
aḥadiyya serves an important role in the oeuvre of both Guénon and Schuon, Schuon’s major inspiration from 
Ibn ‘Arabi appears to have come from either his particular reading of the Fuṣūṣ or ʿAbd al-Razzaq al-Qāshānī’s 
commentary misattributed to Ibn ‘Arabi; see chapter 3, p. 221n285. For a thorough treatment of the doctrinal 
differences and historical consequences of the misattribution of Balyānī’s text see Chodkiewicz’s introduction 
and detailed notes in Awḥad al-Dīn Balyānī, Epître sur l’Unicité Absolue, trans. Michel Chodkiewicz (Paris: 
Les Deux Oceans, 1982).  
13 Such material has been generally published under similar titles, which often share the same translated 
passages of Ibn ‘Arabi; e.g., Reza Shah-Kazemi, Paths to Transcendence: According to Shankara, Ibn Arabi, 
and Meister Eckhart (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006); Ghasem Kakaie, “Interreligious Dialogue: Ibn 
‘Arabi and Meister Eckhart,” Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi Society 45 (2009): 45-63; Robert J. Dobie, 
Logos and Revelation: Ibn ‘Arabi, Meister Eckhart, and Mystical Hermeneutics (Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2010); Sayafaatun Almirzanah, When Mystic Masters Meet: Towards a New 
Matrix for Christian-Muslim Dialogue (New York: Blue Dome, 2011). For a critical comparison of the 
doctrines of Ibn Arabi and Meister Eckhart most often claimed to be nearly synonymous see Ian Almond, 
“Divine Needs, Divine Illusions: Preliminary Remarks Toward a Comparative Study of Meister Eckhart and Ibn 
Al’Arabi,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 10 (2001): 263–82. 
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Writing in the foreword to Sayafaatun Almirzanah’s When Mystic Masters Meet (the 
most recent iteration of this now standard comparison), Islamic studies scholar John Esposito 
observes that in the wake of globalization and the communication revolution, there is an 
increasing need within “multi-religious nation states” for inclusivity and interfaith dialogue. 
In order to avoid the pitfalls of irreconcilable religious doctrine, however, Esposito calls for 
“a new matrix” of interfaith dialogue that acknowledges difference, while being “firmly 
rooted in shared spiritual experiences.”14 As proof of traditional precedents to such an 
innovative approach, Ibn ‘Arabi’s ideas—along with those of his Dominican analog Meister 
Eckhart—are here claimed by Esposito to be a type of “spirituality” that emphasizes the 
“Oneness of Being/God” over the theology and doctrine of “believers and religious 
institutions” who use “finite, limited language to describe the ineffable.”15 The separation of 
a formless essence from formal doctrine is thus assumed to be at the core of Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
thought in When Mystic Masters Meet. As Almirzanah subsequently notes, Ibn ‘Arabi’s way 
is epitomized by the separation of a unitive and singular “primordial ideal religion” (dīn) 
from the “various ‘paths’ or ‘laws’ […]” of religious traditions.16  
 Indeed, such a dissociation of a sui generis religious “essence” from historical 
contexts, discursive traditions, and embodied practices is emblematic of the modern 
emergence of depoliticized theology and the attendant construction of a universal category of 
religion “as a transhistorical and transcultural phenomenon.”17 In her 1997 foreword to 
                                                
14 John L. Esposito, foreword to When Mystic Masters Meet, xii.  
15 Ibid., xiii.  
16 Almirzanah, When Mystic Masters Meet, 212. 
17 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 28. Regarding the depoliticization of modern theology see Hugh 
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Schuon’s revised edition of Understanding Islam, Annemarie Schimmel perspicaciously 
observes that “Religion” for Schuon is “something sui generis,” which Schimmel goes on to 
note “cannot be described in scholarly technical terms and whose goal is not to tackle social 
and political problems […].”18 Rather, for Schuon, religion’s job is “to guide humankind to a 
spiritual level on which all problems are seen” through the “the eternal wisdom” of God.19 In 
the same year that Schimmel penned these reflections, Russell McCutcheon published his 
well-known monograph Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and 
the Politics of Nostalgia. Building on the work of Wayne Proudfoot and J. Z. Smith, 
McCutcheon traces the discourse on sui generis religion through a long standing tradition of 
German Protestant scholarship going back to Friedrich Schleiermacher (d. 1834).20 Indeed, as 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith notes, Schleiermacher’s 1799 work Über die Religion (On Religion) 
appears to be “the first book ever written on religion as such […].”21 As McCutcheon 
observes, the conceptual category of “religion” in sui generis terms “constitutes a private, 
interiorized dimension of experience that, although manifested outwardly in varying forms, is 
shared across all religions regardless of their historical differences.”22  
                                                                                                                                                  
Nicholson, Comparative Theology and the Problem of Religious Rivalry (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 50. 
18 Annemarie Schimmel, foreword to Understanding Islam, by Frithjof Schuon (Bloomington: World Wisdom 
Books, 1998), v. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Russell T. McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of 
Nostalgia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 57, 60. 
21 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 45 (emphasis 
mine). 
22 McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion, 60.  
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With the general antipathy many Perennialist authors who sanctify “tradition” have 
for liberal Protestantism, a comparison with Schleiermacher’s discourse of sui generis 
religion may seem strained.23 While the metaphysical framework of Schuonian Perennialism 
is ostensibly at odds with Schleiermacherian liberalism, in terms of discursive practice such 
differences are surprisingly formal.24 Indeed, the type of non-reductionist universalism 
inaugurated by Schleiermacher’s recognition of individual religious formation finds 
important thematic and strategic echoes in Schuon.25 Moreover, both positions concede that 
the conflicting practices, beliefs, and laws of religious traditions are simultaneously validated 
and transcended by an underlying religious “essence” that unites them.26 Thus, in discussing 
                                                
23 E.g., René Guénon, The Crisis of the Modern World (Hillsdale: Sophia Perennis, 2004), 61-2; and Frithjof 
Schuon, Christianity/Islam: Perspectives on Esoteric Ecumenism, ed. James S. Cutsinger (Bloomington: World 
Wisdom, 2008), 23, 32n11. 
24 Indeed, much like Schuonian Perennialism, Schleiermacher’s notion of God consciousness is grounded 
within a Neoplatonic notion that all things are reflective of a transcendent reality grounded within a unified 
cosmos. Where Schleiermacher most differs from the Perennialists, however, is his “modern” turn toward an 
immanent progressivism. Following a Hegelian-like historical teleology, Schleiermacher sees the divine Spirit 
(heiliger Geist) working through human culture and religion in a melioristic fashion. As Jens Zimmermann 
notes, for Schleiermacher, “the assumption of an organic teleology intrinsic to human nature tends to blur the 
distinction between culture and Spirit.” Jens Zimmermann, Humanism and Religion: A Call for the Renewal of 
Western Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 148. For Schuon, however, true religion qua 
esoterism understands Reality in starkly Neoplatonic terms as the necessary source of all contingent realities. 
The unity of the one Reality is that which is expressed by all religions, but as such is hidden from the 
slumbering consciousness of humanity and is, in general, negatively related to human culture, which is in this 
view progressively degenerative. See Jean-Baptiste Aymard and Patrick Laude, Frithjof Schuon: Life and 
Teachings (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 84. 
25 E.g., regarding revelation Schleiermacher states, “Every sacred writing is in itself a glorious production, a 
speaking monument from the heroic time of religion, but, through servile reverence, it would become merely a 
mausoleum, a monument that a great spirit once was there, but is now no more. […] Not every person has 
religion who believes in a sacred writing, but only the man who has a lively and immediate understanding of it, 
and who, therefore, so far as he himself is concerned, could most easily do without it.” Moreover, even though 
Schleiermacher provisionally accepts the possibility of “producing” a new religion for the person whom the 
existing forms are not adequate, he qualifies this notion by asserting that “[m]ost men, following their nature, 
will belong to an existing form, and there will be only few whom none suffices.” Schleiermacher, On Religion, 
91, 224-5. 
26 Both Schleiermacher and Schuon ultimately reject rational epistemology and morality as a basis of religious 
“truth” and agree that since the religions are diverse and conflictive, the essence of religion is accessed through 
unmediated intuitive “feeling” (for Schleiermacher) or “gnosis” (for Schuon). 
 98 
Ibn ‘Arabi’s so-called doctrine of religious diversity, Reza Shah-Kazemi, who writes openly 
from a Schuonian perspective, notes:  
The logical concomitant of the view that all religious paths are validated by their divine 
origin and goal is that this divine element—as Essence—transcends the religious forms 
emerging therefrom and leading thereto. In other words, the distinction between religious 
form and divine Essence at one and the same time validates the form as a means of access to 
the Essence whilst also highlighting the inevitable relativity of all such forms in the face of 
the Essence.27 
 
While chapter 3 will be concerned to flesh out some of the more exclusivist presuppositions 
underlying such essentialist strategies of religious universalism, this chapter throws into 
relief a dominant Schuonian Perennialist discursive regime in the Western construction of 
Ibn ‘Arabi and Sufism. Not only has Schuon’s discourse been seminal in the association of 
Ibn ‘Arabi with transhistorical and transcultural formations of “universal validity” and 
religious pluralism, it continues to inform the discourses of new generations of scholars. 
This chapter thus proceeds in roughly two parts. The first historicizes Schuonian 
Perennialism and establishes its prominence within the contemporary Western interpretation 
of Ibn ‘Arabi. Through a comparison with the universalism of Schleiermacher, Schuonian 
Perennialism is here situated within a modern “experiential-expressivist” model notable for 
its “Copernican” turn away from premodern models of religious absolutism. After a brief 
excursus on the distinction between soteriological and epistemological “universalism” in 
relation to Ibn ‘Arabi’s thought, the second part resumes the close readings of Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
discourse on the People of the Book that began in chapter 1 and compares them with 
particularly determinative assertions made by Ibn ‘Arabi’s foremost contemporary Schuonian 
commentators.  
                                                
27 Shah-Kazemi, Paths to Transcendence, 123. 
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While chapter 1 established Ibn ‘Arabi’s doctrine of abrogation (naskh) and the 
qualified subjugation of the People of the Book through the payment of the poll-tax (jizya), it 
also revealed that Ibn ‘Arabi did acknowledge that the religions of the People of the Book 
maintain a mode of “validity,” although inferior to the Muslims. Building on the more 
generalized Middle Period intellectual historicization offered in chapter 1, in what follows I 
historicize Ibn ‘Arabi’s positions on the People of the Book from within the local context of 
his Andalusian home of Seville and his intellectual engagement with the theological and 
juridical discourse of the polemical polymath Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064). In light of such a 
historicization, the remainder of this chapter explores traditional polemical debates regarding 
the “validity” of pre-Qur’anic scripture and Ibn ‘Arabi’s subsequent position on the 
corruption (taḥrīf) of previous revelation. Here, I show that Ibn ‘Arabi holds that the 
scriptures of the People of the Book are textually corrupted and not simply wrongly 
interpreted as the Schuonian Perennialists claim. This chapter concludes by returning to the 
issue of the “validity” of the People of the Book brought up in chapter 1 and shows that 
through their willing subjugation they attain felicity. Such findings thus directly challenge 
the Perennialist notion that for Ibn ‘Arabi religious achievement is attained through a gnostic 
response to a “valid” set of revealed symbols that transcend heteronomous frameworks of 
authority and obedience. 
Ibn ‘Arabi, the Perennialist “Tradition,” and the Importance of Schuon  
Writing in 1909 under the pseudonym Palingénius at the start of a career as one of the 
most influential twentieth-century European esotericists,28 René Guénon disparaged occult 
                                                
28 Guénon assumed this name while serving as the holy bishop for the Gnostic Church in Paris. See William 
Quinn, “Guénon, René Jean Marie Joseph,” Dictionary of Gnosis and Western Esotericism, ed. Wouter J. 
Hanegraaff (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 442. On Guénon’s influence see ibid., 444-45. 
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“doctrines” as spiritually ineffective and ultimately leading to “absurd consequences.” 
Rather, he posited an esoteric quest for “gnosis,” which he claimed was beyond the purview 
of any type of systematization: “Gnosis in its broadest and highest sense is knowledge; true 
gnosticism cannot be a school or a particular system, but it is above all the search for the 
integral Truth.”29 According to Guénon, the only reliable guide for the attainment of gnosis 
was the “the orthodox Tradition contained in the sacred books of all peoples [. . .].”30 Such 
“orthodox Tradition,” Guénon claimed, was “the same everywhere, despite its various forms 
appropriate for every race and era.”31 Throughout the next decade, Guénon gradually 
dissociated himself from the occult movement of fin de siècle France by developing his 
peculiar concept of “orthodox Tradition,”32 which he would come to call the “Primordial 
Tradition” (la Tradition primordial). The Primordial Tradition would become synonymous 
with such terms as philosophia perennis, sophia perennis, and religio perennis that came to 
mark the contemporary esoteric movement of Perennialism popularized by Frithjof Schuon.33 
 Guénon and Schuon are commonly viewed as the “dual originators and expositors”34 
of what is variously referred to as Traditionalism or Perennialism.35 It has even recently been 
                                                
29 Palingénius (R. Guénon), “La Gnose et les écoles spiritualistes,” La Gnose, no. 2 (1909): 20. 
30 Ibid., 21. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Martin Lings notes that Guénon’s particular spiritual “function” was “to remind twentieth century man of the 
need for	  orthodoxy […].” According to Lings, Guénon restored to the world the “original meaning” of 
orthodoxy as a “rectitude of opinion […] which compels the intelligent man not merely to reject heresy, but also 
to recognize the validity of all those faiths which conform to those criteria on which his own faith depends for 
its orthodoxy.” Martin Lings, introduction to The essential René Guénon: Metaphysics, Tradition, and the 
Crisis of Modernity, by René Guénon, ed. John Herlihy (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2009), xxvi-vii. 
33 Regarding the origins of the “Perennial Philosophy” (philosophia perennis) see the introduction to this study, 
p. 4n12.  
34 William Stoddart, foreword to René Guénon: Some Observations, by Frithjof Schuon, ed. William Stoddart 
(Hillsdale: Sophia Perennis, 2004), xi. 
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asserted, in evangelical-like fashion, that “Guénon was the pioneer, and Schuon the 
fulfillment.”36 Indeed, Perennialism developed from an intellectual movement into a full 
fledged  “initiatic tradition” when Schuon took on the mantle of spiritual guide (i.e., shaykh) 
for the ʿAlāwiyya Sufi order at the end of 1936,37 which became the ʿAlāwiyya Maryamiyya 
in the mid 1960s due to his special devotion to the Virgin Mary.38 After Guénon’s death in 
1951, “Schuon gradually assumed the role of the premier expositor of the philosophia 
perennis […].”39  
Yet, Schuon critically distinguished his version of Perennialism from Guénonian 
Traditionalism. Unlike the strict French Catholic upbringing of his predecessor, Schuon was 
brought up in the Lutheran Church in Basel, Switzerland until he converted to Catholicism at 
the age of fourteen at the request of his dying father. His early interest in Orientalism was 
complemented by a wide reading in German romanticism from his father’s library.40 
Schuon’s ecumenical upbringing in tandem with his interest in German romanticism no 
doubt influenced his evolution from the insularism of Guénon’s metaphysics and his 
rejection of the “anti-traditional” West. Indeed, Schuon’s most significant difference with 
Guénon revolved around the validity of Christian initiation. He strongly disagreed with 
                                                                                                                                                  
35 Traditionalism is more commonly associated with Guénon and Perennialism with Schuon; see p. 103n45 
below. 
36 Stoddart, foreword to René Guénon, xi. 
37 Aymard and Laude, Frithjof Schuon, 23; see the introduction to this study, p. 3n10. 
38 For a non-hagiographical, albeit tendentious, biography of Schuon’s role as Sufi shaykh and leader of a 
Universalist religious movement see Mark J. Sedgwick, Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the 
Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 73-94, 147-77. 
39 William Quinn, “Schuon, Frithjof (also known as Shaykh ʿIsâ Nur al-Dîn Ahmad al-Shâdhilî al-Darqâwî al-
ʿAlawî al-Maryamî),” Dictionary of Gnosis and Western Esotericism, ed. Wouter J. Hanegraaff (Leiden: Brill, 
2006), 1044. 
40 Aymard and Laude, Frithjof Schuon, 5, 7, 10. 
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Guénon’s contention that the Church had lost its early connection to esotericism.41 Indeed, 
Schuon’s redemption of Western forms of spirituality within the Traditionalist framework 
included “orthodox” Protestantism, i.e., Lutheranism, which according to Schuon, 
“incontestably manifests a Christian possibility—a limited one, no doubt, and excessive 
through certain of its features, but not intrinsically illegitimate and therefore representative of 
certain theological, moral, and even mystical values.”42 In a 1982 letter, Schuon wrote 
regarding Lutheranism: “It cannot be pure heresy. . . . Its priorities are simplicity, inwardness 
and trust in God; nothing else touched me in my early childhood.”43 
Schuon’s ecumenism would come to uniquely define his approach, which, as Paul 
Sérant notes, “above all intends to show the profound agreement between Eastern and 
Western traditions […].”44 Nevertheless, the importance of “the Guénonian message” as a 
precursor to Schuon’s lifework and self-image is without question and was contextualized by 
Schuon himself in spiritual terms.45 Indeed, as John Herlihy notes, Guénon’s emphasis on the 
Primordial Tradition as the source of the “world religions” 
prepared the way for an understanding of what Frithjof Schuon described as “the transcendent 
unity” of the world’s religious traditions, wherein each religion casts the same universal truth 
within the mold of an individual form that suits a particular mentality and a given era.46 
                                                
41 Excepting some forms of Freemasonry, Guénon saw the West as entirely devoid of initiatic traditions. For 
Schuon’s criticisms on Guénon, see Frithjof Schuon, René Guénon: Some Observations, ed. William Stoddart 
(Hillsdale: Sophia Perennis, 2004). In regards to Christianity as a valid initiatic path see ibid., 37-47. 
42 Frithjof Schuon, Christianity/Islam: Perspectives on Esoteric Ecumenism, ed. James S. Cutsinger 
(Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2008), 23. 
43 Frithjof Schuon quoted in Aymard and Laude, Frithjof Schuon, 7 (emphasis mine). 
44 Paul Sérant, “Frithjof Schuon and René Guénon,” in René Guénon: Some Observations, by Frithjof Schuon, 
ed. William Stoddart (Hillsdale: Sophia Perennis, 2004), 59. 
45 Indeed, Schuon saw his own “initiatic function” as a shaykh to be “the ‘providential complement’ of the 
Guénonian message,” since “Guénon had never been conferred with an initiatic function.” Aymard and Laude, 
Frithjof Schuon, 67, 161n70. 
46 John Herlihy, preface to The essential René Guénon: Metaphysics, Tradition, and the Crisis of Modernity, by 
René Guénon, ed. John Herlihy (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2009), xi. 
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Here, Herlihy makes direct reference to Schuon’s 1948 publication The Transcendent Unity 
of Religions (De l’Unité transcendante des Religions), which as mentioned in the 
introduction to this study has become the emblematic phrase of Schuon’s lifework and is 
often associated with the teachings of Ibn ‘Arabi. For example, a recent Perennialist 
monograph on Sufism claims that The Transcendent Unity of Religions is in reality an 
“allusive” presentation of Ibn ‘Arabi’s ideas.47 Indeed, in an important 1972 essay, Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr—an overt initiate of Schuon’s ʿAlāwiyya48— describes Sufism as the Islamic 
vehicle for the attainment of the Schuonian ideal with Ibn ‘Arabi at the helm: 
The Sufi is one who seeks to transcend the world of forms, to journey from multiplicity to 
Unity, from the particular to the Universal. He leaves the many for the One and through this 
very process is granted the vision of the One in the many. For him all forms become 
transparent, including religious forms, thus revealing to him their unique origin. Sufism or 
Islamic gnosis is the most universal affirmation of that perennial wisdom which stands at the 
heart of Islam and in fact of all religion as such. It is this supreme doctrine of Unity—which 
is itself unique (al-tawḥîd wâḥid)—that the Sufis call the ‘religion of love’ and to which Ibn 
‘Arabî refers in his well-known verses in the Tarjumân al-ashwâq. This love is not merely 
sentiment or emotions, it is the realized aspect of gnosis. It is a transcendent knowledge that 
reveals the inner unity of religions.49 
 
Given such associations of the Schuonian notion of the “transcendent unity of religions” with 
Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse, it is perhaps not surprising that both Guénon and Schuon—as the 
“dual expositors” of Perennialism—have been compared to the Andalusian Sufi himself.50 
Furthermore, such associations go some way to explaining why post-9/11 the conceptual 
                                                
47 See Eric Geoffroy, Introduction to Sufism: The Inner Path of Islam (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2010), 
187. 
48 William C. Chittick, introduction to The Essential Seyyed Hossein Nasr, by Seyyed Hossein Nasr 
(Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2007), xi. 
49 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Sufi Essays (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 146-7 (underline 
mine). 
50 See Pietro Nutrizio, “Rene Guenon: A Biographical Note,” in René Guénon, The Lord of the World: Le Roi 
du monde (Ripon: Coombe Springs Press, 1983), 68; and Aymard and Laude, Frithjof Schuon, 72. 
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legacy of Schuonian Perennialism has been so intertwined with the thought of Ibn ‘Arabi, 
interfaith dialogue, and pluralistic approaches to the Qur’an.51 Yet, the academic use of 
Schuonian Perennialism to present Ibn ‘Arabi’s ideas has not simply been a post-9/11 
phenomena.  
As William Chittick recently points out, Nasr’s “strong endorsement of the writings 
of Schuon” in three of his first English books published in the mid 1960s by Harvard 
University Press proved “instrumental in bringing the traditionalist school to the notice of 
official academia.”52 In Three Muslim Sages, the first of the Harvard publications, Nasr 
spends an entire chapter focusing on Ibn ‘Arabi where he forcefully asserts that “[a]ll 
attempts at a profound rapprochement with the other religions made by Muslims today can 
and should be based on the rich foundations prepared by Ibn ‘Arabī and Rūmī.”53 Yet, as late 
as 1986 in the first installment of a widely respected three-part scholarly article on Ibn 
‘Arabi, James Morris lamented that there was still no adequate introductory study of the 
“essential ‘rhetorical’ aspect of Ibn ʿArabī’s writings,” which “unites many methods, styles, 
and traditional subjects in view of certain recurrent spiritual intentions […].”54 But Morris 
                                                
51 See p. 94n13 above. Added to this list should be Shah-Kazemi’s The Other in the Light of the One, where Ibn 
‘Arabi’s ideas as interpreted from within a Perennialist framework play a central role. Reza Shah-Kazemi, The 
Other in the Light of the One: The Universality of the Qur’ān and Interfaith Dialogue (Cambridge: Islamic 
Texts Society, 2006). 
52 William C. Chittick, introduction to The Essential Seyyed Hossein Nasr, by Seyyed Hossein Nasr 
(Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2007), xiii. Sedgwick has recently noted the ubiquitous presence of Schuonian 
Perennialism within Western publishing houses since 1950: “In the period 1950–99 Schuon and 23 other 
identified followers published some 220 books. Eighty of these were well enough received to be translated into 
other languages (135 translations in total) or to go into new editions. Thirty were major works […].” Mark J. 
Sedgwick, Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth 
Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 167. 
53 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Three Muslim Sages: Avicenna, Suhrawardī, Ibn ʻArabī (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1964), 117 (emphasis mine). 
54 James W Morris, “Ibn ʿArabī and His Interpreters. Part I: Recent French Translations” Journal of the 
American Oriental Society 106, no. 3 (1986):  541n8. 
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importantly qualified this assertion, noting that: 
the best illustration of the needed sensitivity to that crucial dimension of Ibn ʿArabī’s writing, 
usually phrased in terms of comments on “Sufism” in general, is to be found in the various 
collections of essays by F. Schuon on Islamic subjects […]. However, those reflections 
generally presuppose a great familiarity with both the writings of Ibn ʿArabī and the broader 
Sufi traditions of which they are a part.55 
 
More recently, Morris importantly observes what he notes as “the profound effect of 
the abundant writings of F. Schuon in applying the central ideas of Ibn ‘Arabī to articulating 
(but in the long run also deeply shaping) an understanding of the spiritual dimensions of 
religious life […].”56 Schuon’s particular application of Ibn ‘Arabi’s ideas, Morris continues, 
has profoundly appealed  
to several generations of philosophers and theologians seeking to develop a comprehensive, 
non-reductive “philosophy of religions” enabling mutual understanding and active co-
operation between the followers of different religious traditions and the increasing number of 
citizens who do not consciously identify exclusively with any particular historical tradition.57  
 
And yet, Morris concludes, “Because of the peculiar vagaries of academic opinion and 
respectability, this wide-ranging influence is rarely mentioned publicly […], but is to be 
found virtually everywhere.”58 
 While such a statement may seem oddly conspiratorial, public discretion regarding 
loyalty to a Schuonian interpretive framework is certainly true in the case of Chittick, who as 
mentioned in chapter 1, is recognized as one of the foremost Western experts on Ibn ‘Arabi 
today.59 While Chittick’s meticulous and erudite translations have become a standard source 
                                                
55 Ibid. 
56 James Winston Morris, “Ibn ‘Arabi in the ‘Far West,’” Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi Society 24 
(2001): 105-6. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Morris, “Ibn ‘Arabi in the ‘Far West,’” 106 (emphasis mine). 
59 E.g., Mark Sedgwick situates Chittick as the leading American authority on Ibn ‘Arabi. Sedgwick, Against 
the Modern World, 157. 
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for the majority of academic and popular references to Ibn ‘Arabi in English, and especially 
for Perennialists themselves, Chittick’s own opinion regarding Schuonian Perennialism has 
remained inconspicuous. Indeed, Chittick’s definitive work on Ibn ‘Arabi and religious 
pluralism, Imaginal Worlds, only contains a brief reference to Schuon as a Sufi authority 
“who writes with intellectual rigor […].”60 Yet, in a few select places Chittick has expressed 
his views more openly. While references to Perennialists like Schuon and Nasr are found 
scattered throughout Chittick’s writings, the following two examples are exceptional. 
 First, in 2006, Chittick’s essay “Sufism and Islam”61 was published in an anthology 
on Sufism described by Nasr in his foreword to the volume as “one of the most valuable 
anthologies devoted to Sufism in a Western language […].”62 While Chittick’s article may 
indeed have been written at an earlier stage in his career given the dated references, its 
appearance in a volume whose preface asserts the following is telling: “These particular 
essays […] are a sampler of the thought and approach of writers who would consider 
themselves ‘traditionalists’ or ‘perennialists’.”63 In the essay itself, Chittick argues that 
Sufism is an “esoteric” path of gnosis that understands “exoteric” doctrine to be merely “a 
symbolic prefiguration” of knowledge.64 Indeed, such explicit Schuonian themes are 
supported by references to overt Perennialist authors, which in and of themselves offer a 
                                                
60 William C. Chittick, Imaginal Worlds: Ibn al-ʻArabī and the Problem of Religious Diversity (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1994), 4, 177n4. 
61 William C. Chittick, “Sufism and Islam,” in Sufism: Love and Wisdom, ed. Jean-Louis Michon and Roger 
Gaetani (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006), 21-32. 
62 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, foreword to Sufism: Love and Wisdom, ix. 
63 Roger Gaetani, preface to Sufism: Love and Wisdom, xiv. 
64 Chittick, “Sufism and Islam,” 31. 
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significant slice into the “classical” Perennialist oeuvre including multiple works by Schuon 
and Nasr as well as references to Guénon, Titus Burckhardt, and Martin Lings.65 
Second, in his 2007 anthology of essays, Science of the Cosmos, Science of the Soul, 
Chittick sets aside his eminent role as translator and lets his own voice come to the fore in a 
sustained argument for the contemporary revival of the Islamic “intellectual” (ʿaqlī) tradition 
in opposition to its “transmitted” (naqlī) counterpart. Chittick identifies this intellectual 
tradition with premodern Islamic philosophy and Sufism qua internal paths of “self-
knowledge.”66 Chittick’s proximity to Schuonian Perennialism is most evident in chapter 5, 
which is an exposition on the philosophy of Nasr whom he describes as “one of the few 
today who speak for this [‘intellectual’] tradition.”67 Even in this chapter, however, Chittick 
maintains an outsider perspective, taking “Nasr and the traditionalists” to task for using “the 
esoteric/exoteric dichotomy as a key conceptual tool for understanding religion”—which, not 
without irony, Chittick takes recourse to in his “Sufism and Islam” article referenced above 
but here argues is unhelpful for “dealing with the actual texts.”68 This being said, Chittick’s 
predilection for Nasr’s Perennialist perspective is clear throughout. In defense of Nasr’s own 
penchant for quoting Schuon, Chittick states: 
                                                
65 Such authors are classified by Sedgwick as “hard” Traditionalists and are mainly published by overt 
Perennialist publishers for small specialized audiences. See Sedgwick, Against the Modern World, 167. 
66 William C. Chittick, Science of the Cosmos, Science of the Soul: The Pertinence of Islamic Cosmology in the 
Modern World (Oxford: Oneworld, 2007), viii-ix. 
67 Ibid., xi. 
68 Ibid., 79, 81. Yet, in the final analysis, Chittick’s criticism appears to be a rather constrained concession to an 
increasing academic consensus around such terms. On closer inspection, however, Chittick’s repeated program 
of reviving an “intellectual” (ʿaqlī) tradition over a “transmitted” (naqlī) one presents the same opposition in 
more indigenous terms. Indeed, the presentation of Schuonian Perennialism as an “esoteric” path is based 
precisely on the distinction of “intellect” over traditional form; e.g., see Aymard and Laude, Frithjof Schuon, 
94. 
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The fact that he does not always cite Muslim authorities, but instead is likely to refer to 
Frithjof Schuon or Ananda Coomaraswamy, cannot be taken as evidence that his views do 
not have the Islamic support that he claims. He is not speaking as a preacher […], but rather 
as a philosopher who has found some of the clearest expositions of his own intellectual vision 
in contemporary authors.69 
 
Chittick then makes the following observation about Nasr, which is critical for my analysis 
of Chittick’s hermeneutical perspective in the present chapter:  
Nasr, of course, does not write only about Islam, but also about other religions as well. Like 
Schuon and Coomaraswamy, he claims universal validity for a point of view that he and they 
usually call “traditional” and that observers have often called “traditionalist” or 
“perennialist.”70 
 
As we will see, the idea of “universal validity”—which even here is identified by Chittick as 
specific to Schuonian Perennialism—often forms a subtext of Chittick’s approach to Ibn 
‘Arabi and thus marks his interpretation as particularly Perennialist. Indeed, it is worth noting 
here that in an article arguing for Schuon’s Islamic credentials, Nasr includes Chittick in a 
list of ten well-known American and European Islamicists, “all of whom,” according to Nasr, 
“were deeply influenced by Schuon’s works […].”71 
Scholars who are openly devoted to Schuonian Perennialism, such as Reza Shah-
Kazemi,72 can quite effectively use Chittick’s translations to present a specific universalist 
image of Ibn ‘Arabi that leaves out a particular set of polemical themes present within his 
writings—themes that I argue are too important to disregard, especially for any discursive 
analysis that attempts to historicize Ibn ‘Arabi’s ideas. Those committed to the Perennialist 
                                                
69 Chittick, Science of the Cosmos, 78 (emphasis mine). 
70 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
71 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Frithjof Schuon and the Islamic Tradition,” in The Essential Sophia, ed. Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr and Katherine O’Brien (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006), 268. 
72 Shah-Kazemi writes overtly from within the Perennialist school, and his two full length works that argue for 
an authentic Islamic mode of religious universalism, i.e., Paths to Transcendence and The Other in the Light, 
are dedicated to Frithjof Schuon and Martin Lings respectively.  
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framework, however, will no doubt respond that the Andalusian Sufi’s metaphysics 
transcend history and thus rise above the more mundanely secular issues of politics, 
authority, and religious polemics. I maintain, however, that while Ibn ‘Arabi’s view of the 
religious Other may trouble our modern sensibilities, such a transhistorical approach 
essentializes his complex metaphysical ideas—which are fully imbricated with the situational 
discourse of their historical origin—and thus ultimately abuse them.  
Ibn ‘Arabi and the Transcendent Unity of Religions: A Perennialist Imperative 
In his 1972 essay “Islam and the Encounter of Religions,” Seyyed Hossein Nasr laid 
out what he felt was at stake in the contemporary study of religion. The “essential problem” 
with such a field of study, according to Nasr, “is how to preserve religious truth, traditional 
orthodoxy, the dogmatic theological structures of one’s own religion and yet gain knowledge 
of other traditions and accept them as spiritually valid ways and roads to God.”73 Given 
Nasr’s intellectual and spiritual standing in the Perennialist movement as, in the recent words 
of Chittick, “the foremost living member of the traditionalist school,”74 such a prescriptive 
challenge for the study of religion should not be taken as empty rhetoric likely to go 
unheeded by those who follow his lead. In fact, the Perennialist scholar Shah-Kazemi has 
recently dubbed Nasr’s 1972 essay as “one of the most important contemporary expressions 
[…] of the principle of the ‘transcendent unity of religions’ from the point of view of the 
Islamic tradition as a whole.”75 Indeed, it was in his 1972 essay, as cited above, that Nasr 
                                                
73 Nasr, Sufi Essays, 127 (emphasis mine).  
74 William C. Chittick, introduction to The Essential Seyyed Hossein Nasr, by Seyyed Hossein Nasr 
(Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2007), ix. 
75 Shah-Kazemi, The Other in the Light, xvii. 
 110 
compared Ibn ‘Arabi’s “religion of love” with Schuon’s emblematic theme of “transcendent 
unity.”  
The doctrine of the transcendent unity of religions has been used by Perennialists to 
argue that within the Qur’an and the esoteric writings of the Sufis there is an 
acknowledgement of a deeper religious unity marking all revealed traditions as equally valid. 
This is so, they argue, in spite of the triumphant assertion of abrogative supersessionism that 
was held by most scholars of the medieval Islamic tradition, which, as was shown in chapter 
1, included Ibn ‘Arabi. Thus, Nasr, in the passage quoted above from his 1972 essay, asserts 
that “Sufism or Islamic gnosis is the most universal affirmation of that perennial wisdom 
which stands at the heart of Islam and in fact of all religion as such.” He then, as we recall, 
invokes Ibn ‘Arabi’s “religion of love” as most representative of this perennial wisdom—as 
the true religion within all outward religious forms. Here, in order to universally validate “all 
religion as such,” Nasr following Schuon must transcend historical religious difference by 
arguing for a transcendent a priori as “true religion,” which in this case is represented by 
“perennial wisdom” (i.e., sophia perennis) and Ibn ‘Arabi’s essential “religion of love.”  
Nasr’s Perennialist recourse to a transcendent religious a priori is indeed a prominent 
feature of universalist religious discourse. Yet, while Nasr’s Perennialist position has been 
compared to other essentialist modes of religious pluralism, particularly the thought of John 
Hick, the discursive analytical value of such comparisons has been limited because of their 
tendency to devolve into theological debate. Part of the issue here, is that the Perennialist 
recourse to “tradition” and its insistence on the divinity of all religions as upholding “the 
irreducible character—the divinely willed uniqueness—of each of the revealed religions” 
creates an aura of authenticity against the comparatively “modern” pluralism of Hick, which 
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“seeks to eliminate these differences for the sake of a unity […].”76 Such an ostensible divide 
between the “traditional” and the “modern” leads Adnan Aslan in his comparative analysis of 
the two scholars to note: 
It is certainly a problematical task to compare Hick, whose philosophy of religion bears the 
stamp of the idealism of Kant and the empiricism of Hume, with Nasr, whom it is hard to 
situate within any mainstream philosophical orientation of the West, with the possible 
exception of Neoplatonism. The two thinkers differ entirely in their conceptions of 
knowledge: Hick’s concept is basically constituted from elements of post-Enlightenment 
philosophy, while Nasr’s is constituted by the principles of Islamic faith and the perennial 
philosophy.77 
 
Aslan tries to nuance his discussion later on when he states:  
[T]he perennial philosophy is a modern discourse, to a certain extent an ideological attempt to 
discover the significance of traditions. For instance, according to the perennialists, the great 
metaphysicians such as Ibn ‘Arabi and Eckhart are the main expositors of the sophia 
perennis. I would argue that they are traditional, but not perennialists in Nasr’s sense of the 
word; they did not write about their religions in order to convince modern people. Instead, 
they presented their traditions from the mystical perspective of which they were a part. In 
other words, they presented a traditional view of their religion, but not the perennial 
philosophy in a modern sense, as Nasr and other perennialists understand it. Hence we are 
obliged to conclude that the traditional point of view is not traditional in the sense that 
traditional people understood it.78  
 
Yet, in the end such an analysis falls flat because it is circular. Aslan is correct to note that 
Perennialism is a modern discourse, but the fact that premodern people “did not write about 
their religions in order to convince modern people” is tautological and does not help us to 
understand the discursive structures that make Perennialism particularly modern.  
Indeed, Schuonian Perennialism shares with Hickian pluralism a particular modern 
conception of religions that can be likened, as Hick himself does with his own theology, to a 
“Copernican revolution” that shifts the premodern conception of a singular dogmatic 
                                                
76 Shah-Kazemi, The Other in the Light, 250. 
77 Adnan Aslan, Religious Pluralism in Christian and Islamic Philosophy: The Thought of John Hick and 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Richmond: Curzon, 1998), 77 (emphasis mine). 
78 Ibid., 129. 
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worldview to multiple religious worlds of equal validity.79 Yet, while Hick’s distinctive 
Kantian model posits a central, unknowable “Real,” Schuon’s universalism argues that the 
divine makes itself known through various religions and is thus knowable through a mode of 
experiential intellection, i.e., “gnosis.” Thus, in Hick’s negative conception, the contrasting 
truth claims of each circling religious worldview are ultimately human cognitive creations 
and thus false in varying degrees.80 Conversely, Schuon’s positive perspective acknowledges 
each conflicting religious claim as variously true. 
Instead of comparing Schuonian Perennialism with Hickian universalism, as Aslan 
does above, a comparison with Schleiermacher’s religious pluralism proves to be more 
fruitful analytically and situates Schuonian Perennialism within a larger genealogy of 
religious pluralism. Because Schleiermacher was keen to reject the Kantian reduction of 
religion to mere reason and morality, he was unwilling to discredit the historical religions as 
invalid.81 Thus, Schleiermacher posits that each religion was “one of the special forms which 
mankind, in some region of the earth and at some stage of development, has to accept.”82 As 
such, Schleiermacher asserts that  
the positive religions are just the definite forms in which religion must exhibit itself—a thing 
to which your so-called natural religions have no claim. They are only a vague, sorry, poor 
                                                
79 See John Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oneworld 
Publications, 1993), 130-31. See also Philip Almond, “John Hick’s Copernican Theology,” Theology 86: 709 
(1983)  36-41. 
80 Gavin D’Costa has noted how Hick’s recourse to the Kantian typologies of noumenal Real and phenomenal 
religious responses forces the distinctive truth claims of each religion “into agnosticism.” See Gavin D’Costa, 
“John Hick and Religious Pluralism: Yet Another Revolution,” in Problems in the Philosophy of Religion: 
Critical Studies of the Work of John Hick, ed. Harold Hewitt, Jr. (Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 1991), 7. See 
also John Hick, God has Many Names (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982), 105. 
81 Zimmermann, Humanism and Religion, 136. 
82 Schleiermacher, On Religion, 216. 
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thought that corresponds to no reality, and you will find that in the positive religions alone a 
true individual cultivation of the religious capacity is possible.83 
 
Thus, Nasr’s above assertion that Ibn ‘Arabi’s “religion of love” is found at the heart of all 
religions tellingly echoes Schleiermacher’s recourse here to an a priori “religion” found 
within “the positive religions.” As William Johnson notes, for Schleiermacher, “[e]very 
particular, positive Religion was ultimately founded upon the Religion of the infinite,” i.e., 
“the religious a priori.”84  
By momentarily setting aside the theological differences between Perennialism and 
the universalist discourse of Schleiermacher here,85 I wish to look more closely at 
Schleiermacher’s particular strategic use of a transcendent religious a priori in order to 
highlight a similar strategy within Schuonian Perennialist discourse on religious validity.86 
The discursive strategy of establishing “true religion” as a transcendent a priori allowed 
Schleiermacher to circumvent the problem of religious difference and simultaneously argue 
for its necessity. Thus, for Schleiermacher, “[r]eligion could never be realized except in a 
concrete historical form. Historical Religions always possessed, therefore, the quality of 
imperfection.”87 
The discursive structure of the Schuonian Perennialist argument for orthodoxy as 
both divine and conflictive follows a similar logic, as Nasr notes: 
                                                
83 Ibid., 217 (emphasis mine). 
84 William A. Johnson, On Religion: A Study of Theological Method in Schleiermacher and Nygren (Leiden: E. 
J. Brill, 1964), 37 (emphasis mine). 
85 Regarding their most pronounced differences, see p. 97n24 above. 
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54. 
87 Johnson, On Religion, 36. 
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For Schuon orthodoxy is related at once to Truth and the formal homogeneity of a particular 
traditional universe. To speak of the Truth is also to speak of the possibility of error. To be 
orthodox is to be on the side of the Truth. But since the Truth has revealed itself not once and 
in only one formal language but many times in different ‘worlds’ possessing their own formal 
homogeneity and language of discourse, the question of being on the side of the truth 
involves also the formal world in question. Schuon therefore defends Christianity as orthodox 
in itself while being heterodox from the point of view of Jewish orthodoxy and he explains 
why Buddhism is an orthodox relgion [sic], that is an embodiment of the Truth and means 
“provided” by that Truth to attain the Truth, while it is considered as heterodox from the 
perspective of Brahmanism.88  
 
Here in full view, Nasr rushes headlong into an argument that forcefully counters what is 
commonly referred to as the Aristotelian law of non-contradiction, a principle that is the tacit 
assumption of normative theology.89 Indeed, precisely because “orthodox” doctrines make 
truth claims about reality, they have historically struggled to avoid such contradictions. Yet, a 
theological or metaphysical perspective that claims to acknowledge all truth claims as valid 
cannot operate from such normative principles. In addressing this conflict, Schuon notes: 
One could conceive, it is true, that there might be only one Revelation or Tradition for our 
human world and that diversity might be realized through other worlds, unknown to man or 
even unknowable by him; but this would imply a failure to understand that what determines 
the difference among forms of Truth is the difference among human receptacles. For 
thousands of years humanity has been divided into several fundamentally different branches 
constituting as many complete humanities, more or less closed in on themselves; the 
existence of spiritual receptacles so different and so original demands a differentiated 
refraction of the one Truth.90 
 
In a similarly structured notion, Schleiermacher states: 
The whole of religion is nothing but the sum of all relations of man to God, apprehended in 
all the possible ways in which any man can be immediately conscious in his life. In this sense 
there is but one religion, for it would be but a poverty-stricken and halting life, if all these 
relations did not exist wherever religion ought to be. Yet all men will not by any means 
apprehend them in the same way, but quite differently. Now this difference alone is felt and 
alone can be exhibited while the reduction of all differences is only thought. 
                                                
88 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, introduction to The Essential Writings of Frithjof Schuon, by Frithjof Schuon, ed. 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Amity: Amity House, 1986), 9.  
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James Cutsinger (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006), 17 (emphasis mine). 
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You are wrong, therefore, with your universal religion that is natural to all, for no one will 
have his own true and right religion, if it is the same for all.91 
 
In both of these arguments, the authors call upon a mode of discourse that seeks to transcend 
the principle of non-contradiction by arguing that for religion to be valid, different 
individuals or groups must experience religious truth differently. In Schuon, the differences 
within human ontological capacity “demand” different refractions of one divine truth, while 
in Schleiermacher one ontological truth is experienced differently depending on the human 
receptacle. While such subtle differences highlight the distinctive ontological assumptions of 
each author, the structure of the argument is identical.  
In his study on postliberal theology, George Lindbeck has called this type of doctrinal 
model “experiential-expressivism.” Following Bernard Lonergan, Lindbeck has identified 
several key aspects of such a model, all of which revolve around the notion that different 
religions are diverse objectifications or expressions of “a common core experience.” Such a 
core experience is described by Lonergan as “‘God’s gift of love’ or when fully present, as 
‘the dynamic state of being in love without restrictions’ and ‘without an object.’”92 Recalling 
again Nasr’s 1972 essay and his passage on Islamic gnosis and Ibn ‘Arabi (quoted in its 
entirety above), the connection of love with such a “common core experience” is implicit:  
Islamic gnosis is the most universal affirmation of that perennial wisdom which stands at the 
heart of Islam and in fact of all religion as such. It is this supreme doctrine of Unity […] that 
the Sufis call the ‘religion of love’ and to which Ibn ‘Arabî refers in his well-known verses in 
the Tarjumân al-ashwâq. This love is not merely sentiment or emotions, it is the realized 
aspect of gnosis. It is a transcendent knowledge that reveals the inner unity of religions.93 
 
                                                
91 Schleiermacher, On Religion, 217 (emphasis mine). 
92 Bernard A. Lonergan cited in George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a 
Postliberal Age (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), 31. 
93 Nasr, Sufi Essays, 146-47 (underline mine). 
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Here, “love” is claimed to be “the realized aspect of gnosis” qua “transcendent knowledge.” 
Similarly, the Perennialist author Patrick Laude writes that Schuon’s “perspective on Islam 
derived from gnosis, that is, a spiritual and supra-rational ‘heart-knowledge’ that finds its 
most direct expression in the primordial and universal wisdom referred to as sophia 
perennis.”94 Thus, the concept of “gnosis” as combining the experiential state of love with 
that of a “supra-rational” knowledge, is a type of experiential intuition, or what Laude and 
Jean-Baptiste Aymard have elsewhere called “supraformal intuition.”95 In Schleiermacher’s 
version of the experiential-expressivist model, he uses similar terms that express the common 
experience of religion, the closest one to the Perennialist “gnosis” is the Schleiermacherian 
“intuition” (Anschauung),96 which as John Oman in his preface to the original English 
translation of On Religion notes, is perhaps more exactly translated as “immediate 
knowledge.”97  
                                                
94 Patrick Laude, Pathways to an Inner Islam: Massignon, Corbin, Guénon, and Schuon (Albany: State 
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Hegel: From German Idealism to Christian Metaphysics (Aldershot: Ashgate Pub., 2007), 44. 
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 What is important in all of this is the fact that for both Schleiermacherian and 
Schuonian essentialist models of religion, the idea of religious experience qua intuitive 
knowledge is strategically deployed in order to transcend the differences of competing 
religious epistemologies. Yet, in order for such an experiential modality to satisfactorily 
engage with competing truth claims, a concomitant conception of religious “symbols” must 
also be posited. Thus, in experiential-expressivist models 
[t]he purpose of doctrine is not to mirror the real but to give logical coherence to a system of 
symbols. If this is the case, then it is possible that two differing religious systems of symbolic 
representation and the second order doctrines that systematize them can both be valid 
expressions of the experience of [the divine].98 
 
Similarly, recourse to symbolism is an inherent strategy of Schuonian Perennialism. As 
Schuon himself notes:  
If Revelations more or less exclude one another, this is so of necessity since God, when He 
speaks, expresses Himself in an absolute mode; but this absoluteness concerns the universal 
content rather than the form, to which it applies only in a relative and symbolical sense, for 
the form is a symbol of the content and so too of humanity as a whole, to which precisely this 
content is addressed. […] Revelation speaks an absolute language because God is absolute, 
not because the form is absolute; in other words the absoluteness of the Revelation is absolute 
in itself, but relative in its form.99 
 
Schuon can thus assert that “with God, truth lies above all in the symbol’s effective power of 
enlightenment and not in its literalness,” and “the existence of dogmatic antinomies serves to 
show that for God truth is above all in the efficacy of the symbol and not in the ‘bare 
fact’.”100  
Yet, in terms of Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse on religious authority, such claims of the 
symbolic as regnant over other discursive practices are difficult to sustain. Indeed, the notion 
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99 Schuon, Gnosis, 18 (emphasis mine). 
100 Ibid., 10, 12. 
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that systems of symbols are the decisive factor that determine so-called religious dispositions 
and experience has been forcefully challenged by Talal Asad. In Genealogies of Religion, 
Asad argues that before the modern universalization of religion, religious “truth” was formed 
through established sets “of practical rules attached to specific processes of power and 
knowledge […].”101 In an insightful discussion on the relationship between power and truth 
in early Christianity, and here he discusses St. Augustine particularly, Asad notes that 
“coercion was a condition for the realization of truth, and discipline essential to its 
maintenance.”102 Asad further notes that for Augustine 
it was not mere symbols that implant true Christian dispositions, but power—ranging all the 
way from laws (imperial and ecclesiastical) and other sanctions (hellfire, death, salvation, 
good repute, peace) to the disciplinary activities of social institutions (family, school, city, 
church) and of human bodies (fasting, prayer, obedience, penance). Augustine was quite clear 
that power, the effect of an entire network of motivated practices, assumes a religious form 
because of the end to which it is directed, for human events are the instruments of God. It was 
not the mind that moved spontaneously to religious truth, but power that created the 
conditions for experiencing that truth.103 
 
In what follows, I similarly interrogate the notion that for Ibn ‘Arabi religious truth was 
arrived at through a gnostic response to a set of symbols devoid of frameworks of power. 
This is not to deny the importance of transcendent experience in Ibn ‘Arabi’s thought, and 
Sufism more broadly.104 Rather, I argue that Ibn ‘Arabi’s experience was fully integrated 
within his own historical and intellectual context. In other words, while Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
visionary “monism” is famous for its inversions, such inversions happened within the 
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confluence of established discursive practices and socio-political history. The claims that 
result from such a worldview often seem to contradict themselves within a peculiar wedding 
of transcendent metaphysics and literalistic legalism. In Western scholarship on Ibn ‘Arabi, 
as noted in chapter 1, the former is often given primacy while the latter explained away as 
accidental. Yet, I argue here that in order for the economy of Ibn ‘Arabi’s ideas to remain 
solvent, both sides of this epistemological coin must be tendered. As Asad trenchantly notes, 
a “consequence of assuming a symbolic system separate from practices is that important 
distinctions are sometimes obscured, or even explicitly denied.”105 
Schuonian Heliocentrism and Ibn ‘Arabi’s Doctrine of Abrogation 
In chapter 1, we were introduced to the following passage of Ibn ‘Arabi from the 
Futūḥāt (Fut. III, 153), here translated by Chittick in Imaginal Worlds: 
All the revealed religions [sharā’i‘] are lights. Among these religions, the revealed religion of 
Muhammad is like the light of the sun among the lights of the stars. When the sun appears, 
the lights of the stars are hidden, and their lights are included in the light of the sun. Their 
being hidden is like the abrogation of the other revealed religions that takes place through 
Muhammad’s revealed religion. Nevertheless, they do in fact exist, just as the existence of the 
light of the stars is actualized. This explains why we have been required in our all-inclusive 
religion to have faith in the truth of all messengers and all the revealed religions. They are not 
rendered null [bāṭil] by abrogation—that is the opinion of the ignorant.106 
 
In more specialized discussions, this passage has become the sole proof-text for those who 
claim that Ibn ‘Arabi recognized all religions as valid, even in the face of the classical 
assertion of abrogation (naskh).107 As a preface to his translation, also quoted in chapter 1, 
Chittick issues the following caveat: 
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The Koran never criticizes the prophetic messages as such, but it often condemns 
misunderstandings or distortions by those who follow the prophets. The Shaykh sometimes 
criticizes specific distortions or misunderstandings in the Koranic vein, but he does not draw 
the conclusion that many Muslims have drawn—that the coming of Islam abrogated (naskh) 
previous revealed religions. Rather, he says, Islam is like the sun and other religions like the 
stars. Just as the stars remain when the sun rises, so also the other religions remain valid 
when Islam appears.108 
 
Chittick follows this statement with a final remark not mentioned in chapter 1, but critical for 
the present discussion. At the end of the above passage he states: “One can add a point that 
perhaps Ibn al-‘Arabī would also accept: What appears as a sun from one point of view may 
be seen as a star from another point of view.”109 Chittick’s claim is significant, since it 
anachronistically suggests that Ibn ‘Arabi would have accepted a heliocentric cosmography 
displacing his clear “Ptolemaic” framework. Indeed, as detailed in chapter 1, Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
“geocentric” cosmography consists of an Islamo-centric world around which a “triumphant” 
Muhammadan sun revolves.110 As such, Chittick’s assertion subtly implies that Ibn ‘Arabi 
would have agreed to a paradigm shift challenging the entire basis of his supersessionist 
metaphysical cosmography—i.e., a shift to a non-hierarchical universe of multiple prophetic 
                                                                                                                                                  
Hassan Khalil (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 95; “The Metaphysics of Interfaith Dialogue: Sufi 
Perspectives on the Universality of the Quranic Message,” in Paths to the Heart: Sufism and the Christian East, 
ed. James S. Cutsinger (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2002), 182; “Beyond Polemics and Pluralism: The 
Universal Message of the Qur’an,” (paper presented at the conference: “Al-Azhar and the West: Bridges of 
Dialogue,” Cairo, 5 January, 2009), 8. Chittick’s translation and commentary on Fut. III, 153 from Imaginal 
Worlds (p. 125) was also published verbatim without proper citation by Muhammad Suhail Umar, preface to 
The Religious Other: Towards a Muslim Theology of Other Religions in a Post-Prophetic Age, ed. Muhammad 
Suhail Umar (Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 2008), ii. References to the original passage in support of the above 
argument are also made by Éric Geoffroy, “Pluralism or the Consciousness of Alterity in Islam,” in Universal 
Dimensions of Islam: Studies in Comparative Religion, ed. Patrick Laude (Bloomington: World Wisdom, Inc., 
2011), 102; and Abd ar-Razzâq Yahya (Charles-André Gilis), L’Esprit universel de L’Islam (Algiers: La 
Maison des Livres, 1989), 119. 
108 Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 125 (emphasis mine). 
109 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
110 As chapter 1 discusses in detail, Chittick leaves out critical passages in the Futūḥāt that definitively show Ibn 
‘Arabi’s clear supersessionist stance regarding abrogation and the sun metaphor presented in Fut. III, 153. See 
chapter 1, pp. 74-82. 
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suns revolving around other “equally valid” religio-centric planets. While chapter 1 made 
clear that this was decidedly not the way Ibn ‘Arabi used the metaphor of the sun (invoking 
the poem of Nābigha), such a strikingly “non-traditional” interpretation of this ancient 
metaphor has been made by Perennialists before.111 
 In his 1986 introduction to The Essential Writings of Frithjof Schuon, Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr stated something remarkably similar about Schuon’s own work. Here he notes 
that Schuon “has written over and over again on […] how the sun of each religious cosmos is 
for that cosmos the sun while being a star in that spiritual firmament which symbolizes the 
Divine Infinity.”112 An example of one such passage that Nasr alludes to here was put forth 
by Schuon in his 1957 publication of Sentiers de Gnose (Gnosis: Divine Wisdom). Following 
an extended discussion of how revelations can exclude one another and still be 
simultaneously valid, Schuon encapsulates this “doctrine” within a solar metaphor: 
This whole doctrine is clearly illustrated by the following example: the sun is unique in our 
solar system, but it is not so in space; we can see other suns since they are located in space 
as is ours, but we do not see them as suns. The unicity of our sun is belied by the multiplicity 
of the fixed stars without thereby ceasing to be valid within the system that is ours under 
Providence; hence the unicity is manifested in the part, not in the totality, which the part 
nonetheless represents for us; by the divine Will it “is” thus the totality, though only for us 
and only insofar as our mind, whose scope is likewise willed by God, does not go beyond 
forms; but even in this case the part “is” totality as far as its spiritual efficacy is concerned.113 
 
The striking similarity between Schuon’s above passage, Nasr’s apparent gloss, and 
Chittick’s additional commentary on Ibn ‘Arabi’s “proof-text” on the validity of revealed 
                                                
111 Indeed, the concept that our sun was merely a star in an infinite universe can be traced back to the Italian 
Dominican friar Giordano Bruno (d. 1600), whose eclectic universalism expanded upon Copernicus’s 
heliocentric model and argued for an interconnected and interdependent reality: “There are countless suns and 
an infinity of planets which circle round their suns as our seven planets circle round ours.” Giordano Bruno 
cited in Michael White, The Pope and the Heretic: The True Story of Giordano Bruno, the Man Who Dared to 
Defy the Roman Inquisition (New York: William Morrow, 2002), 71. 
112 Nasr, introduction to The Essential Writings of Frithjof Schuon, 5 (emphasis mine). 
113 Schuon, Gnosis, 19-20 (emphasis mine). 
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religions should indeed give us pause. Whether Chittick’s statement that “[w]hat appears as 
a sun from one point of view may be seen as a star from another point of view” is a direct 
allusion to the similar assertions made by Schuon or Nasr, or merely an echo, is of little 
consequence; the symmetry between them and their Copernican commentary upon an ancient 
metaphor clearly shows that Chittick is thinking about Ibn ‘Arabi’s passage within the same 
Schuonian discursive field that presupposes the “transcendent unity of religions.” 
Indeed, it is from within this discursive field that Chittick observes: “One would 
expect to find among the Sufis a clear exposition of the universality of revealed truth without 
the reservations expressed by most other Muslims. But the Sufis had to take into account the 
beliefs of their contemporaries.”114 Besides taking recourse to a Schuonian position of 
universal validity, here Chittick (as also noted in chapter 1) surprisingly employs a reductive 
approach that relegates Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse on the People of the Book as pandering to the 
scholarly authority of his day. Thus, according to Chittick, Ibn ‘Arabi “often defends a literal 
reading of the Koranic criticisms of the People of the Book,” but he does not do so 
universally like “most other Muslims”; i.e., he only criticizes the particular local groups that 
the Qur’an addressed during the time of Muhammad.115 
Chittick’s above commentary on Ibn ‘Arabi’s “proof-text” on the validity of revealed 
religions (i.e., Fut. III, 153) has provided Shah-Kazemi with the authoritative basis necessary 
to develop this rather technical argument further in openly Perennialist discourse and as a 
result appears in the majority of his publications.116 Drawing on Chittick’s above assertion 
                                                
114 Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 125 (emphasis mine). 
115 Ibid. 
116 See p. 119n107 above. 
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that Ibn ‘Arabi rejected the idea that the coming of Islam abrogated the validity of other 
religions, Shah-Kazemi asserts: 
In many places Ibn Arabi exalts the Quranic revelation above all others, but he does so in a 
nuanced manner, making it clear that the historical appearance of Islam (or: the final 
revelation of the one religion, “Islam,” in the sense of universal submission) did not nullify 
the efficacy of the earlier religions (or: the earlier revelations of this one religion); the 
commonly held view in Islamic exoterism, that Islam “abrogated”—in the sense of annulled 
or invalidated—all other religions is thus rejected; for him, Islam’s “abrogation” (naskh) of 
other religions means that Islam takes precedence over them, it “supersedes” them, in the 
literal sense of “sitting above” them. And, in a brilliant dialectical stroke, he transforms the 
whole doctrine of abrogation from being a basis for the rejection of other religions into a 
decisive argument for the validity of the other religions […].”117 
 
Here, Shah-Kazemi dissociates Ibn ‘Arabi’s doctrine of abrogation from “the commonly held 
view in Islamic exoterism,” which has invalidated the previous religions through the standard 
concept of abrogation. Rather, according to Shah-Kazemi, Ibn ‘Arabi’s idea of abrogation 
simply means that “Islam” (historical or universal) benevolently sits above them and 
confirms their validity.  
After quoting Chittick’s translation of Fut. III, 153 from Imaginal Worlds, Shah-
Kazemi draws the following conclusion: 
In other words, following the dictates of Islam and believing it to be the most complete 
religion can coexist with an awareness that the other religions retain their enlightening 
function and their spiritual efficacy for their adherents. The very real differences of 
conception, orientation, and ritual as exist between the religions are not ignored in this 
perspective; rather, one is urged to submit entirely to the form of one’s own religion even 
while recognizing its inevitable particularity and hence relativity; thus for Ibn Arabi there is 
no substantial contradiction between following the dictates of one’s own “way”—in terms of 
which certain things may be forbidden—and accepting the intrinsic validity of another “way” 
which permits those same things.118 
 
Shah-Kazemi’s summation here (and variously repeated in the majority of his other works) is 
useful for its concise grafting of Schuon’s above heliocentric model of the validity of all 
religions onto Ibn ‘Arabi’s doctrine of abrogation. Here, Shah-Kazemi claims that Ibn ‘Arabi 
                                                
117 Shah-Kazemi, Paths to Transcendence, 121 (underline mine). 
118 Ibid., 121-22 (emphasis mine). 
 124 
subscribed to an essentialist discourse on religion that transcended the principle of non-
contradiction by accepting the “intrinsic validity” of opposing religious rules and doctrines. 
Here, religious experience qua intuitive knowledge is implicit in their common “enlightening 
function” and “spiritual efficacy.” Indeed, Schuon’s cosmographic model of the 
transcendental unity of religions, as quoted above, links the different religious solar systems 
together by means of their “spiritual efficacy”:  
The unicity of our sun is belied by the multiplicity of the fixed stars without thereby ceasing 
to be valid within the system that is ours under Providence; hence the unicity is manifested in 
the part, not in the totality […]; but even in this case the part “is” totality as far as its spiritual 
efficacy is concerned.119 
 
As was also discussed above, Schuon links “efficacy” with the enlightening power of the 
religious “symbol”: “the existence of dogmatic antinomies serves to show that for God truth 
is above all in the efficacy of the symbol and not in the ‘bare fact’.”120 Indeed, Shah-Kazemi 
similarly argues that Ibn ‘Arabi enacted legal prescriptions “as symbols relating to the 
principial [sic] realities they embody and intend.”121 Such a proposition allows Shah-Kazemi 
above to decouple legal prescriptions with their actual rulings and thus posit an a priori set of 
“principal realities” (i.e., essences) that transcend particular forms and thus the law of non- 
contradiction: “thus for Ibn Arabi there is no substantial contradiction between following the 
dictates of one’s own ‘way’—in terms of which certain things may be forbidden—and 
accepting the intrinsic validity of another ‘way’ which permits those same things.” 
 To recapitulate the main points presented by the Schuonian Perennialist 
cosmographical treatment of Ibn ‘Arabi’s doctrine of abrogation and as formulated in the 
                                                
119 Schuon, Gnosis, 19-20 (emphasis mine). 
120 Ibid., 12. 
121 Shah-Kazemi, Paths to Transcendence, 200. 
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detailed arguments of Chittick and Shah-Kazemi above, the following three interrelated 
points are clearly presented as Ibn ‘Arabi’s position: (i) even though Islam is the most 
complete religion (for those who follow it), all other contemporary religions maintain their 
“enlightening function” and “spiritual efficacy,” (ii) the particular conceptual and material 
differences of each religion are real, but ultimately relative, and (iii) the existence of 
conflicting prescriptions among the religions do not present a “substantial contradiction” 
between them; thus all religions are equally and intrinsically “valid.”   
 Before interrogating these claims further, however, it is necessary to pause here and 
unpack such assertions within a broader scholarly discussion of inter-religious validity 
outside of the Perennialist purview, as far as is possible.122 Since the language used to 
address such issues is ambiguous and potentially confusing, the following excursus attempts 
to distill the operative ideas around Perennialist claims of the transcendent unity of religions 
in the context of Ibn ‘Arabi’s cosmology of salvation and the attendant term “universalism.” 
In doing so, I will clarify exactly what is at stake and refine the questions with which I 
approach Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse in the remainder of this chapter.  
Excursus: Epistemological and Soteriological Universalism  
 In reading contemporary treatments of Ibn ‘Arabi and his ideas on other religions, the 
terminology of religious validity, universalism, and pluralism is often used interchangeably 
and with various meanings that often conflict. For example, Shah-Kazemi defines religious 
“pluralism” through a Hickian framework as the belief that although “all religions are equal, 
none has the right to claim to be unique, for all are human, ‘cognitive responses’ to the 
                                                
122 I make this qualification since even the thorough treatment of Ibn ‘Arabi’s soteriology by Mohammad 
Hassan Khalil discussed below relies heavily on Chittick’s interpretations.    
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ineffable Real—in the words of its chief proponent, John Hick.”123 As such, Shah-Kazemi 
argues that Ibn ‘Arabi is representative of a “universalist” position, which  
shares with pluralism the basic premise that the major religious traditions are valid paths to 
salvation, but parts company with the pluralist in asserting that this salvific efficacy stems 
from the fact that these religions are divinely revealed, not humanly constructed.124 
 
Conversely, in his recent monograph on Traditionalism, Mark Sedgwick notes that “[t]he 
distinction between Perennialism and ‘universalism’ […] is that the former finds unity in the 
primordial Perennial Philosophy, while the later lumps religions together indistinctly.”125 
Thus, Shah-Kazemi and Sedgwick use the term “universalist” in starkly opposite ways: as a 
stand-in for the Perennialist position and as against Perennialism respectively.  
In his recent work Islam and the Fate of Others, Mohammad Khalil uses the term 
“universalism” to categorize Ibn ‘Arabi in a still different context. Here, universalism is the 
binary opposite of “damnationism.” These terms are used to specifically categorize 
discourses on the duration of Hell: universalists hold that all people will be granted eternal 
Paradise, while damnationists maintain that some will have to endure the Fire eternally. To 
complicate things even more, the category of universalism, for Khalil, includes the subgroups 
quasi- and ultimate universalism.126 Paradoxically, Khalil is forced to classify Ibn ‘Arabi as a 
“quasi-universalist” since, as mentioned in chapter 1, according to Ibn ‘Arabi’s rather unique 
mixture of literalism and a hermeneutics of mercy, there will be people who will remain in 
                                                
123 Shah-Kazemi, The Other in the Light, xxiv. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Sedgwick, Against the Modern World, 129. 
126 Mohammad Hassan Khalil, Islam and the Fate of Others: The Salvation Question (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 13, 20. 
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Hell forever even though their punishment will cease and it will become pleasing for them.127 
Besides Khalil’s universalism/damnationism category, he further divides Muslim theological 
discourses into the now standard threefold typology of inclusivism, exclusivism, and 
pluralism.128 However, in Khalil’s treatment he includes the additional subgroups of limited 
and liberal inclusivism.129 Indeed, Khalil’s proliferation of categories and final classification 
of Ibn ‘Arabi as a “liberal inclusivist” over that of a “pluralist” (in addition to a quasi-
universalist) quickly reaches a point of diminishing returns where such categories seem too 
similar to be analytically useful.130  
Yet, what is more important for our concerns here, is that Khalil jettisons the usual 
inclusion of truth claims within the standard threefold model above and situates his 
classifications from a strictly soteriological basis.131 As such, Khalil asserts that Ibn ‘Arabi  
affirms the salvation of “sincere” non-Muslims, because of his belief that every single path 
we take is not only created by but leads to God—a God of mercy (raḥma) and nobility 
                                                
127 See Ibid., 66-69. See also chapter 1, p. 63. 
128 This threefold model is the usual typology used within studies on religious pluralism. Originally formulated 
by Alan Race, it was further developed by Gavin D’Costa. See Alan Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism 
(London: SCM Press, 1983); and Gavin D’Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism: The Challenge of Other 
Religions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). See also Marianne Moyaert, Fragile Identities: Towards a Theology of 
Interreligious Hospitality (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011), 14n3. 
129 Khalil, Islam, 7, 11, 12. 
130 According to Khalil, inclusivists “affirm that theirs is the path of Heaven but hold that sincere outsiders who 
could not have recognized it as such will be saved,” while pluralists “assert that, regardless of the 
circumstances, there are several religious traditions or interpretations that are equally effective salvifically.”130 
In this schema inclusivists limit the ability of the religious Other to be saved more than pluralists do, since the 
latter categorically recognize other religions as equally salvific. Yet, according to Khalil, liberal inclusivists 
“assert that the category of sincere non-Muslims includes individuals who have been exposed to the message in 
its true form yet are in no way convinced. […] For liberal inclusivists, if the message were never seen to be a 
possible source of divine guidance, it would make little sense to speak of a sincere response.” See Khalil, Islam, 
7, 11, 12, 55. See also p. 130n138 below. 
131 As Khalil states: “whereas various versions of this classification system concern truth claims, mine is strictly 
soteriological; whereas most define, for example, ‘pluralists’ as those who hold multiple religions to be equally 
salvific and equally true ontologically, I define ‘pluralists’ simply as those who hold multiple religions to be 
equally salvific.” Khalil, Islam, 152n23 (emphasis mine). 
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(karam)—he maintains that all of humanity, including even the most wicked, will ultimately 
arrive at bliss.132 
 
Indeed, as mentioned in chapter 1, because Ibn ‘Arabi’s ultimate soteriology is informed by a 
radical hermeneutic of mercy, Ibn ‘Arabi posits that even those in eternal damnation will 
eventually find contentment and bliss. Yet, because Khalil does not address scriptural truth 
claims and their epistemological validity, the implications regarding a severe punishment for 
those in Hell during the interim period remain unfleshed.   
As I noted towards the beginning of chapter 1, it is a popular contention, often offered 
in Perennialist discourse, that Ibn ‘Arabi simply accepted all belief positions as “true,” and 
thus leading to God. Yet as was shown in chapter 1, such assertions are highly reductive and 
prone to being anachronistically understood within secular-liberal frameworks of modern 
subjectivity.133 Indeed, as was also evinced in chapter 1, Ibn ‘Arabi clearly has issues with 
what he considers “deviant” religious positions, particularly those that display modes of what 
he considered to be “disbelief (al-kufr) and blasphemy (al-sabb) spoken by the Jews and 
Christians with respect to God.”134 Even Khalil himself admits that for Ibn ‘Arabi, 
“[a]lthough all will eventually attain felicity as they proceed toward God, the righteous will 
be spared the ‘deserts, perils, vicious predators, and harmful serpents’ found along the 
way.”135 Here Khalil quotes a larger discussion and translation from Imaginal Worlds where 
Chittick recounts Ibn ‘Arabi’s concept that all paths lead back to God. Chittick relates that 
for Ibn ‘Arabi, perfect saints understand with the “eye of the heart” that all things, good and 
                                                
132 Ibid., 55. 
133 See chapter 1, pp. 42-45, 48. 
134 Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 2004), 235 (Fut. I, 191). See 
chapter 1, p. 66. 
135 Khalil, Islam, 67. 
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evil, exist through God’s will and His creative command (al-amr al-takwīnī). However, 
Chittick immediately qualifies this statement by noting Ibn ‘Arabi’s formulaic, dyadic 
corollary asserting the necessity of God’s prescriptive, or obligative, command (al-amr al-
taklīfī), which is the origin of revealed law. Here, Chittick notes 
In no way does their acceptance of all beliefs negate their acknowledgement that everyone is 
called to follow the prescriptive command, which sets down the immediate path to felicity. 
This is why Ibn al-‘Arabī writes, “It is incumbent upon you to practice the worship of God 
brought by the Shariah and tradition [al-samʿ]” (III 311.23). He explains that the person who 
sees things as they truly are “travels on the path of felicity that is not preceded by any 
wretchedness, for this path is easy, bright, exemplary, pure, unstained, and without any 
crookedness or deviation. As for the other path, its final outcome is felicity, but along the way 
are found deserts, perils, vicious predators, and harmful serpents. Hence no created thing 
reaches the end of this second path without suffering those terrors” (III 418.12).136  
 
 
Thus as Khalil notes, because Ibn ‘Arabi holds “wrath” as an eternal divine attribute, its 
consequence of “chastisement” is also considered by him to be an eternal attribute.137 
Moreover as mentioned in chapter 1, Khalil also crucially points out Ibn ‘Arabi’s therapeutic 
conception of “chastisement” as a rectification of divine mercy, thus allowing the torments of 
Hell to turn blissfully sweet.138 It is therefore important to note that while Ibn ‘Arabi held that 
“every single path we take is not only created by but leads to God,” as Khalil does above, he 
also held that the interim between any path and its destination of felicity is either filled with 
divine reward or chastisement. And as Chittick himself stresses in the passage above, the 
criteria that Ibn ‘Arabi used for distinguishing between them was based on revealed law, i.e., 
the sharia.  
In such a context, the problem raised by a prescriptive sharia and the Qur’anic call for 
“obedience” as also discussed in chapter 1 addresses more immediate questions posed by 
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138 See chapter 1, p. 63. See also Khalil, Islam, 66. See Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, ed. Abul Ela Affifi 
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religious truth claims than those of final redemption qua felicity (saʿāda)—at least in terms 
of Ibn ‘Arabi’s cosmology of universal salvation, broadly defined.139 Since Schuonian 
Perennialists argue for the symbolic “truth” of conflicting religions, discussions like Khalil’s 
that focus strictly on soteriology appear to explore counter, albeit related, questions. Indeed, 
in a separate article on Islamic pluralism Khalil writes, “One of the core beliefs of 
perennialism is that each of the major religious traditions is, in a sense, true and can lead its 
adherents to God (or ‘the Real’).”140 Similarly, Shah-Kazemi states that the notion that the 
different religions “are ‘true’ insofar as they can lead one to the ‘real’” is characteristic of 
Ibn ‘Arabi’s perspective.141 Another overt spokesperson for Schuonian Perennialism, the 
renown scholar of religion Huston Smith explains the universal validity of religions by noting 
that “the differences in revelations ‘flesh out’ God’s nature by seeing it from different angles. 
They supplement our view without compromising the fact that each angle is, in its own right, 
adequate, containing (in traditional locution) ‘truth sufficient unto salvation.’”142  
Thus, when Schuon invokes his heliocentric model of the transcendental unity of 
religions above, the idea of “spiritual efficacy” is used analogously for “validity” and “truth”: 
The unicity of our sun is belied by the multiplicity of the fixed stars without thereby ceasing 
to be valid within the system that is ours under Providence; hence the unicity is manifested in 
                                                
139 “Broadly defined” here, since technically Ibn ‘Arabi still makes a distinction between the people of Hell and 
those of Paradise, which is why Khalil refuses to consider Ibn ‘Arabi a full blown “universalist.” However, even 
Khalil admits that within Ibn ‘Arabi’s cosmology of salvation, those destined for the Fire would be miserable in 
Paradise since its equilibrium would not accommodate their extreme hot or cold constitutions. Such a concept, 
in my opinion, renders quibbling over the details of Ibn ‘Arabi’s ultimate position of soteriological universalism 
moot. See Khalil, Islam, 69. 
140 Mohammad Hassan Khalil, “Salvation and the ‘Other’ in Islamic Thought: The Contemporary Pluralism 
Debate (in English),” Religion Compass 5, no. 9 (2011): 512. 
141 Shah-Kazemi, The Other in the Light, 259 (emphasis mine). 
142 Huston Smith, “Is There a Perennial Philosophy?,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 55, no. 3 
(1987): 562 (emphasis mine). Smith here claims to follow in the position of “Rene Guenon, A. K. 
Coomaraswamy, Titus Burckhardt, Frithjof Schuon, Martin Lings, S. H. Nasr, and their like” (ibid., 560n11). 
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the part, not in the totality […]; but even in this case the part “is” totality as far as its spiritual 
efficacy is concerned.143 
 
“Spiritual efficacy” is thus the ability of a religion to provide its adherents with symbolic 
truth that is attained through gnosis, which was identified by Nasr above as Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
“religion of love” and the “transcendent knowledge that reveals the inner unity of religions.” 
Indeed, elsewhere Schuon uses precisely this idea of gnosis within a similar metaphor, 
asserting that “the various religions are like the beads of the rosary; the cord is gnosis, their 
single essence passing through them all.”144 Thus, “spiritual efficacy,” “enlightening power,” 
and “gnosis” are all synonymous terms for Schuon that denote religious experience qua 
intuitive knowledge, thus acknowledging a concomitant transcendent a priori of “true” or 
“valid” religion, i.e., “religion as such” or the Perennial Religion (religio perennis). 
Since Ibn ‘Arabi posits that all people will ultimately be saved no matter if they 
follow truth or not, and that such salvation may come after a “therapeutic” interim in Hell, 
the Perennialist assertion that all revealed religions are “valid” in that they lead to “the Real” 
cannot be considered in relation to Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse merely in soteriological terms. 
Thus, the question persists whether Ibn ‘Arabi’s “universalism” remains on a purely 
soteriological level, or does it also accept, in the interim, the epistemological validity of 
religions other than Islam as having scriptural “truth sufficient unto salvation” like the 
Perennialists claim? It is to this question that we now turn.   
Ibn ‘Arabi and the Question of pre-Qur’anic Scriptural “Corruption” (taḥrīf) 
Shah-Kazemi expresses what is implicit in Chittick’s reading of Fut. III, 153 above 
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when he states that Ibn ‘Arabi “transforms the whole doctrine of abrogation from being a 
basis for the rejection of other religions into a decisive argument for the validity of the other 
religions.”145 Yet, as was shown in chapter 1, additional textual evidence not discussed by 
either Chittick or Shah-Kazemi regarding Ibn ‘Arabi’s ideas on the topic of abrogation and 
its attendant solar metaphor shows that such a supposed universalist “transformation” of 
abrogation is untenable.  
Here, it will be useful to briefly review some pertinent evidence presented in chapter 
1. In a critical passage in the Futūḥāt (Fut. I, 145), Ibn ‘Arabi emphatically acknowledges 
that Islam abrogated pre-Qur’anic religions. In this passage Ibn ‘Arabi claims that God 
commands from the fourth heaven that Muhammad’s revealed law abrogates “all revealed 
laws (jamīʿ al-sharāʾiʿ) and the triumph (ẓuhūr) of his religion (dīn) over all of the religions 
(adyān) of each messenger who preceded him and each revealed book.”146 Ibn ‘Arabi goes 
on, however, to make two important qualifications regarding his doctrine of abrogation: (i) 
any ruling (ḥukm) from a previous revelation that is not abrogated and remains is thus 
subsumed within the “universal messengership” (ʿumūm risāla) of Muhammad, and (ii) the 
only exception to this is the case of the People of the Book. By paying the poll-tax (jizya), 
their act of subjugation causes their revealed laws to be subsumed in toto within the 
Muhammadan sharia. Ibn ‘Arabi qualifies his statement about the “the people of the poll-tax 
(jizya)” further, however, by stating that their rulings have indeed been named “invalid” 
(bāṭil).147 While this emphatic statement seems to directly contradict the passage cited in 
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Imaginal Worlds where Ibn ‘Arabi states that the previous religions have decidedly not been 
rendered invalid,148 the contradiction is resolved at the end of Futūḥāt  I, 145 where Ibn 
‘Arabi asserts that even though such laws may be valid for the People of the Book who pay 
the poll-tax, the light of the stars (i.e., the revealed law of the People of the Book) “is 
subsumed (indaraja) within the light of the sun.” He thus triumphantly asserts: “So, the day 
is ours, but the People of the Book only have the night, that is, if ‘they offer the poll tax 
(jizya) in a willing state of subjugation’ (Qur’an 9:29).”149  
While this and other evidence presented in chapter 1 clearly establishes Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
general avowal of abrogation as invalidating pre-Qur’anic religions, pace Chittick and Shah-
Kazemi,150 the subjugation of the “the People of the Poll-Tax (jizya)” and their backdoor 
entrance into the fold of Islam, albeit in an inferior “nocturnal” participation, presents a 
noteworthy variation on the theme of religious “validity.” Here the heteronomous imposition 
of Islamic law appears to counter the autonomy of gnosis as the validating factor within the 
universalist discourse of Schuonian Perennialism. Yet, before offering additional textual 
evidence and further analysis, it is necessary to first look at more basic Perennialist claims 
regarding Ibn ‘Arabi’s conception of the scriptural “validity” of pre-Qur’anic revelation and 
his neglected discourse on the subject. 
Shah-Kazemi notes that the type of “inclusivism” that “emerges naturally out of the 
principles of Ibn ʿArabī’s hermeneutics” is that “he upholds and practises Islam in all its 
uniqueness, its particularity—even while recognising the truth and holiness in other religions 
                                                
148 Ibn ‘Arabi cited in Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 125. (Fut. III, 153). 
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[…].”151 Not surprisingly, Shah-Kazemi quotes Ibn ‘Arabi from Chittick’s translation of Fut. 
III, 153 in Imaginal Worlds as a proof-text for this assertion: “we have been required in our 
all-inclusive religion to have faith in the truth of all messengers and all the revealed 
religions.”152 As Shah-Kazemi argues elsewhere, there are several Qur’anic passages that 
clearly corroborate this assertion, such as: 
Say: We believe in God and that which is revealed unto us, and that which is revealed unto 
Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob and the tribes, and that which was given unto 
Moses and Jesus and the prophets from their Lord. We make no distinction between any of 
them, and unto Him we have submitted (III:84).153 
 
Yet, as was brought to light in chapter 1, the so-called call for religious pluralism in 
Qur’an 3:84 quoted by Shah-Kazemi here is the very verse that Ibn ‘Arabi “received” when 
he attained the Muhammadan Station (muḥammadī al-maqām) at the end of his ascension 
recounted in the Futūḥāt. Yet, rather than interpreting this verse as a call for religious 
universalism, Ibn ‘Arabi states that it was given to him as “the key to all knowledge” and 
thus a triumphal indication of his Muhammadan comprehensiveness as the totality of all 
previous prophetic understanding.154  
Along with Ibn ‘Arabi, classical Islamic exegetes did not read verses like Qur’an 3:84 
as a call for religious pluralism. Rather, they understood them as articulating a commonality 
of Prophetic renewal of one single religion (al-dīn). As Norman O. Brown notes 
Islam picks up and extends the notion, already present in Jewish (Ebionite) Christianity, of 
the unity of the prophetic spirit: Christus aeternus, verus propheta ab initio mundi per 
saeculum currens; the one true prophet, from age to age, from the beginning of the world; 
                                                
151 Shah-Kazemi, The Other in the Light, 259-60. 
152 Ibn ‘Arabi cited in Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 125. (Fut. III, 153). 
153 Quoted in Shah-Kazemi, The Other in the Light, xv, 156. See also Qur’an 42:13, 10:47, 41:43, 5:48, 2:62.  
154 See chapter 1, p. 57. Here it should be noted that Ibn ‘Arabi’s reception of Qur’an 3:84 seems to accord to 
the literal interpretation of the very next Qur’anic verse: “And who seeks a religion other than Islam (al-islām), 
it will not be accepted from him, and in the Hereafter he will be from the losers” (3:85). 
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Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Christ, Muhammad. The later prophet comes to reiterate the 
Eternal and Everlasting Gospel—the “seim anew,” Lex mosaica per Jesum prophetam 
reformata, the mosaic law reformed by Jesus the prophet. The tradition gets de-formed and 
has to be re-formed. Thus “true Christianity” is identical with “true Judaism” […].155 
 
Similarly, the Qur’anic scholar Jane McAuliffe observers that classical Muslim exegetes 
understood “true” Christianity as those pre-Islamic Christians who embraced “that vision of 
Christian scripture that sees in it a prefiguration of the final Prophet.”156 Thus, as Jacques 
Waardenburg notes, the historical framework of medieval Islamic theology 
is not one in which different religions succeed each other in a continuous history. It is, rather, 
the history of the one religion which has been revealed intermittently and which perpetuates 
itself through multiple histories. This primordial religion was in particular realized in history 
through the “heavenly” or “revealed” prophetical religions with their historical variations.157  
 
Within this medieval prophetology of continuous renewal, the Qur’an was thus understood to 
be the final revelation of previously revealed books, all sent down from the same heavenly 
source—the “mother of the book” (umm al-kitāb).158 However, according to the Qur’an, 
some of the People of the Book were guilty of scriptural “corruption” (taḥrīf)159 and 
“substitution” (tabdīl).160 Yet, the exact meaning and ramifications of such assertions has 
been the subject of a long-standing debate amongst Muslim scholars.  
In reference to Qur’anic passages in apparent support of the universal validity of 
other religions (e.g., 3:84 above), Shah-Kazemi himself notes, “many Muslims” assert “the 
                                                
155 Norman O. Brown, Apocalypse and/or Metamorphosis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 51. 
156 Jane McAuliffe, Qur’ānic Christians: An Analysis of Classical and Modern Exegesis (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 289. 
157 Jacques Waardenburg, “The Medieval Period 650–1500,” in Muslim Perceptions of Other Religions: A 
Historical Survey, ed. Jacques Waardenburg (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 22. 
158 Qur’an 13:39 and 43:4. See Daniel A. Madigan, “Preserved Tablet,” in Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, vol. 4 
(Leiden: Brill, 2004), 261-263. 
159 Qur’an 2:75, 4:46, and 5:13.  
160 Qur’an 2:59 and 7:162. 
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unreliability of the ‘sacred books’ revealed before the Qur’ān […] referred to as the doctrine 
of taḥrīf (alteration) […].”161 As such, he argues that “[w]hile the Qur’an gives only a single 
actual instance of actual alteration (IV:46),” it also unconditionally relates that in both Jewish 
and Christian Scripture there is “guidance and light.”162 Shah-Kazemi goes on to make an 
argument for “[t]he continuing validity of the revealed Scriptures of the People of the 
Book.”163 He states: 
While […] the Qur’ān certainly castigates some of the People of the Book for some attitudes, 
this criticism does not extend to the sources of their tradition, sources which retain their 
value: otherwise the legal recognition and formal protection granted to them would be devoid 
of meaning, and their being referred to as ‘People of the Book’ would be both inaccurate and 
illogical.164 
 
Shah-Kazemi here takes a particular stand on a very old exegetical argument that dates back 
to the very beginning of Muslim polemics against Jewish and Christian scripture regarding 
two distinct interpretations of what the Qur’anic accusation of taḥrīf implies. While some 
polemicists argued that taḥrīf referred to the “distortion of the text” (taḥrīf al-naṣṣ) itself, 
others claimed that it referred only to a “corruption of the meaning” (taḥrīf al-maʿānī).165 In 
arguing that the sources of the People of the Book “retain their value,” Shah-Kazemi not only 
directly supports a Schuonian framework for the universal validity of other religions, but he 
also endorses the exegetical conception that the Qur’an criticized the People of the Book for 
corrupting its texts only at the level of interpretation (taḥrīf al-maʿānī) and not for literal 
                                                
161 Shah-Kazemi, The Other in the Light, 237. 
162 I.e., Qur’an 5:44, 46. Shah-Kazemi, The Other in the Light,  237. 
163 Shah-Kazemi, The Other in the Light, 238 (emphasis mine). 
164 Shah-Kazemi, The Other in the Light, 237. 
165 Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, “Taḥrīf,” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 10 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000), 
111-112. See also Camilla Adang, Muslim Writers on Judaism and the Hebrew Bible from Ibn Rabban to Ibn 
Hazm (Leiden: E. J Brill, 1996), 223. 
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“distortion of the text” (taḥrīf al-naṣṣ) itself.166 While Shah-Kazemi’s argument simply 
implies, but never claims, that Ibn ‘Arabi took this particular view of taḥrīf, Chittick’s 
treatment is at once more specific in such assertions and much less transparent about the 
exegetical debate it entails.  
Although Chittick never mentions the technical terminology involved in the debate, 
Shah-Kazemi’s above argument for taḥrīf al-maʿānī clearly echoes (in reverse order) the 
same assertions made by Chittick above regarding Ibn ‘Arabi and taḥrīf.167 Thus, Chittick 
states: “The Koran never criticizes the prophetic messages as such, but it often condemns 
misunderstandings or distortions by those who follow the prophets.”168 Chittick then 
acknowledges that Ibn ‘Arabi confirms the Qur’anic assertion of scriptural “distortion” (i.e., 
taḥrīf):  “The Shaykh sometimes criticizes specific distortions or misunderstandings in the 
Koranic vein […].”169 At the end of Chittick’s discussion on abrogation (also quoted in 
chapter 1), he thus concludes:  
To maintain the particular excellence of the Koran and the superiority of Muhammad over all 
other prophets is not to deny the universal validity of revelation nor the necessity of 
revelation’s appearing in particularized expressions. Since all revealed religions are true in 
principle, the particular circumstances that lead one to suspect that they have been corrupted 
may change.170 
 
By claiming that Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse confirms “the universal validity of revelation,” 
Chittick, like Shah-Kazemi above, alludes to the Schuonian concept of the continued 
“spiritual efficacy” of contemporary religions, while Chittick’s final assertion in this passage 
                                                
166 See Adang, Muslim Writers on Judaism, 223. 
167 Shah-Kazemi briefly mentions the two different arguments in a footnote. See Shah-Kazemi, The Other in the 
Light, 237n49. 
168 Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 125. 
169 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
170 Ibid., 125-26 (emphasis mine). 
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refers again to taḥrīf.  Here, Chittick clearly argues for the corruption of meaning (taḥrīf al-
maʿānī): “Since all revealed religions are true in principle, the particular circumstances that 
lead one to suspect that they have been corrupted may change.” Since the opposing idea of 
taḥrīf al-naṣṣ implies that the original text has been literally lost, Chittick’s statement only 
makes sense in the context of “corruption of meaning” since such meaning could arguably be 
recoverable in the right circumstances. In other words, because all the revealed religions as 
they exist in their contemporary forms are essentially true, they cannot be permanently 
corrupted, only misunderstood.  
It is necessary to pause here and look at how Chittick’s articulation of taḥrīf al-
maʿānī echoes Perennialist discourse in important ways. As a point of comparison, in the 
same article cited above, Huston Smith defines the nature of religious validity in Perennialist 
terms by noting that “[t]he great historical religions have survived for millenia [sic], which is 
what we would expect if they are divinely powered. Stated negatively, God would not have 
permitted them to endure for such stretches had they been founded on error.”171 In other 
words, while people may distort the “great historical religions” in their own personal 
understanding, they cannot distort them at base; because “true in principle,” they are divinely 
protected. 
Indeed, Ibn ‘Arabi often makes assertions that could easily be read from within the 
Perennialist framework of the universal validity of religions. For example, in the first of two 
ascension narratives in the Futūḥāt, which offers an allegorical narration,172 Ibn ‘Arabi 
describes a symbolic vision at the foot of the Tree of the Furthest Boundary (sidrat al-
                                                
171 Smith, “Is There a Perennial Philosophy?,” 562.  
172 I.e., chapter 167; the other biographical narrative is recounted in chapter 367 of the Futūḥāt and referred to 
in chapter 1, pp. 56-57. 
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muntahā) (Qurʾān 53:14) where three lesser rivers and their smaller tributaries emerge from a 
larger one. Here he relates that the larger river is the Qur’an, while the three emerging ones 
are the Torah, Psalms, and the Gospel, finally followed by the lesser revelations (al-ṣuḥuf al-
munzala).173 Ibn ‘Arabi then makes a claim that at first glance appears to support a 
Schuonian model: he states that whoever has drank from any of these rivers becomes an 
inheritor (wārith) of their respective prophets, for “all are true, since they are the words of 
God.”174 However, he further clarifies thus: 
“The ulama are the inheritors of the prophets” in what they have drank from these rivers and 
tributaries. So commence (ishraʿ)175 with the river of the Qur’an and you will triumph in each 
way of felicity, since it is the river of Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him peace, 
for whom prophethood was realized while Adam was between water and clay. And 
Muhammad was given “the comprehensive words” (jawāmiʿ al-kalim) and was sent to all 
people (ʿāmma). Thus, the branches of the rulings (furūʿ al-aḥkām) are abrogated (naskh) by 
him, but his ruling (ḥukm) is not abrogated by another.176 
 
By following his assertion that whoever has drank the scriptural rivers becomes an inheritor 
(wārith) of their respective prophets with the famous hadith “the ulama are the inheritors of 
the prophets,”177 Ibn ‘Arabi clarifies that he here is speaking about the religious “scholars” 
who have come after the advent of Muhammad (i.e., the Muslim ulama). Indeed, in the 
Fuṣūṣ, Ibn ‘Arabi directly comments on this hadith, noting that even though the death of the 
Prophet put an end to law-giving prophethood (nubūwat al-tashrīʿ), God gave His servants 
the ability to continue, in a sense, such law-giving through legal reasoning (al-ijtihād). The 
“inheritance” to which the above hadith refers, states Ibn ‘Arabi, “is none other than the 
                                                
173 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 3, 325 (Fut. II, 279-280). 
174 Ibid. (Fut., II, 280). 
175 Here the imperative of sharaʿa denotes to begin or commence, but also to prescribe. 
176 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 3, 325 (Fut. II, 280). 
177 Hadith; e.g., Bukhārī, al-ʿIlm, 10. 
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ulama’s use of legal reasoning to arrive at rulings and thus legislate them.”178 Like Ibn 
‘Arabi’s story of Ibn Barthalmā discussed in chapter 1, which claimed that after the advent of 
the prophet Muhammad a saintly “heir” (wārith) of a prophet other than Muhammad will still 
necessarily follow the sharia of Muhammad since it abrogates previous revealed laws,179 here 
Ibn ‘Arabi instructs the Muslim ulama to drink from the supreme river of the Qur’an, which 
he not only associates directly with Muhammad, but also with his exoteric sharia and its 
abrogative supersession of all previous laws.  
Thus in the “visionary” passage above, Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse appears to deploy a 
hadith in an “exoteric” fashion as a modality of his triumphal discourse of Muhammadan 
comprehensiveness discussed in chapter 1. As Morris importantly notes, a distinctive feature 
of Ibn ‘Arabi’s writing is “spiritual literalism,” i.e., Ibn ‘Arabi’s “constant insistence on the 
ultimate coincidence (not simply in outward formulation) between the precise, revealed 
literal formulations of the Koran and hadith and their essential spiritual truth and intentions 
as realized and verified by the saints.”180 Itzchak Weismann has similarly observed that a 
close examination of the Futūḥāt reveals that Ibn ‘Arabi’s “thought was basically a 
meticulous, though unbound by reason, literal interpretation of the scriptures.”181  
It is thus my contention here, and throughout this study, that Ibn ‘Arabi’s “spiritual 
literalism” is nowhere more apparent than in his rather polemical statements regarding naskh 
                                                
178 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 134-35. 
179 As Ibn ‘Arabi states, “Do you think that monk remained on the rulings (aḥkām) of the Christians? No, by 
God, the sacred law (sharīʿa) of Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him peace, is abrogative (nāsikha)!” 
Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 1, 273 (Fut. I, 224). See chapter 1, p. 83. 
180 James Morris, “Ibn ‘Arabi’s ‘Esotericism’: The Problem of Spiritual Authority,” Studia Islamica 71 (1990): 
45. 
181 Itzchak Weismann, Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus (Leiden: 
Brill, 2001), 144 (emphasis mine). 
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and taḥrīf; i.e., the abrogative function of Muhammad’s legal dispensation, as detailed in 
chapter 1, and the attendant idea that the pre-Qur’anic scriptures were distorted. In such 
discourse, Ibn ‘Arabi’ appears to forcefully echo—albeit in a more “spiritualized” fashion— 
one of his most intellectually formidable religious heroes and fellow Andalusian, the famous 
Ẓāhirī scholar and polemicist Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064). 
After having a profound dream of Ibn Ḥazm in his early life in which he witnessed 
his Andalusian predecessor embracing the Prophet in a cloud of light,182 Ibn ‘Arabi 
assiduously studied and transcribed his works.183 Although Ibn ‘Arabi scholar Michel 
Chodkiewicz recognizes the “undeniable” influence of the Ẓāhirī school upon Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
legal ideas, he staunchly refutes Goldziher’s often cited claim that Ibn ‘Arabi was a Ẓāhirī.184 
Since Ibn ‘Arabi himself denied legal affiliation with Ibn Ḥazm, Chodkiewicz argues that Ibn 
‘Arabi was actually the founder of his own “Akbarian school of jurisprudence,” which he 
rather adulatingly asserts was “the most irenic, the most conciliatory of all those that Islam 
has known.”185 Similarly, Morris notes that Goldziher’s assertion is based on “superficial 
                                                
182 Ibn ‘Arabi’s recounting of this dream in the introduction of Ibṭal al-qiyās wa-l-raʾy wa-l-istiḥsān wa-l-taqlīd 
wa-l-taʿlīl was first noted in the West by Goldziher in Die Ẓâhiriten in 1884. See Ignaz Goldziher, The Ẓāhirīs: 
Their Doctrine and their History, trans. and ed. Wolfgang Behn (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 170. This incident is also 
recorded in the Futūḥāt (Fut. II, 519). 
183 Not only did Ibn ‘Arabi personally transcribe Ibn Ḥazm’s treatise attacking analogical and discretional 
reasoning, Ibṭāl al-qiyās wa-l-raʾy (legal methodologies Ibn ‘Arabi also disavowed), he wrote an abridgement 
of Ibn Hazm’s thirty volume treatise on legal theory, al-Muḥallā bi al-āthār. See Gerald T. Elmore, Islamic 
Sainthood in the Fullness of Time: Ibn al-‘Arabī's Book of the Fabulous Gryphon (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 42; and 
Cyrille Chodkiewicz, “The Law and the Way,” in The Meccan Revelations, ed. Michel Chodkiewicz, vol. 2 
(New York: Pir Press, 2004), 61. 
184 See Goldziher, The Ẓāhirīs, 171. 
185 Michel Chodkiewicz, An Ocean without Shore: Ibn ‘Arabî, the Book, and the Law, trans. David Streight 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 55.   
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resemblances” such as the disavowal of analogical reasoning (qiyās) by Ibn ‘Arabi.186 Yet, in 
opposition to such assertions, Gerald Elmore trenchantly points out that no self-respecting 
Ẓāhirī would agree to being labeled as one.187 Similarly, as Adam Sabra recently observes: 
Ẓāhirism cannot be called a madhhab, since it rejects the division of believers into experts 
and laypersons, the fundamental basis for the establishment of a school of law. […] The 
nature of Ibn Ḥazm’s method is that it perpetually seeks the correct interpretation of the 
Qur’ānic text, and that it seeks to establish the canon of authentic traditions and to interpret 
them.188 
 
While Ibn Ḥazm’s above method was necessarily rationalist, such principles are 
undoubtedly present in Ibn ‘Arabi’s approach to jurisprudence, albeit within a supra-rational 
criteria of spiritual unveiling (kashf). Indeed, Ibn ‘Arabi’s entire hermeneutical approach 
seems to be an outgrowth of Ibn Ḥazm’s, which strove to obtain “the maximum utility from 
the fixed canon of sacred texts.”189 Thus, for Ibn Ḥazm “when a word has more than one 
meaning, one must not restrict it to one meaning. All possible meanings are valid, provided 
they do not result in a logical absurdity.”190 Similarly, for Ibn ‘Arabi, as Chodkiewicz notes, 
“rigorous fidelity to the letter of Revelation does not exclude but, on the contrary, it implies a 
multiplicity of interpretations.”191 While it can be compellingly argued that Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
                                                
186 Morris, “Ibn ‘Arabi’s ‘Esotericism’,” 61n52. Indeed, the similarities between what Ibn ‘Arabi considered to 
be the only valid sources of the law and Ibn Ḥazm’s Ẓāhirī position are striking (e.g., a literal but wide 
interpretation of the Qur’an and ḥadith, a general prohibition against qiyās, and the location of ijmāʿ only 
amongst the Companions of the Prophet). See Cyrille Chodkiewicz, “The Law and the Way,” in Ibn ‘Arabi, The 
Meccan Revelations, vol. 2, ed. Michel Chodkiewicz (New York: Pir Press, 2004), 61; and R. Arnaldez, “Ibn 
Ḥazm, Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Saʿīd” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 3 (Leiden: E. J. 
Brill), 790-99. 
187 Elmore, Islamic Sainthood, 43n161.  
188 Adam Sabra, “Ibn Ḥazm’s Literalism: A Critique of Islamic Legal Theory (I),” Al-Qantara 28, no. 1 (2007): 
22. 
189 Ibid., 17. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Michel Chodkiewicz, An Ocean without Shore: Ibn ʿArabî, the Book, and the Law, trans. David Streight 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 30. 
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methodology often evinces more of a promiscuity rather than “fidelity” to the Qur’anic 
Arabic he interprets,192 it is his discursive claim to fidelity within such a polysemic context 
that so closely resembles Ibn Ḥazm’s Ẓāhirī principles above.  
Indeed, by all indications—methodological and historical—Ibn ‘Arabi was part of 
what Elmore refers to as an “avant-garde” movement of “Ḥazmism” in Seville, where 
Ẓāhirism “became the official law of the land” under the reform campaign of the Almohad 
caliph Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb al-Manṣūr (r. 1184-99) against the Mālikīs.193 Indeed, as Camilla 
Adang notes, the tension between the Mālikīs and the Ẓāhirīs appears to have been formative 
in Ibn Ḥazm’s own position regarding the abrogation (naskh) of Mosaic law by the sharia of 
Muhammad and the supremacy of Islam over Judaism194: 
Ibn Ḥazm’s demonstration of the abrogation of the Mosaic law is not primarily meant to 
convince the Jews of the antiquated nature of their scripture, but seems above all at reminding 
his fellow-Muslims that the only valid canonical law is the Islamic sharīʿa […] and that it is 
therefore not permitted to follow the laws of Moses or any other prophet apart from 
Muhammad. This he deemed necessary, since he had noticed that a number of Muslims, or, to 
be more specific, Mālikīs, displayed tendencies which might be termed “Judaizing”.195 
 
In light of the historical tension between the Mālikīs and Ẓāhirīs in Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
native Seville and his deep affinity for Ibn Ḥazm’s intellectual approach,196 Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
                                                
192 As Ata Anzali has recently argued in an unpublished paper: “The Primordial Tension of the Hidden (bāṭin) 
versus the Manifest (dhāhir): the Case of Ibn ʿArabī and his Qurʾanic Hermeneutics.” 
193 Elmore also notes that Ibn ‘Arabi was indeed labeled a Ẓāhirī “propagandist” by the biographical historian 
Aḥmad b. Muhammad Ibn Khallikān (d. 1282). Elmore, Islamic Sainthood, 42-44, 45. 
194 For a detailed overview of Ibn Ḥazm’s position on the abrogation of Mosaic law see Adang, Muslim Writers 
on Judaism, 216-22. 
195 Adang, Muslim Writers on Judaism, 221. 
196 While Ibn Ḥazm was above all a rationalist and dialectician—and not a Sufi in any “normative” sense—it is 
certainly the case that many aspects of his literalist approach to religion were conducive to Sufism. As Elmore 
notes, this is particularly true with “the uncompromising, monistic variety of Ibn al-ʿArabī, for whom the 
obvious ‘Outer’ was ever the inalienable manifestation of the unseen ‘Inner’.” Elmore, Islamic Sainthood, 44. 
Indeed, Goldziher had himself noted how “exponents of Ṣūfism were so easily accommodated within the frame 
of the Ẓāhirite school.” Ignaz Goldziher, The Ẓāhirīs, 165.  
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above vision of a Qur’anic urtext at the foot of the Tree of the Furthest Boundary takes on a 
particularly existential hue. Given the fact that the audience Ibn ‘Arabi wrote for can be 
broadly defined as an intellectual Muslim elite “composed mainly of religious scholars,”197 
his more polemical statements regarding pre-Qur’anic revelation do not appear to be made in 
dialogue with non-Muslims in an attempt to convert or debate them. Indeed, in a telling 
passage found in the introduction of the Futūḥāt, Ibn ‘Arabi echoes both Ibn Ḥazm and al-
Ghazālī in a discussion about the direct power of the Qur’an for salvation and the limited 
utility of other sciences such as speculative theology (kalām)198: 
A great wealth is contained in the Mighty Qur’an for the intelligent person, and for one who 
has a chronic disease it is a remedy and a healing. As God said: “We reveal from within the 
Qur’an that which is a healing and a mercy for the believers” (17:82). It is a sufficient 
healing for one who has undertaken the way of salvation (ṭarīq al-najāh), has desired to 
ascend the ranks, and has left the sciences that produce perplexity and doubts, for they waste 
time and induce animosity.  
 
If that way is embraced, then it must be said that such a person will not be safe from that 
which excites to enmity or being preoccupied with rehearsals and dialectical refinement so 
that all his free moments will be sunk in repelling unreal opponents and refuting specious 
arguments that may or may not transpire.  
 
If they do, then the sword of the sharia is the most repellent and cutting! “I have been 
commanded to fight people until they say ‘there is no god but God’ and until they believe in 
me and what I have brought.” This is the Prophet’s statement, may God bless him and grant 
him peace. He did not oblige us to argue with them when they are present; rather, (our 
recourse) is to jihad and the sword if they have been openly resistant (ʿānada) to what has 
been declared.199 
 
While Ibn ‘Arabi’s language here straddles double registers of literalism and allegory, given 
the similar discursive bellicosity in his advice to Kaykāʾus, the Seljuk Sultan of Anatolia, as 
discussed in chapter 1, there is no reason to doubt his commitment to both. Yet, irrespective 
                                                
197 James W. Morris, “Ibn ‘Arabi’s ‘Esotericism’: The Problem of Spiritual Authority,” Studia Islamica 71 
(1990): 38. 
198 For the similarities between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Ḥazm regarding theology see Anwar G. Chejne, Ibn Hazm 
(Chicago: Kazi Publications, 1982), 80. 
199 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 1, 54 (Fut. I, 35). 
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of how seriously his jihadist rhetoric was intended, his concern is clearly not to dialectically 
convince the “openly resistant.” In light of such avowals, Ibn ‘Arabi’s emphatic claim in his 
ascension narrative above that by beginning “with the river of the Qur’an,” one “will triumph 
in each way of felicity” combined with his following statement that Muhammad’s law 
abrogates but is not abrogated seems to be addressed primarily to his co-religionists who may 
have been tempted, like the Mālikīs according to Ibn Ḥazm, to incorporate aspects of other 
religious practice or discourse into Islam—particularly that transmitted from the rabbinic 
tradition.200 
 Indeed, such an assertion is found in a passage at the very end of chapter 157 in the 
Futūḥāt, where Ibn ‘Arabi rails against the “Tales of the Prophets” (qiṣaṣ al-anbiyāʾ) or 
Isrāʾīliyyāt literature. As Gordon Newby notes, “the circulation of non-Islamic materials for 
use as the basis for Qurʾân commentary”—particularly that derived from rabbinic sources—
“was present during Muḥammad’s lifetime and saw a considerable increase in the two 
generations after his death.”201 This tradition was continued not only by early proto-Sufis 
such as al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 728) and al-Muḥāsibī (d. 857) who used such sources freely, but 
also by later figures like Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣfahānī (d. 1038) and al-Ghazālī who also 
apparently employed them without question.202 While the embellishments of the story tellers 
                                                
200 Even though Ibn ‘Arabi has no sustained polemic against the People of the Book, as does Ibn Ḥazm in 
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Ḥazm was infamous. For a brief survey of Ibn Ḥazm’s polemical works against Judaism and Christianity see 
Adang, Muslim Writers on Judaism, 64-69. Moreover, not only did Ibn ‘Arabi’s conception of the sharia seem 
to parallel perfectly Ibn Ḥazm’s in terms of content (i.e., as the Qur’an, sunna, jurisprudence, and theology), he 
also agreed that out of all previous revealed law, Muhammad’s law is the only one remaining that contains the 
complete truth “that should be known and followed without the slightest deviation.” Anwar G. Chejne, Ibn 
Hazm (Chicago: Kazi Publications, 1982), 109. 
201 Gordon D. Newby, A History of the Jews of Arabia: From Ancient Times to Their Eclipse Under Islam 
(Columbia, S.C. : University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 66. 
202 See G. Vajda, “Isrāʾīliyyāt,” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 4 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 212. 
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(quṣṣāṣ) became a standard subject of scorn by the fourteenth century for scholars such as 
Ibn Kathīr (d. 1373),203 many of the earliest critics of story tellers were Sufis like Abū Ṭālib 
al-Makkī (d. 996).204  
  In the following passage, Ibn ‘Arabi, like his predecessor al-Makkī, draws a line 
between the “assemblies of remembrance” (majālis al-dhikr),205 which according to the 
tradition of hadith are visited by the angels, and the “lies” of the story tellers that result in 
angelic rejection. As such, Ibn ‘Arabi admonishes the leader of assemblies of remembrance 
“to avoid calamities in his lesson,” by which he means transmitting fabrications that the Jews 
made about their prophets commonly used in Qur’anic commentary (tafsīr). Thus, Ibn ‘Arabi 
counsels such leaders:  
It is necessary to aspire for the truth and not go into what the historians have narrated, on the 
authority of the Jews, about the (imagined) transgressions of those whom God praised and 
selected, and thus not take such narrations as commentary on the Book of God, saying, “the 
commentators have said…” 
 
It is not appropriate to present such calamities as commentary on the speech of God like the 
tale of Joseph (qiṣṣat yūsuf) and David and those similar, peace be upon them, and 
Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him peace, by means of perverted interpretations 
and on the authority of people with baseless chains of transmission who said concerning God 
what God did not mention about the prophets. If the leader relates the like of this in his 
assembly, the angels will abhor and eschew him, and God will abhor him as well. Indeed, the 
person who (habitually tries to) find a dispensation in his religion will use such tales to 
support his disobedience and say: “If the prophets had fallen into situations like this, then 
who am I (to not do the same)?”—God forbid!  
 
                                                
203 Ibid. 
204 Indeed, al-Makkī distinguished between the disciplined Sufi “assemblies of remembrance” (majālis al-dhikr) 
and the inferior meetings of the story tellers  (majālis al-quṣṣāṣ), which he felt were merely gatherings for the 
hoi polloi. Moreover, he “also objected to the storytellers’ recitation of false traditions.” Jonathan P. Berkey, 
Popular Preaching and Religious Authority in the Medieval Islamic Near East (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2001), 27, 103n30. 
205 As Massignon notes, such majālis al-dhikr were originally sessions in which practitioners “recited sections 
of the Qurʾān, as well as prose and verse on related themes for meditation.” Louis Massignon, Essay on the 
Origins of the Technical Language of Islamic Mysticism, trans. Benjamin Clark (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1997), 73. 
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I swear by God that the prophets are far from what has been ascribed to them by the Jews, 
God curse them (laʿanahum allāh)! […] So, the establishment of the sanctity of the prophets 
(ḥurmat al-anbiyāʾ), upon them be peace, and having shame (al-ḥayāʾ) before God is 
obligatory upon the leader of the assembly who should not follow what the Jews have 
claimed to be the truth regarding the defects of the prophets, nor should he follow the writing 
of (their) exegetes—God forsake them (khadhalahum allāh)!206 
 
While such vituperative language against the People of the Book is extremely rare for Ibn 
‘Arabi, this being the only passage in the Futūḥāt that I am aware of with specific curses 
against them, it is also the case that the Futūḥāt is not a polemical work. Yet, as was shown 
in chapter 1, Ibn ‘Arabi was not entirely adverse to polemical statements against the Jews and 
Christians. Indeed, the topic of disrespect against the prophets in the above passage seems to 
have sufficiently raised Ibn ‘Arabi’s ire to warrant curses against them, and his rhetoric here 
strongly echoes the polemical style of Ibn Ḥazm who often hurled similar imprecations.207 
Indeed, as Theodore Pulcini notes, “Perhaps the most impassioned charge Ibn Ḥazm brings 
against the Jewish scriptures is that they contradict the Islamic doctrine of ʿiṣma, i.e., they 
violate the principle that the prophets are immune from error and sin.”208 The following lines 
contained in Ibn Ḥazm’s Kitāb al-fiṣal similarly attack what he considered Jewish lies 
against the prophets in the Torah: “Of David they say that he openly committed adultery with 
the virtuous wife of one of his soldiers […]. Not to mention the lies they impute to Abraham, 
Isaac, Jacob and Joseph […]. God’s curse and His wrath be upon everyone who gives 
credence to any of these lies!”209  
                                                
206 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 3, 298 (Fut. II, 256). 
207 Indeed, Ibn Ḥazm liked to curse the Jews so much he included such in the title of one of his major works, 
i.e., Refutation of Ibn al-Naghrīla the Jew, May God Curse Him (al-Radd ʿalāʾ ibn al-naghrīla al-yahūdī, 
laʿanahuʾ llāh). See Adang, Muslim Writers on Judaism, 67. 
208 Theodore Pulcini, Exegesis as Polemical Discourse: Ibn Ḥazm on Jewish and Christian Scriptures (Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1998), 59-60. See also Camilla Adang, Muslim Writers on Judaism and the Hebrew Bible from 
Ibn Rabban to Ibn Hazm (Leiden: E. J Brill, 1996), 239-240. 
209 Ibn Ḥazm cited in Adang, Muslim Writers on Judaism, 240.  
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Indeed, it was Ibn Ḥazm’s systematic polemical attack on Judaism and his allegations 
that not only had Mosaic law been subject to abrogation (naskh) by the sharia of Muhammad, 
but that the text of the Torah itself had actually been irretrievably altered (i.e., taḥrīf al-naṣṣ) 
that changed the way Muslim scholars approached the scriptures of the People of the 
Book.210 Before Ibn Ḥazm, most scholars subscribed to the more moderate conception of 
scriptural alteration that held the meaning of the text to have been distorted (i.e., taḥrīf al-
maʿānī), while the integrity of the text itself remained unchanged.211  
In contradistinction to Chittick’s assertion in Imaginal Worlds, as discussed above, 
that Ibn ‘Arabi adhered to the more liberal view of taḥrīf al-maʿānī, the Andalusian Sufi 
appears to follow Ibn Ḥazm and the more extreme position of taḥrīf al-naṣṣ. While there are 
several statements in the Futūḥāt where Ibn ‘Arabi emphatically asserts that the Qur’an is 
protected from taḥrīf (and various analogous terms),212 as opposed to “the other revealed 
books,”213 there is one particular passage remarkable for its metaphysical context. It appears 
in the second ascension narrative in the Futūḥāt (i.e., chapter 367)214 and comes in the final 
section where Ibn ‘Arabi describes his visionary experience after he attained to the 
“Muhammadan Station” (muḥammadī al-maqām), as mentioned in chapter 1.215 It is in this 
section that he narrates a long list of visions of particular types of knowledge—each 
beginning with “And I saw…” (wa raʾaitu). As James Morris notes, this list differs from 
                                                
210 Lazarus-Yafeh, “Taḥrīf,” 112. See also Adang, Muslim Writers on Judaism, 246-48, 251. 
211 Adang, Muslim Writers on Judaism, 251. 
212 E.g., “addition” (al-ziyāda) and “substitution” (tabdīl).  
213 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 6, 76 (Fut. III, 360). See also ibid., vol. 8, 153 (Fut. IV, 417). 
214 Ibid., vol. 6, 54-70 (Fut., III, 340-54). 
215 Ibid., 65 (Fut. III, 350). See chapter 1, p. 57. 
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similar listings in the other chapters contained in the section of “spiritual abodes” (faṣl al-
manāzil) of the Futūḥāt216 (in which chapter 367 is included) in that “it contains a number of 
Ibn ‘Arabî’s most fundamental metaphysical theses.”217 
Yet, no mention of the following passage is made by Morris, or any other Western 
scholar of Ibn ‘Arabi that I am aware, since its synthesis of the highest mode of visionary 
experience with a clear disavowal of the authenticity of the Torah is a circle difficult to 
square for those who wish to project Ibn ‘Arabi as universally accepting the validity of the 
religions of his day. Here, Ibn ‘Arabi states: 
And I saw (wa raʾaitu) the Torah and the specific knowledge that God wrote in it by His own 
hand. But I was astonished at how, even though He wrote it by His own (single) hand, God 
did not protect it from substitution (al-tabdīl) and alteration (al-taḥrīf) by the Jews, the 
companions of Moses, who changed (ḥarrafa) it! Just as I was so astonished, I was spoken to 
secretly; I heard the address, but what is more, I saw the very speaker, and I witnessed him in 
an expansive mercy in which I stood and which surrounded me. He said to me: “More 
astonishing than that, is that He created Adam by his two hands and He did not protect him 
from disobedience and forgetfulness—where is the rank of one hand compared to that of 
two!” How astonishing indeed! The two hands were turned only towards his clay and his 
nature. And because Satan whispered to him, the whispering came only to him from the 
direction of his nature. And Satan is created from part of what Adam was created from.218 It 
was only by his own nature that Adam forgot and yielded to the whispering, and it was upon 
his nature that the two hands were turned. For that reason, He did not protect Adam from the 
disobedience of his own offspring, which he carried within his own clay.  
 
So, do not be astonished by the Jews changing the Torah, since the Torah was not changed in 
its pure form, but rather change has befallen it by their writing it and their verbalizing it. This 
was referred to by the speech of God when He said: “they knowingly altered it after they 
                                                
216 There are a total of 6 sections within the Futūḥāt, the faṣl al-manāzil being the fourth and includes chapters 
270-383 (Fut. II, 571-III, 523). For a brief overview of each section of the Futūḥāt see Michel Chodkiewicz, 
“Toward Reading the Futûhât Makkiyya,” in The Meccan Revelations, vol. 2, ed. Michel Chodkiewicz (New 
York: Pir Press, 2004), 7-11. 
217 James W. Morris, “Ibn ‘Arabî’s Spiritual Ascension,” in The Meccan Revelations, vol. 1, ed. Michel 
Chodkiewicz (New York: Pir Press, 2002), 229. 
218 Ibn ‘Arabi holds to the traditional view that Satan was a jinn. As such, Satan’s elemental makeup is 
predominantly the elements of fire and air, whereas Adam’s is water and earth. However, Ibn ‘Arabi 
acknowledges that as created beings, they each have something of all four elements. See William C. Chittick, 
“Iblīs and the Jinn in al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya,” in Classical Arabic Humanities in Their Own Terms: Festschrift 
for Wolfhart Heinrichs on his 65th Birthday Presented by his Students and Colleagues, ed. Beatrice Gruendler 
(Leiden: Brill, 2008), 104. 
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understood it.”219 The Jews knew that the words of God were understood (by many) among 
them, yet what they disclosed in their transcription (of the Torah) contradicted what was in 
their hearts and what was in their revealed book (muṣḥafihim al-munzal). They only changed 
it when they copied it from the original, while knowledge of the original remained for those 
scribes and their scholars. 
 
Thus, even though Adam was with the two hands (of God), he disobeyed by himself and he 
was not protected like the speech of God, which is even more astonishing. Rather, the speech 
of God was safeguarded (ʿaṣima) because it is a (divine) ruling (ḥukm). And the ruling is 
inviolable (maʿṣūm), but its abode is with the scholars. So what was with the scholars was 
changed, which they did for their followers. And Adam is not a ruling of God, so it is not 
imperative for him to be safeguarded in himself, but safeguarding (al-ʿiṣma) is imperative in 
what is conveyed from his Lord with respect to the ruling (al-ḥukm) when he was a 
messenger, and so it is for all of the messengers. This is noble knowledge (ʿilm sharīf).220  
 
In this passage, remarkable for its amalgamation of visionary experience and polemical 
theology, Ibn ‘Arabi explains the metaphysical reasons behind the seemingly astonishing fact 
that the Torah could have been physically changed even though, as the speech of God, it 
must be inviolable (maʿṣūm). Yet, even more amazing, according to Ibn ‘Arabi, is how Adam 
disobeyed God, even though he was made with both of God’s hands. Thus, in a notably sober 
mood, Ibn ‘Arabi sets forth an argument distinguishing God’s transcendent perfection in 
opposition to the nature of His creation, no matter how enlightened.  
Al-Ṭabarī (d. 923) was perhaps the first to argue that in addition to a genuine Torah, 
which was burned, lost, and then miraculously restored by Ezra,221 there was a second text 
written by a group of rabbis and mistakenly taken as the original by the Jews of al-Ṭabarī’s 
day.222 Ibn Ḥazm similarly held that the Torah was destroyed and rewritten by Ezra. Instead 
                                                
219 Qur’an 2:75. 
220 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 6, 66 (Fut. III, 351). 
221 Al-Ṭabarī builds on the story of Ezra as one of the pious captives in Babylon who returned to Palestine and 
grieved over the loss of the Torah. An angel came to him and gave him a drink which allowed him to write 
down the entire Torah, thus restoring it and establishing it among the Jews in Palestine. After his death, 
however, the Jews considered Ezra to be the son of God as mentioned in the Qur’an: “The Jews said Ezra 
(‘Uzair) is the son of God, and the Christians said Christ is the son of God” (9:30). See Adang, Muslim Writers 
on Judaism, 230-31. 
222 Adang, Muslim Writers on Judaism, 231. 
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of a miraculous restoration, however, Ezra radically changed the Torah into an invalid 
forgery.223 Ibn Ḥazm anticipated objections to his extreme assertion of taḥrīf that would 
argue, as Shah-Kazemi does above, that the Qur’an itself claims that the Torah contains 
“guidance and light.”224 While such a divine Torah exists, according to Ibn Ḥazm, it is not 
the one possessed by the Jews. Rather, the true Torah along with the Gospel was taken up by 
Jesus when he ascended to heaven.225 While Ibn ‘Arabi does not rehearse this particular 
narrative in the passage above, he clearly holds the same idea, i.e., that while the Torah 
remains intact “in its pure form,” the written and verbalized form was textually changed. The 
metaphorical paradox, of course, is that Adam, as a messenger and perfected human, is both 
the channel of a protected divine message and the simultaneous cause of its corruption. 
Moreover, there is a concurrent subtext of the superiority of Muhammad here, whose own 
revelation is the only one granted protection in both the heavenly and earthly realms. Indeed, 
it is to this special nature of the Muhammadan dispensation and its apparent ability to remain 
protected, but also to redeem prior dispensations, that we now turn.   
The Efficacy of Subjugation: A Heteronomous Model 
We have now come full circle to the question of Ibn ‘Arabi’s position on the 
“validity” of religions other than Islam and the problem presented by “the People of the Poll-
Tax” in chapter 1. Having decidedly established Ibn ‘Arabi’s discursive position regarding 
scriptural corruption (taḥrīf)—in addition to abrogation (naskh)—it is now possible to more 
                                                
223 Adang, Muslim Writers on Judaism, 246-246. 
224 Qur’an 5:44. 
225 Thus, according to Ibn Ḥazm, the only way that Jews and Christians can fulfill the injunctions of their divine 
revelations and attain to salvation is by embracing Islam and following the sharia of Muhammad. See Adang, 
Muslim Writers on Judaism, 248. 
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fully situate the limited validity Ibn ‘Arabi gives to the People of the Poll-Tax and 
conclusively determine if such validity has any correspondence to the epistemological 
universalism of Schuonian Perennialism and its claim that all orthodox religions contain 
“truth sufficient unto salvation” as discussed in the excursus above.  
In yet another passage from the Futūḥāt, Ibn ‘Arabi qualifies the relationship of the 
People of the Book to Islam through their payment of the poll-tax. Not only does Ibn ‘Arabi 
again sanction their “qualified subjugation,” but he also relates that through such subjugation 
the People of the Book are granted salvific “felicity” (saʿāda). In the following passage, Ibn 
‘Arabi specifically discusses “the Followers of the Books who pay the poll-tax” (aṣḥāb al-
kutub bi al-jizya) and states: 
Their remaining upon their religion (dīn) was prescribed (shraraʿ) by God for them on the 
tongue of Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him peace. So their giving the poll-tax 
(al-jizya) benefits them if it is taken under the threat of force and as a humiliation for them, 
since (under such conditions) they have fulfilled their obligation.226 This, then, is their portion 
from the revealed law (al-sharīʿa) (of Muhammad), and they are allowed to remain upon 
their divine law (sharʿ), which is, as such, Muhammadan law (sharʿ muḥammadī). So they 
attain to felicity by that, but those who exceed the proper bounds will be punished from the 
law that they are upon.227        
     
Thus, despite his various admonishments of the People of the Book for their unbelief (kufr) 
and associationism (shirk) discussed in chapter 1, here Ibn ‘Arabi asserts that through the 
fulfillment of the Qur’anic command of humiliation (9:29) Jews and Christians can 
presumably be spared the torments of Hell.228  
                                                
226 I.e., under the conditions of Qur’an 9:29. See chapter 1, pp. 81-82. 
227 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 5, 168 (Fut. III, 145). 
228 Although the word “felicity” (saʿāda) can mean both worldly and eternal happiness, Ibn ‘Arabi’s famous 
Syrian commentator ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī (d. 1731) acknowledged the possibility of both interpretations 
of this passage. Regarding the latter, he states: “These dimmīs would be those about whom it is said that they 
gained the happiness which is free from all misery, just by giving the ǧizya […].” Al-Nābulusī quoted in 
Michael Winter, “A Polemical Treatise by ʿAbd al-Ġanī al-Nābulusī against a Turkish Scholar on the Religious 
Status of the Ḏimmīs,” Arabica 35, no. 1 (1988): 97, 99. 
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While this passage succinctly confirms the argument proffered in chapter 1—i.e., that 
according to Ibn ‘Arabi, Judaism and Christianity can only be considered “valid” religions if 
their adherents submit to Qur’an 9:29—it additionally throws into relief how Ibn ‘Arabi 
understands such validity. Thus, in sharp contrast to the Schuonian notion of “spiritual 
efficacy” via transcendent gnosis of symbolic truth, the spiritual efficacy of Judaism and 
Christianity is here shown to be solely determined by obedience to the revelation of 
Muhammad and not to any “truth sufficient unto salvation” granted to the Torah or Gospel. 
While Jews and Christians appear to remain disbelievers/infidels and their revelations 
corrupted, their payment of the jizya “under the threat of force and as a humiliation” fulfills 
their particular Qur’anic scriptural “obligation,” and they are thus coercively subsumed 
within the cosmographical sovereignty of Muhammad. 
Conclusion: A Discursive Field Revealed 
Rather than the efficacy of Judaism and Christianity having anything to do with 
autonomous “experience,” for Ibn ‘Arabi these religions achieve validity only by a fully 
heteronomous process of forceful subjugation to the Islamic sharia or not at all. Indeed, as 
mentioned in chapter 1, Ibn ‘Arabi defined “religion” as “obedience” (inqiyād),229 and such a 
definition replicates a theological principle at work within early Islamic technical 
terminology. As Louis Gardet importantly points out, pace Wilfred Cantwell Smith,230 the 
identification of the technical term islām with obedience to the particular message of the 
                                                
229 See chapter 1, p. 46. 
230 In The Meaning and End of Religion, W. C. Smith famously argues that the verbal noun islām originally 
denoted “a personal commitment to heed God’s voice,” and only through a modern process of gradual 
reification (marked by a sea change in the 19th century) became identified with the religion of Islam, i.e., the 
historical community of Muhammad and obedience to his sharia. See Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning 
and End of Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 112-18. 
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Prophet Muhammad happens early on in Islamic history and is reflected in early theological 
writing such as the so-called Fiqh Akbar II (circa tenth century C.E.):  
[I]slām is indeed, as the Fiḳh Akbar II says, a surrender (taslīm) to the divine Will as 
expressed by the ḳurʾānic teaching, and an obedience (inḳiyād) to His commandments; and, 
by this very means, admission to the Community […]. Quite soon, admission to the 
Community was to be the aspect preferred. If the requisite inner attitude does not correspond 
to it, there is some grave individual failing (fiṣk), there is no abandonment of islām.231 
 
As noted above, Ibn ‘Arabi’s concordance with any such formal “exoteric” theology has 
often been imagined to be a political ruse. Indeed, even Chittick, whose work has been 
particularly noted as emphasizing “Ibn ʿArabi’s respect for the revealed Law,”232 takes 
apologetic recourse to such explanations in the face of Ibn ‘Arabi’s criticism of the People of 
the Book, which nonetheless he never fully divulges.233 
While Ibn ‘Arabi did not focus on inter-religious polemics like his intellectual 
predecessor Ibn Ḥazm, the evidence presented above shows that his metaphysical ideas were 
forged within a habitus that took such notions for granted. Indeed, Ibn ‘Arabi’s position on 
Judaism and Christianity parallels the polemical framework of his medieval milieu. As 
Waardenburg observes: 
Just as the Qurʾān had been declared to be the uncreated an infallible Word of God, in the 
second half of the ninth century C.E., so Muhammad’s status as the infallible seal of the 
prophets proclaiming definite truth was fixed. The three issues of naskh, tahrīf, and 
prophethood […] formed the basis for the mutakallimūn’s polemics against Christianity, as 
they did for their polemics against Judaism.234 
 
As we saw above, Ibn ‘Arabi’s incorporation and metaphysical synthesis of each of these 
                                                
231 L. Gardet, “Islām,” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 4 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 174. 
232 Knysh asserts that Chittick’s The Sufi Path of Knowledge “emphasizes that Ibn ʿArabi’s respect for the 
revealed Law, which is evident from the Futuhat, was his genuine concern, not just ‘a window dressing,’ as 
some Western writers suggested.” Alexander D. Knysh, Ibn ʿArabi in the Later Islamic Tradition: The Making 
of a Polemical Image in Medieval Islam (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 20. 
233 See chapter 1, pp. 26-7, and p. 122 above. 
234 Waardenburg, “The Medieval Period,” 44. 
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three main polemical issues (i.e., naskh, taḥrīf, and prophethood) clearly shows that he took 
them seriously.  
Thus, in spite of repeated Perennialist claims that Ibn ‘Arabi upheld the validity of all 
contemporaneous religions after the advent of Islam, and by doing so transcended the 
Aristotelian law of non-contradiction, the dearth of actual textual evidence in support of such 
assertions is telling. While the evidence offered above regarding Ibn ‘Arabi’s absolute 
supersessionism—and subsequent upholding of the law of non-contradiction—provides 
much support for a long overdue reassessment of his supposed religious “universalism,” it 
does not necessarily make Perennialist authors like Shah-Kazemi and Almirzanah guilty of 
covering up what may prove to be unknown textual evidence. Indeed, the question of 
individual intentions has not been my concern here. Rather, through a comparative method of 
analysis, I have attempted to bring to light a larger discursive regime by revealing the rules of 
formation that have sustained Ibn ‘Arabi’s Western discursive image as a universalist. 
Yet, here it should be noted that the Perennialist discursive field has boldly 
operationalized such rules in the face of long-observed discrepancies between Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
ideas and the Schuonian conceptual claim for the transcendent validity of all religions. 
Indeed, Shah-Kazemi, like Chittick himself, never broaches the subject of Ibn ‘Arabi’s well-
known letter to the Seljuk Sultan of Anatolia. Yet, as mentioned at the beginning of chapter 
1, Ibn ‘Arabi’s hostility to the Christians displayed in the missive was noted early on and 
with not a little pique by the Catholic scholar Miguel Asín Palacios in his 1931 work on Ibn 
‘Arabi, El Islam cristianizado.235 Moreover, Reynold A. Nicholson’s study of ‘Abdal Karīm 
al-Jīlī’s al-Insān al-kāmil first published in 1921 has long been regarded as an important 
                                                
235 See chapter 1, p. 29.  
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early contribution to the study of Ibn ‘Arabi and his school.236 As one of Ibn ‘Arabi’s most 
important interpreters, Jīlī (d. after 1408) articulated much of the same discourse. While 
Nicholson admits that Jīlī criticizes Christianity, albeit “mildly and apologetically,” he notes 
that Ibn ‘Arabi “is more critical and orthodox than Jílí.”237 Still, according to Nicholson, Jīlī 
not only recognizes Islam as “the crown of religions,”238 he accepts—like Ibn Ḥazm and Ibn 
‘Arabi—the idea of taḥrīf in its more extreme form, i.e., the actual corruption of the text 
(taḥrīf al-naṣṣ). Thus, Nicholson glosses Jīlī: “It is true that the Jews and Christians suffer 
misery, but why is this? Because they have altered God’s Word and substituted something of 
their own.”239  
Yet, even more germane to the legacy of Perennialist engagement with Ibn ‘Arabi is 
the similar position of Ivan Aguéli (d. 1917), the Swedish painter, anarchist, esotericist, and 
Sufi extraordinaire who introduced Guénon and Schuon to the thought of the Andalusian 
Sufi. While studying at the famous al-Azhar university in Cairo, Aguéli was initiated into a 
branch of the Shādhiliyya by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿIllaysh,240 who was for a time an associate of 
Amir ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī  (d. 1883) in Damascus. Famous as the leader of the resistance 
against the French occupation of Algeria, ʿAbd al-Qādir “proved to be the most influential 
interpreter of Ibn ʿArabī in his time.”241 Thus, as Sedgwick notes, the “Traditionalist 
                                                
236 Nicholson’s analysis of Jīlī is commended by Schimmel. See Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of 
Islam (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 281. 
237 Reynold A. Nicholson, Studies in Islamic Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921), 139. 
238 Ibid., 138, 141. 
239 Ibid., 133 (emphasis mine). 
240 I.e., the ‘Arabiyya Shādhiliyya (or Shādhiliyya ‘Arabiyya); see Meir Hatina, “Where East Meets West: 
Sufism, Cultural Rapprochement, and Politics,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 39 (2007): 390. 
241 Weismann, Taste of Modernity, 6. It should be noted here that Perennialists often point out as evidence of his 
religious universalism ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī’s compassionate treatment of French prisoners during the 
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emphasis on Ibn al-Arabi, then, derives ultimately from the Amir Abd al-Qadir.”242 After 
surveying Aguéli’s Arabic letters, the Swedish Islamicist H. S. Nyberg (the first Western 
scholar to publish a critical edition of several important treatises by Ibn ‘Arabi243) asserted 
that Aguéli was an “expert on Muḥyi ʾd-Dīn ibn al-‘Arabī.”244 Not only did Aguéli have a 
direct influence upon Guénon as his initiator into ‘Illaysh’s Sufi order, Aguéli’s views on Ibn 
‘Arabi and Sufism were also put forth in a series of articles published in Guénon’s journal La 
Gnose under Aguéli’s Muslim name ‘Abdul-Hādi.245  
Due to his long-term interest in Theosophy and his engagement with Guénon’s 
French occultist milieu, much of what would come to be standard Schuonian Perennialist 
doctrine can be found in Aguéli’s writing such as the division between esoteric and exoteric 
and the importance of initiation. Indeed, even the notion of the “Marian Initiation” 
(l’initiation marienne) that Schuon importantly claimed for himself can be found first in 
                                                                                                                                                  
Algerian resistance and his famous 1860 defense of Damascene Christians against a pogrom initiated by Druze 
leaders. However, as Weismann notes, “ʿAbd al-Qādir does not deny the duty of jihad against the opponents of 
Islam, until they pay the poll tax and are humiliated, although he describes it as the most difficult 
commandment for the sufis to endure.” Importantly, however, his compassionate attitude towards the Christians 
did cause a significant spiritual rift with Ibn ‘Arabi, who supposedly came to ʿAbd al-Qādir in a dream and 
reprimanded him for giving some of them the traditional Muslim greeting of taslīm. Ibid., 190 (emphasis mine). 
For a Perennialist treatment of ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī’ see Reza Shah-Kazemi, “From the Spirituality of Jihād 
to the Ideology of Jihadism,” in Islam, Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition, Revised and Expanded: 
Essays by Western Muslim Scholars, ed. Joseph E. B. Lumbard (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2009), 130-136.  
242 Sedgwick, Against the Modern World, 61, 62. See also Hülya Küçük, “A Brief History of Western Sufism,” 
Asian Journal of Social Science 36, no. 2 (2008): 296. 
243 In 1919, Nyberg published a critical edition of three of Ibn ‘Arabi’s smaller works: Inshāʾ al-dawāʾir (The 
Book of Circles), ʿUqlat al-mustawfiz (The Knot of Preparedness) and Tadbīrāt al-ilāhiyya (The Divine 
Dispositions). See H. S. Nyberg, Kleinere Schriften des Ibn al-‘Arabî (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1919). 
244 H. S. Nyberg cited in Paul Chacornac, The Simple Life of René Guénon (Hillsdale: Sophia Perennis, 2004), 
36. 
245 See Abdul-Hâdi (John Gustav Agelii, dit Ivan Aguéli), Ecrits pour La Gnose: comprenant la traduction de 
l'arabe du Traité de l'Unité (Milano: Archè, 1988). See also Sedgwick, Against the Modern World, 59-60. 
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Aguéli.246 Yet, as Meir Hatina notes, Aguéli imbued “Sufism with an orthodox hue,” which 
“also encompassed Ibn ʿArabi himself.”247 Thus, Aguéli would call Ibn ‘Arabi “the most 
Muslim of all Muslims”248 and depict him as “the purest of ʿulamaʾ in adherence to the unity 
of Allah and the path of His Prophet.”249 Although Aguéli expounded on the similarities 
between Islam and Taoism, he clearly stated that he believed Islam to be the superior of the 
two. Even though they were both “primordial” religions, Taoism was, according to Aguéli, 
purely esoteric, while Islam was “esotero-exoteric” and therefore complete.250 Other 
religions, however, such as Christianity and Buddhism, were qualitatively inferior since they 
rejected “collective reality”—social justice being an important reality for Aguéli—while 
“Brahmanism” was also inferior because it “is only local, at least in practical terms, while 
Islam is universal.”251 Indeed, Aguéli time and again praises Islam as the most integral and 
universal religion known to humanity. Moreover, in accordance with the assertions of Ibn 
‘Arabi that we have seen above, such discourse is always contextualized within a 
supersessionist Prophetology, as Aguéli states: 
[W]e consider the prophetic chain to be completed, sealed, with Muhammad, the Prophet of 
Arabs and non-Arabs, because he is its culmination. The prophetic spirit is the doctrine of the 
“Supreme Identity,” the All-One in metaphysics, the Universal Man in psychology, and the 
Integral Humanity in social organization. It began with Adam and was completed by 
Muhammad.252 
                                                
246 ‘Abdul-Hâdi, “Pages dédiées à Mercure,” in Ecrits pour La Gnose, 30. Regarding Aguéli’s general 
biography and relation to Perennialist history see Sedgwick, Against the Modern World, 45, 150-51, 265. 
247 Hatina, “Where East Meets West,” 396. 
248 ‘Abdul-Hâdi, “Pages dédiées à Mercure,” 28. 
249 ʿAbd al-Hadi quoted in Meir Hatina, “Where East Meets West,” 396, 407n47. 
250 ‘Abdul-Hâdi, “L’universalité en l’Islam,” in Ecrits pour La Gnose, 101. 
251 Ibid., 100. 
252 Ibid., 88. 
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Yet, as I have argued above, it is apparent that Schuon made a Copernican turn away 
from such a geocentric cosmology with Muhammad as the luminous “sun” that subsumes the 
inferior stellar bodies of other prophets. While Guénon may have begun such a modification 
with his idea of a Primordial Tradition dissociated from any particular religious form, it was 
Schuon’s conception of “the transcendent unity of religions” that made a decisive paradigm 
shift, subtly rejecting Aguéli’s assertions above.253  
Indeed, Schuon would later call such recourse to supersessionism “dogmatism,” 
which although a natural manifestation of “divine subjectivity” is “limitative” and not “pure 
truth.”254 As such, Schuon states that “Muhammad is ‘the best’ inasmuch as he represents a 
quality of Islam by which it surpasses other religions; but every integral religion necessarily 
possesses such an incomparable quality, for otherwise it would not exist.”255 Schuon thus 
understands “the role of esoterism” as the surmounting of such “dogmatist disequilibriums,” 
and not prolonging or refining them.256  Indeed, this was Ibn ‘Arabi’s error precisely, which 
caused his thought to be, according to Schuon, “uneven” and “discontinuous”; i.e., while Ibn 
‘Arabi’s metaphysics was sometimes sublime, his theology was too often tied to a Semitic 
heteronomy and its attendant fideistic literalism.257 
 Thus, Schuon’s Copernican turn was more a move away from the premodern 
institution of Sufism as a whole, and not Ibn ‘Arabi’s thought in particular. As Schuon notes: 
                                                
253 Such a shift began with the 1948 publication of The Transcendent Unity of Religions. See chapter 3, p. 220. 
254 Schuon, Christianity/Islam, 92, 93. 
255 Ibid., 99. 
256 Frithjof Schuon, Sufism: Veil and Quintessence: A New Translation with Selected Letters, trans. Mark Perry, 
Jean-Pierre Lafouge, and James S. Cutsinger ed. James S. Cutsinger Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006), 33. 
257 Ibid., 65. See chapter 3, pp. 201-202. 
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Our starting point is Advaita Vedânta, and not a voluntarist, individualist, and moralist 
anthropology, with which ordinary Sufism is unquestionably identified; and this is true 
whether or not it is to the liking of those who wish our ‘orthodoxy’ to consist in feigning an 
Arabo-Semitic mentality, or falling in love with it.258   
 
While chapter 3 will explore Schuon’s recourse to nineteenth century Aryan discourse and its 
connection to his construction of Perennialism, here it is important to point out that his above 
disdain for an “Arabo-Semitic” heteronomy has been smuggled back into contemporary 
Perennialist readings of Ibn ‘Arabi, only as dissociated from Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse itself. 
Such readings repeatedly disavow Ibn ‘Arabi’s connection to more heteronomous and 
“normative” theological principles that were typical of his juridico-religious milieu as 
exemplified in the discourse of Chittick and Shah-Kazemi above and their denial of Ibn 
‘Arabi’s supersessionism, including his particularly exclusivist understandings of naskh and 
taḥrīf. 
As such, contemporary Schuonian Perennialist discourse on Ibn ‘Arabi has decoupled 
itself from Schuon’s own ambivalence about Ibn ‘Arabi and taken on a life of its own as a 
discursive regime. Thus, in a Foucauldian sense, Schuon is clearly a “founder of 
discursivity,” i.e., an author who has produced “the possibilities and the rules for the 
formation of other texts.”259 According to Foucault, such founders of discursivity have 
“created a possibility for something other than their discourse, yet something belonging to 
what they founded.”260 Thus, the assertions of the Perennialist authors surveyed throughout 
this chapter evince adherence to specific discursive rules laid out in Schuon’s Copernican 
turn away from a premodern religious geocentricism to an expanded heliocentric discourse 
                                                
258 Letter quoted in Aymard and Laude, Frithjof Schuon, 46. 
259 Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?,” in The Essential Foucault: Selections from Essential Works of 
Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (New York: New Press, 2003), 387. 
260 Ibid. 
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on religion. In other words, Schuon’s turn is marked by a move from a hierarchical 
religiocentrism to a multi-religious model united by the transcendent religious a priori of the 
Perennial Religion (religio perennis), i.e., “religion as such.”  
The assimilation of Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse into the Schuonian universalist model 
seems to have been fueled, at least in part, by a Perennialist ideological mission, as detailed 
above by Nasr, “to preserve religious truth, traditional orthodoxy, the dogmatic theological 
structures of one’s own religion and […] gain knowledge of other traditions and accept them 
as spiritually valid ways and roads to God.” Yet, as has been evinced throughout the first 
part of this study, Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse is marked by a very different concern for “spiritual 
validity”—one permeated with an heteronomous tradition of Islamic absolutism. Rather than 
a call to unify all contemporary religions within an underlying religious essence, Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
discourse is marked by a juridico-metaphysical supersessionism that is conspicuously 
exclusivist. While Ibn ‘Arabi’s above mentioned doctrine of ultimate salvation for all is 
certainly a radical mode of soteriological universalism, it should be recalled that the Salafī 
exemplar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) argued for an even more radical soteriology.261 Yet, the 
Andalusian Sufi’s interim position that an untold number of “disbelievers” may need suffer 
an abiding “therapeutic” purification in Hell for following corrupted scriptures and abrogated 
dispensations without the salvific remuneration of the jizya would seem to warrant pause for 
those who claim, like Almirzanah, that Ibn ‘Arabi’s metaphysical approach “is very essential 
in enhancing interfaith dialogue and acceptance of different religious perspectives.”262  
                                                
261 While Ibn ‘Arabi was unwilling to go against the literal and normative consensus that Hell was eternal and 
thus held it would eventually turn “sweet,” as mentioned above (p. 63), Ibn Taymiyya could not imagine God’s 
mercy allowing eternal Hell; nor could he imagine God have any wise purpose in keeping it after its denizens 
had been purified. He thus held it would pass away entirely. See Jon Hoover, “Islamic Universalism: Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s Salafī Deliberations on the Duration of Hell-Fire,” The Muslim World 99 (2009): 189.  
262 Almirzanah, When Mystic Masters Meet, 213. 
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PART TWO  
GENEALOGIES AND IDEAL SUBJECTS
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
 SEAL OF MARIAN SAINTHOOD:   
SCHUONIAN ARYANISM AND THE DE-SEMITIZATION OF IBN ‘ARABI  
      
 
And when, in play, he stole their veils,  
He wished to see himself in Truth’s naked ray.1 
 
The notions that we so willingly see as transcendental, aprioristic, or original are 
almost always those that are most deeply buried in our own cultural memory.2 
 
With the publication of The Transcendent Unity of Religions (De l’Unité 
transcendante des Religions) in 1948 and the death of his predecessor René Guénon in 1951, 
Frithjof Schuon quickly became “the great expositor of esoterism and the sophia perennis of 
his day […].”3 The Transcendent Unity is not only Schuon’s most emblematic work, but it is 
often taken to be based upon the unitive teachings of Ibn ‘Arabi.4 Like its title suggests, it 
claims that all religious forms are unified in their transcendent, essential nature. Yet, a 
hallmark of Schuon’s presentation of such “transcendent unity” is its negative framing. For 
example, Schuon asserts that “it is metaphysically impossible” that any given religious form  
                                                
1 Frithjof Schuon, Songs without Names, Volumes I-VI (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006), 99. 
2 Daniel Dubuisson, The Western Construction of Religion: Myths, Knowledge, and Ideology (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2003), 196. 
3 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Frithjof Schuon and the Islamic Tradition,” in The Essential Sophia, ed. Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr and Katherine O’Brien (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006), 258; first published in the journal 
Sophia 5, no. 1 (1999). 
4 E.g., see Eric Geoffroy, Introduction to Sufism: The Inner Path of Islam (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 
2010), 184, 187. See also Thierry Zarcone, “Rereadings and Transformations of Sufism in the West,” Diogenes 
47, no. 187 (1999): 116. 
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“should possess a unique value to the exclusion of other forms; for a form, by definition, 
cannot be unique and exclusive […].”5 Schuon explains this point further: 
the exoteric claim to the exclusive possession of the truth comes up against the axiomatic 
objection that there is no such thing in existence as a unique fact, for the simple reason that it 
is strictly impossible that such a fact should exist, unicity alone being unique and no fact 
being unicity; it is this that is ignored by the ideology of the “believers,” which is 
fundamentally nothing but an intentional and interested confusion between the formal and the 
universal.6 
 
According to Schuon, it is thus only through “a doctrine that is metaphysical in the most 
precise meaning of the word,” i.e., as proceeding “exclusively from the Intellect,” that the 
“intentional and interested confusion” of normative religion is transcended and the absolute 
truth of “unicity” realized.7 Thus, Schuon asserts that “intellectual intuition is a direct and 
active participation in divine Knowledge and not an indirect and passive participation, as is 
faith.”8 
Such valorization of metaphysical intellection takes on additional significance in a 
work by Schuon published nearly ten years later in 1957. In this tellingly entitled monograph 
Castes and Races (Castes et Races), Schuon asserts that “if the white race can claim a sort of 
pre-eminence, it can do so only through the Hindu group which in a way perpetuates the 
primordial state of the Indo-Europeans and, in a wider sense, that of white men as a whole.”9 
Schuon further notes that such a “primordial state” of the white man is preserved by the 
Hindus because they “surpass every other human group by their contemplativity and the 
                                                
5 Frithjof Schuon, The Transcendent Unity of Religions (Wheaton: Quest Books, 2005), 18 (emphasis mine). 
6 Ibid., 19 (emphasis mine). 
7 Ibid., xxix (emphasis mine). 
8 Ibid., xxx (emphasis mine). 
9 Frithjof Schuon, Castes and Races, trans. Marco Pallis and Macleod Matheson (Bedfont: Perennial Books 
Ltd., 1982), 53 (emphasis mine).  
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metaphysical genius resulting from this […].”10 While the assertion of a Hindu-Indo-
European-white supremacy seems paradoxical enough given Schuon’s above claims for the 
metaphysical impossibility of exclusive form, it appears all the more so given the fact that 
when Castes and Races was published, more than twenty years had past since Schuon had 
taken the spiritual leadership of the first organized “traditional” European Sufi order (ṭarīqa) 
under the Muslim name of ʿlsa Nūr al-Dīn Ahmad al-Shādhilī al-ʿAlawī.11  
Yet, the above primacy Schuon affords the “metaphysical genius” of “the Hindu 
group” in terms of “the primordial state of the Indo-Europeans” is also reflected in his 
attitude towards Sufism. In his only work specifically dedicated to the subject, Sufism: Veil 
and Quintessence (Le Soufisme: voile et quintessence, 1980), Schuon faults “Sufi 
metaphysics” for being linked to the “anti-metaphysical and moralizing creationism of the 
monotheistic theologies,” which ultimately keep it from admitting the “the principle of 
relativity,” i.e., the transcendent unity of religions.12  Shortly after, Schuon asserts: “The 
innermost motive of Muslim mysticism is fundamentally more moral than intellectual […] in 
the sense that Arab or Muslim, or Semitic, sensibility always remains more or less volitive, 
hence subjectivist […].”13 Indeed, in the same passage Schuon unapologetically states: “We 
do not believe we are over-stylizing things in taking the view that the Aryan tends to be a 
                                                
10 Schuon, Castes and Races, 53 (emphasis mine). 
11 I.e., a branch of the Shādhiliyya-ʿAlāwiyya ṭarīqa founded by Ahmad al-ʿAlāwī in Mostaganem, Algeria. See 
Mark J. Sedgwick, “The ‘Traditionalist’ Shâdhiliyya in the West: Guénonians and Schuonians,” in Une voie 
soufie dans le monde: la Shâdhiliyya, ed. Eric Geoffroy (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2005), 461.   
12 Frithjof Schuon, Sufism: Veil and Quintessence: A New Translation with Selected Letters, trans. Mark Perry, 
Jean-Pierre Lafouge, and James S. Cutsinger ed. James S. Cutsinger Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006), 24. 
13 Ibid., 28 (emphasis mine). Schuon uses the term “subjectivist” (subjectiviste) here to an attitude that he 
attributes to “Semitic” ontology that is subsumed with empirical feelings and denies “objective” reality. See 
Frithjof Schuon, Le Soufisme: voile et quintessence (Paris : Dervy-Livres, 1980), 38. 
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philosopher whereas the Semite is above all a moralist […].”14 As evidence of such an 
assertion, Schuon thus claims that one may simply “compare the Upanishads, the Yoga-
Vasishtha, and the Bhagavad Gītā with the Bible, or Hindu doctrines with Talmudic 
speculations.”15 It is in the face of such historically situated and ideologically weighted 
comparisons, not to mention their normalization, that Perennialist constructions of Ibn ‘Arabi 
as the premodern foundation for Schuonian “universalism” should give us pause. 
Indeed, in an essay theorizing religious discursivity in terms of “social formation,” 
Russell McCutcheon importantly points out that since all social behavior is constrained by 
historical context, any one perspective or point of view can never be universal. As such, “all 
social formation relies on a kind of sleight of hand whereby all-inclusive systems arise from 
premises that are fundamentally exclusive.”16 Although Schuon’s discourse claims to 
recognize the universal validity of all religions beyond the limits of exoteric exclusivity, it 
consistently presents as self-evident the metaphysical superiority of a so-called Aryan 
spiritual typology over that of the Semitic. Rather than seeking to unite the various religions, 
the following chapter argues that Schuon’s Perennialism is an ideological and hegemonic 
discourse built upon a racialist scaffolding that strikingly echoes what Léon Poliakov 
famously dubbed the nineteenth century “Aryan myth.”17 Such framing allows Schuon to 
decouple Ibn ‘Arabi’s Sufism—which is faulted for its so-called Semitic characteristics of 
moralism, dogmatism, voluntarism, inspirationism, literalism, etc.—from a “pure” 
                                                
14 Schuon, Sufism, 28 (emphasis mine). 
15 Ibid., 28. 
16 Russell T. McCutcheon, Critics not Caretakers: Redescribing the Public Study of Religion (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2001), 33. 
17 Léon Poliakov, The Aryan Myth: A History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas in Europe, trans. Edmund Howard 
(New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1996). 
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esotericism that acknowledges the relativity of exoteric religious forms. In order to 
accomplish this, Ibn ‘Arabi’s Muslim subjectivity and self-identification with Muhammad 
are reinscribed within an Indo-European frame through an Aryanized image of the Virgin 
Mary. As such, Schuon effectively de-Semitizes Ibn ‘Arabi in order to legitimize his own 
Aryan ideal of “authentic” religion, i.e., the religio perennis. While demonstrating certain 
unacknowledged, and thus ironic, similarities to Ibn ‘Arabi’s normative Islamic paradigm of 
exclusive validity and supersessionism,18 Schuon’s racialist ideology of Aryan supremacy 
remains quite apart from the ideas articulated by the Andalusian Sufi.19 
To formulate this argument, the following chapter proceeds in two parts. The first is a 
detailed comparative historicization of Schuon’s formulations of Aryan metaphysical 
superiority in opposition to a Semitic Other. Here, I compare Schuon’s discursive practices 
with that of the field of nineteenth century Aryanist discourse as famously represented by 
Ernest Renan (d. 1892) and his well-known contemporaries such as Christian Lassen (d. 
1876), Joseph Arthur de Gobineau (d. 1882), and Houston Stewart Chamberlain (d. 1927). In 
comparing Schuon’s discourse to that of such founders, it is not my intention to make claims 
of direct influence of any one author or text. Rather, I make the case for Schuon’s use of a 
particular set of discursive practices developed within nineteenth century Aryanism and 
                                                
18 As discussed in the previous chapters, Ibn ‘Arabi’s religious “exclusivity” (i.e., his discourse on abrogation 
[naskh] and scriptural corruption of previous revelation [taḥrīf al-naṣṣ]) does not include exclusive rights to 
salvation in its widest sense, since even Hell becomes blissful for its denizens. See chapter 1, p. 63.  
19 The difference here lies mainly between a premodern inferiorization of the religious Other based upon 
doctrinal terms in opposition to the modern “inferiorization of the human beings practicing those religions 
[…].” See Ramón Grosfoguel and Eric Mielants, “The Long-Durée Entanglement Between Islamophobia and 
Racism in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist/Patriarchal World-System: An Introduction,” Human Architecture: 
Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge 5, no. 1 (2006): 4 (emphasis original).   
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marked by a “simplified, distorted, and prejudiced construction of opposites”20 that 
ideologically frames Schuon’s discourse. The second part is thus an analysis of how these 
discursive practices are deployed in Schuon’s construction of esotericism and Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
delimited place within it. 
Approaching Schuon’s Aryanist Discourse 
Schuon’s complex construction of Perennialism is not only one of the most dominant 
discursive fields in the contemporary Western reception of Ibn ‘Arabi and Sufism,21 his 
extensive oeuvre is also held by some to rank as the most profound metaphysical legacy of 
the twentieth century.22 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, who is one of this past century’s most 
celebrated thinkers and recognized in many circles as one of the foremost experts on Islam 
alive today,23 has stated that Schuon was seemingly “endowed with the intellectual power to 
penetrate into the heart and essence of all things, and especially religious universes of form 
and meaning, which he has clarified in an unparalleled fashion […].”24 Moreover, Nasr has 
suggested that the influence of Schuon’s “works in both the West and the Islamic world is 
much greater than what a cursory glance would reveal and in fact only in-depth studies can 
                                                
20 Stefan Arvidsson, Aryan Idols: Indo-European Mythology as Ideology and Science (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2006), 109. 
21 James Winston Morris, “Ibn ‘Arabi in the ‘Far West,’” Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi Society 24 
(2001): 106. 
22 William Quinn, “Schuon, Frithjof (also known as Shaykh ʿIsâ Nur al-Dîn Ahmad al-Shâdhilî al-Darqâwî al-
ʿAlawî al-Maryamî),” Dictionary of Gnosis and Western Esotericism, ed. Wouter J. Hanegraaff (Leiden: Brill, 
2006), 1043. 
23 As Huston Smith recently notes, Nasr is the only scholar ever to have the dual honor of inclusion in the 
Library of Living Philosophers (The Philosophy of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 2001) and the honor of offering the 
Gifford Lectures in Glasgow, Scotland (published as Knowledge and the Sacred, 1981), heralded by Smith as 
“one of the most important books of the twentieth century.” Huston Smith, foreword to The Essential Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr, by Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2007), vii. 
24 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Knowledge and the Sacred (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 97. 
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make known the profundity and extent of his influence.”25 While there has been no shortage 
of hagiographical treatments of Schuon, the general lack of critical scholarship on his work 
bespeaks of the widespread indifference with which he has been received in academia.26 The 
few recent exceptions that do offer sustained critical analyses highlight the scandal that 
surrounded the elderly Schuon and his spiritual community in Bloomington, Indiana.27 Yet, 
by focusing on the dramas around his “personal cult,” such treatments have neglected to 
historicize Schuon’s discursive practices in fields outside of their immediate orbit. Without 
such historicization, however, Schuon’s discourse, and the ideas that it has generated, remain 
somewhat veiled and as such “transcendently” removed from the larger context of religion-
making in the West and its attendant constructions of religious universalism. 
While Schuon’s above recourse to the primacy of Hinduism as a metaphysical 
tradition closely follows the assertions of his predecessor Guénon28 and those who followed 
                                                
25 Nasr, “Frithjof Schuon,” 268. As noted in the previous chapter, Mark Sedgwick has recently pointed out that 
since 1950 there has been a ubiquitous presence of Schuonian Perennialism within Western publishing houses. 
See chapter 2, p. 104n52.  
26 Indeed, the vast majority of the work written about Schuon, with only a few important exceptions (see 
following note), is hagiographical. The reason for this, I think, is rather straightforward. There seem to be two 
camps of scholars who are familiar with Schuon’s work: those who adhere to a version of his Perennialism (or 
Guénonian Traditionalism), or are at least sympathetic to it, and those who think his esotericism lies completely 
outside of the domain of academic scholarship and therefore believe it to hold little or no significance. Recent 
hagiographical treatments of his “life and works” include Jean-Baptiste Aymard and Patrick Laude, Frithjof 
Schuon: Life and Teachings (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004); Harry Oldmeadow, Frithjof 
Schuon and the Perennial Philosophy (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2010); and Michael Oren Fitzgerald, 
Frithjof Schuon: Messenger of the Perennial Philosophy (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2010).  
27 Most notably Hugh Urban, “A Dance of Masks: The Esoteric Ethics of Frithjof Schuon,” in Crossing 
Boundaries: Essays on the Ethical Status of Mysticism, ed. G. William Barnard and Jeffrey J. Kripal (New 
York: Seven Bridges Press, 2002), 406-440; Sedgwick, Against the Modern World. Setareh Houman’s recent 
study should also be mentioned here for its constrained critique, although it is primarily a sympathetic, 
intellectual history of Schuon’s life and work in relation to the broader genealogy of American Perennialism; 
see Setareh Houman, De la philosophia perennis au pérennialisme américain (Milan: Archè, 2010). In 1991 
charges of sexual improprieties with three teenage girls allegedly forced to participate in nude ritual dances 
were brought against Schuon who was then 84. These charges were eventually dropped for reasons that are not 
entirely clear. See Urban, “A Dance of Masks,” 407. 
28 Guénon claimed that the Sanātana Dharma was the only “fully integral” tradition. See René Guénon, Studies 
in Hinduism, trans. Henry D. Fohr, ed. Samuel D. Fohr (Hillsdale: Sophia Perennis, 2001), 81-82. In an article 
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him, it is clear that Schuon’s self-professed “Aryanism”29 is the result of a broader array of 
discursive influences.30 Indeed, the same holds true for the fin de siècle French occultism 
from which modern Perennialism sprang, such as the esotericism of the Theosophical 
Society.31  
In important ways, Schuon’s Aryanist discourse displays closer parallels with older 
discursive practices evinced in the development of the nineteenth century Aryanism of Renan 
and his contemporaries. The discursive genealogy of this particular racialist discourse can be 
                                                                                                                                                  
originally published in 1985, Schuon states that “Guénon was entirely right in specifying that Vedānta is the 
most direct and, in a certain respect, the most assimilable expression of pure metaphysics; no attachment to any 
non-Hindu tradition obliges us not to know this, or to pretend not to know it.” Frithjof Schuon, “René Guénon: 
a note,” in René Guénon: Some Observations, ed. William Stoddart (Hillsdale: Sophia Perennis, 2004), 8; 
originally published in René Guénon, ed. Jean-Pierre Laurant (Paris: Les Editions de l’Herne, 1985). 
29 Schuon professed his “Aryanism” in several letters to disciples. See pp. 210, 213 and 213n249 below. 
30 Although like Schuon, Guénon defended the Indian caste system in spirituo-racial terms, he prefers to speak 
of the Sanātana Dharma or “Hindu tradition” rather than that of Aryanism or the Aryan spirit. Both Guénon 
and his contemporary Traditionalist Ananda K. Coomaraswamy (d. 1947) largely refrained from employing the 
Aryan/Semite binary in racialist terms. For Guénon’s criticisms of “Aryan race” see: René Guénon, 
Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines, trans. Marco Pallis (Hillsdale: Sophia Perennis, 2004), 51, 
123; and René Guénon, Symbols of Sacred Science, trans. Henry D. Fohr, ed. Samuel D. Fohr (Hillsdale: Sophia 
Perennis, 2001), 65n12. While in his pre-Traditionalist scholarly work on India, Coomaraswamy uses the term 
“Aryan” to denote the northern Indo-Aryan linguistic “race” in opposition to the southern “Dravidian,” the term 
becomes notably absent in his later work. For an example of Coomaraswamy’s pre-Traditionalist use of 
“Aryan” see Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, History of Indian and Indonesian Art (New York: Dover Publications, 
1965), 5. While Guénon’s Italian collaborator, the right-wing political philosopher and esotericist Julius Evola 
(d. 1974) liberally employed Aryanist racialist terminology, predominantly in works written before the fall of 
the Third Reich, his warrior-activist appropriation of Guénonian Traditionalism, which replaced metaphysical 
gnosis with “pure power,” distinguishes his Aryanist cosmology from Schuon’s in critical respects. See Julius 
Evola, Revolt Against the Modern World, trans. Guido Stucco (Rochester: Inner Traditions International, 1995), 
68, 21ff. See also Paul Furlong, Social and Political Thought of Julius Evola (New York: Routledge, 2011), 21, 
27, 41, 85. 
31 As Sedgwick observes, one of the most important precursors to Guénonian Traditionalism—and thus later 
Schuonian Perennialism—was the “Vedanta-Perennialism” of the Theosophical Society. See Mark J. Sedgwick, 
Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 40. Although the language and ideas of Theosophy are shot through with 
the racialist conceptions of its nineteenth century milieu, H. P. Blavatsky’s narrative of “anthropogenesis” and 
her particular conception of the Aryan race was quite a departure from the standard academic Aryanism of her 
day. Indeed, Blavatsky specifically distinguished herself from “Max Müller and the other Aryanists.” See H. P. 
Blavatsky, The Secret Doctrine: The Synthesis of Science, Religion, and Philosophy, vol. 2 (1888; reprint, Los 
Angeles: The Theosophy Co., 1947), 425. See also Colin Kidd, The Forging of Races: Race and Scripture in 
the Protestant Atlantic World, 1600-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 244.  
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traced to the nascent nationalism of German Romanticism and its ethnocentric identification 
with ancient India that readily conflated language and race.32 As mentioned in chapter 2, as a 
young boy Schuon was exposed to German Romantic literature and Orientalist works, and it 
is clear that such literature had an enduring influence upon his intellectual identity. Indeed, in 
an unpublished letter to a disciple, Schuon positions himself as a “South German deeply 
rooted in poetic and mystical romanticism—having grown up with the German fairy-tale and 
German song […].”33 While Jean-Baptiste Aymard and Patrick Laude note that the young 
Schuon read “Goethe and Schiller, then later Heine,”34 a more detailed discursive genealogy 
of the German Romanticism—and possibly a neo-Romantic Volkisch mysticism35—that may 
have influenced Schuon’s Aryanism is open to speculation.  
That Schuon was familiar with the racialist discourse of nineteenth century Aryanism 
is clear since he mentions Gobineau and Chamberlain by name in one of his later works. 
Referring to them as “certain racists,” he specifically takes Gobineau and Chamberlain to 
task for being unaware of the fact that racial patterning or “each race repetition of certain 
types” is due not simply “to mixtures” of bloodline, but to the repetition of “typological 
                                                
32 See Douglas T. McGetchin, Indology, Indomania, and Orientalism: Ancient India’s Rebirth in Modern 
Germany (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, c2009), 70-72. See also Poliakov, The Aryan Myth, 
190-91; and J. J. Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment: the Encounter between Asian and Western Thought (London: 
Routledge, 1997), 65. 
33 Frithjof Schuon, “Excerpts from Letters of the Shaykh,” December 1980 (photocopy, unpublished 
Maryamiyya papers), 2. 
34 Aymard and Laude, Frithjof Schuon, 7. 
35 As George Mosse notes, late nineteenth century Volkisch mysticism, or the “New Romanticism,” developed 
from German romanticism as a response to the alienation of modern society. Volkisch ideology took on racial 
dimensions in opposition to the Jews who were blamed for industrialization. The Jewish ethos was thus 
understood to derive “from a static center, the law, and then diffused outward,” while the Volk were receptive 
to a “cosmic feeling” that “penetrated inward to the center […].” In this Volkisch caricature, the “sterile law” 
by which the Jews lived “suffocated their inner spirituality.” George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: 
Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: Grosset and Dunlap,1964), 57-58. See also Roderick 
Stackelberg, “Völkisch Movement and Ideology,” in Antisemitism: A Historical Encyclopedia of Prejudice and 
Persecution, ed. Richard S. Levy (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005), 743-745. 
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possibilities” consisting of “astrological types, the universality of the temperaments, and 
other factors […].”36 Yet, in the same work, Schuon notes:  
If the mixture between races too different from each other is to be avoided, it is precisely 
because this disparity generally has a consequence that the individual possesses two centers, 
which means practically speaking that he has none; in other words that he has no identity.37 
 
By this convenient, if not ironic, example, it is clear that Schuon did not find the category of 
race problematic in and of itself. Yet, more importantly, it further shows that Schuon 
understood biological race itself to be imbricated with spiritual identity, i.e., as “center,” in 
some important way. Indeed, in his above mentioned work Castes and Races, Schuon affirms 
the category of “race” beyond simply physiology as infused with higher spiritual 
significance: 
It is not possible […] to hold that race is something devoid of meaning apart from physical 
characteristics, for, if it be true that formal constraints have nothing absolute about them, 
forms must none the less have their own sufficient reason; if races are not castes, they must 
all the same correspond to human differences of another order, rather as differences of style 
may express equivalence in the spiritual order whilst also marking divergencies of mode.38 
 
Yet, Schuon’s articulation of race as expressing differences “in the spiritual order” is 
not unique to him. As will be discussed below, the eighteenth century “discovery” of the 
common origin of the Indo-European, i.e., “Aryan,” languages—and the subsequent rise of 
comparative philology as a “scientific” discipline in the nineteenth century—opened the way 
for European scholars to posit theoretical connections between language, religion, and race.39 
The essential natures of languages were judged by the sophistication of their grammatical 
structures, which as Tomoko Masuzawa has recently emphasized, were metaphysically 
                                                
36 Frithjof Schuon, To Have a Center (Bloomington: World Wisdom Books, 1990), 46. Originally published as 
Avoir un centre, 1988. 
37 Schuon, To Have a Center, 7. 
38 Schuon, Castes and Races, 37 (emphasis mine). 
39 See Kidd, The Forging of Races, 173. 
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interpreted rather than historically documented.40 Thus, grammatical inflection was 
“construed as a syntactical structure resulting naturally and directly from the innermost 
spiritual urge of a people (Volk), and as such it was said to attest to the creativity and the 
spirit of freedom intrinsic to the disposition of those who originated this linguistic form.”41  
While the Semitic languages were understood to be limited in their inflectional 
capability, thus evincing an essential “rigidity” in the Semitic “mentality,” the perfect 
inflection of the Aryan languages revealed an unconstrained intellectual and spiritual 
sophistication.42 Thus, as Colin Kidd observes, “nineteenth-century anthropologists began to 
explain religious phenomena as manifestations of racial mentalities.”43 In such treatments, 
“[r]ace was not simply a matter of external physical differences but of deep psychic 
differences, which manifested themselves in the varieties of religion found throughout the 
world.”44  
Indeed, both Gobineau and Chamberlain—the very two authors that Schuon 
castigates above as focusing solely on physiology—were also engaged in spiritual 
constructions of race since “[t]heir discussion of the great Teutonic race was shot through 
with talk of German blood that mystically bound all Teutons together with a racial soul.”45 
                                                
40 Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism was Preserved in 
the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 24. 
41 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
42 Ibid., 163-169. 
43 Kidd, The Forging of Races, 171. 
44 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
45 John P. Jackson Jr. and Nadine M. Weidman, Race, Racism, and Science: Social Impact and Interaction 
(Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Inc., 2004), 107. 
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As such, John P. Jackson Jr. and Nadine M. Weidman note that they were “in some 
significant sense, ‘racial mystics.’”46 
Schuon’s idea of race, like his Aryanist predecessors, seems to have vacillated 
between categorizations of language, psychology, physiology, and spirituality. While 
Schuon, as will be shown below, followed Gobineau’s famous tripartite division of race as 
“the white, the yellow, and the black,”47 his ideas regarding the Aryan and Semitic typologies 
fluctuated. In one passage, Schuon notes: “Like the Semites, the Aryans constitute above all 
a linguistic group, which implies that they also constitute, though more vaguely, a 
psychological group and even a racial group, at least originally […].”48 Elsewhere, 
however, Schuon ostensibly denies Aryan and Semite as legitimate racial categories, “even 
though,” he notes, “there may be racial predominances in these linguistic groups, and even 
though each language corresponds to a greater or lesser extent to what may be called a 
‘psychological race.’”49  
Unlike Max Müller, who “insisted that language and race were not equivalent,”50 the 
above examples evince Schuon’s blending of these two categories. Yet, as will be discussed 
in more detail below, such conflation can be traced back to the nascent nationalism of 
German Romanticism and Friedrich Schlegel’s (d. 1829) ethnocentric identification with 
                                                
46 Ibid. 
47 See Arthur comte de Gobineau, The Inequality of Human Races, trans. Adrian Collins (New York: G. P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1915), 205-207.  
48 Schuon, Sufism, 20. 
49 Schuon, To Have a Center, 45 (emphasis mine). 
50 Kidd, The Forging of Races, 186. 
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ancient India.51 Indeed, during the nineteenth century, as Kidd notes, “[t]he intellectual 
borders between philology and race were porous.”52  
 While chapter 2 analyzed how Ibn ‘Arabi has been constructed within the field of 
translation aligned with Schuonian Perennialism, this chapter explores Schuon’s own 
construction of Ibn ‘Arabi in relation to the Aryanist discursive practices of his original 
discourse. The ubiquity of such practices throughout Schuon’s works and their discursive and 
epistemological effects remain largely uninterrogated. Although I refrain from speculating on 
Schuon’s political alliances in his use of Aryanist discourse,53 I do analyze the function of 
such discourse in terms of his understanding of Ibn ‘Arabi within an ideological 
framework.54 Here, I follow McCutcheon in defining ideology as a universalizing and 
homogenizing discourse deployed to authorize “representations whose trace, history, or 
context is obscured (whether intentionally or not).”55  
                                                
51 As Poliakov notes, it was Friedrich Schlegel (d. 1829) who first gave the discipline of comparative philology 
“an anthropological twist by deducing from the relationship of language a relationship of race.” Poliakov, The 
Aryan Myth, 190. See also McGetchin, Indology, 70-72; and J. J. Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment: the 
Encounter between Asian and Western Thought (London: Routledge, 1997), 65. 
52 Kidd, The Forging of Races, 186. 
53 This chapter approaches Schuon’s Aryanist discursivity from within a Foucauldian methodology by seeking 
to deprivilege Schuon as “author.” As James Clifford puts it, discourse analysis “is not interested in what 
[authors] have to say or feel as subjects but is concerned merely with statements as related to other statements in 
a field.” James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 270. See also Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?,” in The 
Essential Foucault: Selections from Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. Paul Rabinow and Nikolas 
Rose (New York: New Press, 2003), 390.  
54 This is not to deny the historical reality of the Aryanist terminology that Schuon deployed post-World War II. 
As Maurice Olender notes, “The plain truth of the matter is that, in the heart of Europe in the middle of the 
twentieth century, the words Aryan and Semite became labels of life and death for millions of men, women, and 
children classed as one or the other.” Olender, The Languages of Paradise: Aryans and Semites, a Match Made 
in Heaven, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Other Press 2002), 19. 
55 Russell T. McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of 
Nostalgia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 29-30. 
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While “politics,” as Terry Eagleton further clarifies, “refers to the power processes by 
which social orders are sustained or challenged, […] ideology denotes the ways in which 
these power processes get caught up in the realm of signification.”56 In this sense, the attempt 
to decouple Ibn ‘Arabi’s so-called “Semitic mentality” of religious formalism from an 
essential “Aryan” formlessness is an ideological framing within two imbricated political 
processes. While the first has to do with Schuon’s discursive construction of esotericism as 
the only means to truth and the related image of his ṭarīqa as a “vehicle” for that truth, the 
second reflects the broader socio-political context of Western secular-liberalism and a post-
Enlightenment essentialization of “religion” as separate from juridico-politics. In both 
contexts, the extent to which Ibn ‘Arabi is shown to transcend his Semitism, is the extent to 
which he is considered to be an enlightened representative of his tradition and a universal 
purveyor of “authentic” religion. Such a construction of Ibn ‘Arabi is reflective of an 
ideological project that conceals a structured schema of exclusion within a discourse that 
claims to be universal and pluralist. While this chapter confines its exploration to the first 
internal context of Schuonian ideological formation, the final chapter will look at the second 
socio-political context more broadly in terms of how Kantian constructions of Ibn ‘Arabi and 
Sufism have been employed in the contemporary West in similar ways to create Muslim 
religious subjectivities deemed conducive to secular-liberal notions of authentic religion. 
The 19th Century Aryan Myth and Schuonian Discursivity 
Although the modern “scientific” discipline of comparative philology was virtually 
inaugurated by the English Orientalist William Jones (d. 1794), whose study of Sanskrit 
                                                
56 Eagleton adds, however, that “since politics has its own sort of signification,” it is perhaps more accurate to 
suggest that “ideology concerns less signification than conflicts within the field of signification.” Terry 
Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991), 11. 
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prompted him to famously declare the common origins of Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Gothic and 
Celtic,57 its most powerful theory locating India as the common origin of humanity was 
enthusiastically taken up by the German Romantic philosophers.58 As Poliakov notes, it was 
Schlegel who first “gave it an anthropological twist by deducing from the relationship of 
language a relationship of race.”59 This new Indo-European anthropology was quickly 
appropriated by anti-Semitic discourses, bolstered as it were by Jewish emancipation. While 
European Jewry aspired to be citizens, a “scientific” discourse was constructed to counter 
such aspirations and “the ‘deicide caste’ of the Jews was transformed in the aftermath of 
emancipation into an ‘inferior race.’”60 In this nascent discourse, Jews came “to be seen as 
slavishly bound to external Law and tradition, ritualistic and irrational, and incapable of the 
maturity and autonomy called for in the development of enlightened, modern subjectivity 
[…].”61  
While romantic arguments asserting the superior Indian capacity for philosophy are to 
be found as early as Schlegel’s 1808 Essay on the Language and Wisdom of the Indians,62 
corresponding negative affirmations denigrating “Semitic mentality” arose in various 
                                                
57 See Poliakov, The Aryan Myth, 190. 
58 As Léon Poliakov notes, it was “Herder above all who introduced the passion for India into the Germanic 
lands and who prompted the imagination of the Romantics to seek affiliation with Mother India.” Poliakov, The 
Aryan Myth, 186. Besides Herder, Raymond Schwab includes the following list of important early German 
Indophile philosophers: Schelling, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Schleiermacher, and Schlegel. Raymond 
Schwab, Oriental Renaissance: Europe’s Rediscovery of India and the East, 1680-1880 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984), 53. 
59 Poliakov, The Aryan Myth, 190. 
60 Ibid., 194. 
61 Aamir R. Mufti, Enlightenment in the Colony: The Jewish Question and the Crisis of Postcolonial Culture 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 38 (emphasis mine). 
62 Here, Schlegel notes how the ancient language of Sanskrit was particularly well suited for the articulation of 
philosophical concepts. Poliakov, The Aryan Myth, 191. 
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German authors soon after, particularly in Schlegel’s successor, the German Indologist 
Christian Lassen. For Lassen, the worldview of the Semite “is subjective and egotistical.”63 
According to Lassen, such extreme subjectivity and egotism had made Semitic religiosity 
intolerant and exclusivist, thus resulting in the Semitic claim to posses the only truth.64 
Indeed, Lassen held that Semitic nature is so overcome with passion and emotion that the 
Semite cannot appreciate the higher and refined arts such as sculpture or painting like the 
Indo-German.65 Similarly, Lassen considered the Semitic mentality to be incapable of 
philosophical thought, since “[t]heir views and notions so absorb their intelligence that they 
are unable to rise with serenity to the contemplation of pure ideas […].”66  
In France, Gobineau, building on the work of Lassen,67 would further cement the 
relationship between philosophy and Aryan superiority through refining the connection 
between language and race.68 In The Inequality of Human Races, Gobineau thus notes that 
“the language of a race is closely bound up with its intelligence and has the power of 
reflecting its various mental stages as they are reached. […] Where the mental development 
of a race is faulty or imperfect, the language suffers to the same extent.”69 Thus, Gobineau 
continues: 
                                                
63 Christian Lassen quoted in Arvidsson, Aryan Idols, 94 (emphasis mine). 
64 Arvidsson, Aryan Idols, 94. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Christian Lassen quoted in Poliakov, The Aryan Myth, 197 (emphasis mine). 
67 See Dorothy Matilda Figueira, Aryans, Jews, Brahmins: Theorizing Authority through Myths of Identity 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 70. 
68 Pace Tzvetan Todorov, who locates Renan as the first to really establish “Aryan” and “Semite” as races in 
place of language families. Tzvetan Todorov, On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in 
French Thought, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 144. 
69 Gobineau, The Inequality of Human Races, 188. 
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The superabundance of philosophical and ethnological terms in Sanscrit corresponds to the 
genius of those who spoke it as well as its richness and rhythmic beauty. The same is the case 
with Greek while the lack of precision in the Semitic tongues is exactly paralleled by the 
character of the Semitic peoples.70 
 
Renan, who was also indebted to Lassen,71 further developed Gobineau’s idea, 
asserting the existence of “linguistic races.”72 Thus, for Renan, language was “for any one 
race the very form and fashion of thought […].”73 Indeed, “language took almost entirely the 
place of race in the division of humanity into groups; or, to put it in another way, the word 
‘race’ assumed a different meaning. Language, religion, laws, and customs, came to 
constitute the race far more than blood.”74 Indeed, it was through such claims of an inherent 
linkage between language and race that Renan could famously reassert the superiority of the 
Aryan intellect: 
[T]he languages of the Aryans and the Semites differed essentially […]. The Aryan language 
was immensely superior […]. This marvellous instrument […] contained in the germ all the 
metaphysics which were afterwards to be developed through the Hindoo genius, the Greek 
genius, the German genius.75 
 
For Renan it was indeed the particular “genius” of the Aryan spirit that allowed their race to 
become “masters of the planet”—theirs was a “courageous and philosophical […] search for 
the truth,” while the downfall of the “Semitic spirit” was precisely its “fearful shallowness 
[…] narrowing the human mind and closing it to all subtle ideas […].”76 Moreover, 
                                                
70 Gobineau, The Inequality of Human Races, 189. 
71 As Stefan Arvidsson recently notes, Renan’s conception of the “Semitic spirit” was perhaps most indebted to 
Lassen’s ideas. See Arvidsson, Aryan Idols, 93f. 
72 Ernest Renan, Mélanges religieux et historiques (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1904), 242. 
73 Ernest Renan, History of the People of Israel: Till the Time of King David, trans. C. B. Pitman and D. 
Bingam, vol. 1 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1905), 3. 
74 Ibid., 3 (emphasis mine). 
75 Ibid., 7-8 (emphasis mine). 
76 Ernest Renan cited in Poliakov, The Aryan Myth, 208 (emphasis mine). 
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according to Renan, the Semitic languages were unable to “express the mythological and epic 
conceptions of the Aryan peoples […],” which were thus “transformed under Semite 
treatment into dull historical narratives.”77 Thus, according to Renan: 
The same trait of character that prohibited the Semites great mythology, prohibited them 
metaphysics, that is to say, research of laws and principles of the world […]. [I]t could be 
shown that whenever metaphysical speculation has developed in the bosom of the Semitic 
religions, it has been surreptitiously through the influence of the Indo-European race and an 
exemption from the requirements of strict orthodoxy.78 
 
In Sufism, Schuon follows the Renanian redefinition of race into that of language 
groups. As was quoted above, Schuon notes that the Semites and Aryans constitute not only a 
“linguistic group,” but also “though more vaguely, a psychological group and even a racial 
group.”79 Schuon thus strikingly echoes Renan’s contentions of a superior Aryan spirit in the 
quest for “truth” in opposition to the Semitic spirit that veils it. “It is perhaps not too 
hazardous to say,” Schuon ventures, “that the Aryan spirit […] tends a priori to unveil the 
truth whereas the Semitic spirit, whose realism is more moral than intellectual, tends toward 
the veiling of the divine Majesty and those of its secrets that are too dazzling or intoxicating 
[…].”80 Elsewhere, Schuon echoes Renan’s above contention that any notion of metaphysics 
in a Semitic context is only possible through an appropriation of Aryan thought and a 
departure from Semitic formalism. Thus, Schuon asserts that Martin Luther was both 
“fundamentally German” (i.e., Aryan) and “Semitic in spirit”: “fundamentally German, he 
loved what is sincere and inward, not clever and formalistic; Semitic in spirit, he admitted 
                                                
77 Renan, History of the People of Israel, 41. 
78 Ernest Renan, Nouvelles considérations sur le caractère général des peuples sémitiques: et en particulier sur 
leur tendance au monothéisme, vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimtre impériale, 1859), 87. 
79 Schuon, Sufism, 20 (emphasis mine). 
80 Ibid., 26. 
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only Revelation and faith and did not wish to hear of Aristotle or the Scholastics.”81 
The Renanian assertion that true metaphysics belonged solely to the “genius” of the 
Aryan race as diametrically opposed to Semitic revelatory “formalism” was further refined 
and popularized by the British born Germanophile Houston Stewart Chamberlain, a self-
described “prophet” of Aryanism in Germany and beyond.82 Thus, Chamberlain notes that 
the Aryan “can stand as an example of the extreme contrast to the Semite […].”83 According 
to Chamberlain, the Semite, in contrast was mired in mundane matters of revelation and 
“blind faith” as opposed to “inner experience,” “the contemplation of nature,” and “the 
power of the imagination.”84 Indeed, “religion” for the Aryan, as opposed to that of the 
Semite, “has primarily nothing to do either with superstition or with morals; it is a state of 
mind.” This so-called Aryan “state of mind,” its “instinct,” according to Chamberlain, is thus 
“to seek the core of nature in the heart.”85  
Similarly, Schuon’s writings are saturated with the stereotypical dichotomy between 
Semitic faith and Aryan intellect. For example, Schuon asserts that while there are many 
things that can be said about the relations between “intelligence and fervor,” he chooses to 
                                                
81 Frithjof Schuon, Christianity/Islam: Perspectives on Esoteric Ecumenism, ed. James S. Cutsinger 
(Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2008), 33 (emphasis mine). 
82 Chamberlain’s 1899 work Foundations of the Nineteenth Century (Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten 
Jahrhunderts) achieved international acclaim and became “the Bible” of racial truth for the Volkisch movement 
in Germany. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology, 97. It also served as an important intellectual and 
ideological precursor for the theorists of the Third Reich. E.g., Alfred Rosenberg’s Foundations of the 
Twentieth Century. See Jackson and Weidman, Race, 124. See also Poliakov, The Aryan Myth, 318-20. 
83 Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, trans. John Lees, vol. 1 (New York: 
Howard Fertig, 1968), 434. 
84 Ibid., 432-3 (emphasis mine). 
85 Ibid., 216. 
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note that “the Semites have excelled in the latter, and the Aryans in the former […].”86 
Indeed, as noted above, Schuon often asserts in concordance with his Aryanist predecessors 
that Aryans “are above all metaphysicians,” while Semites are “a priori […] moralists.”87 
Similarly, Schuon states that 
the Aryan, to the extent he is an observer and a philosopher, has a tendency to describe 
things as they are, whereas the Semite, who is a moralist, readily presents them as they ought 
to be according to his pious sentiment; he transcends them by sublimizing them before having 
had time to extract the arguments comprised in their nature.88  
 
Indeed, for Schuon, like Chamberlain, the Aryan understands “the nature of things,”89 while 
the Semite can only see things through the subjective filter of his dogmatic and legalistic 
religiosity. Notably echoing Chamberlain’s assertion that Judaism banished “everything but 
faith and obedience,”90 Schuon states “[f]or the Semite, everything begins with Revelation 
and therefore with faith and submission; man is a priori a believer and consequently a 
servant: intelligence itself takes on the color of obedience.”91  
The conceit that the Semite’s entire intellectual process was dictated by revelation 
and law was a recurrent trope in Aryanist discourse. On one hand, this made the imagination 
of the Semite extremely “poor,” as Chamberlain notes: 
All who have any claim at all to speak, testify unanimously that lack—or let us say poverty—
of imagination is a fundamental trait of the Semite. […] Mohammedanism and Judaism are 
                                                
86 Schuon, Survey of Metaphysics and Esoterism, trans. Gustavo Polit (Bloomington: World Wisdom Books, 
1986), 133. 
87 Schuon, Sufism, 21. 
88 Ibid., 59. 
89 Elsewhere, Schuon states that “the Platonic or ‘Aryan’ argument is the nature of things […].” Frithjof 
Schuon, The Fullness of God: Frithjof Schuon on Christianity, trans. Mark Perry, ed. James S. Cutsinger 
(Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2004), 72 (emphasis mine). 
90 Chamberlain, Foundations, vol. 1, 431 (emphasis mine). 
91 Schuon, Sufism, 21 (underline mine). 
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sufficient proofs; what we hear of the Bedouins shows us only the beginning of this poverty. 
As Renan happily remarks: “le sémite a l’imagination comprimante,” that is, his imagination 
narrows, limits, confines; a great thought, a deeply symbolical image returns from his brain 
small and thin, “flattened,” robbed of its far-reaching significance.92 
 
Yet, such assertions regarding the stilted Semitic imagination have been historically 
counterbalanced, albeit in still negative terms, by a common trope disparaging the “inflamed 
imagination” of the Semite.93 Somewhat remarkably, Schuon succeeds in deploying both of 
these stereotypes concurrently: 
Jews and Arabs have in common an overactive imagination even when it is poor, which quite 
paradoxically is not a contradiction. Many Islamic or more particularly Sufic speculations—
without forgetting the Shiite sector—fully rival those rabbinical speculations that are most 
subject to caution […].94 
 
Since it is “nourished by the treasures of Revelation,” Schuon grants that “the Semitic 
monotheistic perspective” has the “right intention,” but nevertheless “it can happen that a 
quasi-stereotypical zeal takes precedence over logic […].”95 According to Schuon, because 
of its dependency on revelation, “the mind of the Semite” is characterized by “a tendency to 
inspiration,” and thus “the Real is enclosed in a dogma.” “In the case of the Aryan,” 
however, “it is a tendency to intellection that seems to predominate,” and here “the emphasis 
is placed on a metaphysical description of the Real and its gradations.”96  
While nineteenth century Aryanist discourse tended to denigrate the Semitic 
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scriptural tradition as moralistic and dogmatic, there was a concurrent propensity in the same 
discourse to reductively associate Hinduism with mysticism and its more metaphysically 
oriented textual tradition, i.e., the Upanishads or Vedanta, the ultimate teaching of the 
Veda.97 Indeed, Gobineau’s, Renan’s, and Chamberlain’s conception of Aryanism developed 
in no small part from German Romantic ideas of the metaphysical superiority of Aryan 
Hinduism as expressed in the Vedanta. As mentioned above, a key German influence for all 
three authors in this respect was the work of the Indologist Christian Lassen, whose 
conception of Aryan philosophical supremacy over that of the Semite linked the highest 
mode of Aryanism with the whitest castes of India.98	  Indeed, Chamberlain affectionately calls 
Lassen “the great Orientalist” and notes in the first volume of Foundations of the Nineteenth 
Century that his Indian Archeology (Indische Altertumskunde, 1847) “proves in detail his 
view that the Indo-European race is ‘more highly and more fully gifted,’ that in it alone there 
is ‘perfect symmetry of all mental powers.’”99 Elsewhere in the same work, Chamberlain 
asserts that “[t]he Aryan Indian […] unquestionably possesses the greatest talent for 
metaphysics of any people that ever lived […],”100 and that the thought of “the Hindoo” is 
“metaphysically the deepest in the world.”101  In the second volume, Chamberlain further 
notes, “The most perfect expression of absolutely mystical religion is found among the Aryan 
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Indians […].”102 Of course, Chamberlain makes a direct association between such “absolute” 
religion and the Germanic branch of the Aryan race: “Indian religion is genuinely Indo-
Teutonic […].”103 Chamberlain thus claims: 
The real High School of freedom from hieratic and historical shackles is mysticism, the 
philosophia teutonica as it was called. A mystical philosophy, when completely worked out, 
dissolves one dogmatic theory after another as allegory; what remains is pure symbol, for 
religion is then no longer a creed, a hope, a conviction, but an experience of life […].104 
 
Schuon also tellingly associates his philosophia perennis with the dissolution of 
dogmatic division as essentialized and symbolic “religion” and, as such, Vedanta. In a brief 
article entitled “The Perennial Philosophy,” Schuon notes that  
[t]he term philosophia perennis, which has been current since the time of the Renaissance and 
of which neo-scholasticism made much use, signifies the totality of the primordial and 
universal truths—and therefore of the metaphysical axioms […].105 
 
Further noting, however, that he prefers “the term sophia to that of philosophia,” since the 
latter has “completely profane” associations, Schuon continues to forcefully echo 
Chamberlain above: 
The most direct doctrinal expression of the sophia perennis is undoubtedly Advaita Vedānta, 
with its notions of Ātmā, of Māyā, and of Tat tvam asi; but this doctrine is also found, in one 
form or another, even if only sporadically in some cases, in the sapiential esoterisms of all the 
great religions, and this must necessarily be so in that every normal—and thus intrinsically 
orthodox—religion is itself an indirect and symbolic expression of the eternal sophia.106 
 
Thus, Schuon’s sophia perennis, like Chamberlain’s philosophia teutonica above, aligns true 
religion with “pure symbol” and the absolute itself as “Ātmā” or “the eternal sophia.”  
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While Schuon maintains that “Revelation imposes itself upon Aryans and Semites 
alike,”107 he also notes that the Indian “Veda” is a superior scriptural form that “awakens” 
“the intelligence” “and reminds it of what it is” instead of “enslaving it” by fiat like the 
Semitic revelations.108 For the Aryan, according to Schuon, “[i]ntellectual certainty has 
priority here over a submissive faith.”109 Yet, this Aryan “tendency to intellection” is not only 
determined externally by the epistemological nature of the Vedic scriptural tradition, since in 
Schuon’s understanding, as cited in chapter 2, “what determines the difference among forms 
of Truth is the difference among human receptacles.”110 While I return to this important 
aspect of Schuon’s esoteric cosmology below, here it is sufficient to note that, according to 
Schuon, the different “mental conditions” of each racial “group”111 self-determine the 
“refraction” of Truth of their particular revelation. Indeed, in Castes and Races, Schuon 
directly states: “a revelation always conforms to a racial genius, though this by no means 
signifies that it is restricted to the specific limits of the race in question.”112 Thus, “diverse 
Revelations do not really contradict one another since they do not apply to the same 
receptacle […]; a contradiction can arise only between things situated on the same level.”113 
For Schuon, the superior quality of Aryan intellection is not simply a result of its distinctive 
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revelation, i.e., the “Veda,” but the mark of a particular spirituo-racial disposition that is in 
itself the cause of its own revelation. Thus, while both Aryan “intellectionism” and Semitic 
“inspirationism” are “sacred,” inspirationism is, according to Schuon, “derived from a 
particular grace and not, like intellection, from a permanent and ‘naturally supernatural’ 
capacity.”114  
It is indeed this same Aryan “capacity” for intellection that Chamberlain’s discourse 
proclaims, noting that for the Teutons, “[i]t is not the amount of their knowledge that 
deserves admiration—for all knowledge constantly remains relative—but the fact that they 
possessed the rare capacity to acquire it […].”115 “Only remarkable philosophical gifts,” 
Chamberlain further notes, “can render the consumption, digestion, and utilization of so 
much knowledge possible.”116 Thus, unlike the poor “religious instinct” of “all the branches 
of the Semitic stem,”117 the religious Aryan, according to Chamberlain, “is in direct contact 
with a world beyond reason, he is thinker and poet […].”118  
Indeed, in Castes and Races Schuon echoes Chamberlain’s assertion precisely, but in 
terms of the white race as a whole. Following Gobineau’s tripartite racial typology, Schuon 
notes: 
Perhaps it might also be said that the white man is essentially a poet; […] As for the black 
man, he is neither a cerebral type nor a visualizer but vital, and so a born dancer; he is 
profoundly vital as the yellow man is delicately visual, both races being existential rather 
than mental as compared to the white race.119 
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Indeed, as was quoted at the start of this chapter, it is in the same work that Schuon claims 
the “pre-eminence” of the white race “through the Hindu group,” which by its “metaphysical 
genius” perpetuates the primordial reality of the Aryan.120 
The Schuonian Aryanization of Christianity and Semitization of Islam 
 Even though Renan and his contemporaries deprecated the Semitic race for its 
parochial and intolerant insularism, they did recognize in Judaism an important function: the 
bequeathal of universal religion to the world. Here, Judaism took on “the custodial status of 
foster parents who hid the universal genius of their offspring until the appropriate 
moment.”121 Indeed, this idea is repeated verbatim by Schuon who characterized Judaism 
(i.e., “Mosaism”) as an inward-looking and servile “carrier” religion: 
Indeed Mosaism—every question of exaggeration or stylization notwithstanding—has the 
vocation of being the preserving ark of both the Abrahamic and Sinaitic heritage, the “ghetto” 
of the One and Invisible God, who speaks and acts, but who does so only for an Israel that is 
impenetrable and turned in on itself and that puts all the emphasis on the Covenant and 
obedience […].122 
 
Yet, Renan and those who followed him held that what was preserved from the core 
of the so-called Sinaitic heritage was indeed a transcultural and transhistorical prophetic 
tradition that taught a universal message “not strictly Jewish or Semitic.”123 As Masuzawa 
observes, “It was as though, as far as the Jews were concerned, the voice of the prophets had 
indeed come from afar and from an alien world, bearing a universal salvific message.”124 
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Perhaps this is why Renan goes out of his way to make the particular correspondence 
between the “Semitic prophet” and the “Indian Avatar.”125 Similarly, Schuon repeatedly uses 
the concept of avatar as a synonym for prophet.126 Like Renan who further differentiates 
between avatar and prophet, noting that while the avatar is a divine incarnation, the prophet 
is a chosen instrument of revelation,127 Schuon categorizes such difference as “major and 
minor Avatāras, complete and partial incarnations” respectively. Schuon goes on to 
importantly clarify the difference between the two: “Christ, who identifies the divine 
Message with himself, belongs to the first of these two categories whereas the Prophet, who 
passively receives the Message that God ‘causes to descend’, belongs to the second […].”128 
It is thus in the difference between these two characterizations that we can fully understand 
Schuon’s above differentiation between Aryan “intellectionism” and Semitic 
“inspirationism,” recalling that according to Schuon, Aryan intellectualism derives “from a 
permanent and ‘naturally supernatural’ capacity,” while Semitic inspirationism derives 
solely from “grace.” In other words, Aryan intellectualism as a “supernatural” capacity is in 
accordance with the “major” Avatara, whom Christ resembles as a Divine manifestation, 
whereas Semitic inspirationism as a passive influx of grace accords with Schuon’s notion of 
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“minor” Avatara and the Arab Prophet. Such distinctions revolve around the notion that the 
Semitic “genius” is completely independent of the Semitic “nature” itself. As Maurice 
Olender notes in the context of Renanian discourse: “Although the Hebrew did indeed 
recognize that God is one, that truth descended upon him: he had no responsibility in the 
matter. His monotheism was in no sense a product of his mind.”129 
Like most of his Aryanist predecessors, however, Schuon could not deny outright the 
“Semitic” genealogy connecting Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.  In a passage in Islam and 
the Perennial Philosophy, Schuon claimed that “Aryan thought” records the very “nature of 
things,” while “Semitic thought” was rather “a process of transmission and persuasion.”130 
Accordingly, in “the Golden Age,” the truth itself was sufficient, but later it was “necessary 
to clothe it in an argument efficacious for certain mentalities, and this is what the Semitic 
religions have done.”131 Yet, Schuon also followed his predecessors in arguing for a deeper 
universal prophetic truth that transcends the narrow confines of such Semitic genealogy and 
its attendant “mentalities.” Thus, Schuon goes on in the same passage to note that  
the fundamental enunciations of the religions remain outside these categories: the Christ-
given idea that “God descended so that man might rise”, or the Islamic idea that “there is no 
god but God”, while being Semitic in certain of their aspects, have at the same time a 
universal character that is open to every possibility of the spirit.132  
 
The circular logic of such an assertion is clear: even though these “universal” conceptions 
originate from Semitic contexts, since they are indeed universal, they must be other than 
Semitic. 
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 While Schuon’s above assertion that seemingly finds the same “universal character” 
in Christianity as in Islam may lead us to think that he found both traditions to be equally 
universal, a closer reading proves this not to be the case. In terms of Christianity breaking 
from the Semitic “framework” of Judaism, Schuon notes that “nascent Christianity was 
opposed to legalistic and formalistic Judaism […].” “Having shattered the formal Mosaic 
framework in the name of the essence, the Christian message acted as an esoterism […].”133 
While I will return to Schuon’s conception of Islam in relation to Christianity momentarily, 
here suffice it to note that in addition to the above claim that “the Christian message acted as 
an esoterism,” Schuon elsewhere maintains that the language of Christianity is “on the whole 
more ‘Aryan’ than that of Moslem piety, hence more direct and more open […].”134 
Schuon’s perception of Christianity as more or less “Aryan” is—like much of his 
comparative religionist discourse—an iteration of similar nineteenth century Aryanist 
conceptions. The idea that Jesus was an Aryan and not a Jew became popular around the turn 
of the twentieth century within various intellectual and esoteric circles and was ultimately 
adopted by members of the National Socialist Party who wished to appear congruent with 
Christianity.135 Renan’s ideas proved once again to be formative in this arena with his 
controversial work The Life of Jesus (Vie de Jésus, 1863), which in the words of Olender 
“saved Jesus from Judaism.”136 Thus, Renan bluntly states that Jesus “represents the rupture 
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with the Jewish spirit.”137 “The Law,” for Renan’s Jesus “does not appear to have had much 
charm for him,” while “the religious lyrics of the Psalms were in marvellous accordance with 
his poetic soul.”138 While “[n]o doubt, Jesus proceeded from Judaism,” according to Renan 
“he proceeded from it as Socrates proceeded from the schools of the Sophists […].”139 Renan 
situated Jesus’ true home in Galilee, whose “free life” was “like perfume from another world 
[…].”140 Conversely, Jerusalem as representative of “Judea” was as city of “littleness of 
mind.” Moreover, according to Renan:  
Its fanaticism was extreme, […] the study of the Law, pushed to the most insignificant 
minutiae, and reduced to questions of casuistry, was the only study. This exclusively 
theological and canonical culture contributed in no respect to refine the intellect. It was 
something analogous to the barren doctrine of the Mussulman fakir […].141 
 
As Kidd notes, “Nobody did more to popularise the Aryan interpretation of Christ 
than Houston Stewart Chamberlain.”142 Following Renan, Chamberlain’s section “Christ not 
a Jew” in Foundations begins with the claim that Jesus’ “advent is not the perfecting of the 
Jewish religion but its negation.”143 Chamberlain thus asserted that the “formalism” of the 
Jews “choked” the “genuine religion” that Jesus opened up, while Jesus himself broke the 
laws of the Jews when needed, “for what has all this to do with religion?”144 Thus, 
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Chamberlain inquires “where is the people, which, awakened by Christ to life, has gained for 
itself the precious right-of calling Christ its own? Certainly not in Judea!”145  
As might be expected, Chamberlain transposes the lineage of Jesus’ religion from 
Semitic Judea to Aryan India and the Vedanta.146 In this too, he follows Renan’s lead, who 
saw in Christ’s predecessor, John the Baptist, the “life of a Yogi of India,” which was “so 
opposed to the spirit of the ancient Jewish people” that it more resembled the “gourous of 
Brahminism.”147 Indeed, Renan asks: “might there not in this be a remote influence of the 
mounis of India?”148 Schuon, like Renan and even more so Chamberlain, situates Jesus’ 
proper place in India, noting that  
Jesus has the function of a regenerator: he is the great prophet of inwardness, and as such he 
should have been accepted by Israel as Isaiah was; however, this acceptance presupposed a 
spiritual suppleness more fitting of India than Judea.149 
 
The late nineteenth century Aryanization of Christianity was paralleled by a 
concurrent conceit, i.e., the Semitization of Islam. As Renan stated quite plainly: “The 
continuation of Judaism was not Christianity but Islam.”150 From this point on, the Muslim 
was recast as a desert Arab who was prototypically “Semitic.”151 In line with such Aryanist 
Semitization of Islam, Schuon notes that “[o]n the surface of Islam we meet with the features 
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of the Bedouin mentality, which obviously have nothing universal about them […].” Yet, 
Schuon immediately qualifies this statement with his customary recourse to the 
essentialization of “religion” as such: “in the fundamental elements, however, we encounter 
as it were religion as such, which by its essentiality opens quite naturally onto metaphysics 
and gnosis.”152 Even though such an admission of universality appears to raise Islam up to 
the level of Christianity, according to Schuon, the religion of Muhammad ultimately remains 
“wholly Semitic” and thus distinct from the more Aryan disposition of Christ:   
Since it was not necessary for Muhammad to present himself—any more than Abraham and 
Moses—as the Manifestation of the Absolute, he could, like them, remain wholly Semitic in 
style, a style which attaches itself meticulously to human things, not scanting even the 
smallest; whereas in Christ—paradoxically and providentially—there is an element that 
brings him closer to the Aryan world, that is, a tendency in his nature toward the idealistic 
simplification of earthly contingencies.153 
 
Here, Schuon’s classification of Muhammad’s “Semitic” style posits a mentality that is 
attached “meticulously to human things” in opposition to Christ’s “Aryan” tendency towards 
a  Platonic “idealism,” i.e., a metaphysical realm that transcends the human world of material 
reality.154 Indeed, after apologizing for what may strike the reader as “ill-sounding,” Schuon 
clarifies in a footnote that “we shall say that Christ, who was destined to be an ‘Aryan god’, 
has himself, by way of anticipation, a certain Aryan quality, which shows itself in his 
independence—seemingly ‘Greek’ or ‘Hindu’—toward forms […].”155  
Such a comparison between the Semitic “worldly” Muhammad and the Aryan 
“formless” Christ is once again a forceful and clear reiteration of an Aryanist conceit 
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deprecating a Semitic “materialism” notable for its voluntarism, ritualism, and lack of 
metaphysics.156 As Chamberlain succinctly states: “Pure materialism is the religious doctrine 
of the Arab Mohammed […].”157 Chamberlain continues to note that “[w]herever the Semitic 
spirit has breathed, we shall meet with this materialism. Elsewhere in the whole world 
religion is an idealistic impulse […].” But “in the case of the Semites,” Chamberlain asserts, 
“the imperious will immediately lays hold of every symbol, every profound divination of 
reflective thought, and transforms them into hard empirical facts. And thus it is that with this 
view of religion only practical ends are pursued, no ideal ones.”158  
In Castes and Races, Schuon echoes Chamberlain’s conception of Semitic 
materialism by asserting that because of the absence of the caste system in Semitic religions, 
there is an imposition of “a certain mental uniformity” on people of different spiritual 
capacities. Such a mode of “collectivity,” notes Schuon, “represents a principle tending to 
increase density and complexity; it is always ready to lend an absolute character to facts, 
and this is the tendency for which religious dogmatism makes allowance from the outset.”159 
It is such Semitic dogmatism, Schuon continues to note, that ultimately creates “doctrinal 
simplification and a need for external activities which are the very antipodes of intellection 
and contemplation.”160 Conversely, “the pure and direct character of Vedantic metaphysics 
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would be inconceivable apart from the caste system […].” Since no such imposed spirituo-
racial hierarchy exists “[i]n the Semitic religions,” according to Schuon, “esotericism is 
closely bound up with exotericism and vice versa.”161 “[N]o one can deny,” as Schuon notes 
elsewhere, “that in Semitic doctrines the formulations and rules are usually determined by 
considerations of dogmatic, moral, and social opportuneness.”162 Therefore, the Semitic 
traditions of jurisprudence and ritual practice—or the “need for external activities” as Schuon 
puts it above—are in fact the very opposite of Aryan “intellection and contemplation.”  
Putting Ibn ‘Arabi in “Esoteric Context”: The Problem of Ashʿarism 
No other metaphysician so lionized by Traditionalists has challenged Schuon’s robust 
Aryanist framework as Ibn ‘Arabi,163 who not only professed pure Arab descent, as his name 
suggests,164 but whose metaphysical discourse was thoroughly steeped within the Islamic 
textual tradition of his medieval milieu, as has been shown in the previous chapters. As was 
noted in chapter 2, Schuon praises Ibn ‘Arabi as “the great enunciator of gnosis in Islam,”165 
and thus as an important representative of the religio perennis.166 Yet, he also takes Ibn 
‘Arabi to task for “divergent interpretations—one esoteric and the other exoteric […]”167 and 
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elsewhere disparages the “unevenness and contradictions” in his thought “owing above all to 
his at least partial solidarity with ordinary theology […].”168 
For example, when Ibn ‘Arabi exalts Muhammad over Joseph in the Fuṣūṣ,169 Schuon 
asserts: “one has a right to expect a more nuanced and objective perspective in an esoteric 
context.”170  Similarly, Ibn ‘Arabi’s auto-exegetical statement that his “religion of love is the 
prerogative of Muslims; for the station of the most perfect love has been imparted 
exclusively to the Prophet Muhammad and not the other Prophets”171 is derided by Schuon as 
an “abrupt and unintelligible denominationalism,” the “extenuating circumstance” of which 
is due to “the fact that for each religion the Prophet who founded it is the sole personification 
of the total, not the partial, Logos.”172 “Nonetheless,” Schuon continues, 
one might expect an esoterist not to enclose himself in this concept-symbol but, since he has 
opted for the essence, to take into account the relativity of forms, even those that are dear to 
him, and to do so in an objective and concrete, and not merely metaphorical, manner—or 
else remain silent, for pity’s sake.173 
 
Such corrective reprimands not only evince an exasperation with Ibn ‘Arabi’s recourse to 
Islamic normativity, but also, and more importantly, a perceived infringement upon a 
particular bounded discourse (i.e., “the relativity of forms”). In setting Ibn ‘Arabi straight 
when he is found venturing outside of the decorum deemed proper for an “esoterist,” Schuon 
                                                
168 Schuon, Sufism, 33 (emphasis mine). 
169 I.e., “See then […] how excellent are the knowledge and rank of Muhammad!” Ibn ‘Arabi quoted in Schuon, 
Sufism, 44. 
170 Schuon, Sufism, 45 (emphasis mine). 
171 Ibn ‘Arabi quoted in Schuon, Sufism, 40n29. Schuon seems to be following Reynold Nicholson’s translation 
of the Tarjumān al-Ashwāq here. Regarding Nicholson’s translation of “Moslems” for al-muḥammadiyyīn, see 
the discussion in chapter 1, pp. 49-52. 
172 Schuon, Sufism, 40n29 (emphasis mine). 
173 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
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apparently follows his great Renaissance predecessor, Agostino Steuco (d. 1548), whose 
1540 work De perenni philosophia coined the term philosophia perennis.174 As Theobald 
Freudenberger notes, if a passage of an ancient poet or philosopher used by Steuco “refuses 
to fit into his system, he earnestly addresses the author and admonishes him in a fatherly way 
to come to his senses.”175  
Like Steuco’s admonishments, Schuon’s reproach of Ibn ‘Arabi’s “abrupt and 
unintelligible denominationalism” above revolves around a particular “system” of esoteric 
principles, which he succinctly relates at the end of his above critique. “One is obliged,” 
notes Schuon, “to take note of the de facto existence of two esoterisms, one partially 
formalistic and the other perfectly consistent, all the more so as facts cannot be at the level of 
principles.”176 While this rather opaque statement is left here without additional explanation, 
Schuon elucidates its meaning further in an essay published several years later, appropriately 
entitled “Two Esoterisms.”177 In explicating its first sense, Schuon follows one of the earliest 
usages of “esotericism” and employs the term in complementary relation to its binary 
opposite “exotericism.”178 As such, Schuon notes: 
                                                
174 See Charles B. Schmitt, “Perrenial Philosophy: From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz,” Journal of the History of 
Ideas 27, no. 4 (1966): 515-24. Steuco believed that true theology “is nothing other than the revealed truth 
which has been known to mankind from the earliest times” (ibid., 518). See also the introduction to this study, 
p. 4n12. 
175 Theobald Freudenberger quoted in Wouter J. Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy: Rejected 
Knowledge in Western Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 72. 
176 Schuon, Sufism, 40n29 (underline mine). 
177 Schuon, Survey of Metaphysics and Esoterism, 115-22. (Originally published as Résumé de métaphysique 
intégrale, 1985). 
178 While the adjective “esoteric” can be traced to a satire by Lucian of Samosata in the second century C.E., the 
noun “esotericism” (also esoterism) is of relatively recent occurrence, first appearing in French (l’ésotérisme) in 
1828. In 1839, Jacques Etienne Marconis de Nègre employed the neologism to denote the division of “sacred 
science in exotericism or external science and esotericism or internal science.” As Wouter Hanegraaff notes, 
“esotericism” may refer to various typological constructs of religions activity having to do with “secrecy,” but 
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Where there is a truth of Revelation, hence of formal and theological truth, there must also be 
a truth of intellection, hence of non-formal and metaphysical truth; not legalistic or 
obligatory truth, but truth that stems from the nature of things, and which is also vocational 
since not every man grasps this nature. 179  
 
In this concise definition, Schuon posits esoteric truth in terms of a series of binary opposites. 
Esoteric truth is a “metaphysical” mode of “intellection” that originates from the very 
“nature of things.” Such truth is opposed to the “formal and theological truth” of 
“Revelation,” which is by implication “legalistic or obligatory truth.” Finally, esoteric truth is 
“vocational,” i.e., discernable only by an elite, since not everyone is capable of grasping its 
nature. 
In offering a second definition, however, Schuon further reifies the concept of 
esotericism and gives it a unique autonomy decoupled from any relationship to its exoteric 
Other. Here, esotericism “is not, in its intrinsic reality, a complement or a half.” Rather, for 
Schuon, “esoterism as such is metaphysics,” indeed it is “the total truth as such.”180 As “the 
total truth,” this pure form of esotericism is inherently different than an “esoterism of a 
particular religion,” which “tends to adapt itself to this religion and thereby enter into 
theological, psychological and legalistic meanders foreign to its nature […].”181 For Schuon, 
therefore, there are two distinct kinds of esoteric doctrines: (i) “pure,” “true,” “intrinsic,” or 
“universal” esotericism (which Schuon also refers to as metaphysics, intellection, gnosis, the 
                                                                                                                                                  
its early usage in association “with the deeper, ‘inner mysteries of religion’ as opposed to its merely external or 
‘exoteric’ dimensions” is the primary sense through which proponents of Perennialism (along with religionists 
such as Eliade, Corbin, and Carl Jung) deploy the term. Wouter J. Hanegraaff, “Esotericism,” Dictionary of 
Gnosis and Western Esotericism, ed. Wouter J. Hanegraaff (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 336, 337. 
179 Schuon, Survey of Metaphysics, 115 (emphasis mine). 
180 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
181 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
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primordial religion, religio perennis etc.), and (ii) esotericisms attached to particular 
religions, or what Schuon calls “esoterism-complements.”  
For example, “Advaita-Vedānta” is “unquestionably,” for Schuon, “an intrinsic 
esoterism, and as such suffices unto itself; but it is not an esoterism-complement, that is, an 
esoterism found alongside a religious system of a sentimental character.”182 Yet, as Schuon 
makes clear in Sufism: Veil and Quintessence, Sufism is an esotericism-complement because 
its doctrine seeks “to combine two tendencies, Platonism and Asharism.” Platonism, like 
Vedanta, is an example of “true metaphysics” where “the true, the beautiful, and the good are 
such because they manifest qualities proper to the Principle, or to the Essence […].” Yet, in 
Sufism, Platonism is combined with the “ordinary” theological tradition of Ashʿarism, which 
proclaims “that the true, the beautiful, and the good are such because God wills it so without 
our being able to know why […].”183  
In Ashʿarism, which according to Schuon is not only voluntaristic but also “viscerally 
moralistic and therefore individualistic,”184 God is understood to possess the power simply 
by His free will to determine reality “as if will had its sufficient reason in itself and as if 
freedom could logically and ontologically include the absurd […].”185 Similarly, “man is 
defined as will predestined for obedience and apparently free in its choices ‘if God wills’.”186 
                                                
182 Schuon, Survey of Metaphysics, 118. Elsewhere, Schuon explains “sentimental” as that which is the limiting 
factor in any given exoteric religion: “To speak of sentimentality is to speak of limitation: the margin of 
sentiment that envelops each one of the religions proves in its fashion the limit of all exoterism and, as a result, 
the limits of exoteric claims.” Schuon, Form and Substance, 16. 
183 Schuon, Sufism, 31. 
184 Schuon repeatedly denigrates Semitic Ashʿarism as “individualistic,” which echoes Lassen’s critique of 
Semitic subjectivism. See pp. 178 above and 205n211 below. 
185 Schuon, Sufism, 31 (emphasis mine). 
186 Ibid. 
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It is exactly this type of voluntarism that Schuon disparages throughout his oeuvre again and 
again as being counter to any notion of authentic esotericism. As such, Schuon pointedly 
notes that “Sufism obviously approaches pure gnosis to the extent it is Platonic […] and it 
departs from it to the extent it capitulates to Asharism.”187 
Schuon concludes the above discussion by pointing out how the doctrine of waḥdat 
al-wujūd (the unity of being), generally associated with Ibn ‘Arabi,188 is tainted with an 
Ashʿarī voluntarism since in it “everything that exists is ‘good’ because it is ‘willed by God’ 
[…]. We are not told why God does not love certain things even though all things are good 
‘in themselves’ […].”189 Schuon thus notes, “Here the most vertiginous metaphysics is 
combined with the most summary Asharism.”190 Yet in a similar discussion elsewhere, 
Schuon directly equates Ibn ‘Arabi’s related occasionalism to “the Hanbalite and Asharite 
negation of secondary causes and natural laws.”191 Indeed, in Sufism, Schuon takes Ibn 
‘Arabi to task for supporting “the excessive fideism of the Hanbalites,”192 a school (madhhab) 
of law and theology known for its populist traditionalism and radical anthropomorphism.193 
In yet another work, Schuon claims that “it is from Hanbalism that Asharite kalām inherited 
                                                
187 Schuon, Sufism, 31. 
188 Ibn ‘Arabi, however, never used the term. See William Chittick, “Rūmī and waḥdat al-wujūd,” in Poetry and 
Mysticism in Islam: The Heritage of Rūmī, ed. Amin Banani, Richard Hovannisian, and Georges Sabagh (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
189 Schuon, Sufism, 31. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Schuon, Logic and Transcendence, 124 (emphasis mine). 
192 Schuon, Sufism, 65 (emphasis mine). 
193 Khalid Blankinship, “The Early Creed,” in The Cambridge Companion to classical Islamic Theology, ed. 
Tim Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 52. 
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its most questionable theses.”194 In linking Ḥanbalism and Ashʿarism, Schuon creates a 
powerful—albeit reductive195—genealogy of anti-philosophical and fideistic literalism in 
which he situates Ibn ‘Arabi’s metaphysics. Thus, Schuon reproaches the Andalusian Sufi for 
both a “confused” hermeneutic—which is “independent of every question of dialectic” 
combining esoteric and exoteric interpretations—and an excessive fideism resulting from his 
monistic absorption.196 Although Schuon’s portrayal of Ashʿarī voluntarism and 
occasionalism reproduces a rather radical and unhistorical stereotype,197 it serves throughout 
his works as a symbol of a wider typology that should by now be familiar:  
Like all Semitic theologians Ashari has in mind only the opposition between the created and 
the Creator and not the participation—nonetheless necessary—of the former in the latter, 
whence the negation of secondary causes and natural laws that is characteristic of 
Asharism.198 
 
If “the negation of secondary causes and natural laws that is characteristic of Asharism” is a 
trait common to “Semitic theologians,” then it should not surprise that the reason Platonism 
                                                
194 Frithjof Schuon, Christianity/Islam, 164. 
195 Because al-Ashʿarī did claim to be a Ḥanbalī, his doctrine is often reduced to Ḥanbalī non-rational literalism. 
Yet, historically Ashʿarism was a synthesis between it and rationalism. As W. Montgomery Watt notes, even 
though “to a European reader [al-Ashʿari’s] argumentation differs little at first sight from that of the ultra-
conservative followers of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal,” al-Ashʿarī was in no way adverse to using rational argument. W. 
Montgomery Watt, “al-As̲h̲ʿarī, Abu ’l-Ḥasan,” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (Leiden: E. J. 
Brill, 1986), 694. See also Roy Jackson, Fifty Key Figures in Islam (London: Routledge, 2006), 58-59. 
196 Schuon, Logic and Transcendence, 124-25, 125n29 (emphasis mine). It should be noted here, that Ibn ‘Arabi 
himself was critical of voluntarism. As he asserts in the Fuṣūṣ: “There are some rationalists of weak intellect, 
for whom it has been proven that God does what He wills, who go on to warrant for God, the Most High, what 
contradicts wisdom and the reality of things in itself. As such, some thinkers have strayed so far as to deny 
contingency […]. Yet, the person of realization affirms contingency.” Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, ed. Abul 
Ela Affifi (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-ʿArabi, 1966), 67. 
197 As Frank Griffel recently observes, “Often occasionalism is so closely connected to early Ashaʿrism that it is 
almost regarded as a necessary constituent of that theology. That, however, is not the case.” Following Daniel 
Gimaret and Richard M. Frank, Griffel thus notes that “at no point in Ashʿarite history did they defend a radical 
occasionalist position that completely denies efficacy to created beings. Most early Ashaʿrites acknowledged 
that human decisions trigger their actions even if they are not the only sufficient cause.” Frank Griffel, Al-
Ghazali’s Philosophical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 132. 
198 Schuon, Christianity/Islam, 150-51 (emphasis mine).  
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is opposite to Ashʿarism in this respect is because, according to Schuon, Plato “belonged 
intellectually to the Aryan world, and his doctrine is like a distant modality of Brahmanism 
[…].”199 According to Schuon, this Aryan-Vedantist typology facilitated in Plato “the 
actualization of pure intellection”200 as opposed to the fideism of al-Ashʿarī. It is here that 
Schuon’s ideological hermeneutic behind his assertion of Ibn ‘Arabi’s deficient “dialectic” 
and so called “confusion” between the esoteric and exoteric begins to surface. Indeed, 
elsewhere Schuon clarifies that the problem is again seemingly due to a difference in 
typology: 
Greeks and especially Hindus have long possessed the instrument of dialectic, for it 
corresponds to their sense of objectivity, whereas it was missing among the early Semites, as 
well as for nascent Islam […].201 
 
Thus, while Plato’s dialectical thought was made possible because of the Greek genealogical 
connection to Hinduism (i.e., Brahmanism above) and the “Aryan world,” al-Ashʿarī as a 
“Semitic theologian” inherently lacks such an “instrument” and is thus unable to rise to the 
level of impartial truth, i.e., “objectivity.” Elsewhere, Schuon similarly notes that “the 
reasoning of Semites” is based merely upon a “dogmatic” certitude and a wish to 
“communicate and reinforce what is evident,” in opposition to that of “Greeks and Hindus” 
whose mode of reasoning is “a dialectic that is concerned with doing justice to the nature of 
things.” Schuon thus concludes that such lack of Semitic impartiality “explains the weakness 
of certain arguments of Sufis themselves.”202 Here, Schuon concisely summarizes the issue 
that appears to be the basis of his remarks on Ibn ‘Arabi above and the attendant problem of 
                                                
199 Schuon, Logic and Transcendence, 78. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Schuon, Form and Substance, 210 (emphasis mine).  
202 Schuon, Christianity/Islam, 165 (emphasis mine). 
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Sufism in relation to its so-called tension between Platonism and Asharism. Sufism is in 
Schuon’s mind ultimately a “Semitic” modality of spirituality because it lacks the “dialectic” 
of an intellectualist or naturalist discourse that recognizes reality, or “nature,” as imbued with 
an unchangeable “universal” law that is autonomously knowable through the intellect.203 This 
Schuon opposes to Semitic “moralism,” or voluntarism, which gives God’s will the ultimate 
power in deciding the moral value of things.204  
Indeed, Schuon’s repeated criticism of Semitic “voluntarism” is precisely paralleled 
in Chamberlain, who writes that for the “genuinely Semitic faith […] Will triumphs.”205 For 
Chamberlain, this is so not only because of “its uncommon strength,” but as a “consequence 
of the impoverishment of the understanding and the imagination” of the Semite. Thus, 
“opposed to a minimum of religion we find a maximum of unconditional, unshakeable 
capacity of faith […].”206 Like Schuon, Chamberlain opposes Semitic voluntarism to 
Hinduism: “while the Indian taught the negation of will, […] religion is for the Semite the 
idolization of his will, its most glowing, immoderate and fanatical assertion.”207 In the 
following passage, Chamberlain brings together Aryanism and natural law theory in 
                                                
203 Schuon thus makes “Platonism” a synecdoche for “natural law theory” as originated by classical Greek 
philosophers and fully developed by the Stoics. This “intellectualist” idea is marked by the notion that God is 
bound by the rational laws that He (or the Logos) created the universe with originally. In terms of morality, that 
which is good is thus intrinsically so in relationship to the created, purposeful order of the universe and not 
according to the will of God as potentially separate from such order. See Patrick D. Hopkins, “Natural Law,” 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed., ed. Donald M. Borchert, vol. 6, (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 
2006), 505-517.  
204 While Greek naturalism is also reflected in Muʿtazilī rationalism, Schuon decidedly chooses to identify 
directly with the Greek lineage of Platonism in opposing Ashʿarī voluntarism and occasionalism. For a brief 
overview of the tradition of theological voluntarism in Islamic ethics see Daniel Brown, “Islamic Ethics in 
Comparative Perspective,” The Muslim World 89, no. 2 (1999): 181-185. 
205 Chamberlain, Foundations, vol. 1, 423. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid., 419. 
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opposition to Islamic and Jewish voluntarism that concludes with a strikingly familiar 
diatribe: 
The abnormally developed will of the Semites can lead to two extremes: either to rigidity, as 
in the case of Mohammed, where the idea of the unlimited divine caprice is predominant; or, 
as is the case with the Jews, to the phenomenal elasticity, which is produced by the 
conception of their own human arbitrariness. To the Indo-European both paths are closed. In 
nature he observes everywhere the rule of law, and of himself he knows that he can only 
achieve his highest when he obeys inner need. […] Of ourselves, we should certainly never 
have arrived at the conception of a free almighty God and of what may be called an “arbitrary 
Providence,” a Providence, that is, which can decree something in one way, and then in 
answer to prayers or from other motives decide in a contrary direction.208 
 
Schuon’s discourse on “Semitic” Ashʿarism thus echoes Western scholarship that has 
traditionally defined Ashʿarism as “ethical voluntarism”—or in George F. Hourani’s terms 
“theistic subjectivism.”209 Indeed, in contrast to such Ashʿarī “subjectivism,” Hourani 
himself defines the thought of Plato and Aristotle as “objectivism.”210 As noted above, 
Schuon similarly opposes “objectivity” with “subjectivity,” but within an Aryan/Semitic 
opposition. This oft-repeated dichotomy in Schuon’s writings echoes those common in 
Lassen, Renan, and Chamberlain where the “subjective” sentimentality of the Semitic 
mentality does not have the necessary self-distance to experience higher forms of poetic and 
philosophical thought.211 Thus, in Logic and Transcendence (Logique et Transcendance, 
1970), Schuon notes: 
                                                
208 Chamberlain, Foundations, vol. 1, 242-3. 
209 George F. Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
17. 
210 Ibid., 22. 
211 See p. 178 above. Lassen understood Semitic subjectivism to be a form of self-absorption where as 
Arvidsson explains “everything circles around the self […]. Consequently, Semitic poetry, for example, is just a 
place where the poet can pour out his completely private feelings and passions. Literary genres such as epic and 
drama, that require the poet to keep his personality in the background, are completely missing in Semitic 
literature.” Arvidsson, Aryan Idols, 94 see also 95-96 
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Platonists and Vedantists are interested first and foremost in the Real—in what truly is rather 
than in what we can or must or will do; they do not dwell on the subjective accidents of 
realization; […] on the contrary the emphasis is placed on a metaphysical description of the 
Real and its gradations. Semites, on the other hand, stress a subjective way of attaining what 
is; the Real is enclosed in a dogma, and the whole emphasis is placed on the unfolding of the 
subjective experiences of realization.212 
 
Similarly, in Sufism, Schuon states that “Aryans are objectivists […] while Semites are 
subjectivists […]. It is the difference between intellectualism and voluntarism […].”213As 
with Lassen and Renan, Schuon’s insistence on linking “objectivity” with Aryans and 
“subjectivity” with Semites is not value neutral even though he occasionally endeavors to 
mitigate, and thus ostensibly equalize, the difference between these binaries by noting their 
negative potentials.214 Yet, such attempts ultimately ring hollow in light of the essentializing 
qualifiers that Schuon associates with each. Indeed, in Echoes of Perennial Wisdom (Les 
Perles du pelerine, 1990), Schuon claims that the “prerogative of the human state is 
objectivity […].” “Objectivity is none other than the truth,” furthers Schuon, “in which the 
subject and the object coincide, and in which the essential takes precedence over the 
accidental […].”215 It is thus clear that “objectivity” for Schuon is analogous to his above 
notion of “esoterism” as “the total truth as such”—thus both esotericism and its attendant 
“primordial” objectivity fall within the special province of Aryans, who as we may recall are, 
according to Schuon, “above all metaphysicians.”216 In light of such ideological discourse 
                                                
212 Schuon, Logic and Transcendence, 128. 
213 Schuon, Sufism, 21. 
214 E.g., Schuon qualifies his statement above by adding: “deviated objectivism gives rise to rationalism and 
scientism whereas excessive subjectivism engenders all the illogicalities and pious absurdities of which a 
sentimental, zealous, and conventional fideism is capable” (ibid., 21). 
215 Schuon, Echoes of Perennial Wisdom, trans. Mark Perry and Jean-Pierre Lafouge (Bloomington: World 
Wisdom), 60 (emphasis mine). 
216 Schuon, Sufism, 21. 
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that gives the Aryan special access to pure “objectivity” (as distinct from “the subjective 
accidents of realization”), Schuon’s above demurral regarding Ibn ‘Arabi’s exaltation of 
Muhammad over Joseph—i.e., that “one has a right to expect a more nuanced and objective 
perspective in an esoteric context”—takes on added meaning. It is to this expectation and its 
discursive manifestations that we now turn.  
De-Semitizing Ibn ‘Arabi: Finding Vedanta in the Naked Virgin 
The primary problem with Semitic subjectivism, according to Schuon, is its 
inability to distinguish the underlying formlessness of the Real from the contingent dogmas 
presented by the various religions. Like his Aryanist predecessors, Schuon linked this 
Semitic “confusion” with the inherent nature of monotheistic “inspirationism,” which was 
incapable of higher order, metaphysical insight that affords objective understanding. Indeed, 
as was noted in the introduction to this chapter, this was precisely his critique of Sufism, 
which he claimed was linked to the “anti-metaphysical and moralizing creationism of the 
monotheistic theologies,” and thus keep it from sufficiently acknowledging the “the principle 
of relativity.”217 The ability to accommodate this principle is what Schuon elsewhere refers to 
as “the esoteric vision of things” that allows the esotericist to detect the limits of religious 
“totalitarianism,”218 i.e., religious absolutism. As Schuon notes, “Inwardly or substantially, 
the claims a religion makes are absolute, but outwardly or formally, namely on the plane of 
human contingency, they are necessarily relative.”219 “The principle of relativity” is thus a 
key tenet for Schuon’s emblematic notion of “the transcendent unity of religions” and its 
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attendant notion of the universal validity of religions, which was discussed in chapter 2. It is 
thus important to note that “intrinsic esoterism”—and its associated principles of the 
relativity, transcendent unity, and universal validity of religions—represented for Schuon the 
entire raison d’être of his Sufi ṭarīqa. As Schuon notes in a 1980 letter to a disciple, before 
and at the foundation of the ṭarīqa “the question did not arise a priori as to the nature of 
Sufism, but only the question as to how esoterism as such could manifest and assert itself 
anew.”220 As is evinced here and in a letter dated a year later, Schuon positions his ṭarīqa, the 
ʿAlāwiyya Maryamiyya, as unique in the history of Sufism due to its “purely esoteric 
perspective” and its “metaphysical foundation” in “the Vedānta.”221  
Yet, as Schuon argues elsewhere, such “[s]trict and universal esoterism—of the 
‘advaitic’ type so to speak—has necessarily always existed in the climate of Semitic 
monotheism […].” This is so, Schuon asserts, “for the simple reason that everywhere there 
are men whose nature requires it; namely, men whose intelligence, discernment and 
contemplativeness are proportionate to pure metaphysics and thus to the corresponding 
path.”222 In answer to the imagined demurral that “there are no documents proving the more 
or less traditional existence of this gnosis,” Schuon responds: 
that is because it was of necessity transmitted orally—apart from certain providential 
exceptions which are also necessary—given that gnosis is independent of the exoteric systems 
which may be its vehicle, and that therefore it inevitably comprises aspects that are 
incompatible with them.223 
 
                                                
220 Schuon, “Excerpts from Letters,” December 1980, 2 (emphasis mine). 
221 Ibid., May 1981, 5. 
222 Schuon, Survey of Metaphysics, 119. 
223 Ibid. (emphasis mine). Schuon here simply counters an argumentum ad ignorantiam with another, seemingly 
weaker one; i.e., there is no proof that p is true, therefore p is false vs. there is no proof that p is false, therefore 
p is true. See Douglas N. Walton, Arguments from Ignorance (University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1996), 26. 
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Indeed, Schuon adds that by such esotericism’s “recourse to intellection it seems to make 
Revelation redundant and even superfluous […].”224 Similarly, in an internal Maryamiyya 
directive, Schuon notes: “The philosophia perennis is founded, essentially and intrinsically, 
upon the nature of things perceived by intellectual intuition; it is only formally and 
extrinsically that it is founded upon a particular revealed Text, and it could never be 
dependent on it.”225 Like Schuon’s above assertion decoupling gnosis from “the exoteric 
systems which may be its vehicle,” thus “inevitably” comprising “incompatible” aspects with 
such systems, Schuon here notes:  
It may happen that the pure pneumatic will act in a manner foreign to a particular religious 
perspective and to particular prescriptions, but it cannot happen that he act in a manner 
contrary to the nature of things, for he bears the essential, universal and primordial Law in 
the depths of his own heart. For this very reason, deviation or corruption is in his case 
impossible, whatever appearances from a particular limited perspective may be.226 
 
If such claims of the total spiritual autonomy and incorruptibility of pure esoteric 
intellection are read in the light of Schuon’s repeated assertions above regarding the 
“‘naturally supernatural’ capacity” of Aryan “intellection,”227 it should not surprise that 
Schuon describes his position as “messenger” of his unique ṭarīqa as particularly “Aryan.” In 
a letter where Schuon refers to himself as “[t]he human instrument for the manifestation of 
the Religio perennis at the end of time […],”228 Schuon further styles himself as “the 
messenger who brought the Tarīqah to Europe, and there so to speak shaped it anew […].” 
                                                
224 Schuon, Survey of Metaphysics, 119 (emphasis mine). 
225 Frithjof Schuon, “Not To Be Lost from Sight” (photocopy, unpublished Maryamiyya papers), 1075 
(underline original, emphasis mine). 
226 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
227 Schuon, Sufism, 28. 
228 Schuon, “Excerpts from Letters,” December 1980, 2 (underline original). This statement is corroborated by 
Schuon’s wife Sa. Aminah. See Urban, “A Dance of Masks,” 416. 
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Here, Schuon notes that while he is of European ancestry, he is “above all a proto-Aryan and 
through this deeply rooted in the Hindu spirit, since indeed it has in a certain way kept alive 
the proto-Aryan spirit.”229  
 While identifying himself as “above all a proto Aryan” in direct relationship to “the 
Hindu spirit,” Schuon nevertheless continues in the same letter to note that he additionally 
has “a profound kinship with the world of Abraham,” and thus “also with Islam.” Yet here, 
Schuon importantly qualifies what kind of Islam: “Islam, not as a mold for the world of Arab 
sentiment and impulse, but as a manifestation of the Primordial Religion at the end of time 
[…].”230 Schuon goes on to assert that such a “Primordial” Islam specifically relates to “its 
opening towards gnosis and its emphasis upon steadfast remembrance of God, based on the 
Shahādah and the Supreme Name.”231 This description is made even more clear if read in the 
light of another recently published letter addressing what Schuon refers to as “pure Islam”: 
“[I]n Semitic doctrines the formulations and rules are usually determined by considerations 
of dogmatic, moral, and social opportuneness. But this cannot apply to pure Islam […].”232 
In the same letter, Schuon goes on to conceptualize “pure Islam” through Vedantic 
monistic statements of liberation,233 asserting that “the Shahādah cannot but mean […] that 
‘you are That’ (tat tvam asi), or that ‘I am Brahma’ (aham Brahmāsmi) […].”234 Finally, 
                                                
229 Schuon, “Excerpts from Letters,” December 1980, 3 (underline original, emphasis mine).  
230 Ibid. (underline original, emphasis mine). 
231 Ibid. (underline original, emphasis mine). 
232 Schuon, Sufism, 135 (emphasis mine). 
233 Shankara was of the opinion that liberation could result through reflection on such “great statements” (i.e.  
the mahāvākyas). See John Taber, “Vedānta,” in The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy, ed. Jay L. 
Garfield and William Edelglass (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 153. 
234 Schuon, Sufism, 135 (emphasis mine). 
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Schuon asserts that according to “universal wisdom,” the invocation of the supreme name of 
God (i.e., “Allah”) “contains and replaces all other rites […].”235 The reality of this fact is 
therefore “of decisive authority against those who would make the sharīʿah or sunnah into a 
kind of exclusive karma-yoga, and it even allows us to draw conclusions by analogy (qiyās, 
ijtihād) that most Shariites would find illicit […].”236 Therefore “Pure Islam”—or Islam as “a 
manifestation of the Primordial Religion at the end of time” above—is for Schuon simply a 
metaphysical perception (i.e., intellection, gnosis, etc.) of reality that if grasped is sufficient 
unto itself—and thus “contains and replaces all other rites.”  
Nasr has vigorously argued that “Schuon was and remained rooted in the Islamic 
tradition to the moment of his death and knew more than anyone else that one cannot live 
beyond the world of forms […].”237 Nasr additionally holds that Schuon’s ṭarīqa “was based 
on pure Islamic orthodoxy and orthopraxy.”238 While Schuon did insist on retaining the 
“traditional” form of Islam, it would seem that he did so only as a formal means to legitimize 
its transcendence. As Schuon states in a 1983 letter: 
A condition of the legitimacy of a spiritual school or community is the presence of the 
traditional form; in our case, Islam. Nevertheless, the more conscious one is of the supra 
formal nature of spiritual Truth and Reality, the more conscious one must be also of the 
relativity of the traditional form; and according to the spatial or temporal circumstances, one 
must in one fashion or another manifest this consciousness.239 
 
                                                
235 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
236 Ibid. Indeed, in the same letter Schuon asserts that his universalism distinguishes him from “Muslim-born or 
converted individuals” in that “the universal authority of the metaphysical and initiatic traditions of Asia, whose 
point of view reflects the nature of things more or less directly, takes precedence […] over the generally more 
‘theological’ authority of the monotheistic religions” (ibid., 134-35 [emphasis mine]). 
237 Nasr, “Frithjof Schuon,” 272. 
238 Ibid., 259. 
239 Schuon, “Excerpts from Letters,” January 1983, 10 (emphasis mine). 
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In an earlier letter, Schuon theorizes the manifestation of such supra formal “consciousness” 
and “relativity” of traditional form as “a moving away from the Religio formalis by virtue of 
a moving towards the Religio perennis […].” Here, Schuon explains that the “Religio 
perennis is the body,” while “the Religio formalis is the garment […].”240 While Schuon 
admits that Islam forms “the providential ground” for his ṭarīqa, he specifies that “the goal” 
of “the work” is “not the Islamic form as such, but precisely esoterism, and from this it 
follows that our Tarīqah as vehicle of esoterism could not simply be absorbed in the Islamic 
form.”241 
In the same letter, Schuon relates that as part of an answer to his search for a new 
“framework” came the “Holy Virgin in a new form, corresponding directly to esoterism 
[…].”242 Indeed, as was mentioned in chapter 2, Schuon changed the name of his ṭarīqa to 
the ʿAlāwiyya Maryamiyya in the mid 1960s in response to repeated experiences and visions 
of the Virgin Mary, which marked a transition to the mature stage of Schuon’s esoteric 
theory and the exposition of the religio perennis.243 Indeed, Schuon understood “the domain 
of Mary, the Virgin Mother,” to be on a level where separate religious “systems as such lose 
much of their importance and where by way of compensation the essential elements they 
have in common are affirmed, elements which, whether one likes it or not, give the systems 
                                                
240 Ibid., October 1980, 2 (underline original). 
241 Ibid., December 1980, 2 (underline original, emphasis mine). 
242 Ibid. 
243 This transition was marked by the 1965 publication of his essay “Religio perennis” (included in Regards sur 
les mondes anciens 1967), which exposited the “formless essence” underlying all religion “where the extrinsic 
antinomies of dogma are explained and resolved.” Schuon, Light, 125. See Aymard and Laude, Frithjof Schuon, 
76. 
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all their value […].”244  Besides belonging to “the proto-Semitic world,” this “new form” of 
the Virgin is, according to Schuon, “a form that in a certain way includes India […];” as 
such, it “rises above all theological and liturgical particularization.”245 Thus, Schuon often 
equates the Virgin with the “incarnation of divine Femininity”246 and its Hindu 
manifestation, the “Supreme Shakti,”247 which precedes all forms and “overflows upon them 
all, embraces them all, and reintegrates them all.”248  
In a letter explaining the characteristics of his “Aryanism,” a particular aspect 
mentioned by Schuon is “the cult of Divine Femininity” along with “the fine arts, namely the 
representation of living creatures and consequently the worship of images.” “All this,” 
Schuon notes, “has been persevered in the highest degree in the Hindu civilization […]; and 
we find these same characteristics with the proto-Europeans […].”249 Here, Schuon’s 
mention of “the cult of Divine Femininity” and “the fine arts” in relationship to “Hindu 
civilization” is not coincidental. As part of Schuon’s new spiritual relationship with the 
Virgin Mary, he began to paint her partially or totally naked.250 Schuon related these images 
                                                
244 Schuon, Christianity/Islam, 87-88 (emphasis mine). 
245 Schuon, “Excerpts from Letters,” December 1980, 2 (emphasis mine). 
246 Schuon, The Fullness of God, 137. 
247 Schuon, Form and Substance, 118.  
248 Schuon, Christianity/Islam, 88. 
249 Schuon, “Excerpts from Letters,” January 1981, 4. Also included in this list is an identification with the 
divinity of nature and nature symbolism as reflected in polytheistic mythology and “pantheism.” Such ideas 
remarkably perpetuate explicit nineteenth century Aryanist conceits regarding what proto-Aryans were thought 
to have believed. See Arvidsson, Aryan Idols, 95, 103-04, 122. Schuon also states in a previous letter that as 
“the messenger” who brought the ṭarīqa to Europe, he was “more a proto-Aryan than a European.” Schuon, 
“Excerpts from Letters,” December 1980, 2. 
250 For a selection of Schuon’s naked Virgin paintings, see Frithjof Schuon, Images of Primordial and Mystic 
Beauty: Paintings by Frithjof Schuon (Bloomington: Abodes, 1992), 231-277. This collection is divided into the 
following sections: “Red Indian World,” “Miscellaneous,” “Yogini and Devi,” and “Celestial Virgin.” Although 
the majority of the paintings in this volume are of fully naked women depicted without pubic hair, all of the 
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of the Virgin to Hinduism: “In my paintings of the Virgin a tendency towards Hinduism, 
towards Shaktism if you will, manifests itself […].”251 Moreover, Schuon theorized this 
distinctive genre as “sacred nudity,” which he equated with “a return to the essence” as he 
states in an interview: “It is said, in India, that nudity favors the irradiation of spiritual 
influences […]. In an altogether general way, nudity expresses—and virtually actualizes—a 
return to the essence, the origin, the archetype, thus to the celestial state […].”252 Thus, 
returning to the letter above in which Schuon notes that the new esoteric form of the Holy 
Virgin “includes India,” Schuon continues: 
And here we touch once again upon the mystery of sacred nudity; for dress is form, or 
particularity, at least in the respect considered here. If the protecting mantle is an essential 
component of the Holy Virgin, then this holds true for her long, down-streaming hair as well, 
for this is her natural mantle.253 
 
It is thus through this imagery of “sacred nudity” and the above notion of the Virgin as 
“corresponding directly to esoterism” and “above all theological and liturgical 
particularization,” that Schuon’s distinction between the religio perennis as “the body” and 
the religio formalis as “the garment” is made explicitly clear. 
In the same letter where Schuon notes that the unique esoteric perspective of his 
ṭarīqa is in its “metaphysical foundation” in “the Vedānta,” Schuon also relates that “our 
                                                                                                                                                  
“Celestial Virgin” images are partially naked, displaying the breasts only. For an example of a fully naked 
Virgin by Schuon (also without pubic hair) see: Mark Koslow, “Frithjof Schuon: Child molestation and 
Obstruction of Justice,” <http://www.naturesrights.com/knowledge%20power%20book/frithjof_Schuon.asp>. 
251 Schuon, “Excerpts from Letters,” October 1981, 7.  
252 Frithjof Schuon quoted in Oldmeadow, Frithjof Schuon, 190. It is worth noting that a similar esoteric notion 
was popular amongst the German Volkisch Aryanist movement. As George Mosse notes, Volkisch ideologues 
such as Willibald Hentschel held that external beauty mirrored the beauty of the soul, and as such clothing 
“alienated man from his body, which was a divine gift, and thus destroyed his inner equilibrium.” Indeed, 
nudism became so popular in the movement that there was a journal entitled Volkisch Nudism. Mosse, The 
Crisis of German Ideology, 116. 
253 Schuon, “Excerpts from Letters,” December 1980, 2 (emphasis mine). 
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point of departure is the quest after esoterism and not after a particular religion; after the pure 
and total Truth, not after a sentimental mythology.” In seemingly direct relation to this 
statement, Schuon further on states that while “Shankara is altogether clear and 
unambiguous; Ibn ‘Arabī, on the contrary, is uneven, tortuous, obscure and ambiguous, 
despite all his merits. Quite generally we recognize in Hinduism the great resonance of the 
primordial religion […].” As such, Schuon asserts that “we take our stand on 
Shankarāchārya, not on an Ibn ‘Arabī; the latter we accept only insofar as we find in him 
something of the Vedānta.”254  
In order to find in Ibn ‘Arabi “something of the Vedānta,” Schuon takes recourse in 
the Virgin Mary. In his 1975 publication, Form and Substance in the Religions (Forme et 
substance dans les religions), Schuon notes: 
Muhyiddin Ibn Arabi, after declaring that his heart “has opened itself to all forms”, and that it 
is “a cloister for monks, a temple of idols, the Kaaba”, adds: “I practice the religion of Love”; 
now it is over this formless religion that, Semitically speaking, Sayyidatna Maryam presides, 
thus identifying herself with the Supreme Shakti […].255  
 
In a footnote, Schuon qualifies this statement by noting that while Ibn ‘Arabi specifies that 
the “religion of love” is “Islam,” he was “doubtless obliged to do so in order to avoid a 
charge of heresy, and he could do so in good conscience by understanding the term islâm in 
its direct and universal meaning.”256  
What Schuon thus refers to as “the ‘Marian’ or ‘shaktic’ aspect in the path of Ibn 
Arabi”257 is an interpretive apparatus that allows Schuon to decouple Ibn ‘Arabi from his 
                                                
254 Ibid., May 1981, 6 (emphasis mine). 
255 Schuon, Form and Substance, 118.  
256 Ibid., 118n16. 
257 Ibid., 106. 
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above noted Ashʿarī / Semitic aspect, as reflected both in Schuon’s categorization of Ibn 
‘Arabi’s religion as “formless” and in his hackneyed interpretation of Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
“denominationalism” as simply lip service “to avoid a charge of heresy.” As “the universal 
Shakti” Mary represents for Schuon “the Sophia Perennis.”258 Moreover, Schuon notes that 
“the Marian wisdom is necessarily an expression of Christic wisdom, to which it adds—or 
from which it extracts—an aspect proper to itself […].”259 Schuon further notes that the 
Christic or “Isan wisdom manifests first of all its agreement with the ‘antecedent’, hence 
primordial and underlying, Truth—the Religio perennis […].”260  
Thus, the Mary/ Christ, or in Schuonian terms the Shakti/ Avatara manifestation, is a 
personification for Schuon of the Perennial wisdom/ religion.261 Moreover, in this 
relationship, Schuon considers the Virgin as an embodiment of “the feminine aspect of the 
Logos.”262 As such, it is not insignificant that in the context of Ibn ‘Arabi, who is famous for 
his self-identification as the preeminent manifestation of the Muhammadan Logos (i.e., 
ḥaqīqa muḥammadiyya)—the esoteric nature of which Schuon himself had written in 
detail263—that Schuon should choose to associate Ibn ‘Arabi with the logoic identity of Mary 
instead.264  
                                                
258 Schuon, Form and Substance, 115n11. 
259 Ibid., 121. 
260 Ibid., 104. 
261 Schuon notes: “Brahmanically speaking, an avataric woman is necessarily the Shakti of an Avatâra;	  thus she 
[…].” Ibid., 120. 
262 Schuon, The Fullness of God, 170. 
263 His early works on Islam, such as his 1961 Understanding Islam (Comprendre l’islam), show Schuon’s 
knowledge and willing esoteric appropriation of the concept. Moreover, as Nasr points out, his later article “The 
Spiritual Significance of the Substance of the Prophet” “reveals a very rare intimacy with al-haqīqat al-
muhammadiyyah.” Nasr, “Frithjof Schuon,” 263. See Frithjof Schuon, “The Spiritual Significance of the 
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Indeed, in the same letter that Schuon notes that he can accept only a Vedantic Ibn 
‘Arabi, Schuon states: 
The peculiarity of Muhammad is to be the synthesis of all spiritual possibilities; this makes 
his image, as seen from without, somewhat unintelligible, compared with the formal 
unequivocalness of other prophets […]. Christ represented quite unequivocally—in relation 
to the Jewish cult of the Law—spiritual inwardness; and therefore he has this meaning for the 
Sufis also; he is the Prophet of the Heart, not of outward works; and Mary has the same 
meaning, with this difference that she founded no religion and is “Mother of All the 
Prophets”, hence well-spring of all the religions. […W]here Maryam is, there shines ‘Isā 
also; precisely because of the mystery of inwardness.265 
 
Here, Muhammad’s “somewhat unintelligible” image due to his “many-sidedness” is 
significantly similar to Ibn ‘Arabi’s “obscure and ambiguous” nature, which as we have seen 
above is due to his “confusion” between the exoteric and esoteric. Indeed, as we recall, 
Schuon similarly asserted that Muhammad ultimately remains “wholly Semitic in style,” 
because of his attachment to the contingencies of the world, while Christ was according to 
Schuon, “an ‘Aryan god,’” and as such exhibited the “Aryan quality” of being independent 
“toward forms”—a quality that Schuon further describes as “seemingly ‘Greek’ or 
‘Hindu.’”266  
As was shown above, Schuon followed his predecessors Renan and Chamberlain in 
claiming that Christ as “the great prophet of inwardness […] presupposed a spiritual 
suppleness more fitting of India than Judea.” 267 Indeed, elsewhere Schuon specifically 
                                                                                                                                                  
Substance of the Prophet,” in Islamic Spirituality: Foundations, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr (New York : 
Crossroad, 1987), 48-63. 
264 Indeed, as the special Seal of Muhammadan Sainthood, Jesus himself comes under his authority. See Michel 
Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints: Prophethood and Sainthood in the Doctrine of Ibn ʿArabī, trans. Liadain 
Sherrard (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1993), 121, 125; and Addas, Quest, 157. 
265 Schuon, “Excerpts from Letters,” May 1981, 6-7 (emphasis mine). 
266 Schuon, Form and Substance, 24n19 (emphasis mine). 
267 Schuon, Form and Substance, 228 (emphasis mine). 
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couples Christ and the Virgin as personifying the “seal of sanctity” and “primordial sanctity” 
respectively in direct opposition to a metaphysics that is conditioned by exoteric law; Schuon 
thus asserts: “now sanctity is essentially inwardness […].”268 
 In asserting that Ibn ‘Arabi’s “religion of love” is directly connected to the Virgin 
Mary, Schuon simultaneously de-Semitizes and Aryanizes Ibn ‘Arabi. In her nakedness, the 
Virgin personifies for Schuon the underlying essence of reality, “the nature of things,” and 
thus pure esotericism beyond form—“for dress is form,” as Schuon notes above. Indeed, 
Schuon’s frustration with Ibn ‘Arabi, as we have seen, was his attachment to “ordinary 
theology,” i.e., the “Semitic theology” of Ashʿarism and its heteronomous reliance on 
revelation and dependence on the will of a transcendent God.  
Schuon’s movement away from the religio formalis as “the garment” to the religio 
perennis as “the body,” is a movement toward the underlying essence of things, the 
“Primordial Doctrine,” with which Schuon associated his ṭarīqa.269 Schuon’s metaphysics of 
“sacred nudity” as a “return to the essence, the origin, the archetype, [and] thus to the 
celestial state,” seeks a return to “the Golden Age” before, as Schuon notes above, “the 
Semitic religions” found it “necessary to clothe [the truth] in an argument efficacious for 
certain mentalities […].”270 Decoupling Ibn ‘Arabi from Muhammad and his “Semitic style” 
and attaching him to the naked Virgin effectively denudes Ibn ‘Arabi of his “confused” 
Semitic attachments and finds in him a pure Aryan objectivity, i.e., the Vedanta.  
 
                                                
268 Schuon, Christianity/Islam, 86-87. 
269 “In its kernel the Tarīqah is nothing other than the Primordial Doctrine […].” Schuon, “Excerpts from 
Letters,” January 1983, 10 (underline original). 
270 Schuon, Islam, 146 (emphasis mine). 
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The Underlying Racism of the Underlying Religion 
Sedgwick has argued that Schuon’s universalism, although present in the beginning 
of his career, developed over time out of a more or less “orthodox” Islamic perspective—a 
“deviation” marked by an increasingly forceful critique of Islam and turn towards a universal 
esotericism with features of a “new religious movement.”271 More recently, however, Renaud 
Fabbri has apologetically argued that because of Schuon’s “function” as “the paracletic 
spokesman of the sophia perennis,” his universalist position has necessarily been consistent 
from the beginning, thus marking the “underlying continuity in his personality.”272 In a letter 
written in 1981, Schuon seems to confirm, at least in part, Sedgwick’s position. Here he 
divides the history of “the Tarīqah” into three phases, the first lasting until 1942 was 
characterized by “the spell of Guénon and also the psychic atmosphere of exoteric Islam 
[…].”273 Although Sedgwick dates Schuon’s self-estrangement from Islam as late as 1978,274 
it is significant that Schuon’s major discursive production did not begin until the start of his 
“second phase” after 1942 in which he notes that the “spell” of exoteric Islam “was broken.” 
While this phase was marked by the “descent of the Themes”275 and “a certain barakah 
stemming from Hinduism and the American Indians […],” it was also, according to Schuon, 
a liberation from an 
                                                
271 See Sedgwick, Against the Modern World, 90, 147, 170. 
272 Renaud Fabbri, “The Milk of the Virgin: The Prophet, the Saint and the Sage,” Sacred Web 20 (2007): 265, 
239. 
273 Schuon, “Excerpts from Letters,” October 1981, 7 (emphasis mine). 
274 See Sedgwick, Against the Modern World, 170. 
275 This refers to the “Six Themes of Meditation” (i.e., Death and Life, Repose and Action, and Knowledge and 
Being), which Schuon “received” after he had received a vision through which he became certain that had 
become a full Shaykh. The Themes marked Schuon’s offshoot from the Algerian Alawiyya by a distinctive 
practice. By the second phase, the Schuonian Alawiyya had zawiyas in Basel, Amiens, and Paris. See Sedgwick, 
Against the Modern World, 90-92. 
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increasingly unbearable prejudice that would see in me nothing more than the tool of Guénon 
and the commentator of Ibn ‘Arabī; that would even make of me a champion of the Islamic 
faith and pseudo-esoteric Mahdism. Whereas we had been seeking esoterism!276 
 
The third phase began, according to Schuon, in 1965 and “the coming of the Holy Virgin” 
and “the fact that, proceeding from an inner vision, I painted the Virgin and wrote Arabic 
poems, or rather prayers, to her […].”277 
Yet, setting aside its hagiographic flourishes, Fabbri’s above assertion also points out 
a certain reality in terms of a continuity in Schuon’s esoteric thought. In a 1932 letter, just 
prior to his conversion (and thus before the three phases above), Schuon confessed his 
hesitations regarding Islam to a friend in language strikingly similar to his later work: 
[H]ow could you think that I would wish to come to God “through Mecca,” and thereby 
betray Christ and the Vedanta? […] Do I have to explain to you once again that either we are 
esoterists and metaphysicians who transcend forms—just as Christ walked over the waters—
and who make no distinction between Allah and Brahma, or else we are exoterists, 
“theologians”— or at best mystics—who consequently live in forms like fish in water, and 
who make a distinction between Mecca and Benares?278 
 
Indeed, Schuon’s first published article was written soon after the above statements in 
Mostaganem, Algeria during his one-time visit to Shaykh Al-‘Alawī in 1933. Entitled “The 
Ternary Aspect of the Monotheistic Tradition” (L’aspect ternaire de la tradition monothéiste) 
and published in Le voile d’Isis, it “evoked, for the first time, the notion of the ‘essential and 
transcendent unity’ of the three monotheistic religions.”279 This article would eventually 
become the sixth chapter in what has been called “his first major doctrinal book,”280 The 
Transcendent Unity of Religions.  
                                                
276 Schuon, “Excerpts from Letters,” October 1981, 7. 
277 Ibid. 
278 Frithjof Schuon quoted in Aymard and Laude, Frithjof Schuon, 16. 
279 Aymard and Laude, Frithjof Schuon, 20. 
280 Nasr, “Frithjof Schuon,” 267. 
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It is thus in Schuon’s most iconic work that he first laid out what he understood to be 
the proper objective perspective through which Ibn ‘Arabi should be received. Schuon begins 
by discussing “the universality of religion,” which he notes,  
is clouded over by all sorts of historical and geographical contingencies, so much so that 
certain people freely doubt its existence; for instance, we have heard it disputed somewhere 
that Sufism admits this idea, and it has been argued that Muḥyi ’d-Din ibn ‘Arabī denied it 
when he wrote that Islam was the pivot of the other religions.281 
 
“The truth is, however,” Schuon continues, “that every religious form is superior to the 
others in a particular respect, and it is this characteristic that in fact indicates the sufficient 
reason for the existence of the form.”282 Schuon goes on to claim that “this point of view 
finds its prototype in the Koran itself; in one place the Koran says that all the Prophets are 
equal, while elsewhere it declares that some are superior to others.”283 Schuon then notes that 
this latter Qur’anic declaration (i.e., 2:253, 17:55) is interpreted by Ibn ‘Arabi to mean “that 
each Prophet is superior to the others by reason of a particularity that is peculiar to him 
[…].”284 While it is not entirely clear what text Schuon based this innovative interpretation 
on,285 such an ostensible reading of Ibn ‘Arabi is an early example of Schuon’s “principle of 
                                                
281 Frithjof Schuon, The Transcendent Unity, 35. Schuon here is most likely referring to Ivan Aguéli’s 
conception of Ibn ‘Arabi and Islam. Schuon quotes Aguéli’s article entitled “L’universalité en l’Islam” in 
several places (e.g., Schuon, The Transcendent Unity, 157-58; and Sufism, 88) and also refers to Balyānī’s 
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(Milano: Archè, 1988), 107-133. Regarding the misattribution of Balyānī’s text, see chapter 2, p. 94n12. 
282 Schuon, The Transcendent Unity, 35-36. 
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Fuṣūṣ as discussed below or alternatively on ʿAbd al-Razzaq al-Qāshānī’s commentary misattributed to Ibn 
‘Arabi. Indeed, Nasr notes that Qāshānī’s commentary was a favorite of Schuon’s. Nasr, “Frithjof Schuon,” 
263. Although Qāshānī acknowledges unique prophetic typologies and archetypal missions, he also maintained 
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relativity” above and his “Copernican turn” as discussed in chapter 2. Here, Schuon’s novel 
heliocentric prophetology, which treats each prophetic tradition as an independent solar 
system, replaces Ibn ‘Arabi’s premodern, geocentric model where all of the prophets orbit 
around Muhammad at the center. 
Yet, in contradistinction to Schuon’s claim of prophetic relativity, Ibn ‘Arabi offers a 
much more hierarchical interpretation of these Qur’anic verses (i.e., 2:253, 17:55) in the 
Fuṣūṣ. Here, he notes that each prophetic community is ranked in degree according to their 
own excellence, while each prophet is ranked with his particular community, thus forming a 
necessary link between the particular knowledge of a prophet and the needs of his respective 
community.286 In a footnote to his translation of this section, Caner Dagli seemingly follows 
Schuon by noting that “Ibn al-‘Arabī is saying that as individuals the prophets also are 
different from one another, each possessing certain strengths in relation to the other 
prophets.”287 There is no indication in the text, however, that Ibn ‘Arabi makes any attempt 
to relativize prophetic strengths; rather, Ibn ‘Arabi’s interpretation of these verses appears 
literal and unequivocally hierarchical.288 Dagli continues by claiming that the fact that Ibn 
                                                                                                                                                  
a prophetic hierarchy. For example, he attributed to Moses the mission of the unification of the external and the 
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unification of the essence and the Qur’anic synthesis of inner and outer through the doctrine of Unity (al-
tawḥīd). As Pierre Lory notes, for Qāshānī, although all prophetic religions lead to “a single Reality,” Islam, 
and in particular the practice of Sufism, is the only path that gives “access to complete spiritual realization.” See 
Pierre Lory, Les Commentaires ésotériques du Coran d’après ‘Abd al-Razzâq al-Qâshânî (Paris: Les Deux 
Océans, 1980), 148, 135-153. 
286 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 132. 
287 Caner K. Dagli, trans, The Ringstones of Wisdom (Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam), by Ibn Al-ʿArabī (Chicago: Great Books 
of the Islamic World, 2004), 148n6. 
288 Indeed, Ibn ‘Arabi goes on to quote Qur’an 16:71: “And God has preferred some of you over others in 
sustenance.” 
 223 
‘Arabi discerns “a different wisdom in each of the prophets” in the Fuṣūṣ indicates that he 
“sees something special in each of them.”289 While one could hardly argue with this truism, it 
neglects to underscore the entire raison d’être of the Fuṣūṣ itself, which as mentioned in 
chapter 1 is to situate each individual prophet as a “word” (kalima) within “the 
comprehensive words (jawāmiʿ al-kalim)” of Muhammad, both spiritually and physically, 
i.e., as the logoic Muhammadan Reality (ḥaqīqa muḥammadiyya) and as “the Seal of the 
prophets.” This sentiment is repeated several times by Ibn ‘Arabi in the Fuṣūṣ,290 but perhaps 
most fittingly summarized in the first passage of the chapter on Muhammad: 
His wisdom is that of singularity because he is the most complete creation of the human race. 
Thus, this affair begins and is sealed by him: he was a prophet when Adam was between 
water and clay, and then by his elemental birth he became the Seal of the prophets. [...] He 
was, peace be upon him, the greatest proof of his Lord, for he was given the comprehensive 
words (jawāmiʿ al-kalim), which were the appellations named by Adam.291 
 
Indeed in the Futūḥāt, Ibn ‘Arabi repeatedly addresses the above issue of prophetic hierarchy 
in relationship to the unique universality of Muhammad, thus marking his superiority and 
necessitating obedience to him after his physical manifestation. For example, Ibn ‘Arabi 
states: 
Each prophet was only sent specifically to designated people because each one has a 
precisely suited disposition (for a particular group). However, Muhammad, blessings and 
peace be upon him, was sent by God with a universal message to all of humanity in its 
entirety. He only received the like of this message because he has a universal disposition that 
encompasses the disposition of every prophet and messenger. Indeed, he has the most 
balanced and perfect of dispositions and the most upright compositions. […] You know the 
degree of your low standing compared to the composition of Muhammad, blessings and 
peace be upon him, in knowledge of his Lord. So, adhere to faith, follow him, and make him 
your leader!292 
 
                                                
289 Dagli, The Ringstones of Wisdom, 148n6. 
290 E.g., Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 63-64. 
291 Ibid., 214. 
292 Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya, vol. 5 (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 2004), 287-88 (Fut. III, 251). 
 224 
Elsewhere in the Futūḥāt, Ibn ‘Arabi unequivocally equates Muhammad’s universality with 
his supersessional “preeminence” over all of the former prophets: 
And if Muhammad, blessings and peace be upon him, had been sent during the time of Adam, 
the prophets and all of humanity would be physically under the ruling (ḥukm) of his revealed 
law (sharīʿa) until the Day of Resurrection. Thus, no one (of the prophets) has been sent 
universally except for him, so he is the king (al-malik) and the master (al-sayyid). Every 
messenger besides him was sent to specific people, thus not one of the messages of the 
messengers except his, blessings and peace be upon him, was universal. Muhammad’s 
kingdom spans from the time of Adam, peace be upon him, to the time when he was sent, 
blessings and peace be upon him, until the Day of Resurrection. And his preeminence 
(taqaddum) and lordship (sīyāda) in the Hereafter over all the messengers is specified in the 
authentic traditions (al-ṣaḥīḥ).293  
 
In addition to Schuon’s admonishment of Ibn ‘Arabi’s declarations of Muhammad’s 
superiority over other prophets and exclusive claim to the religion of love, as noted above, 
Schuon elsewhere spurns similar arguments regarding the superiority of Muhammad and the 
universality (and thus supersession) of his religion over all others. While “self-evident in 
Islam,” such a “dogmatic assertion,” according to Schuon, is simply the acknowledgement 
that Muhammad is the personification of the Logos in its entirety, but (as Schuon similarly 
implies in The Transcendent Unity of Religions above), “the same can be said of every other 
Messenger within the framework of his own Message” and thus “every integral religion 
necessarily possesses such an incomparable quality, for otherwise it would not exist.”294 
Thus, Schuon assures us that if Ibn ‘Arabi did make statements apparently holding to the 
exclusivity of Islam, this is simply because he was obliged to do so since he “belonged to the 
Islamic civilization and owed his spiritual realization to the Islamic barakah and the Masters 
of Sufism, in a word, to the Islamic form of religion.”295  
                                                
293 Ibid., vol. 1, 170. (Fut. I, 135). 
294 Schuon, Christianity/Islam, 98-99. 
295 Schuon, The Transcendent Unity, 36. 
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 While Schuon’s “generous” reading of Ibn ‘Arabi appears to be infinitely more 
inclusive that the Andalusian Sufi’s own arguments for the superiority of the Muhammadan 
Logos and Islam, a closer and contextualized reading of Schuon’s position proves otherwise. 
Schuon rejects Ibn ‘Arabi’s Islamic conception of one universal religion with Muhammad at 
its center, not on metaphysical grounds, but on ethno-racial ones. While Schuon concedes 
that it is possible to conceive “that there might be only one Revelation or Tradition for our 
human world,” he argues that such an assertion is in actuality “a failure to understand that 
what determines the difference among forms of Truth is the difference among human 
receptacles.”296 While this conception of diversity looks very similar to Ibn ‘Arabi’s assertion 
above that the knowledge of a prophet is based on the need of the particular community that 
he is sent to, Schuon adds a spirituo-racial component: 
For thousands of years humanity has been divided into several fundamentally different 
branches constituting as many complete humanities, more or less closed in on themselves; the 
existence of spiritual receptacles so different and so original demands a differentiated 
refraction of the one Truth. Let us note that this is not always a question of race, but more 
often of human groups, very diverse perhaps, but nonetheless subject to mental conditions 
which, taken as a whole, make of them sufficiently homogeneous spiritual recipients […].297  
 
Importantly, Schuon understood differences between “human groups” not solely in the 
context of race, but more completely in a context of “natural castes.”298 As he states above, 
                                                
296 Schuon, Gnosis, 17 (emphasis mine). 
297 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
298 In Castes and Races, Schuon seeks to spiritualize the concept of race in terms of a metaphysical idea of caste 
based on spiritual disposition of typologies rather than blood. Such typologies can be found in “pure” blood 
groups, but not necessarily. Schuon thus notes: “In order to understand the meaning of races one must first of all 
realize that they are derived from fundamental aspects of humanity and not from something fortuitous in nature. 
If racialism is something to be rejected, so is an anti-racialism which errs in the opposite direction by attributing 
racial difference to merely accidental causes […] What is never understood by those who have a passion for 
racial purity is that there is a greater qualitative difference between the psychic heredity of different natural 
castes - even if the race be the same - than between that of members of the same caste of differing race; 
fundamental and personal tendencies have more importance than racial modes, at any rate so far as the major 
races or healthy branches of these are concerned, though not degenerate groups.” Schuon, Castes and Races, 
39-40. 
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each “human group” has  a particular “mental condition” that makes them “sufficiently 
homogeneous.” Thus, as was previously noted, Schuon directly asserts in Castes and Races 
that “a revelation always conforms to a racial genius, though this by no means signifies that 
it is restricted to the specific limits of the race in question.”299 Thus, Schuon forcefully 
echoes the discourse of his nineteenth century predecessors. As Kidd notes, “Just as racialists 
ascribed distinctive intellectual qualities (or failings) to particular races, so they also 
associated particular racial groups with certain spiritual characteristics.”300 Schuon thus 
continues the passage above: 
This being so, we can say that the diverse Revelations do not really contradict one another 
since they do not apply to the same receptacle and since God never addresses the same 
message to two or more receptacles having a divergent character, that is, corresponding 
analogically to dimensions that are formally incompatible; a contradiction can arise only 
between things situated on the same level. The apparent antinomies between Traditions are 
like differences of language or symbol; contradictions are an aspect of the human 
receptacles, not of God; diversity in the world is a result of its remoteness from the divine 
Principle […].301 
 
Indeed, let us also recall that Schuon noted that after “the Golden Age,” the Semitic 
religions were forced “to clothe [the truth] in an argument efficacious for certain 
mentalities.” Like Gobineau and Chamberlain who, as noted in the introduction to this 
chapter, held that German blood was bound by a racial soul, Schuon similarly notes that there 
is “a fundamental tendency in the Gospel that responds with particular force to the needs of 
the Germanic soul: namely, a tendency toward simplicity and inwardness, hence away from 
theological and liturgical complication, [and] formalism […].”302 Indeed, in a similar vain, 
                                                
299 Schuon, Castes and Races, 42n30 (emphasis mine). 
300 Kidd, The Forging of Races, 171.  
301 Schuon, Gnosis, 17 (emphasis mine). 
302 Frithjof Schuon, Christianity/Islam, 28 (emphasis mine). 
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Schuon argued that the idea of a single universal religion (as Ibn ‘Arabi claims for Islam 
above) was in fact “contrary to the nature of things […].”303 This is so, he argues, because 
the ethnic diversity of humanity and the geographical extent of the earth suffice to render 
highly unlikely the axiom of one unique religion for all and on the contrary highly likely—to 
say the least—the need for a plurality of religions; in other words the idea of a single religion 
does not escape contradiction if one takes account of its claims to absoluteness and 
universality, on the one hand, and the psychological and physical impossibility of their 
realization, on the other, not to mention the antinomy between such claims and the 
necessarily relative character of all religious mythology; only pure metaphysics and pure 
prayer are absolute and therefore universal. As for “mythology”,304  it is indispensable—
apart from its intrinsic content of truth and efficacy—for enabling metaphysical and essential 
truth to “gain a footing” in a given human collectivity.305 
 
In light of the above, it would seem that Schuon’s conception of the “transcendent unity of 
religions” is ironically based on a less obvious foundation—that of “the ethnic diversity of 
humanity.” According to Schuon, such diversity makes religious pluralism necessary, not 
because of the inherent “good” of plurality in itself, but because human spirituo-racial 
difference makes the acceptance of a single exoteric religion an impossibility, i.e., certain 
spirituo-racial dispositions, such as “the German soul,” are in need of more esoteric religions, 
such as Christianity. Yet here we encounter a second irony: while Schuon claims “the idea of 
a single religion does not escape contradiction if one takes account of its claims to 
absoluteness and universality,” he also claims that “only pure metaphysics and pure prayer 
are absolute and therefore universal.”  
Although, as noted above, Schuon claimed that Islam formed “the providential 
ground” for his manifestation of “the supra formal nature of spiritual Truth,” he clearly 
                                                
303 Schuon, Gnosis, 20 (emphasis mine). 
304 Schuon later notes that “‘outwardly’ the religions are ‘mythologies’ or, more precisely, symbolisms designed 
for different human receptacles and displaying by their limitations, not a contradiction in divinis, but on the 
contrary a mercy.” Ibid., 63. 
305 Ibid., 20 (emphasis mine). 
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rejects Ibn ‘Arabi’s recourse to Muhammad as a universal prophet. As Schuon importantly 
notes in Logic and Transcendence, “[a]ccording to Islam,” Muhammad is the synthesis of all 
of the prophets “since he is thus the first in his celestial reality he is the last in time, 
according to the principle of inverse reflection.” Although Muhammad’s synthesis is thus 
taken as a “unique and supereminent quality” by Muslims, according to Schuon, it is in 
reality “quite contingent” and “entirely in line with henotheist logic, for it is in just the same 
way—because of a given quality shared with the Absolute—that Vishnu, Shiva, or other 
divinities become alternatively or separately the supreme God.”306 Citing Müller’s 
employment of this term as “a cult involving several divinities, each of whom is looked upon 
as the supreme God while it is worshiped,”307 Schuon thus argues that Muhammad’s 
supremacy is relative to his specific sphere of logoic influence, or what Schuon here calls his 
“cosmic sector.” Yet, importantly, Schuon argues: 
Just as the chronological posteriority of the Arab Prophet may—or must—be interpreted in 
the cosmic sector of Islam as marking the principial anteriority of the Muhammadan Logos, 
so the human femininity of the Blessed Virgin, hence her subordination, can indicate a real 
celestial superiority in a particular connection: given the spiritual and cosmic supereminence 
of the personage, femininity appears in this case as the inverted reflection of pure essentiality, 
which amounts to saying that in her “transcendent body” (dharmakāya) the Virgin is the 
virginal Mother of all the Prophets; she is thus identified with divine Femininity or the 
Wisdom that was “in the beginning”.308 
 
                                                
306 Schuon, Logic and Transcendence, 100 (emphasis mine). 
307 Schuon cites Müller as the originator of the term “henotheism” and notes that while it is still “alive” in 
Hinduism, “the henotheist mentality is characteristic of the entire East to one degree or another.” Schuon, Logic 
and Transcendence, 99, 100. The term “henotheism” was first used by Friedrich Schelling (d. 1854) in his study 
of mythology to designate a “rudimentary monotheism.” It was later popularized by Müller as a “belief in single 
gods”—a particular form of polytheism characteristic of the gods in the Rigveda. As opposed to the hierarchical 
polytheism of ancient Greece and Rome, henotheism was characterized by the worship of a plurality of gods, 
each representing the absolute and thus not constrained by the powers of other gods. Müller theorized that 
henotheistic phase was the global precursor to both polytheistic and monotheistic modes of worship. See 
Michiko Yusa, “Henotheism,” in Encyclopedia of Religion, 2nd ed., vol. 6 (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 
2005), 3913-3914. 
308 Schuon, Logic and Transcendence, 101. 
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Here, it is clear that Schuon finds in the “pure essentiality” of the Virgin Mary a higher 
“celestial supremacy” even more anterior to Muhammad, since she is his “virginal Mother.” 
Although, as noted above, Ibn ‘Arabi situated himself decidedly within the Muhammadan 
Logos as its preeminent manifestation, Schuon chooses instead to situate Ibn ‘Arabi within 
the “cosmic sector” of the Virgin, thus taking him outside of the “mythology” of Islam.  
In Sufism, Schuon refers to an iconic passage in the Fuṣūṣ dealing with Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
famous concept of “the divinity of beliefs” (al-ilāh al-muʿtaqad).309 Here, Schuon asserts that 
“[a]mong the statements made by Ibn Arabi” it is “the one most directly in conformity with 
the esoteric perspective […].”310 Although Schuon quotes a longer section from the final 
chapter on Muhammad in the Fuṣūṣ, the thrust of his commentary revolves around the 
following passage: 
The believer . . . praises only the Divinity contained within his belief […]. The Divinity in 
whom one believes is (so to speak) fashioned by him who conceives (nādhir), and it is 
therefore (in this respect) his work; the praise addressed to what he believes is praise 
addressed (indirectly and with regard to conceptualization) to himself.311  
 
Schuon thus notes that “[i]t is important to understand here that the image of the ‘believer 
who praises himself’ must be applied above all, according to the logic of things, to a given 
religious point of view and therefore to a given collectivity.”312  
Yet, like Michael Sells’s treatment of Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse on belief discussed in 
chapter 1, Schuon’s slide from theological “belief” to religious “collectivity” is here 
                                                
309 This is another rendition of al-ilāh fī al-iʿtiqādāt as Ibn ‘Arabi uses in the chapter of Muhammad, which 
Schuon quotes from here. See Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 225-6. For a discussion of Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse 
on belief see chapter 1, pp. 42-48. 
310 Schuon, Sufism, 40. 
311 Ibn ‘Arabi quoted in Schuon, Sufism, 40. See Ibn al-ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 226. 
312 Schuon, Sufism, 41 (emphasis mine). 
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discursively more aligned with “the logic” of secular modernity, which tends to construe 
religion as an internal “set of beliefs” rather than obligatory observance of law and 
disciplined practice. Such a modern distinction is especially apparent when contrasted to the 
premodern “logic” of Ibn ‘Arabi’s definition of “religion” as “obedience” (inqiyād) to 
revealed law.313 Nevertheless, Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse on belief has been directly associated 
with Schuon’s universalist schema itself. For example, Eric Geoffroy recently notes that it 
was “Ibn ‘Arabī who furnished a doctrinal framework for the concept of the ‘transcendent 
unity of religions’ […]. To him, all beliefs, and therefore all religions, are true because each 
is a response to the manifestation of a divine Name […].”314 Such a summary of Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
discourse on belief through the lens of Schuon’s emblematic idea evinces a now 
commonplace reduction of both “doctrines” to a democratized discourse of religious 
pluralism. Yet, as was noted above, rather than understanding all religions as “true” in an 
absolute sense, Schuon understood religions as only relatively true, i.e., as “mythology” 
designed “for enabling metaphysical and essential truth.” Indeed, Schuon uses Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
discourse on belief to relativize all religions except for that of esotericism, which he claims 
“alone is absolutely monotheistic.” Here, concluding his discussion of Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse 
on belief, which as noted above Schuon claimed as “directly in conformity with the esoteric 
perspective,” he states: 
It follows from these considerations that God is the same for all the religions only in the 
divine “stratosphere”, not in the human “atmosphere”; in this “atmosphere” each religion has 
its own God for all practical purposes, and there are as many Gods as there are religions. In 
                                                
313 As noted in chapter 1, this definition as articulated by Ibn ‘Arabi in the Fuṣūṣ parallels the original Latin 
term religio and its notion of being bound (from religare) to God in terms of obligation or duty. See chapter 1, 
p. 46n79. 
314 Eric Geoffroy, Introduction to Sufism: The Inner Path of Islam (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2010), 184. 
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this sense it could be said that esoterism alone is absolutely monotheistic, it alone recognizing 
only one religion under diverse forms.315  
 
Indeed, Schuon thus appropriates Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse on belief in the service of what he 
described in Logic and Transcendence above as a “henotheistic logic,” i.e., a representative 
“Hindu” doctrine of many gods that relativizes all notions of divine supereminence within a 
wider esoteric cosmology of competing “cosmic sectors.” In such a henotheistic cosmology, 
Ibn ‘Arabi’s identification with the Qur’anic dispensation and the Muhammadan Logos as the 
universal prophetic synthesis316 is transmogrified into an identification with “esoterism 
alone” as the only “absolutely monotheistic” path. As was shown above, in Logic and 
Transcendence, this uniquely monotheistic esotericism is personified by none other than the 
“celestial superiority” of the “the virginal Mother of all the Prophets” whose “spiritual and 
cosmic supereminence” is posited as even more essential than that of “the principial 
anteriority of the Muhammadan Logos.”317 
Conclusion 
As the Seal of Muhammadan Sainthood (khātam al-walāya al-muḥammadiyya) and 
the principle manifestation of the Muhammadan Reality on earth,318 Ibn ‘Arabi took the 
cosmological and historical superiority of the Prophet as seriously as he took the purity of his 
                                                
315 Schuon, Sufism, 41 (emphasis mine). 
316 I.e., as having been given “the comprehensive words” (jawāmiʿ al-kalim). In the Futūḥāt, Ibn ‘Arabi 
specifically relates the jawāmiʿ al-kalim to “the station of Muhammad.” See Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 5, 164 
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own Arab pedigree; indeed, his esoteric “vocation” depended on them both.319 As noted in 
chapter 1, Ibn ‘Arabi explains in the Futūḥāt that the “spiritual presence (rūḥāniyya)” of 
Muhammad “was with each prophet and messenger” during their prophethood; even though 
each revealed law is associated with its particular prophet, “in reality, each is the revealed 
law of Muhammad (sharʿ muḥammad).” Yet, although these revealed laws (sharāʾiʿ) were 
not separate from Muhammad’s, when Muhammad manifested physically “God abrogated 
(nasakha) all of the laws by his law.” Thus, Ibn ‘Arabi claims: “Muhammad is the ruler (al-
ḥākim) both in his absence (ghaiban) and when witnessed (shahādatan).”320  
While Ibn ‘Arabi’s portrayal of Muhammad as “ruler” effectively blurs imagined 
boundaries between his logoic essence and his historical person, his intermixing of the so-
called “esoteric” and “exoteric” elsewhere is taken by Schuon as evidence of the Andalusian 
Sufi’s confused “contradictions” and lack of a necessary “objective perspective in an esoteric 
context.” As was shown above, Schuon’s notion of intellectual “objectivity” is synonymous 
with “none other than the truth” in which the subject is far enough removed from its own self 
to fully merge with its object of awareness. In such an objective state, “the essential takes 
precedence over the accidental”—a state Schuon claims as the natural “prerogative” of the 
human being. The “esoteric” as the essential substance or “nature of things” is thus superior 
to the “exoteric,” which is in turn “accidental” and ultimately dispensable.  
Schuon’s discourse thus neatly reflects Kocku von Stuckrad’s description of 
esotericism as “the claim to a wisdom that is superior to other interpretations of cosmos and 
                                                
319 Indeed, Ibn ‘Arabi stipulated that the “office of the Seal of Muḥammadan Sainthood belongs to an Arab, one 
of the noblest in lineage and power.” Ibn ‘Arabi quoted in Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints, 117-18. 
320 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, vol. 1, 170 (Fut. I, 135). 
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history.”321 As was noted above, Schuon claimed two kinds of esotericisms, one essential and 
the other complementary. While essential esotericism was metaphysics itself, esotericisms 
qua complements of religions were partially concealed by “theological, psychological and 
legalistic meanders foreign to [their] nature.” According to Schuon, this is exactly the 
problem with Sufism, which is an esotericism that is veiled by its “subjectivist” attachment to 
an exoteric religion, i.e., Islam. While such exaltation of the “esoteric” over the “exoteric” is 
a spiritualization of a rather commonplace post-Kantian valorization of the “interior life” 
over that of the communal,322 Schuon’s deployment of the Aryan/ Semitic binary as an 
additional signifier marks a racialization of this dialectic.323 As was noted at the start of this 
chapter, Schuon faulted Sufism as “more moral than intellectual,” which he attributed to the 
“subjectivist” Semitic sensibility of the “Arab or Muslim.” Just as Renan insisted that 
Judaism could not be comprehended without first understanding the characteristics of the 
Semitic race,324 Schuon repeatedly asserts that the quality of the Aryan and Semitic “spirit” is 
reflected in their respective religions. Schuon thus followed his Aryanist predecessors, such 
as Chamberlain, in asserting that the “‘naturally supernatural’ capacity” of Aryan 
“objectivity” is reflected in the essential metaphysical nature of Vedanta, while Semitic 
“subjectivity” is mirrored in an essentially moralistic and voluntaristic Islam/ Sufism.  
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Schuon’s esoteric discourse thus clearly echoes nineteenth century anthropological 
explanations of religious phenomena as expressions of racial traits. In such ideological 
configurations, as Kidd points out, “[r]ace was not simply a matter of external physical 
differences but of deep psychic differences, which manifested themselves in the varieties of 
religion found throughout the world.” As such, religion came to be seen as simply a 
byproduct of race, and “religious diversity an expression of the deeper underlying truth of 
racial differences.”325 It is in this sense that Gil Anidjar argues that the early nineteenth 
century “invention of religion” cannot be understood as separate from “the invention of 
modern racism.” Anidjar here claims that the idea of “religion” can be understood as a 
strategy “that distributes and separates according to distinct and apparently unrelated grids of 
differences, religious differences and ethnic or racial differences.” As such “religion and 
race,” according to Anidjar, “are contemporary, indeed, coextensive and, moreover, co-
concealing categories.”326 Schuon’s discourse of the religio perennis as a way of objectivity, 
which he insists is the “prerogative of the human state,” is itself juxtaposed with the religio 
formalis as a subjective veil needed for “certain mentalities” (i.e., Semitic) to accept the 
truth. Schuon’s path of esotericism as a means to denude the religio formalis from the religio 
perennis, or the exoteric from the esoteric, thus emerges as fully imbricated with a racialist 
discourse, i.e., the ridding of the Semitic from the Aryan.  
While Schuon clearly understood the general contours of the logoic superiority Ibn 
‘Arabi gave to Muhammad in relation to the other prophets, he chose to openly reject it. In 
Muhammad’s stead, Schuon imagined another cosmic figure to associate Ibn ‘Arabi with, 
                                                
325 Kidd, The Forging of Races, 171 (emphasis mine). 
326 Anidjar, Semites, 27, 28. 
 235 
one that was less encumbered with exoteric trappings, i.e., Mary as “the virginal Mother of 
all the Prophets.” In literally painting this “shaktic” image of Mary as naked, Schuon was 
able to denude her of her Semitic clothing, i.e., the religio formalis of exoteric law and align 
her with his Aryan vision of the religio perennis, pure esotericism beyond Semitic dogma 
and moralism. In order to bring Ibn ‘Arabi fully into a paradigm of pure esoterism, Schuon 
de-Semitized him by separating him from Muhammad, who was after all “wholly Semitic in 
style,” and replaced him with Mary, and thus Jesus, who for Schuon was an “Aryan god.” In 
Schuon’s discourse, Ibn ‘Arabi became for all intents and purposes the Seal of Marian 
Sainthood—a saint more conducive to the Indo-European paradigm of interior and 
“formless” religion.  
Rather than a system that seeks to unite the various religions, Schuon’s universalism 
thus emerges as hegemonic. Discursively based upon one of the most exclusory ideologies 
known in modern history, it seeks to legitimize its own image, while delegitimizing those 
Others that threaten to constrain its sovereign knowledge. Schuon’s self-identification with 
“Aryanism” and its attendant mode of “intellection” serves an ideological strategy against 
heteronomous systems that claim the ability through discursive traditions of law, dogma, 
deontology, and morality to adjudicate truth and legitimize authority. As such, Schuon’s 
selective reading of Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse and subsequent construction of his “Marian” 
image is a particularly lucid example of what McCutcheon refers to as the “cosmogonic” 
activity of the “art” of hermeneutics327—here, as a discursive strategy used to formulate and 
sustain a particular regime of knowledge through the ideological deployment of race and 
religion as two mutually imbricated concepts. Although Schuon claimed that “one cannot 
                                                
327 McCutcheon, Critics not Caretakers, 173. 
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make a ‘religion’ out of Advaita Vedânta,”328 his Aryan identification with “esotericism 
alone”—i.e., the religio perennis—as “absolutely monotheistic” and his concomitant 
substitution of Mary for Muhammad renders such a distinction merely semantic. 
Hugh Nicholson has recently observed that all universalist schemes are inevitably 
ideological in their attempt to mask their own universalist particularism. Such discourse 
“declares a radical break with religious exclusivism, but does so only through an act of 
exclusion that it fails to acknowledge.”329 While Schuon’s elucidation of Ibn ‘Arabi and the 
“transcendent unity of religions” has been widely interpreted by both supporters and 
detractors as a discourse that seeks to unify or homogenize religious diversity within a 
purported underlying religious essence, Schuon’s own discursive practices evince a much 
more complex and ironic appropriation of the Andalusian Sufi marked by a universalization 
of nineteenth century racialist categories as signifiers of Semitic difference in opposition to a 
single Aryan truth.
                                                
328 Schuon, The Fullness of God, 173-74. 
329 Hugh Nicholson, Comparative Theology and the Problem of Religious Rivalry (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 6.  
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
WITHIN A KANTIAN LOOKING GLASS: 
 REASONABLE SUFISM AND THE RISE OF IBN ‘ARABI IN THE WESTERN IMAGINARY 
  
 
The universal must be found everywhere, must be valid for all, and to do this, it must 
retain a familiar profile, its own.1 
 
From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the 
outside. There are only people who should be like us and whose crime is not to be.2 
 
 In a book published in 2008, tellingly entitled The Other Islam: Sufism and the Road 
to Global Harmony, Stephen Schwartz claims Ibn ‘Arabi as the earliest example of a “truly 
European Muslim.”3 According to Schwartz, a journalist and executive director of the Center 
for Islamic Pluralism (CIP),4 Ibn ‘Arabi’s “Spanish Sufism inaugurated a truly European 
Islam, providing a model for moderate Muslims living in Christian Europe in the twenty-first 
century.”5 Depicting a global, intra-faith confrontation between “fundamentalist and spiritual 
Muslims,” The Other Islam posits a particular mode of Sufism “promoting intellectual and 
                                                
1 Daniel Dubuisson, The Western Construction of Religion: Myths, Knowledge, and Ideology (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2003), 114-5. 
2 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
(London: Athlone Press, 2005), 178. 
3 Stephen Schwartz, The Other Islam: Sufism and the Road to Global Harmony (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 
90. 
4 CIP is a Washington-based think tank connected with the noted anti-Muslim propagandist Daniel Pipes. For 
Pipes’s acknowledgement of his connection see his blog entry: “Stephen Schwartz and the Center for Islamic 
Pluralism” Lion's Den: Daniel Pipes Blog (March 25, 2005), www.danielpipes.org/blog/2005/03/stephen-
schwartz-and-the-center-for-islamic (accessed May 17, 2003). For a review of Pipes’s formative connection 
with institutionalized Islamophobia in American policy see Wajahat Ali, Eli Clifton, Matthew Duss, Lee Fang, 
Scott Keyes, and Faiz Shakir, Fear, Inc.: The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America (Washington, DC: 
Center for American Progress, 2011), 41-44.  
5 Schwartz, The Other Islam, 63. 
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spiritual liberty” as a strategic ally with the West in a “common battle against Islamist 
radicalism.”6 On one side “we find the fanatical creed of Wahhabism […] at the other we 
find the enlightened habits of Sufism.”7 In support of such totalizing juxtapositions, Schwartz 
cites a report published in 2007 by the RAND Corporation (a military policy think tank 
funded primarily by Department of Defense contracts8), which categorically states that Sufis 
are “natural allies of the West” and “potential partners for the United States and its friends 
and allies in the ideological struggle against radical Islamism.”9 
Since the 2007 RAND report, which builds on similar assertions about Sufism in two 
previous RAND reports published after 9/11,10 there have been over a dozen articles written 
in the US and abroad citing RAND’s enthusiasm for a Western strategic alliance with 
Sufism.11 One of the apparently more influential of such articles was a 2009 Boston Globe 
op-ed piece, written by Philip Jenkins, a professor of history and religious studies at Baylor 
University.12 Although Jenkins admits that Sufis—whom he Europeanizes as “the knights of 
                                                
6 Schwartz, The Other Islam, 29, 245n5 (emphasis mine). 
7 Ibid., 14 (emphasis mine). 
8 David D Newsom, The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 
116. 
9 Angel Rabasa et al., Building Moderate Muslim Networks (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), 73, 3, 70 
(emphasis mine). Although not mentioned in The Other Islam, the 2007 RAND report directly cites Schwartz as 
providing “valuable insights on Sufism.” See Rabasa, Building, xxv. 
10 The 2004 RAND report makes exactly the same “natural allies of the West” claim, while the general idea is 
found throughout the 2003 report. See Angel M. Rabasa et al., The Muslim World after 9/11 (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 2004), 23; and Cheryl Benard, Civil and Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, Strategies (Santa 
Monica: Rand Corporation, 2003), passim.  
11 For a representative sample of such articles see the following search results for “RAND” in the blog: “Sufi 
News and Sufism World Report,” http://sufinews.blogspot.com/search?q=rand. 
12 This article was recently cited in God’s Century, a work authored by a group of political scientists through a 
research initiative funded in part by the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. 
Using Jenkins’s 2009 Boston Globe article along with the 2007 RAND report as their sole sources, the authors 
repeat assertions for Sufism “as a voice of moderation” and “hope for an antidote to extremism.” See Monica 
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Islam”—have a history of armed resistance against Western colonialism, today they are 
“deadly enemies” of “hard-line fundamentalists like the Saudi Wahhabis and the Taliban.” 
Thus, Jenkins states: “To look at Islam without seeing the Sufis is to be ignorant of a crucial 
clash of civilizations in today’s world: not the conflict between Islam and the West, but an 
epochal struggle within Islam itself.”13  
Yet Sufis, according to Jenkins, “are much more than tactical allies for the West: they 
are, potentially, the greatest hope for pluralism and democracy within Muslim nations.” After 
citing the authoritarian governments of Uzbekistan, Syria, and China as examples of 
successful state use of “tolerant-minded Sufi orders” against “Islamist subversion,” Jenkins 
with no little irony suggests that Western support of the Sufis’ “struggle against the fanatics” 
may “encourage the growth of a Euro-Islam that could reconcile easily with modernity and 
democracy […].” Jenkins’s optimistic view of Sufism is based on his repeated assertion of 
Sufi “open-mindedness.” While fundamentalists are epistemologically bound “to the pure 
religion taught by the prophet Muhammad in the seventh century,” the Sufis “cherish 
intellectual exploration.” Thus Jenkins states that “Progressive Sufi thinkers are quite open to 
modern knowledge and science.”14 
 In such discourse as put forth above by Jenkins, Schwartz, and the RAND 
Corporation, Sufism is constructed as particularly rational and tolerant—what the initial 
2003 RAND report defines as “an open, intellectual” and “a more philosophical, mystical 
                                                                                                                                                  
Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah, God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2011), 173. 
13 Philip Jenkins, “Mystical Power: Why Sufi Muslims, for centuries the most ferocious soldiers of Islam, could 
be our most valuable allies in the fight against extremism,” Boston Globe (January 25, 2009),      
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2009/01/25/mystical_power/?page=full (accessed May 16, 
2013) emphasis mine. 
14 Jenkins, “Mystical Power,” emphasis mine. 
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interpretation of Islam.”15 Located at the Euro-American nexus of academia, media, and the 
state, this discourse—what I refer to in the following chapter as the Western discourse of 
“reasonable Sufism”16—is depicted in a Manichean struggle with its intra-religious, fanatical 
Other, or in the words of Jenkins above, a “clash of civilizations […] within Islam itself.” 
Here, an explicit and “natural” (i.e., inherent) connection is made between Sufism and the 
modern West that can serve as a model of reformed, “European Islam.”  
Although certainly part of Mahmood Mamdani’s oft-mentioned “good Muslim/bad 
Muslim” binary (i.e., “good Muslims are modern, secular, and Westernized, but bad Muslims 
are doctrinal, antimodern, and virulent”17), in what follows I suggest that the discourse of 
reasonable Sufism is more than simply a “political” construct disseminated by the state to 
discursively enforce secular-liberal subjectivity. While Mamdani’s important analysis 
focuses upon the post-9/11 “official” American discourse of “good” and “bad” Muslims as a 
specific political construction that essentializes cultural and religious identity,18 this chapter 
analyzes the discourse of reasonable Sufism as formed within a Western historical struggle to 
(re)define the “essence” of religion in terms of evolving epistemologies and shifting 
                                                
15 Benard, Civil and Democratic Islam, 46, 42 n15. 
16 While “reasonable” is here in part used to signify “rational,” I choose not to use “rational Sufism” to avoid 
confusing this discourse with that of Fazlur Rahman’s “neo-Sufism.” Although Rahman clearly states that such 
discourse, in his view, is “an attitude of moral and religious positivism” (not “rationalism”), it has 
problematically been dubbed “rational mysticism.” See Fazlur Rahman, Islam, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1979), 209; R. S. O’Fahey and Bernd Radtke, “Neo-Sufism Reconsidered,” Der Islam 70 
(1993): 56n7; and Rosemary R. Hicks, “Comparative Religion and the Cold War Transformation of Indo-
Persian ‘Mysticism’ into Liberal Islamic Modernity,” in Secularism and Religion-Making, ed. Markus Dressler 
and Arvind-Pal Mandair (Oxford University Press, 2011), 161ff. 
17 Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New 
York: Pantheon Books 2004), 24. 
18 Mamdani states: “Judgments of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ refer to Muslim political identities, not to cultural or 
religious ones.” In such discourse of “official America” post-9/11, rather than referring to any overtly religious 
or cultural characteristic, such categories “are really quasi-official names for those who support and oppose 
American policies […].” Mamdani, Good Muslim, 15, 260. 
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constructions of human subjectivity.19 As Talal Asad points out, although religion is 
commonly regarded “as alien to the secular,” the sociopolitical location of Western secular-
liberal subjectivity is inherently tied to the production of modern forms of religion and 
religiosity.20  
The formation of such secular-liberal religiosity, what David Pacini calls the “modern 
religion of conscience,” is distinctively marked by its break with premodern speculative 
ontological frameworks. Rather than positing an interior human connection with the divine, 
the modern religion of conscience rests “on the claim that God ‘speaks’ to us through 
directives of a self-governing conscience that guide moral conduct.”21 In what follows, I 
heuristically employ Kant’s 1793 work Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason as a 
particularly formative representation of such autonomous religious subjectivity. As will be 
discussed below, Kant’s Religion is less a philosophical argument than a European 
teleological metanarrative of the modern religion of conscience. I thus argue that “Sufis,” and 
increasingly the contemporary image of Ibn ‘Arabi, serve in the discourse of reasonable 
Sufism as mirror reflections of the modern Western religious imaginary. In such discourse, 
an autonomously rational Sufism—specifically notable for its proximity to Greco-Christian 
humanism—is framed within a Kantian teleology of universal reason and juxtaposed to an 
                                                
19 This chapter’s “post-secular” theoretical engagement expands upon a preliminary study that takes a more 
“political” approach. See G. A. Lipton, “Secular Sufism: Neoliberalism, Ethnoracism, and the Reformation of 
the Muslim Other,” The Muslim World 101 (2011): 427–40. 
20 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 
2003), 193. As Asad elsewhere notes: “Religion has been part of the restructuration of practical times and 
spaces, a rearticulation of practical knowledges and powers, of subjective behaviors, sensibilities, needs, and 
expectations in modernity. But that applies equally to secularism, whose function has been to try to guide that 
rearticulation […].” Talal Asad, “Reading a Modern Classic: W. C. Smith's ‘The Meaning and End of 
Religion,’ History of Religions 40, no. 3 (2001): 220. 
21 David S Pacini, Through Narcissus’ Glass Darkly: The Modern Religion of Conscience (New York: 
Fodrdham University Press, 2008), 4 (emphasis mine). 
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irrationally heteronomous and Semitic Islam(ism). While Kant’s intellectual legacy is 
certainly more nuanced and complex than my focus here can accommodate, his ideas 
regarding the universal nature of autonomous religious subjectivity are nevertheless 
connected to significant presuppositions present in his theories of humanity and civilization 
that have been noted for their Eurocentric racialism and particularism.22 By interrogating 
such presuppositions present in the discourse of reasonable Sufism, this chapter aims to track 
the kinds of religious subjectivities it sanctions and the ideological rhetoric of “conversion” it 
thereby supports. 
Re-Orienting “Mysticism” via “Reasonable” Sufism 
In the contemporary study of religion, the term “mysticism” has suffered from the 
same problems of definition as that of “religion,” which as Richard King notes, has been 
plagued by a scholarly quest “to delineate the precise nature or ‘essence’ of the phenomena 
under consideration.”23 Following on the heals of Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s groundbreaking 
1962 critique of “religion,” the past several decades have witnessed a sustained scholarly 
interrogation of “mysticism” as a universal category.24 Building on Steven Katz’s pioneering 
constructivist “plea for the recognition of differences” against claims for a universal typology 
of mystical experience,25 Wayne Proudfoot analyzed William James’s categories of mystical 
                                                
22 E.g., see Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, “The Color of Reason: The Idea of ‘Race’ in Kant’s Anthropology,” in 
Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader, ed. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (Cambridge: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1997), 103-140; and Ian Hunter, “Kant’s Regional Cosmopolitanism,” Journal of the History of 
International Law 12, no. 2 (2010): 165-188. 
23 Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and ‘The Mystic East’ (London: 
Routledge, 2002), 8. 
24 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991). 
25 Steven T. Katz, “Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism,” in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, ed. 
Steven T. Katz (London: Sheldon Press, 1978), 25. 
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experience (as representative of a romantic tradition going back to Friedrich Schleiermacher) 
to argue that such governing rules actually help to form the nature of mystical experience 
itself.26  
Throughout the following decade, Grace Jantzen took the general subject of 
Proudfoot’s study in a Foucauldian direction (and feminist analysis), arguing that the attempt 
of Schleiermacher and James to sidestep the Kantian strictures on knowledge resulted in a 
subjectivized construction of mysticism based on states of consciousness and inner 
experience—as opposed to rational processes.27 According to Jantzen, this attempt to escape 
Kant has been formative in modern understandings of mysticism, which have been 
“depoliticized” and hermetically sealed off from the vagaries of sociohistorical contexts of 
power, authority, and gender. In such romantic conceptions, mysticism is only a private, 
subjective experience whose major ingredients include “the annihilation or absorption of the 
self, the merging into complete unity of subject and object, the intensity of feeling, and the 
inadequacy of rationality […].”28 
Following Jantzen, Omid Safi has forcefully mobilized a similar critique in terms of 
the Western study of Islamic mysticism, arguing that the study of Sufism continues to focus 
on “mystical experience” and understand its subject through a post-Enlightenment, Protestant 
worldview “in which the realms of ‘religion’ and ‘mysticism’ have been privatized and 
                                                
26 Proudfoot analyzes James’s “primary marks” of mystical experience as articulated in The Varieties of 
Religious Experience (i.e., “its ineffability and a noetic quality”). See Wayne Proudfoot, Religious Experience 
(Berkeley: University of California, 1985), 120, 119-154 passim. 
27 Grace M. Jantzen, Power, Gender and Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
7, 317. See also Grace M. Jantzen, “Mysticism and Experience,” Religious Studies 25, no. 3 (1989): 295-315 
28 Jantzen, Power, 320 (emphasis mine). 
 244 
defined in opposition to “rational philosophy.”29 Safi thus interrogates the Western scholarly 
adoption of Jamesian categories of experience and privatized religion over social and 
institutional aspects of Sufism and shows how in premodern contexts of Persian Sufism 
mystical sanctity was intimately tied to social expressions of political power.30 
In the following chapter, I build upon the important insights offered by Proudfoot, 
Jantzen, and Safi, but shift the subject of interrogation away from “experiential-expressivist” 
models of mysticism that extol experience and feeling as authentic modes of spirituality in 
opposition to rationality.31 Instead, I focus on a parallel, and often overlapping, mode of 
contemporary construction of mysticism.32 Rather than highlighting “feeling,” I argue that 
this particular construction of Islamic mysticism is distinctive in emphasizing so-called 
universal principles of Kantian autonomous reason and morality. In Safi’s critique of the use 
of Jamesian categories of Sufism as privatized and anti-rational mysticism cited above, he 
specifies the Western academic focus “on the mystical expressions of two individuals: the 
elaborate metaphysical thought of Ibn al-ʿArabī, and the mystical poetry of Rumi.”33 
Similarly, in the discourse of reasonable Sufism, both Ibn ʿArabi and Rumi are used as 
                                                
29 Omid Safi, “Bargaining with Baraka: Persian Sufism, ‘Mysticism,’ and Pre-modern Politics,” The Muslim 
World 90 (2000): 260 (emphasis mine). See also Omid Safi, The Politics of Knowledge in Premodern Islam: 
Negotiating Ideology and Religious Inquiry (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 127-28, 
passim. 
30 Safi, “Bargaining with Baraka,” 266. 
31 For my discussion of “experiential-expressivist” models of mysticism and Schleiermacher see chapter 2, pp. 
115-16, passim. 
32 As Carl Ernst shows, both constructions of Sufism have been present since the beginning of its modern study 
in the mid eighteenth century. Thus, “[o]utsider terminology for Sufism stressed the exotic, the peculiar, and 
behavior that diverges from European norms,” while other early depictions saw Sufis as “freethinkers” who had 
more to do with Christianity and Greek philosophy than with Islam. Carl W. Ernst, The Shambhala Guide to 
Sufism (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1997), 3, 9. 
33 Safi, “Bargaining with Baraka,” 260. 
 245 
premodern examples, often simultaneously.34  
Yet, Ibn ‘Arabi and Rumi have not always enjoyed equal praise in the West as 
“enlightened” representatives of Sufism. The Persian training of the early British Orientalists 
who “discovered” Sufism in India in the eighteenth century, along with the philological 
interests of many of the nineteenth century Orientalists who followed them, naturally led to a 
scholarly preoccupation with Persian Sufi poetry and an association of Sufism with Persia 
itself. These scholars typically viewed Sufis as “freethinkers” or even “libertarians” whose 
creative spirituality could not be farther from the desolate aridity of Arabian Islam.35 
Through the nineteenth century slide from language to race (as discussed in chapter 3) such 
associations, as Carl Ernst notes, “would turn into a theory of Sufism as ‘Aryan’ mysticism 
overlaid on the ‘Semitic’ legalism of the Arabs.”36 Thus, in his now classic 1893 memoir A 
Year Among the Persians, E. G. Browne asserts that “Súfís,” as part of “a host of heterodox 
sects born on Persian soil,” 
arose to vindicate the claim of Aryan thought to be free, and to transform the religion forced 
on the nation by Arab steel into something which, though still wearing a semblance of Islám 
had a significance widely different from that which one may fairly suppose was intended by 
the Arabian prophet.37 
                                                
34 E.g., in a recent book on Islam, interfaith dialogue, and religious pluralism, Akbar S. Ahmed discusses the 
possibilities of common understanding between “Islam and the West” through a “dialogue of civilizations,” 
which he suggests is a process, not of emotions, but of “rational thought.” As such, he invokes Ibn ‘Arabi and 
Rumi: “Perhaps the greatest model for dialogue still relevant is provided by the two great mystics Jalal al-Din 
Rumi and Ibn ‘Arabi, whose works convey the essential unity of the divine vision in synagogue, church, and 
mosque.” Akbar S. Ahmed, “Islam and the West: Clash or Dialogue of Civilisations?,” in Islam and Global 
Dialogue: Religious Pluralism and the Pursuit of Peace, ed. Roger Boase (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 105, 112. 
35 See Ernst, The Shambhala Guide, 8-9, 15; and Alexander Knysh, “Historiography of Sufi Studies in the 
West,” in A Companion to the History of the Middle East, ed. Youssef M. Choueiri (Malden: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2005), 109. See also Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 106. 
36 Ernst, The Shambhala Guide, 15. 
37 Edward G. Browne, A Year Amongst the Persians: Impressions as to the Life, Character, and Thought of the 
People of Persia, Received During Twelve Months’ Residence in that Country in the Years 1887-1888, 
(London: Adam and Charles Black, 1893), 123 (emphasis mine). 
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In such discourse, Indo-Persian (i.e., “Aryan”) Sufism is constructed as reflective of the 
Western imaginary in its “free-thinking” and “free-living” style, while so-called Arab Sufism 
is commonly said to display more narrow and rigid “Semitic” characteristics—as the 
formidable British scholar of Sufism Reynold Nicholson (d. 1945) himself asserts on the very 
first page of the preface to his acclaimed Studies in Islamic Mysticism.38 
As I will explore in more detail below, the Aryan/Semitic binary has continued to 
inform the Western reception of Ibn ‘Arabi until today, but in changing and more muted 
ways. As late as 1957, W. C. Smith would contextualize the poetic tradition of Indo-Persian 
Sufism as a type of mystical humanism that resembles the artistic sensibilities of ancient 
Greece, while simultaneously denigrating the Arab Sufism of Ibn ‘Arabi as a somehow 
stilted and thus less “authentic” religious expression.39 Yet, the following year saw the 
publication of Henry Corbin’s L’Imagination créatrice dans le Soufisme d’Ibn ‘Arabî 
(Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn ʿArabī), which effectively Persianized Ibn ‘Arabi. 
In the mid 1960s, Seyyed Hossein Nasr would synthesize Corbin’s Persianization of Ibn 
‘Arabi with Schuonian Perennialism, thus raising Ibn ‘Arabi out of his Arab-Semitic 
encrustation and transposing him onto the open discursive field of Rumi’s reasonableness.40 
As will be shown below, Ibn ‘Arabi’s recent transformation from a rather convoluted Semitic 
metaphysician to a premodern Muslim forerunner of “European” secular-liberal autonomy 
                                                
38 Reynold A. Nicholson, Studies in Islamic Mysticism (1921; reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1967), v (emphasis mine). 
39 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 34n31. See 
pp. 283-85 below. 
40 ʿAbdolkarim Soroush’s repeated use of Rumi in the context of Kantian rationalism is an excellent example of 
a similar discourse. See ʿAbdolkarim Soroush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings 
of Abdolkarim Soroush, trans. and ed. Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 79, 88, 94, 98. 
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underscores both the protean and racialist nature of Western views regarding “mysticism” 
and rationality.  
Yet, modern narratives about the Western construction of “mysticism”—whether 
negative in terms of its Enlightenment framing of “false” religion (i.e., enthusiasm, 
fanaticism, pietism, eroticism, etc.) or positive in its romantic revaluation as “the 
fountainhead of all genuine spirituality”41— seemingly agree upon one point: the “mystical” 
is overwhelmingly opposed to “the pursuit of rationality.”42 Indeed, King notes that while the 
opposition between the mystical and the rational are indeed ancient, “the explicit polarization 
of rationality and mysticism takes on a particularly potent influence in the modern era 
[…].”43 With the onslaught of Western secularization and rationalization, “the mystical” 
becomes, as in Kant, “the death of philosophy.”44  
While it is true that “mystical fanaticism” for Kant was simply a form of magical 
thinking that obscured pure rational religion,45 Kant’s entire epistemology draws heavily 
upon the intellectual mysticism of the Christian Platonic tradition.46 Indeed, the partial 
“genealogy” that I sketch below shows that a Western discourse asserting a rational Islamic 
mysticism, which similarly draws upon categories of Christian Platonism, has been present 
                                                
41 Leigh Eric Schmidt, “The Making of Modern ‘Mysticism’,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 
71, no. 2 (2003): 278-81.  
42 King, Orientalism and Religion, 27. 
43 Ibid., 32. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing  Company, 2009), 144, passim.  
46 Hunter, “Kant’s Regional Cosmopolitanism,” 173. See p. 259 below.   
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since the initial European “discovery” of Sufism.47 Why then does such a discourse manifest 
in the Euro-American construction of Sufism, while it remains undeveloped in other Western 
treatments of mysticism?  
As noted in the introduction to this study, Jantzen has importantly pointed out that 
“what counts as mysticism will reflect (and also help to constitute) the institutions of power 
in which it occurs.”48 Additionally, King has observed that the denial of rationality “has been 
a common strategy in subordinating the Other throughout human history […].”49 In light of 
these two important insights, I theorize that the category of “reason” has been mobilized in 
the discourse of reasonable Sufism as a means to subordinate Islam(ism), which in such 
discourse is variously referred to as “fundamentalist,” “orthodox,” “normative,” “Sunni,” or 
“standard” Islam. It is indeed such a juxtaposition between rational and irrational conceptions 
of religion—what Jenkins above calls a “clash of civilizations […] within Islam itself”—that 
I argue fuels the ongoing construction of Sufism as “reasonable” mysticism.  
The idea of an intra-religious “clash of civilizations” within Islam, implicit in 
Schwartz and explicit in Jenkins, spins off the famous claim made in Bernard Lewis’s oft-
mentioned 1990 article “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” Here, Lewis uses the “irrational” and 
violent “religious culture of Islam” as a civilizational foil to “our Judeo-Christian 
heritage”—an “ancient” rivalry that formed “no less than a clash of civilizations […].”50 
                                                
47 I follow an Asadian notion of “genealogy” here that does not pretend to be “a substitute for social history,” 
but rather “a way of working back from our present to the contingencies that have come together to give us our 
certainties.” Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular, 16. 
48 Jantzen, Power, 14 (emphasis mine). 
49 King, Orientalism and Religion, 25. 
50 Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” The Atlantic Monthly 266, no. 3 (1990): 60 (emphasis mine). 
Samuel Huntington would later capitalize on Lewis’s phraseology and developed the now famous “clash of 
civilizations” hypothesis first in a 1993 Foreign Affairs article and later in an expanded monograph. See Samuel 
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While a recent example of Lewis’s own addition to the discourse of reasonable Sufism will 
be explored below, here it is important to note that both Schwartz and Jenkins above invert 
Lewis’s conceit into an entirely Muslim conflict. No longer is Islam representative of a single 
culture, but is bifurcated in terms of Lewis’s above pattern: Sufism as reflective of “our 
Judeo-Christian heritage,” while Islam(ism) simply plays the tautological role of its own 
“irrational” religion.  
I thus argue that while the discourse of reasonable Sufism is clearly a discourse of 
othering, it is also—and more explicitly—a discourse of “saming.” In other words, the 
discourse of reasonable Sufism promulgates a form of ideological racism through the 
universalization of sameness. As Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari note, such racism “never 
detects the particles of the other; it propagates waves of sameness until those who resist 
identification have been wiped out (or those who only allow themselves to be identified at a 
given degree of divergence).”51 Indeed, the debate about Jewish emancipation in nineteenth 
century Germany was fueled by a similar project of Kantian universalism and imposition of 
sameness. As Michael Mack notes, because Jews were perceived as lacking the Kantian ideal 
of autonomous religious subjectivity, they were “excluded from an idealist body politic.”52 
Thus, in order to become a member of the modern German state, Jews needed to “lose their 
otherness.”53 Similarly, this chapter looks at how such Kantian framing of religion inherent 
within the Western liberal-secular imaginary has constructed Sufism as a means for Muslims 
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to lose their otherness. Here, Sufism is colonized and acculturated to the Western imaginary 
as an “authentic” evolution of rational religion, while “normative” Islam is racially marked as 
irrationally and Semitically heteronomous and thus in need of reform on the model of Sufism 
itself. 
Discovering Ourselves: The European “Species” of Sufi 
Carl Ernst has trenchantly noted that concomitant to the British Orientalist 
“discovery” of the “Sooffees” in the latter half of the eighteenth century in India, the term 
Sufi-ism was invented “as an appropriation of those portions of ‘Oriental’ culture that 
Europeans found attractive.”54 In terms of religion, one of the things that eighteenth century 
Europeans seemed to have found most attractive was their own self-image. As David Pacini 
recently observes, seventeenth and eighteenth century European thought marked a “shift 
from a conception of religion as conformity to the divine order of being to a conception of 
religion as conformity to the human ordering of ideas […].”55 This “modern religion of 
conscience,” or “looking glass” religion, according to Pacini was based upon “a view of the 
modern subject whose most enduring trait was its dissociation from the world around it, and 
what was more, its subsequent transformation of that world into an image of itself.”56  
Although the beginnings of the modern sea change in religious subjectivity and the 
emergence of the religion of conscience cannot be found in any one Enlightenment thinker, 
its early synthesis finds full enunciation arguably in Kant.57 As Susan Meld Shell observes, 
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while Kant follows Rousseau’s subordination of “religious faith to sincerity before the voice 
of human conscience […], Kant goes further than Rousseau in insisting on the sufficiency of 
conscience, or the moral law, to motivate the human heart.”58 As Kant himself notes, “The 
question […] is not how conscience should be guided (for it needs no guide; having a 
conscience is enough), but how conscience itself can serve as guiding thread in the most 
perplexing moral decisions.”59 Conscience, for Kant, thus “becomes the court in which 
reason lays down for itself its own inner law.”60 Such a totalizing subjective “court” of 
reason makes up what Pacini calls the “Kantian ‘critical standpoint,’” which replaces the 
traditional “idea that the world constitutes me with the idea that I constitute the world […].”61 
This idea, i.e., that knowledge is determined by the subject rather than the object, forms the 
essence of Kant’s “Copernican” turn.62  
In his 1793 work Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, Kant theorizes such 
Copernican subjectivity as the final phase of the development of religion in human history. 
Although presented as a philosophy of religion, Religion is equally a “history of reason” that 
prefigures Hegel’s own dialectical teleology of history.63 Here, history is conceived as the 
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teleological realization of autonomous reason, which for Kant begins with a Greek inspired 
form of “statutory” Judaism, evolves into a Christianity whose progressively mature forms 
increasingly shed the “cloak” of childish law, and finally emerges as purely autonomous 
rational religion.64 
Evidence that such an autonomous subjectivity and historical teleology of 
autonomous rational religion were part of the interpretive framework at the very beginnings 
of the Western study of Sufism can be found in the first European article solely dedicated to 
Sufism. Written by Lt. James William Graham of the British East India Company in 1811 
(and published in 1819), “A Treatise on Sufiism” is representative of a nascent liberal 
Protestant tradition informed by the anthropocentric zeitgeist of the age.65 On the surface, 
Graham’s treatise interprets Sufi doctrine through elaborate analogies made from classical 
Christian Platonic conceptions of divine emanation, Trinitarian speculation, and the process 
of self-knowledge through the soul’s reflection of—and ultimate union with—the divine.66 
The importance of Graham’s treatise as representative of the early Orientalist treatment of 
Sufism through such analogical models (along with mention of Indian traditions) was 
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brought to scholarly attention by Arthur Arberry and more recently by Ernst.67 Here, I wish 
to revisit Graham’s treatise once more to show how the modern religion of conscience 
underlies its overt Christian Platonic interpretive framework.  
As I will discuss more below, the Christian Platonic tradition from which Graham 
draws upon also played a formative role in Kant’s own intellectual tradition. One of the 
controlling metaphysical ideas of this tradition that was transmogrified in the Kantian turn to 
the subject is the process of self-reflection. Going as far back as the tradition of the Delphic 
Oracle in the Platonic school, the metaphorical image of the mirror was deployed to represent 
the rational part of the soul that reflects its true nature in the divine.68 The Platonic concept of 
reflection and self-knowledge is thus directly linked to the Delphic command “Know 
thyself!,” which as Douglas Hedley notes, means “Know God!”69 Augustine’s treaty The 
Trinity famously employed the Platonic tradition of the Delphic Oracle as the intellectual 
process of self-knowledge culminating in the unity of the knowing subject with divine 
reason; here, “the knower is transformed by the object of contemplation.”70 The Delphic 
command along with the apostle Paul’s statement “For now we see through a glass, darkly; 
but then face to face” (1 Cor. 13:12) became central elements of Christian Platonic 
speculation.71  
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Similarly, in “A Treatise on Sufiism” Graham notes that Sufis hold the same doctrine 
as the early church fathers who believed “the Scripture itself authorizes a belief of the 
ultimate union of the soul with the Deity,”72 Graham thus asserts that the Sufi conception of 
God’s emanation within the nature of humanity is a replication of the Trinity; “though I am 
sorry to say,” he informs his readers, “they do not take it as such.”73 In addition to such 
Christian references, Graham predictably makes recourse to the Delphic command. In an 
attempt to establish a general analogy between “the nature of Sufiism” and what Graham 
calls “the spiritual man of our doctrine” he asserts:  
The grand thing herein is to ‘know one’s self,’ according to the motto I have adopted, in its 
full spiritual and proper sense. “The proper study of Mankind is Man:” let him circle the 
globe, let him traverse the skies; and then, for something more worthy his notice and 
admiration, return to himself.74 
 
Here, Graham’s discourse reveals a subtle break from traditional Christian Platonism by  
supporting his invocation of the Delphic Oracle with an intertextual reference to Alexander 
Pope’s Essay on Man (1734). Pope himself begins the second book of the Essay by invoking 
the Delphic command: “Know then thyself, presume not God to scan.”75 Graham simply 
picks up where Pope’s first line leaves off, thus quoting its second: “The proper study of 
Mankind is Man.” Pope’s first couplet thus foreshadows Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and 
its assertion that knowledge of things outside of sensory experience (i.e., the phenomenal), 
such as God, is impossible. Indeed, Pope was a favorite poet of Kant’s, and it has been 
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suggested that Pope’s ideas were formative for Kant’s philosophy.76 While, Kant defined 
philosophy as the study of humankind and its purpose in “the whole vocation of man,”77 in 
the Essay Pope declares reason “The God within the mind.”78 
 It is through Graham’s textual reference to Pope, whom he does not cite by name, and 
his direct reference to Rousseau,79 that a pronounced difference emerges between Graham’s 
approach to self-knowledge and that of premodern Christian Platonism. In the Christian 
Platonic tradition, as mentioned above, the subject is defined by the divine object reflected 
within the mirror of the soul. Yet, by the time Pope’s Essay was published “it was 
commonplace that all human knowledge was subjective, dependent on sense experience and, 
consequently limited.”80 No longer revealing knowledge of an internal divine nature, this 
new Enlightenment framework of “self-reflection” is centered around the ordering of human 
reason.81 And yet, because human reason can only know itself, and not “presume” knowledge 
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of God, its finitude establishes both the parameters of knowledge and acknowledges a divine-
like power “to produce itself.”82  
Thus, Graham immediately follows his above call for man to “return to himself” by 
stating that “[t]o himself he is a theatre immense, and was reputed such when that theatre 
had much less to exhibit than at present it can boast, and when it was but faintly illuminated 
with the glimmering beams of far more feeble light.”83 Here, Graham refers to a distinct 
historical teleology: even in antiquity man was held to be an immense spiritual theatre, but 
compared to man’s present illumination, his light was then “far more feeble.” Graham thus 
makes a dual analogy, comparing Sufism and Christianity as mirror images of the realization 
of the Delphic command in the Pauline assertion that the human “theatre” is “consecrated 
into a venerable temple, a temple of the Holy Spirit.”84 Indeed, such a teleology equating 
Sufism and Christianity with what he identifies as “the supreme wisdom of man” has, 
according to Graham, a common origin. Here Graham compares the doctrine of Sufism to the 
Pauline “doctrine of grace doing away with the law and its works; for the Mussulman 
Shĕryât in its feature very much resembles the Jewish dispensation […].”85 Indeed, Graham 
tellingly sets Sufism, which he calls a “doctrine of spiritualism and grace,” against the 
“scribes and pharisees of the Mahomedan synagogue.”86 
In recounting the path of Sufism, Graham relates that a Sufi may be “a person of any 
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religion or sect.”87 Such a “mystery,” according to Graham, lies in the fact of the Sufi’s 
“total disengagement” from the sensory world, which includes not only “an entire throwing 
off not only of every superstition […,] but of the practical mode of worship, ceremonies, &c. 
laid down in every religion […].”88 Yet, this process of “throwing off” superstition and “the 
practical mode of worship,” what Graham also refers to as the “pharisaical mode of 
worship,”89 only happens when the mind of the Sufi is “properly nurtured and become 
matured” through “tuition and due reflection.”90 This marks the first stage of the Sufi path 
when the mind “may throw off those things which it was at first taught to revere, and enter 
into the view of a sublimer system.”91 It is from the view of this “sublimer system,” that 
“man arrives to a knowledge of his own nature” and thus “may himself then look upon those 
outward prescribed forms as nugatory.”92  
In the midst of the above explanation, which takes up several pages, Graham again 
references a line of Pope’s Essay, stating that the Sufi “may be said, in the words of a great 
poet of ours, ‘To look through nature up to nature’s God.”93 Again, Graham only quotes the 
second line of a couplet, while the first is inferred: “Slave to no sect, who takes no private 
road.”94 Indeed, directly after his above description of Sufism as a “sublimer system” where 
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“man arrives to a knowledge of his own nature” and thus perceives the “prescribed forms as 
nugatory,” Graham states: 
It may not be unworthy of remark, especially in this place, that we are, generally speaking, at 
least in this country, looked upon as a species or one kind of Sûfi, from our non-observance 
here of any rites or forms, conceiving a worship of the Deity in mind, and adherence to 
morality, sufficient. In fine, the present free-thinker or modern philosopher of Europe would 
be esteemed a sort of Sûfi […].95 
 
Graham ends this interruption by referring to what he identifies as a hadith: “The Sûfi has no 
religion.”96 Graham repeats this so-called hadith elsewhere in fuller form: “‘The Sûfi has no 
religion, on account of his nonobservance of the rites, forms, or ceremonies of any religion:’ 
so says the Mahomedan lawgiver […].”97 
That Graham sees himself as “a species” of Sufi, whom he associates above with no 
formal “religion” and whom he simultaneously identifies with the European “free-thinker,” 
or “modern philosopher,” is telling. Such assertions when taken together with Graham’s 
above description of the European “Sufi” as “conceiving a worship of the Deity in mind, and 
adherence to morality, sufficient” show that Graham’s interpretation of Christian Platonism 
goes beyond the orthodox tradition of Protestant scholasticism and is informed by the 
modern religion of conscience and its attendant idea of self-governing morality. Indeed, such 
assertions in combination with Graham’s additional claims above—i.e., that Sufism is open 
to people of “any religion or sect,” that it is the specific result of a teleological process of 
intellectual nurturance and maturation, and that the practical result of such intellectual 
maturity is the “throwing off” of both superstition and the “pharisaical mode of worship”—
are all tropes that echo a European universal religion of reason like that which is 
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systematically presented in Kant’s 1793 work Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. 
Although there is no evidence that Graham specifically refers to Kant, the elements of Pope’s 
Essay mobilized by Graham reveal a particular modern subjectivity seminally established 
and enunciated in Kant’s Copernican turn. Thus, buried within Graham’s early account of 
Sufism are the rudimentary discursive practices that will form the discourse of reasonable 
Sufism and will increasingly reflect the European self-image as synthesized in the Kantian 
universal religion of reason. It is to the formative edifice of Kant’s universal religious 
subjectivity—which is strikingly prefigured by Pope’s above mentioned line “Slave to no 
sect, who takes no private road”—that we now turn.   
Casting off Cloaks of Servitude: The Kantian Teleology of “Bare Rational Religion” 
As Ian Hunter recently notes, Kant’s north-German Protestant university metaphysics 
was deeply infused with Christian Platonic anthropology. Such anthropology, like that of 
Augustine’s mentioned above, posited that while the human soul is created, it retains a trace 
of the divine image through its rationality and freedom. By freeing itself from the slavery of 
the senses, Augustine thought that the rational mind could attain to spiritual wisdom within 
the intelligible divine order through the indwelling Christ and divine law.98 It was the 
intelligible divine order, and not the created world, that was understood to be the source of all 
knowledge. While Kant maintained this strict epistemological divide, he situated human 
reason, instead of a purported indwelling divinity, as pure rational being (Vernunftwesen) and 
thus pure intelligence (homo noumenon).99 Thus, in Religion within the Bounds of Bare 
Reason Kant establishes human autonomous reason as self-regulating moral law in place of 
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divine intelligence by invoking the Christian Platonic idea of the Logos as the divine 
archetype.100 As such Kant claims that to “to elevate ourselves to this ideal of moral 
perfection, i.e., to the archetype of the moral attitude in all its purity, is a universal human 
duty […].”101 
Indeed, the Kantian idea of the pure rational being not only exists independently of 
space and time, but also has a dual intellectual function: (i) to intelligize pure forms of 
experience, and (ii) to govern the will by thinking the form of its law.102 It is through these 
intellectual processes that “Kant’s homo noumenon or rational being is supposed to free 
himself from the ‘sensuous inclinations’ that otherwise tie the will of empirical man (homo 
phenomenon) to extrinsic ends or goods.”103 Kant’s teleological approach to history can thus 
be understood as an attempt to show a progressive development from homo phenomenon to 
homo noumenon, and Kant’s critique of religion theorizes this progression. In Religion, Kant 
states: 
It is [...] a necessary consequence of the physical and simultaneously of the moral 
predisposition in us—the latter being the foundation and simultaneously the interpreter of all 
religion—for religion finally to be detached gradually from all empirical determining bases, 
from all statutes that rest on history and that, by means of a church faith, unite human beings 
provisionally in order to further the good, and thus for pure rational religion ultimately to 
rule over all, “so that God may be all in all.”104 
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Here, Kant posits a divinely given “moral predisposition” of the human being that has served 
as the foundation of all positive religions.105 The purity and sole truth of this autonomous 
morality has facilitated the progressive detachment of the positive religions from their 
historical accretions—i.e., their scriptural laws. This narrative of emancipation finds its telos 
in the final emergence of a “pure rational religion”—what Kant also calls “the universal true 
religious faith”106—that will ultimately “rule over all.”107 Like Graham’s assertion above that 
a Sufi may be “a person of any religion or sect,” Kant notes that the universal true religious 
faith “offers itself on its own to any human reason and is, therefore, found in the religion of 
most civilized peoples.”108  
While such pure rational religion may be inherent in the religion of “civilized 
peoples,” it is not always evident. Indeed, the framing metaphor in Religion within the 
Bounds of Bare Reason equates the human moral predisposition with autonomous “bare 
rational faith.”109 Thus, in perhaps the most iconic passage of Religion, Kant states: 
The cloaks under which the embryo first formed itself into the human being must be cast off if 
he is now to step into the light of day. The leading string of holy tradition, with its 
appendages—the statutes and observances—which in its time rendered good services, is little 
by little becoming dispensable, indeed in the end a fetter, when he enters adolescence. As 
long as he (the human genus) “was a child, he was astute as a child” and knew how to 
combine with statutes—which had been imposed on him without his collaboration—[…] “But 
now that he becomes a man, he puts away what is childish.”110 
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Kant thus sounds a clarion call for humanity to divest itself of its religious “cloaks,” i.e., “the 
holy tradition” of theological constructions of the divine and their attendant “statutes and 
observances.” While such veils were necessary in the beginning stages of human history to 
aid in the germination of pure faith, they need to be discarded now that humanity has 
matured. The human being must “cast off” such traditions through the quintessential path of 
autonomous reason, which will liberate “him” in the naked light of truth.111 Thus, Graham’s 
above assertion that the novitiate of the Sufi path will “throw off those things which it was at 
first taught to revere, and enter into the view of a sublimer system” strikingly echoes Kant. 
Graham’s further assertion that the Sufi engages in “an entire throwing off not only of every 
superstition […,] but of the practical mode of worship, ceremonies, &c. laid down in every 
religion […]” again finds resonance in Kant who defined “religious superstition” as “[t]he 
delusion that through religious acts of cult we accomplish anything in regard to justification 
before God […].”112   
According to Kant it is through an adherence to “bare rational faith” that the entire 
world can unite as an “ethical community”—what Kant also calls a “universal church”—and 
thus be “cleansed of the imbecility of superstition […].”113 Importantly, Kant notes that the 
way to make the “transition to this new order” is “not to be expected from an external 
revolution,” but rather “through a gradually progressing reform […].”114 Accordingly, one of 
the subsections of Religion is titled: “Historical Presentation of the Gradual Founding of the 
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Dominion of the Good Principle on Earth.”115 As Yirmiahu Yovel notes, this historicization 
maps “not only a succession in time, but equally the ascent of the rational principle toward 
full self-consciousness.”116  
Given Kant’s open opposition to any religious tradition of “statutory law,” as most 
clearly exemplified in Judaism, it should not surprise that Jesus serves in Kant’s 
metanarrative of the ascent of reason as the founder of “the first true church.”117 According to 
Kant, Jesus brought only “pure teachings of reason.” Rather than demanding “the observance 
of external civic or statutory church duties,” Jesus taught that “only the pure moral attitude of 
the heart shall be able to make a human being pleasing to God.”118 Thus, Kant asserts 
Christianity arose as “a pure moral religion in place of an ancient cult […].”119 Since 
Christianity was bound “to no statutes at all,” it contained “a religion valid for the world, not 
for one single people.”120 As such, Kant claims that “one cannot deny to this church the name 
of true universal church.”121 
 Perhaps less expectedly, however, is Kant’s refusal to admit Judaism any historical 
role in the emergence of pure rational religion. Indeed, according to Kant, “the Jewish faith 
stands in no essential connection whatsoever, i.e., in no unity according to concepts, with this 
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[…] history we want to examine […].”122 This is so, Kant contends, because “Judaism, as 
such, taken in its purity, contains no religious faith at all”; rather, it was founded only as “a 
political, not an ethical community […].”123 Kant thus flatly asserts: 
The Jewish faith is, in terms of its original arrangement, a sum of merely statutory laws, on 
which a state constitution was based; for whatever moral additions were appended to it, either 
already at that time or later on, absolutely do not belong to Judaism, as such.124 
 
Indeed, according to Kant, the invocation of the name of God in the Jewish tradition does not 
make Judaism a religion, since in this theocratic context God is “venerated merely as a 
secular regent who makes no claim at all concerning and upon conscience […].”125 Thus, as 
Kant further on notes, Judaism serves as the model of a “merely statutory faith” whose 
“slavish service” was “devoid of moral aim.”126 
Although Kant finally consents to the fact that “Christianity arose from Judaism,” he 
does so only within the context of the later history of Judaism when “this otherwise ignorant 
people had already been reached by much foreign (Greek) wisdom.”127 Indeed, “the Greek 
philosophers’ moral doctrines of freedom,” Kant contends, “shocked the slavish mind” of the 
Jew.128 Kant thus notes that such Greek teachings enlightened Judaism and provided it with 
the morality and reason necessary to facilitate the coming of Jesus.129 Here, it is important to 
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note the parallels between Kant’s explanative recourse to a “foreign (Greek) wisdom” that 
gave rise to Christianity from Judaism and the Orientalist trope of necessary Greek (or other 
“Aryan”) mediation for the evolution of Sufism from Islam. As mentioned above, since Kant 
equates true morality with self-legislation through autonomous reason, his insistence that 
“the Jewish faith” lies outside the history of true religion because it lacks an ethical system is 
to argue that Judaism is inherently irrational.  
It is through the persistent discrimination against Judaism in Religion that Kant’s 
teleology clearly emerges as an ideological narrative rather than a reasoned argument. 
Indeed, in the preface to the second edition of Religion (1794), Kant notes that “[t]o 
understand this work in terms of its essential content, only common morality is needed, 
without venturing into the critique of practical reason, still less into that of theoretical reason 
[…].”130 What Kant implicitly admits to here is that Religion cannot be understood as a 
formal argument; rather, it is presented as a “religious” treatise that seeks to morally 
“educate” through what Kant calls “the transformation of the way of thinking.”131 As such, 
Religion is an ideological and proselytizing work where, as Yovel notes, “reason does not 
prove itself but asserts itself […].”132 Indeed, Kant’s ideological proselytization focuses upon 
all those who follow a statutory faith, which as noted above is for Kant epitomized in 
Judaism, and is nowhere more evident than in his final work The Conflict of the Faculties, 
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published in 1798.133  
Here, Kant argues “on the subject of sectarianism” that “we are accustomed to say 
that it is desirable for many kinds of religion […] to exist in a state.”134 This is desirable, 
Kant informs us, only “to the extent that it is a good sign […] that the people are allowed 
freedom of belief.” Yet, such “freedom,” Kant qualifies, “is not a good thing unless the 
principle underlying it is of such a nature as to bring with it universal agreement on the 
essential maxims of belief […].”135 In other words, the existence of different religions is only 
good if such religions all agree on an essential doctrine, which Kant goes on to note is “the 
moral improvement of men.”136 Because Christianity is at base “a pure moral religion,” 
which Kant establishes in Religion above, time will gradually bring the differences between 
“[e]nlightened Catholics and Protestants […] closer to the dignity of their end, religion itself 
[…].”137 However, Kant asserts that “for this reason the faith in question cannot be faith that 
we can obtain God’s favor or pardon by anything other than a pure moral attitude of 
will.”138 Since Judaism is such an Other faith, it follows that it is not in “universal agreement 
on the essential maxims of belief.” Thus, Kant states that although “dreaming of a conversion 
of all Jews (to Christianity in the sense of a messianic faith)” is no longer sensible, still 
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we can consider it possible even in their case if, as is now happening, purified religious 
concepts awaken among them and throw off the garb of the ancient cult, which now serves no 
purpose and even suppresses any true religious attitude.139 
 
While Kant here skillfully avoids calling for the outward conversion of the Jews, he 
nevertheless calls for an inward one. As Paul Rose notes,  
Kant has rejected the old Christian dream of converting the Jews, but in its place he envisages 
something far more insidiously destructive of Judaism, namely moral and human purification. 
The first step to this is to reform Judaism into a rational and moral religion of human freedom 
[…].140 
 
Indeed, in the same passage, Kant further asserts that he considers “the proposal of 
Ben David, a highly intelligent Jew, to adopt publicly the religion of Jesus (presumably with 
its vehicle, the Gospel), a most fortunate one.”141 Such a move throughout the Jewish 
community, Kant further avers, would “quickly call attention to them as an educated and 
civilized people who are ready for all the rights of citizenship and whose faith could also be 
sanctioned by the government.”142 In other words, since Judaism is a faith that strives to 
please God through the obedience of statutory laws, it is in its traditional praxis uncivilized 
and thus incompatible with modern society.  
As such, Jews are not eligible for the “freedom of belief” Kant otherwise proposes. It 
is only by accepting the validity of Christianity as a pure rational and moral faith, that Jews 
can hope to integrate into society and become, in essence, rational. As Shell notes, “Judaism, 
thus transformed, becomes one Christian sect among others.”143 Thus Kant concludes: 
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The euthanasia of Judaism is pure moral religion, freed from all the ancient statutory 
teachings, some of which were bound to be retained in Christianity (as a messianic faith). But 
this division of sects, too, must disappear in time, leading, at least in spirit, to what we call 
the conclusion of the great drama of religious change on earth (the restoration of all things), 
when there will be only one shepherd and one flock.144 
 
Kant’s religious universalism thus emerges as a totalizing ideology that ominously 
presages “the euthanasia of Judaism” through global reform—i.e. “inward” conversion—
supported by a teleology of autonomous religion. As evinced in Graham’s treatise on Sufism 
above, the discourse of reasonable Sufism adopts such a Kantian framework. Like Kant’s 
“highly intelligent Jew” who publically adopts Christianity and has thus “thrown off the garb 
of the ancient cult,” the Sufi is presented as a highly intelligent Muslim who has adopted a 
“sublimer system” and accordingly thrown off “pharisaical” Islam.  
Sufism at the End of History: Otto Pfleiderer and the Triumph of Kantian Religion  
 Shortly before his death in 1908, the internationally renowned Protestant theologian 
Otto Pfleiderer published a collection of lectures originally given at the University of Berlin 
in 1906.145 Notable for its distinctly Kantian title, Religion and Historic Faiths is particularly 
exemplary in its faithfulness to a Kantian historiography of “pure rational religion” emerging 
from the evolution of “historical faiths.”146 Most significantly for the present study is 
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Pfleiderer’s positioning of Sufism as the telos of his entire metanarrative.  
In a chapter entitled “Religion and Ethics,” Pfleiderer notes that “religion” is 
essentially different from its “positive church forms” such as “doctrines, ordinances and 
customs.” Indeed, Pfleiderer asserts, “We ought to be permitted to take it for granted that 
anyone who talks about these matters knows that these things are not religion, but merely its 
imperfect presentation-forms, coverings and shells […].”147 We should also presuppose, 
Pfleiderer adds, that just as we recognize the “law of evolution” in “all physical and historical 
life,” we must also agree that “it holds good in religion as well as in morals.”148 As such, 
Pfleiderer rehearses a Kantian teleology of reason, where both religion and morality 
were given at the beginning not as completed entities, but were compelled to work their way 
out of crude beginnings gradually, to rise from attachment to the senses to freedom of the 
spirit. Through arduous effort and education of generation after generation, reason must 
gradually be brought to consciousness in men and finally to mastery over them.149 
 
Indeed, Pfleiderer fittingly calls this teleology an “educative process to reasonableness” and 
continues to note that “the race, as well as the individual, must pass through certain different 
stages […].”150 Pfleiderer continues to echo, in lockstep fashion, Kant’s above iconic passage 
in Religion that proffers the metaphor of child development: 
In the child-stage of development, the good cannot be known by a reasoned judgment, and 
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cannot be desired nor done through a voluntary self-determination […]. It is perfectly natural 
that this stage of development corresponds to the theocratic form of religion and morals, that 
is, the idea that the good is a command to men from a strange and external will of God, the 
supermundane Lord. In this form of religious consciousness, man does bear a relation to God 
which is as unfree as that of a slave to his master, or of a minor child to its tutor. Just as this 
form of consciousness in the lower stage of development is inevitable, so little should it 
remain permanent. When the time was ripe, the discipline of the law was removed and 
mankind called to freedom as the full-grown sons of God. That was the new consciousness of 
God’s children brought by Christianity.151 
 
  Following Kant further, Pfleiderer asserts that “[t]he real service of God is actually 
only moral activity in the world”—not through external worship (i.e., acts of “cult”) where 
such moral activity is “a mere matter of chance and of secondary import […].”152 According 
to Pfleiderer, the latter such worship is the cause of all religious “evil,” and although it may 
have many “primitive” examples in history, it is characteristically represented by the “rigidly 
theocratic and legalistic character of Judaism.”153 Unlike Kant, however, Pfleiderer 
recognizes an original “ethical living spirit” in the prophets of Israel, which was nevertheless 
extinguished by “Pharisaical distortion.”154 Thus, Pfleiderer runs up against the same 
teleological problem that troubled Kant: how does Christianity, which is “mankind called to 
freedom as the full-grown sons of God,” arise out of “Jewish legality and unfreedom”?155  
Like Kant, Pfleiderer answers this conundrum of origins through recourse to the 
Greek tradition that, along with other “Oriental” elements, entered into “the thinking of the 
Jews […], which prepared the foundation for a new religious structure of the future.”156 
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Thus, for example, Pfleiderer finds that the view of the author of Job “harmonizes 
completely” with Plato’s “unconditional value of the ethically good.”157 “Wherever such an 
attitude shows itself,” Pfleiderer strikingly claims, “we may well call it Christianity before 
Christ.”158 Indeed, according to Pfleiderer, Christian belief “gathered up in itself all the truths 
contained in the religions and philosophies of its time.”159 As such, “Christianity may be 
interpreted as the higher unity of the Jewish and the Greek ideas of God.”160 Yet, Christianity 
stands far above the “heteronomy and subordination under strange ordinance and authority” 
that marks Judaism.161 Rather, it shares with the Stoics 
that inner freedom from the world, the calmness of firm character, the power of self-
determining will (autonomous) and the liberality of the humanitarian idea which reaches out 
over all nations and all classes [. . .].162 
 
As a result of such a synthesis, Pfleiderer triumphantly asserts that “Christianity became the 
religion of the religions, conquered the old world and led up to the new.”163  
 Unable in good historical conscience to end his teleological account of religious 
history with the appearance of Christianity, as Kant does in Religion, Pfleiderer is faced with 
a potentially anti-climactic because anti-Christian end. Thus in his final chapter, Pfleiderer 
quickly renders Islam, as he does with non-Hellenic Judaism above, a theocracy and not a 
proper “religion.” According to Pfleiderer, “Islamism is the Jewish idea of theocracy carried 
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out on a larger scale by the youthful national vigor of the Arabians, well calculated to 
discipline raw barbaric peoples, but a brake on the progress of free human civilization.”164 
Although Muhammad posed as a prophet, he lacked “religious motives.” After assuming “the 
rôle of political organizer” in Medina, Muhammad thus revealed his true intentions by 
creating a “national-Arabic theocracy by force of arms.”165 Here, the ritual prayer became “a 
form of military exercise,” and the alms tax “formed the basis of the financiering of the new 
theocracy.”166  
According to Pfleiderer, not only is Islam’s spiritual impoverishment marked by such 
militant ritualism, but also by its irrational theology: “God’s despotic will was expressed, 
though without logical completeness, in the form of an absolute predestination.”167 Yet, 
Pfleiderer notes that with the appearance of the Muʿtazilites and their rationalist “objections 
to orthodox teaching” it seemed for a time “that freer thought was seeking expression in 
Islam.” Yet, ultimately such rationalism was overcome by Islam’s “immutable character” of 
absolute voluntarism.168  
At the very end of Religion and Historic Faiths, Pfleiderer presents Sufism as a 
“peculiarity of Persian Islamism.” After remarking that some of this “mystical-speculative 
tendency” is “deeply pious and given to flights of high thinking,” Pfleiderer assures his 
readers “that this was not a genuine product of Arabian Islamism, even though it must remain 
undecided whether it owes its origin to ancient Persian, Indian or Neo-platonic 
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Gnosticism.”169 Like Graham above, Pfleiderer marks the first stage of Sufism as a departure 
from the “the plane of law” and the realization “that external works are without value for 
those who know, and in their stead there must be placed an ascetic freeing of the spirit from 
sensuality.”170 Thus, in the “highest plane” of Sufi realization  
God is no longer sought outside of one’s self either by ritualistic or ascetic works, but upon 
which, the immanence in one’s own spirit come [sic] into consciousness. For the wise man 
and the mystic who has attained this knowledge, the varying doctrines and ordinances of the 
different religions have lost their meaning.171 
 
Tellingly, Pfleiderer concludes Religion and Historic Faiths with selections from Rumi’s 
poetry, which he calls “thought-laden, pious poems.”172 
 In The Invention of World Religions, Tomoko Masuzawa refers to “Pfleiderer’s frank 
expression” in Religion and Historic Faiths as “useful in that it brings into plain view the 
major components of the stereotypical image of Islam that had by then gained predominance 
in Europe.”173 While Masuzawa’s critique is insightful, she critically fails to acknowledge 
Pfleiderer’s clear Kantian religious epistemology of pure reason and its particular historical 
teleology that I have fleshed out above. Yet, Masuzawa’s final insight regarding Pfleiderer’s 
treatment of Sufism—a construction she trenchantly labels “Aryan Islam”—touches 
precisely on my present argument. Here, she points out the similarity between Pfleiderer’s 
above assertion that Sufi enlightenment entails the effacement of “the varying doctrines and 
ordinances of the different religions” and his earlier statement that Christianity “gathered up 
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in itself all the truths contained in the religions and philosophies of its time.” Masuzawa thus 
notes: 
[I]n the heart of Sufism, or Aryan Islam, Pfleiderer seems to find himself in strangely familiar 
territory. Seen through the mystic kernel of Sufism, all the parochial and miserly laws, 
childish dogmas, and ceremonial encrustations that have constituted orthodox Islam seem to 
fall away. In effect, through deep contemplation, this kernel would come to seem something 
other than Islam proper, or Islam in the usual sense. […] This kernel, in effect, would become 
a sphere more or less coeval with Christianity or, if not quite that, with something yet 
nameless but very much like Christianity of the future.174 
 
Taking Masuzawa’s lead here, I hasten to add that if Pfleiderer’s above categorization of the 
Jewish harmonization of Greek ethics as “Christianity before Christ” is taken as a premise 
within his own Kantian historical teleology, then it follows that Sufism is thus Christianity 
after Muhammad. In Kantian terms, Pfleiderer’s history is therefore not simply about the 
triumph of Christianity, but also and even primarily about the triumph of “universal true 
religious faith” that first manifested, according to Kant, with the appearance of Christianity 
as an “archetype to be emulated.”175 Indeed, as Kant states in Religion: 
One need only allow the germ of the true religious faith—as it has now been planted in 
Christendom […]—to develop further and further unhindered, in order to expect from it a 
continual approximation to the church that unites all human beings forever and constitutes 
the visible presentation (the schema) of an invisible kingdom of God on earth.176 
 
Yet, as mentioned above, Kant understood that such “unhindered” development would come 
about only through a gradual reform, or conversion, of human consciousness. We thus turn to 
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the question of how the discourse of reasonable Sufism has been mobilized in the West as a 
discursive project of religious and civilizational reform. 
Sufism and W. C. Smith’s Kantian “Mission” of Autonomous Faith 
 When Wilfred Cantwell Smith was appointed the first W. M. Birks Professor of 
Comparative Religion at McGill University in 1949, his pluralistic approach to the academic 
study of religion seemed a world away from Pfleiderer’s Religion and Historic Faiths. 
Indeed, two world wars had passed and the Cold War was under way. Even though Smith, 
like Pfleiderer, was an ordained Protestant minister, the rapid rise of global communication 
and the end of colonialism purported to have put paid to nineteenth century Christian 
triumphalism. In the academic study of religion, and the humanities more broadly, a 
perceived shift from evolutionary and hierarchical schemas of Christian superiority to 
geographic and decentered representation of “world-religions” promised a more egalitarian 
pluralism.177 Both a formidable scholar and humanist theologian,178 Smith was among a 
generation of post-war academics who held that the study of religion could help usher in a 
new global humanism that would transform the world from the devastation of war and 
totalitarianism.179  
 It has recently been asserted that during his academic career Smith intentionally set 
out to facilitate liberal Islamic reform in Muslim majority countries by redefining “authentic 
                                                
177 Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions, 13. 
178 As Kenneth Cracknell notes, although Smith presented himself as a historian and comparativist, an 
unabashed theological impulse runs throughout his work. Kenneth Cracknell, introduction to Wilfred Cantwell 
Smith: A Reader, by Wilfred Cantwell Smith, ed. Kenneth Cracknell (New York: Oxford Oneworld, 2002), 20. 
179 Robert A. Orsi, Between Heaven and Earth: The Religious Worlds People Make and the Scholars who Study 
Them (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 189. 
 276 
Islamic mysticism as the socially engaged and ethically liberal practice of a rational ideal.”180 
While this claim suffers from a dearth of discursive evidence,181 Smith’s universalist 
discourse does strikingly echo a Kantian teleology of rational religion with its attendant 
antipathy towards law and historically fixed religious form. In this context, Smith’s liberal 
discursive practices around Islam, Sufism, and Semitic heteronomy anticipate less refined 
twenty first century constructions of reasonable Sufism as a model of religious and 
civilizational reform. 
In the inaugural lecture to his 1949 appointment at McGill, entitled “The 
Comparative Study of Religion,” Smith asserts: “A science of religion would have failed of 
its purpose, would have failed as a science, if it did not prove itself useful to the religions in 
enabling them to function better.”182 Smith thus continues: 
Man has reached a stage in his intellectual development where such a service can, it would 
seem, be rendered, and rendered only, by making that functioning self-conscious, and thereby 
self-critical and self-directing. And in fact only religions so liberated can, so far as I can 
sense, serve men who have entered into the heritage of modern knowledge.183  
 
Although wrapped in the new academic discourse of religious studies, Smith nevertheless 
reproduces an emancipatory Kantian teleological metanarrative of the ascent of reason and 
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the modern religion of conscience of “self-conscious, and thereby self-critical and self-
directing” faith.  
In the same address, Smith discusses the issue of religious authority and uses Islam as 
an example of divergent approaches: “Within Islam, for instance, the distinction between 
external, formal authority and internal appreciation corresponds by and large to the 
dichotomy in historical development between Sunni and Sufi; the Law and mysticism.”184 
While Smith goes on to state that “at certain periods the Law, if unenlivened by Sufi warmth 
and spontaneity, has threatened to become cold, formalistic, an incarceration […],” he also 
admits that it was through such “Law” that the tradition of Islam was socio-politically 
grounded and thus able to transmit to Sufis “that meaning of religion which they, rightly, 
valued more highly than the outward expression.”185 Here, the cold, external authority of the 
sharia has historically provided the sociopolitical ground necessary for the inner warmth of 
mystical truth. 
Yet, in a later essay, Smith notes that the rise of such a heteronomous legal tradition 
in Islamic history corresponds to a “decline” in authentic “intellectual and religious life”: 
it would not be impossible to contend that historically the rise of a concept law as religiously 
absolute may be correlated with a decline, if not of Islamic civilization, anyway of the vigor 
of its intellectual and religious life.186  
 
Indeed, in Kantian terms, recourse to historical religion and statutory law marks a more 
primitive mode of religion compared to autonomous reason and morality. From such a 
Kantian perspective it should not surprise that Smith states that the concept of Islamic law, 
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i.e., sharia, “is appropriate primarily in those cases where one’s sense of God and His 
immediate intervention, and one’s sense of engagement, of one’s own immediate cosmic 
moral involvement, are weak or absent.”187 Here, religious law is appropriate only when there 
cannot be an immediate engagement of “cosmic,” i.e., transcendent, morality. When such an 
engagement is present, then law is in Kantian terms self-determined, and thus there is no 
need for recourse to a heteronomous system of ethics. 
Importantly, in the same essay Smith notes “the fundamental divergence of ethical 
world-view between Greek and Semitic.”188 Smith continues to state that “the epistemology 
of the one is through reasoning, of the other through revelation.”189 This statement echoes a 
nineteenth century Greco-Aryan/Semitic binary, which as noted above was expressed early 
on in Kant’s Religion and repeated in Pfleiderer, where the Greek conceptual apparatus is 
understood to be autonomous reason and morality, while conversely the Semite is 
heteronomously connected to external guidance—as Kant contends above: “the Greek 
philosophers’ moral doctrines of freedom […] shocked the slavish mind” of the Jew. 
Elsewhere, in an essay dedicated to showing how Greek “philosophia” should be 
accepted as “one of the world’s major religious traditions,”190 Smith exposits upon “reason” 
according to such a worldview. Here, he notes that “we participate in the divine insofar as 
our ideas are true – and more actively, our behavior rational.”191 As Such, “the intellect 
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serves as our integrating principle,” which is both social and individual. In terms of the 
social, “rationality is the link among persons in society, and the principle social order,” and 
in terms of the individual “to behave rationally is moral […].”192 As such, Smith notes that 
through the intellect the universe and our personal life become coherent, ordered, and 
integrated. Smith thus declares: “This is faith.”193 Although Smith’s assertion here is made 
within an exposition of Greek “philosophia,” because he states that he is trying to understand 
his subject from a comparative religious standpoint of “self-understanding,”194 there is no 
reason not to accept this explanation as one of the ways that he conceptualizes faith. 
Smith’s concession, then, that “faith” is marked by reason is significant since his 
entire theory of “religion” (or the non-existence thereof) as presented in his 1963 magnum 
opus The Meaning and End of Religion is based upon a division between individual “faith” 
and “cumulative tradition”195—or in Kantian terms between pure moral religion and 
historical faith. Thus, in The Meaning and End of Religion Smith states: 
My faith is an act that I make, myself, naked before God. Just as there is no such thing as 
Christianity (or Islam or Buddhism) […] so there is no generic Christian faith; no ‘Buddhist 
faith’, no ‘Hindu faith’, no ‘Jewish faith’. There is only my faith, and yours […]. We are all 
persons, clustered in mundane communities, no doubt, and labeled with mundane labels but, 
so far as transcendence is concerned, encountering it each directly, personally […].196 
 
                                                
192 Smith, “Philosophia,” 76 (emphasis mine). 
193 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
194 Ibid., 83. Indeed earlier in the essay, Smith connects Greek humanism with Christianity and “Western life” 
(ibid., 73). 
195 Smith defines these: “By ‘faith’ I mean personal faith […]. By ‘cumulative tradition’ I mean the entire mass 
of overt objective data that constitute the historical deposit, as it were, of the past religious life of the 
community in question: temples, scriptures, theological systems, dance patterns, legal and other social 
institutions, conventions, moral codes, myths, and so on […].” Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End 
of Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991) 156-7. 
196 Ibid. (underline mine). 
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In Kant the terms are reversed (i.e., personal religion and the historical faiths), but the 
rhetorical structure is almost identical: 
Differences in religion: an odd expression! Just as if one spoke of different moralities. No 
doubt there can be different kinds of historical faiths, though these do not pertain to religion, 
but only to the history of the means used to promote it, and these are the province of learned 
investigation; the same holds of different religious books (Zendavest, the Vedas, Koran, and 
so on). But there is only a single religion, valid for all men in all times. Those [faiths and 
books] can thus be nothing more than the accidental vehicles of religion and can only thereby 
be different in different times and places.197 
 
Kant’s statement here, that historical faiths and their scriptures “can thus be nothing more 
than the accidental vehicles of religion,” is again strikingly echoed in Smith who notes that a 
“lively faith involves a limpid sincerity of relationship to one’s fellow men, and to oneself, 
and to the Creator or ground or totality of the universe. For these things the formalities of 
one’s religious tradition are at best a channel, and at worst a substitute.”198 Asad has indeed 
noted that this statement of Smith’s “is in essence the missionary’s standpoint.” As Asad 
explains: 
The missionary cannot reform people unless they are persuaded that the formal ways they live 
their life are accidental to their being, channels for which other channels can be substituted 
without loss. And thus from one religion to another, or from living religiously to living 
secularly.199 
 
Asad may very well go too far here by suggesting that Smith is indeed concerned to convert 
others to either “one religion to another” or “to living secularly,” since Smith was clearly 
opposed to both types of “mission.” Yet taken on a more rhetorical level, Asad calls out an 
important mode in Smith of Kantian proselytization that argues that religious forms are, as 
Kant sates above, “accidental vehicles.” Such a universalist modality of “conversion”—i.e., 
                                                
197 Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 2003), 24 (underline mine). 
198 Smith, The Meaning and End, 129. 
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from exclusivist religiosity to an inclusive pluralism—was not at all foreign to Smith’s 
universalist missionary project, which as Kenneth Cracknell notes was concerned “to re-
define the role of missionary […] as that of ‘participation’ in bringing into actual reality what 
until now was been an ideal reality only, that of a world wide community […].”200 
From this utopian-humanist standpoint, Smith engages in a Kantian rhetoric of 
“conversion,” or liberal reform, that seeks to persuade his readers that the outward forms of 
religion are secondary and thus should be amended to meet the universal demands of a global 
human community. This assertion can be seen most clearly in Smith’s 1949 inaugural 
address, where he notes that in “liberal circles many are ready to admit that the present state 
of even their own religion, as historically manifested, could stand being chipped and polished 
here and there to reveal better the essential core.”201 Indeed, elsewhere Smith underscores 
that all modern reform, no matter if Western or “indigenous,” is based upon “the nature of 
liberal values themselves,” 
such as the concern for every man in his individual personality, with its own distinctive 
capacity for growth, its superlative freedom and inner responsibility, and for the rational 
consent of his mind, over against all systems and overt authority. These values, we believe, 
are in fact universal […].”202 
 
Thus, Smith’s liberal project of Kantian reform outlined in his inaugural address and 
presented as the goal of “the science of religion” is to remove (by “chipping” and 
“polishing”) the outer accretions of religion “as historically manifested”—i.e., legal 
traditions of “overt authority”—to reveal the “universal values” of Kantian autonomous 
ethics. While such a reform project is presented above in his 1949 inaugural lecture as 
                                                
200 Cracknell, introduction to Wilfred Cantwell Smith, 23. This is also exemplified in Smith’s theological call for 
Christians to relinquish exclusivism. See p. 282n205 below. 
201 Smith, “The Comparative Study,” 46 (emphasis mine). 
202 Smith, Islam in Modern History, 64 (emphasis mine). 
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something more or less restrained, i.e., simply chipping and polishing “here and there to 
reveal better the essential core,” in the closing remarks of the same address Smith puts it in 
more absolute terms. Here, Smith notes that if “modern enlightened man […] is to have any 
religion at all” it must be consonant with “his developed inner standards of truth (scientific 
and rational), beauty, and the rest, and that is of universal validity […].”203 Smith continues 
to note that “[i]n looking for the creation of not only new but better, fuller, truer 
developments of the religious traditions which we know, one must think in terms of loyalty 
only to universal ideals […].”204 Again, the Kantian recourse to universal validity in terms of 
transcendental reason is clear. For Smith, like Kant, religion should be made “better, fuller, 
truer,” not by loyalty to heteronomous tradition, but to rational and universally valid 
ideals.205 
Returning once more to Smith’s above equation between “Sunni and Sufi; the Law 
and mysticism,” it is thus clear that not only is there a binary implied between heteronomous 
blind submission (i.e., Sunni) and autonomous reason and morality (i.e., Sufi), there is also 
the analogous binary intimated between the Kantian cloak of history and the “naked” faith of 
universal reason—as Smith states above: “My faith is an act that I make, myself, naked 
before God.” Indeed, in his seminal work Islam in Modern History, Smith states: 
Sufism differs from the classical Sunni Weltanschauung radically; and not least in its attitude 
to history, the temporal mundane. It stresses the individual rather than society, the eternal 
rather than the historical, God’s love rather than His power, and the state of man’s heart 
rather than behavior. It is more concerned that one’s soul be pure than one’s actions be 
                                                
203 Smith, “The Comparative Study,” 60 (emphasis mine). 
204 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
205 In practical terms, Smith’s insistence upon the “imperative” of all Christians to relinquish the traditional 
theology of Christian exclusivism for the sake of a world community is a compelling example. See Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith, “The Exclusivist Position is Theoretically Difficult,” in Wilfred Cantwell Smith: A Reader, 
207-213. 
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correct. Some Sufis thought the Law unimportant. Most regarded it as a private discipline 
guiding the person towards transcendent fulfillment, and paid little heed to its function in 
ordering society, in marshaling history into a prescribed pattern.206 
 
While the historical and discursive inaccuracy of such a statement has already been discussed 
in chapter 1,207 here the important point is Smith’s Kantian separation of Sufism as a 
purported autonomous “authentic” modality of faith from the heteronomous modes of Sunni 
Islam, history, and law. From this Kantian view of Sufism it is thus not surprising that in the 
same work Smith (rightly) notes: that “every major Islamic reformer of the modern age 
shows deep Sufi influence.”208 Yet, he further states: 
In a world in which the extant Law as a formal system could seem a somewhat obsolescent 
method of bringing persons vividly face to face with the divine, some might argue that Sufism 
provides an inescapable factor in any refreshened version of the faith.209 
 
While this statement is clearly structured as tentative, its construction of Sufism within the 
context of reform as a modern modality of “refreshened faith” against an “obsolescent” 
“formal system” of “Law” is aligned with Smith’s more categorical contentions above and 
their Kantian autonomous model of religious reform in opposition to heteronomous tradition. 
Indeed, not only does Smith juxtapose heteronomous Semitic revelation with Greek 
autonomous reason, as noted above, he also contrasts “classical Arabic civilization” and 
Islam with Greek humanism. Thus, Smith states: 
Classical Arabic civilization adopted the rationalist tradition of Greek philosophy and science 
up to a limited point, but refused altogether the humanist tradition of Greek art and poetry; 
and that tradition never penetrated Muslim society. Again, religiously Islam repeats many of 
the basic doctrines of Christianity but not the humanist one; it rejected and still rejects with 
all the force and even horror that it can muster the affirmation that God Himself can best be 
                                                
206 Smith, Islam in Modern History, 37. 
207 Chapter 1 builds upon Carl Ernst’s and Omid Safi’s critiques of such an Orientalist view that attempts to 
dissociate Sufism from socio-political concerns and frameworks of power. See chapter 1, pp. 31, 35-36, passim. 
208 Smith, Islam in Modern History, 56. 
209 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
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known in a human embodiment. A statue of Praxiteles, which seeks the perfection of beauty 
in the human form, and a doctrine of incarnation, which portrays God there, provide 
foundations on which the West could and did build a humanist movement but which are not 
immediately available to Islam.210 
 
Smith here importantly rehearses the discursive practices of the nineteenth century European 
romance with ancient Greece. As Masuzawa notes, it was the Greek “felicitous culmination 
of the aesthetic and the rational that was believed to be the origin of virtually everything that 
was true, good, beautiful, and therefore universal.”211 Unlike the purported Indo-Persian 
origins discussed in chapter 3, in this particular metanarrative, the essence of Christianity (as 
opposed to its historical origins) “is not to be traced back to Palestine as one of the many 
Jewish messianic sects; rather, Christianity emerged from the far richer soil of the late 
Hellenic world […].”212 
Thus, like Pfleiderer’s above assertion that Islam’s “immutable character” of absolute 
voluntarism could never accept rationalism, Smith argues that Greek philosophy never took 
hold in the “Islamic world” where “theology itself was suspect.”213 Indeed, Smith remarks: 
it is interesting to speculate whether the whole spread of Islām in the Near East and its 
overthrow of Christianity may not be partially viewed as broadly a reassertion of the Semitic 
mind rejecting a religion that, being Hellenically interpreted, it could never quite 
appreciate.214 
 
Yet, for Smith, this purported “Semitic” rejection of Greek humanism somehow did 
not carry over to Sufism, which according to Smith has a tradition of humanism “from which 
                                                
210 Smith, Islam in Modern History, 303-304 (emphasis mine). 
211 Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions, 189. 
212 Ibid., 191. 
213 Smith, Islam in Modern History, 303 (emphasis mine). 
214 Ibid., 303n2. Similarly, Smith asserts regarding the Syriac Christian conversion to Islam in the middle of the 
first millennium C. E. “[O]ne is tempted to speculate,” Smith notes, “whether the Semitic-speaking group 
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a contribution to liberalism could be drawn […].”215 The reason for this was that Smith did 
not associate the highest forms of Sufism with his above category of “the Semitic mind”; 
rather, Sufism was properly an Indo-Persian tradition that shared with Greece a humanist 
tradition of art and poetry. As Smith notes, “The Arabs did not have the creativity […] to 
produce Ṣūfī poets of the Persian quality and depth […],” which may explain “the Arab 
world’s adopting Sufism less fully than the Persians, Turks, and Indians have done—in 
addition, of course, to more obvious and straightforward reasons such as the Arab’s greater 
closeness to classical Islam.” 216 Indeed, Smith therefore wonders whether the intellectual 
expression of “an Ibn al-‘Arabī can in the nature of the case be as adequate an expression of 
the truth that the mystics have grasped, as the artistic expression of a Rūmī.”217 Smith’s 
implication here—i.e., that Ibn ‘Arabi’s thought, as profound as it was, could never be “as 
adequate an expression of the truth” as Rumi because it lacked the artistic expression of the 
Persian poetic tradition (i.e., a humanist tradition like that of the ancient Greeks)—echoes 
presuppositions in the Western study of Sufism that were commonly held up through the first 
half of the twentieth century.  
Henry Corbin, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and Ibn ‘Arabi’s Persian “Conversion” 
The first line of Reynold Nicholson’s chapter on the celebrated Arab poet ʿUmar Ibn 
al-Fāriḍ (d. 1235) in his critically acclaimed Studies in Islamic Mysticism reads: “One of the 
deepest differences between Arabs and Persians shows itself in the extent and character of 
                                                
215 Smith, Islam in Modern History, 55 (emphasis mine). 
216 Ibid., 34n31 (emphasis mine). Elsewhere, in the context of the Islamic movement in India, Smith claims that 
Sufis spread Islam through “men’s hearts,” in opposition to “political power,” and as such “expressed a 
profound and universalist theistic humanism.” Wilfred Cantwell Smith, On Understanding Islam: Selected 
Studies (The Hague: Mouton, 1981), 184. 
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the mystical poetry of each people.”218 Nicholson goes on to note that while Persian poetry is 
“genuinely mystical in spirit,” Arab poetry seldom possesses “the note” of mysticism.219 
“The main reason,” for such a disparity Nicholson avers, “lies in racial endowment. The 
Arab has no such passion for an ultimate principle of unity as has always distinguished the 
Persians and Indians.”220 Thus, according to Nicholson, Ibn ‘Arabi was “a great theosophist 
rather than a poet,” although he was among the few who did excel in the stilted and 
“ambiguous style” of Arabic poetry.221 Even though Nicholson ranked Ibn al-Fāriḍ as the 
“supreme master” of this style over Ibn ‘Arabi, he still noted that the form of Ibn al-Fāriḍ’s 
poetry “as well as in the individuality of his spiritual enthusiasm displays the narrower and 
tenser genius of the Semite.”222 While it is clear Nicholson paid Ibn ‘Arabi the respect he felt 
he deserved as perhaps the foremost Arab theosophist known to history, he considered his 
metaphysics to be muddled with “mystical phantasies struggling to clothe themselves with 
forms of logic.”223 Thus, when Nicholson claims that Ibn ‘Arabi “influenced” some ideas 
expressed by Rumi in his Masnavī, this should in no way be taken as an assertion of their 
spiritual equality.224  
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 However, the relegation of Ibn ‘Arabi’s mysticism in nineteenth century racialist 
terms as ultimately inferior because Semitic, as reflected in Nicholson and Smith above, 
would shift under the discursive weight of Henry Corbin (d. 1978) and Frithjof Schuon (d. 
1998). Importantly though, this new perspective would not challenge such racial stereotypes, 
which continue to inform the discourse of reasonable Sufism today. Rather, the shift would 
occur from another and seemingly more Kantian discursive approach, i.e., through the 
“throwing off” of Ibn ‘Arabi’s Arab-Semitic history.  
In his widely influential 1958 monograph on Ibn ‘Arabi (based upon two separate 
articles published in the Eranos Yearbook in 1955 and 1956), Corbin de-Arabizes and 
reframes Ibn ‘Arabi according to Persianate terms through the construction of a “spiritual 
topography” between “Andalusia and Iran.”225 As a “pilgrim to the Orient,” Ibn ‘Arabi leaves 
behind his “earthly homeland” in the Arab (i.e., Sunni) Occident and emerges in the Persian 
(Sufi/Shīʿite) Orient as the spiritual equal of Rumi.226 In so doing, Ibn ‘Arabi “attained to the 
esoteric Truth,” and as such passed “through and beyond the darkness of the Law and of the 
exoteric religion.”227 As opposed to “the dogmatic believer,” Corbin asserts that 
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the “life of prayer” practiced in the spirit and according to the indications of Ibn ‘Arabī 
represents the authentic form of a “process of individuation” releasing the spiritual person 
from collective norms and ready-made evidences and enabling him to live as a unique 
individual for and with his Unique God.228  
 
Corbin’s “conversion” of Ibn ‘Arabi thus results in a discursive encapsulation of an 
“authentic” religious life where through the Jungian “process of individuation” the seeker 
gains autonomy by “releasing” the “collective norms” of “exoteric religion.”  
Such a depiction evokes Schuon’s own conversion of Ibn ‘Arabi through the naked 
Virgin detailed in chapter 3. Beginning roughly in 1965 and “the coming of the Holy 
Virgin,” Schuon increasingly sought to de-Semitize Ibn ‘Arabi through interpreting his 
thought according to Vedantic categories.229 Here, the garment of the Virgin is removed as a 
symbol of “the throwing off” of “the Religio formalis,” i.e., the exoteric religion.230 As in 
Corbin above, Islam as a formal (i.e., statutory, heteronomous, historical, empirical, 
collective, etc.) religion is thus presented as a veil that Ibn ‘Arabi removes or releases 
himself from. The mature result of this shift was Schuon’s appropriately entitled 1980 work 
Sufism: Veil and Quintessence (Le Soufisme: voile et quintessence), in which Schuon 
denigrates “Sufi metaphysics” as tied to “Arab or Muslim, or Semitic” voluntarism and anti-
intellectualism.231 In Sufism, Schuon routinely criticizes Ibn ‘Arabi’s metaphysics as 
representative of such a propensity—what Schuon refers to as “average Sufism,” which is 
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“above all servile in character.”232 Indeed, in his forward to the 2006 edition of Sufism, Nasr 
notes that “in his earlier days” Schuon was “primarily concerned […] with the manifestations 
of Sufism in the Arab world and with such authorities as Ibn ‘Arabi.”233 Nasr further recounts 
that after meeting Schuon in 1957 he introduced him to “Sufism in the Persian world,” which 
Schuon enthusiastically embraced since by that time he “wanted to go beyond the limiting of 
Sufism to Ibn Arabian teachings as had become common among so many of the so-called 
Guénonians.”234 Nasr thus notes that “[h]enceforth, he began to read much Persian Sufi 
poetry in translation, especially Rumi, and the fruit of this study is reflected in Sufism: Veil 
and Quintessence.”235	   
Because Schuon and Corbin hold various definitions of suprarational “gnosis” as 
epistemologically ultimate—in opposition to discursive reason—the substantive content of 
their thought does not serve as an immediate example of the discourse of reasonable Sufism 
with which I am presently concerned. Yet, the functional parallels in discursive practice 
between the Kantian historical teleology of autonomous self-legislation in opposition to 
heteronomous religious form and the Schuonian and Corbinian constructions of Ibn ‘Arabi 
are striking. As such, I will return to the implications of such parallels in the conclusion of 
this study. This being said, here it is important to note that the Corbinian (and later 
Schuonian) “conversion” of Ibn ‘Arabi is pivotal as a supporting element in the Western 
discourse of reasonable Sufism. Since the mid 1960s, the popular Perennialist discourse of 
Nasr has helped to facilitate Ibn ‘Arabi’s transformation as a “reasonable” Sufi.   
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While it should be said that Corbin did not subscribe to Perennialism and was 
apparently outspoken against the thought of René Guénon, he was professionally and 
personally associated with Nasr in Iran from the early1960s throughout the remainder of his 
life.236 Although Nasr does not classify Corbin’s thought as a “truly authentic” expression of 
Sufism, as he does Schuon’s, since his Ph.D. dissertation Nasr has copiously and approvingly 
cited Corbin’s work and has recently praised him as the first “European ‘Persian 
philosopher.’”237 Moreover, Nasr has expressed alignment with Corbin’s approach to Ibn 
‘Arabi on several occasions.238 In his chapter on Ibn ‘Arabi in his 1964 work Three Muslim 
Sages, which cites Corbin over a dozen times (and Schuon over half a dozen), Nasr seems at 
one point to counter Corbin’s above assertion that Ibn ‘Arabi’s “process of individuation” is 
a release “from collective norms” of exoteric religion. Here, Nasr claims that Ibn ‘Arabi 
sought to transcend the exoteric level by penetrating into the heart of the exoteric rites and 
practices which themselves are an integral aspect of religion and are revealed by “Heaven,” 
and to which man must conform if his quest of the spiritual life is to be really fruitful. It was 
through these formal, or exoteric, aspects of religion and not is spite of them that Ibn ‘Arabī, 
like other Sufis, sought to reach the inner and universal meaning of the Revelation.239 
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Yet, in the very next sentence Nasr dramatically shifts the emphasis of his above assertion, 
stating: 
Essentially, the “burning of images,” or the rejection of the external and formal aspects of 
religion, means that one must first possess these images and formal aspects. One cannot reject 
what one does not possess. When Muḥyī al-Dīn and other Ṣūfīs declared their independence 
of religious forms and rites, they addressed a collectivity in which the observance of religious 
practices of all kinds was taken for granted […].240 
 
Besides the apparent logical fallacy of this passage,241 Nasr here precisely follows Corbin’s 
(and similarly Schuon’s) above claim: that Ibn ‘Arabi ultimately passed “through and beyond 
the darkness of the Law and of the exoteric religion.” In other words, when Ibn ‘Arabi 
attained enlightenment, he burnt “the image” of formal Islam and shed the unnecessary garb 
of “collective norms.” As such, Nasr asserts that Ibn ‘Arabi, like other Sufis, declared an 
“independence of religious forms and rites.” What evidence does Nasr cite to prove such an 
assertion? His only reference is by now familiar: Ibn ‘Arabi’s famous verses from the 
Tarjumān al-ashwāq that claim a heart “capable of every form” and “the religion of 
Love.”242 In a later essay, as cited in chapter 2, Nasr would refer to these same Tarjumān 
verses with an identical Corbinian assertion: “The Sufi is one who seeks to transcend the 
world of forms, to journey from multiplicity to Unity, from the particular to the Universal. 
[…] For him all forms become transparent, including religious forms […].”243  
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Returning to Three Muslim Sages, Nasr follows his above claim—that Ibn ‘Arabi 
declared independence “of religious forms and rites”—by explaining that “it was by means 
of these practices and not in spite of them that he came to realize that the divinely revealed 
paths lead to the same summit and that to have lived one religion fully is to have lived them 
all.”244 Indeed, it was only seven years before that Schuon had written: “to practice one 
religion is implicitly to practice them all.”245 By echoing the Corbinian and Schuonian 
disavowal of religious form, Nasr thus liberates Ibn ‘Arabi from his Arab “homeland” into 
the illumination of the Orient where he could finally attain to, in the words of Nicholson 
above, a “passion for an ultimate principle of unity,” which “has always distinguished the 
Persians and Indians.” Thus, in Three Muslim Sages—his first Harvard University Press 
publication—Nasr sounds a clarion call that would prove emblematic of the discourse of 
reasonable Sufism itself: “All attempts at a profound rapprochement with the other religions 
made by Muslims today can and should be based on the rich foundations prepared by Ibn 
‘Arabī and Rūmī.”246  
While I have already explored the Perennialist response to such a call in chapter 2, in 
what remains I look at how echoes of Nasr’s appeal continue to reverberate within a 
discursive path anticipated above by W. C. Smith in his 1949 inaugural lecture at McGill and 
throughout his academic career. If “modern enlightened man […] is to have any religion at 
all,” Smith had asserted, it needs to conform to a rational standard of truth “that is of 
universal validity.” It was in the likeness of such a universal Kantian ideal—imagined as a 
                                                
244 Nasr, Three Muslim Sages, 118. 
245 Frithjof Schuon, Gnosis: Divine Wisdom, ed. James S. Cutsinger, trans. Mark Perry, Jean-Pierre Lafouge, 
and James Cutsinger (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006), 20. Originally published as Sentiers de Gnose (La 
Colombe, 1957). 
246 Nasr, Three Muslim Sages, 117 (emphasis mine). 
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mode of Greco-Christian humanism—that Smith conceived of Sufism. The post-9/11 
environment would prove an ideal matrix for the discursive appropriation of such reasonable 
Sufism as a perfect foil to Western civilizational superiority. 
Bernard Lewis, Sufism, and the Kantian Religiosity of “Judeo-Christian” Civilization 
When Bernard Lewis invoked Ibn ‘Arabi and Rumi at a conference hosted by the 
International Security Program of the Nixon Center in Washington, D.C. on October 24, 
2003, much had changed geopolitically since the end of the Cold War.247 Only half a year 
prior, the US had invaded Iraq as the latest phase in a massive global military offensive post-
9/11 (i.e., “the Global War on Terror”), which by then extended from America into Africa, 
Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.248 In 2004, the proceedings of the Nixon Center 
conference were published in the tellingly entitled report “Understanding Sufism and its 
Potential Role in US Policy.”249  
                                                
247 The Nixon Center is a Washington-based public policy think tank that was established by former President 
Richard Nixon in 1994 as the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom. It was renamed the Center for the National 
Interest in 2011. See “The Nixon Center; Nixon Center Becomes Center for the National Interest,” Politics & 
Government Business March 24, 2011, 68. As John Trumpbour notes, the Nixon Center famously sponsored a 
seminar on “Megaterrorism” in 1996, and it now “regularly identifies resurgent Islam as one of grave danger to 
global stability.” John Trumpbour, “The Clash of Civilizations: Samuel P. Huntington, Bernard Lewis, and the 
Remaking of Post–Cold War World Order in The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy, ed. Emran 
Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (New York : Columbia University Press, 2003), 94 
248 The precipitous collapse of the World Trade Center buildings on September 11, 2001 was matched by an 
equally precipitous instigation of “the Global War on Terror” announced by then President George W. Bush on 
September 20, 2001. By the time the US preemptively invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003, there were multiple US 
theater-level military operations deployed throughout the world including those in Afghanistan, the 
Mediterranean, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and Georgia. See Gregory W. Morgan, “Global War on 
Terror,” and James C. Bradford, “Enduring Freedom, Operation, Coalition Navel Forces,” in The Encyclopedia 
of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts, vol. 2, ed. Spencer 
C. Tucker (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 487, 415-16. 
249 The report begins by stating that the Nixon Center is “[c]ommitted to the analysis of policy challenges to the 
United States through the prism of the American national interest [. . .].” Zeyno Baran ed., “Understanding 
Sufism and its Potential Role in US Policy,” Nixon Center Conference Report (Washington, D.C.: The Nixon 
Center, 2004). 
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The 2003 Nixon Center conference on Sufism and US policy was notable for the 
nexus of diverse institutions and voices present, including a group of religious studies 
scholars from several American universities,250 members of a prominent American Sufi 
order,251 policy experts,252 and unnamed “representatives from various US government 
agencies.”253 As the report notes, the “highlight of the conference” is a full transcript of 
Lewis’s keynote discussion. Lewis, who is Professor Emeritus of Near Eastern Studies at 
Princeton University, is introduced in the report as a “renowned author” who has “advised 
                                                
250 In addition to Bernard Lewis (discussed below), the religious studies scholars are listed as Dr. Timothy J. 
Gianotti, Department of Religious Studies, University of Oregon; Dr. Zeki Saritoprak, Department of Religious 
Studies, John Carroll University; Dr. Alan Godlas, Department of Religion, University of Georgia; and Dr. 
Mohammad Faghfoory, Department of Religion, George Washington University. See Baran, “Understanding 
Sufism,” 1-5, 7-13. 
251 I.e. Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, the leader of the Naqshbandi Haqqani Sufi Order, and Dr. Hedieh 
Mirahmadi, then executive director of its non-profit organization connected to the order, i.e., the Islamic 
Supreme Council of America (ISCA). It should be noted here that both Mirahmadi and the editor of the Nixon 
Center Report, Zeyno Baran, are contributing members of the hawkish American foreign policy interest group, 
the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), whose mission is “to educate free people about the threat that 
militant Islamism poses to the United States and the free world […].” The introduction to the Nixon Center 
report states that “Shaykh Kabbani […] was the first Muslim leader to warn the United States about the 
imminent threat posed by Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda terrorist network […]. Shaykh Kabbani is a 
tireless promoter of moderate, traditional Islam and a staunch opponent of radical Islamism.” This refers to 
Kabbani’s oft-mentioned remarks in front of a US State Department Forum entitled “the Evolution of 
Extremism” held on January 7, 1999 where he warned of an imminent nuclear threat from an army of suicide 
bombers funded by bin Laden and armed with miniaturized nuclear warheads. He also famously asserted that 
80% of American mosques, and the majority of US Muslim non-profit humanitarian aid organizations, had been 
taken over by extremist ideology and that such ideology “has been spread to 80% of the Muslim population 
[…].” Since 1999, Kabanni’s remarks have played a role in anti-Muslim political agendas—most prominently 
in New York Representative, and former Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security, Peter King’s 
heavily politicized campaign against American Muslim “radicalization,” which has resulted in five separate 
congressional hearings. In 2011, in the run up before the first of these hearings, King directly cited Kabbani’s 
1999 testimony, claiming that “over 80 percent of the mosques in this country are controlled by radical imams.” 
See Glenn Kessler, “Peter King’s claim about radical Muslim imams: Is it true?” The Washington Post (March, 
10, 2011) www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/king-unsure-if-claim-that-80-percent-of-us-
mosques-run-by-radical-imans-is-correct/2011/03/09/ABfpMzP_blog.html. An original transcript of Kabbani’s 
1999 remarks can be found on the ISCA website. See “Islamic Extremism: A Viable Threat to U.S. National 
Security” www.islamicsupremecouncil.org/media-center/domestic-extremism/63-islamic-extremism-a-viable-
threat-to-us-national-security.html. For the CPD’s mission statement quoted above see 
www.committeeonthepresentdanger.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50&Itemid=54. 
252 Listed as Dr. Charles Fairbanks, Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University 
and Alex Alexiev, Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Policy. Baran, “Understanding Sufism,” 7. 
253 Baran, “Understanding Sufism,” 23. 
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policymakers at all levels of the US government on ways to constructively engage 
Muslims.”254  
In his introductory talk, Lewis sets out to synthesize the preceding discussions on 
Sufism in terms of “foreign policy, national security and international relations.”255 After 
discussing a perceived historical difference between a European Christian interest in Islamic 
scholarship and the relative lack of the inverse, along with an explanation of the powerful 
influence of Wahhabism,256 Lewis turns his attention to Sufism, and states: “There are poems 
by Rumi, by Ibn Arabi in Persian and Turkish which indicate that all the religions are 
basically the same […].”257 In accord with the nineteenth century Orientalist preoccupation 
with Sufi poetry discussed above, Lewis highlights “poems” here as a distinguishing mark of 
Rumi’s and Ibn ‘Arabi’s universalism. While, Persian is of course correctly associated with 
Rumi, Lewis significantly frames Ibn ‘Arabi’s poetry as seemingly written in Turkish and not 
in its original Arabic. Here again, Ibn ‘Arabi is “converted” from an Arab Semite to the 
almost European, i.e., Turk. 
                                                
254 Cliff Kupchan, introduction to “Understanding Sufism,” i (emphasis mine). Not only has Lewis earned high 
praise in academia—the Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing calling him “the most influential” 
and eminent scholar in the “liberal tradition in Islamic historical studies”—but after 9/11 Lewis became one of 
the US government’s foremost advisors on foreign policy and the “war on terror.” See Nicholas Lemann, “The 
Next World Order: The Bush Administration may have a brand-new doctrine of power,” The New Yorker April 
1, 2002. See also Trumpbour, “The Clash of Civilizations,” 92; and Mamdani, Good Muslim, 20. See also See 
Martin Kramer, “Lewis, Bernard,” in Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing, vol. 1 (London: 
Fitzroy Dearborn, 1999), 719. 
255 These included socio-political history, religious doctrines, and the intersection between Western modernity 
and the rise of fundamentalism, i.e., “Wahhabism,” (esp. in Eurasia). Baran, “Understanding Sufism,” 16. 
256 This, according to Lewis, was “due to a confluence of circumstances” including the conversion of the house 
of Saud to Wahhabism, the establishment of the Saudi Kingdom, and the discovery of oil. Bernard Lewis, 
“Keynote Lunch Discussion,” in Baran, “Understanding Sufism,” 17-18. 
257 Ibid., 18 (emphasis mine). 
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Lewis thus notes that such a distinct Sufi doctrine of religious universality “is a 
profoundly important contribution” to current and future prospects of intercommunity 
relations. Lewis then goes on to explain the difference between Sufism and “standard” Islam 
by recourse to the Ten Commandments. He states: 
If you look at the Ten Commandments you will see that most of them are concerned with the 
relationship between human beings. Only a small minority of commandments are concerned 
with relations between human beings and God. Most of them are what you should not do to 
your fellow human beings. In standard Islamic texts, it is the other way around: it is mostly 
concerned with relations with God rather than relations with other human beings. Sufism 
again brings significant change in this respect. It is also highly concerned with one’s actions 
towards other people, not just how you behave towards God.258 
 
Here, it is important to pause and note that although the Jewish and Christian 
traditions have historically differed over the exact enumeration of the Decalogue, the first 
three (or four) commandments dealing with Divine-human relations not only preceded those 
addressing interhuman ones, but were assumed to necessarily have religious primacy.259 
Thus, while Lewis’s assertion that the Decalogue is primarily concerned with interhuman 
over Divine-human relations because there are numerically more interhuman commandments 
is ostensibly logical, in Kantian fashion it inverts traditional Jewish and Christian 
interpretations that give primacy to the Divine-human commandments even though they are 
less in number. Indeed, it was only under the influence of Kant’s subjective turn that Jewish 
and Christian scholars endeavored to interpret their ethical traditions “in a doctrine of man 
                                                
258 Lewis, “Keynote Lunch Discussion,” 18 (emphasis mine). 
259 Since antiquity there has been a variety of opinions regarding the exact content and enumeration of the 
Commandments. Rabbinic tradition considers the first commandment to be Ex 20:2, Dt. 5:6, while most 
Christian groups view it as a “prologue.” There is a further difference of opinion between the Jewish tradition 
and various Christian groups as to how the remainder of the commandments are divided. Some, along with the 
Rabbinic tradition, only count the first three as governing Divine-human relations, while others count four. See 
S. M. Polan et al., “Commandments, Ten,” New Catholic Encyclopedia, 2nd ed., vol. 4. (Detroit: Gale, 2003), 7. 
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and only secondarily a doctrine of God.”260 As Nancy Levene notes, “the imitation of God 
that, according to the Jewish and Christian Bibles, was to constitute the highest human end” 
was ruled out by Kant who “bequeathed the notion that a true ethics is one that is 
independent of any modifier […]. In his model, it is the moral human being I am to imitate in 
my conduct […].”261 
Yet, part of the rhetorical skill of Lewis’s above assertion is that he neither refers to 
Judaism nor to Christianity, but only a particular interpretation of the Decalogue against 
“standard Islamic texts.” In so doing, Lewis invokes the problematic post-World War II 
category of a “Judeo-Christian” heritage against a homogenized Islamic textual tradition.262 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, in his famous 1990 article “The Roots of 
Muslim Rage” Lewis openly sets Islam’s irrational “religious culture” against the “heritage” 
of “Judeo-Christian” civilization. As such, Lewis’s above comparison of the Decalogue to 
“standard Islamic texts” is strongly misleading, since instead of comparing Judaism and 
Christianity to Islam, it compares Kantian autonomous morality (as post-World War II 
“Judeo-Christian” civilizational heritage) against Islam as a premodern (and pre-civilized) 
                                                
260 Vigen Guroian, “Differentiation in Christian Ethics,” in The Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics, ed. 
William Schweiker (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 216, 219. Although the Ten Commandments do not 
appear in the Gospels in their entirety, in both Mark and Matthew Jesus identifies love of God and love of 
neighbor as the summation of the law and the prophets (Mk 12: 28-31 and Mt 22: 33-40). Yet, in both passages, 
love of God is given priority, and in Matthew Jesus calls the first “the greatest” commandment. S. M. Polan et 
al., “Commandments, Ten,” 7-8. 
261 Nancy Levene, “From Law to Ethics . . . and Back,” in The Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics, ed. 
William Schweiker (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 191-2 (emphasis mine). See also Shaul Magid, 
“Ethics Differentiated from the Law,” Ibid., 176-77. 
262 As Carl Ernst notes, the vague category of “Judeo-Christian” overlooks the theological differences between 
each religious tradition “as well as the history of anti-Semitism (including the Holocaust).” Moreover, as Emran 
Qureshi and Michael Sells note, “Jews have contributed at least as much to the civilizations ruled by Islam as 
they have to those ruled by Christianity.” See Carl W. Ernst, Following Muhammad: Rethinking Islam in the 
Contemporary World (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 119; and Emran Qureshi and 
Michael A. Sells, “Introduction: Constructing the Muslim Enemy,” in The New Crusades: Constructing the 
Muslim Enemy, ed. Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 6. 
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heteronomous religion. Thus, in the very same way that Kant argues in The Conflict of the 
Faculties, as quoted above, that “the faith in question cannot be faith that we can obtain 
God’s favor or pardon by anything other than a pure moral attitude of will,” Lewis here 
argues that the Muslim focus on God is the problem. Similar to Kant’s argument against the 
Jews, Lewis thus implies that unless Muslims turn away from their heteronomous tradition of 
worship and obedience (i.e., “standard Islamic texts”) and instead focus on an assumed lack 
of human ethics, they will not be able to enter the civilized world. As Mack notes, it was 
precisely such Kantian discourse that essentialized “the Jewish as the ‘heteronomous’” and 
thus and set the stage for the nineteenth century German stigmatization of Jews as non-
modern and thus politically corruptive.263 Thus, in the same way that “Kant grounded the 
immutability of the Jews in their religion,”264 Lewis grounds a similar immutability of 
Muslims in Islam.  
Yet Sufism, for Lewis, “brings significant change in this respect.” Like the teachings 
of the Ten Commandments, Sufism is “highly concerned with one’s actions towards other 
people […].” Thus, Sufism is for Lewis most concerned with interpersonal morality, rather 
than obedience to God, and as such is more like the secular-liberal modernity of “Judeo-
Christian” civilization. Indeed, this Kantian construction of Sufism is fleshed out elsewhere 
in the Nixon Center report. In a panel on Sufi history and theology, it is reported that 
throughout Islamic history “[s]cholars of Islamic law demanded that Sufis follow shariah, 
                                                
263 Mack, German Idealism, 39. 
264 Ibid., 40 (emphasis original). 
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but many Sufis saw the code as nonessential, choosing instead to use the rational capabilities 
which they believed the Quran advocated.”265 The report continues, noting: 
Sufis believe that the scripture encourages Muslims to think and to use their reason to 
understand the meaning of creation. Some Muslim intellectuals, however, followed the way 
of reason as recommended by the scripture. Therefore, an Islamic judiciary system and much 
of Islamic thought came into being as a result of these scholarly efforts. Today, this tension 
continues in an extreme way as a struggle between Wahabism [sic] and Sufism.266 
 
This single passage is a strikingly concise and comprehensive example of the discourse of 
reasonable Sufism that I have attempted to adumbrate throughout this chapter. Here, rather 
than relying on their revealed law and scripture (i.e., Lewis’s “standard Islamic texts”), Sufis 
rely on autonomous reason to understand reality. Yet, other “Muslim intellectuals” 
historically followed a heteronomous form of reason based upon the prescriptions of 
scripture. It was through such a heteronomous system of logic that Islamic law and science 
came into existence. These normative, historical modalities of Islam finally resulted in an 
internal “clash of civilizations,” i.e., a struggle between fanatical Islam (i.e., Wahhabism) and 
Sufism. In other words, as a result of the application of a Kantian metaphysics of 
autonomous reason, Sufis “threw off” the historical accretions of their “ancient cult” and 
attained to a pure rational religion, while the rest of the Muslims clung to the forms and 
prescriptions of their historical tradition and thus became increasingly violent and fanatical.  
Besides this clear rehearsal of the Kantian teleology of pure rational religion, this 
passage also exemplifies a Kantian understanding of hermeneutics, which is implied in 
Lewis’s passage above. Here, the Sufis—as representative of a Kantian autonomous 
subjectivity—are not simply juxtaposed with heteronomous religious subjects (i.e., Muslim 
                                                
265 Attributed to Dr. Zeki Saritoprak, John Carroll University, “Understanding Sufism,” 4. 
266 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
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intellectuals/jurists/Wahhabis), but they are endowed with a particular hermeneutic of 
reading scripture based upon pure autonomous reason. Just as Kant asserts that all meaning 
originates from the subject and not the object, he similarly denies scripture any controlling 
function in determining scriptural meaning.267 Within a section in Religion entitled “Church 
Faith Has Pure Religious Faith as Its Highest Interpreter,” Kant importantly asserts that “the 
predisposition to moral religion lay hidden in human reason […].”268 Thus, although the 
“first crude manifestations” of historical revelations “aimed merely at their use in the service 
of God […],” there can be in “these inventions” something of the pure moral religion.269 
Nevertheless, all such “alleged revelations” must be interpreted “to yield a meaning that 
harmonizes with the universal practical rules of a pure rational religion.”270 Thus, Kant 
states: 
To ourselves this interpretation, in view of the text (of the revelation), may often seem forced, 
and may often actually be forced; and yet this interpretation must […] be preferred to a literal 
interpretation that either contains within itself absolutely nothing for morality, or perhaps 
even acts counter to morality’s incentives.271 
 
Such a hermeneutic is simply a consequence of the Kantian Copernican turn to the subject. In 
other words, Kant’s program of universal religious reform asserts that instead of expounding 
reason and morality according to scripture, one should expound scripture according to 
                                                
267 This marks a break with the hermeneutics of Spinoza, who allowed the text to remain the primary source of 
truth, but only in an entirely different modality than was customarily accepted as authentic. As Yovel notes, for 
Spinoza “[t]he actual content of the Bible is not to be determined by an a priori idea (theological or 
philosophical) to which the meaning of the text is then adjusted. Rather, the basis for research is the document 
itself, from whence one can proceed to discover a general pattern.” This empirical approach to hermeneutics is a 
nascent form of modern textual criticism, but geared to discover the true meaning inherent in the text. Kant 
however, does not share Spinoza’s faith in nature or that of scriptural meaning. See Yovel, Spinoza, 17. 
268 Kant, Religion, 123. 
269 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
270 Ibid., 120 (emphasis mine).  
271 Kant, Religion, 120-21. 
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universal principles of reason.272 The discourse of the Nixon Center report frames Sufism 
precisely within such a Kantian autonomous hermeneutical practice—i.e., the Sufis “use their 
reason to understand the meaning of creation,” while the remaining Muslims (who are by 
default extremists) follow “the way of reason as recommended by the scripture.” As Lewis 
implies above, the Kantian hermeneutical tradition is in fact part of the heritage of “Judeo-
Christian” humanism, which reads the Ten Commandments according to the universal 
principles of autonomous morality rather than an implied “fanatical” adherence to the 
“standard Islamic” textual focus on an external God. 
Educating the Muslim Subject: Sufism, Ibn ‘Arabi, and the “Occidental” Face of God 
 During the same year that the Nixon Center conference on Sufism was held, another 
global policy think tank conceptualized a similar discourse of reasonable Sufism. As 
mentioned in the introduction above, the RAND Corporation issued three reports after 9/11 
attempting to explain the internal struggle within Islam and encourage “greater democracy, 
modernity, and compatibility with the contemporary international world order.”273 The first 
2003 report, Civil and Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, Strategies, begins by noting 
that “[t]he Islamic world is involved in a struggle to determine its own nature and values 
[…],” and the US must “identify appropriate partners and set realistic goals and means to 
encourage its evolution in a positive way.”274 “It is no easy matter to transform a major 
world religion,” the report concedes: “If ‘nation-building’ is a daunting task, ‘religion-
                                                
272 In response to the assertion that “we ought to have no holier morality than the Bible,” Kant rhetorical asks 
“whether morality must be construed in accordance with the Bible or, rather, the Bible in accordance with 
morality”? For Kant, the clear answer is the latter. See Kant, Religion, 121n167. 
273 Benard, Civil and Democratic Islam, x. 
274 Ibid., iii (emphasis mine). 
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building’ is immeasurably more perilous and complex.”275 RAND thus identifies “Sufi 
Islam” as one such “appropriate partner” to help in the “positive” (re)building of Islam. 
 The 2003 RAND report stakes out its place in the discursive genealogy of reasonable 
Sufism by portraying “the Sufi” as a Kantian homo modernus in line with the modern 
religion of conscience. As an “open, intellectual interpretation of Islam,” Sufism is thus 
placed within the category of “modernism” (as opposed to traditionalism, fundamentalism, 
and secularism).276 Of all such categories, the report claims that modernism “is most 
congenial to the values and the spirit of modern democratic society.”277 The RAND report 
continues to describe modernism in Kantian teleological terms as including “the necessity to 
depart from, modify, and selectively ignore elements of the original religious doctrine.”278 To 
reinforce this framework, the report then expresses the “modern” hermeneutical position that 
Muslims should emulate. Instead of insisting (absurdly) that people live according to the 
“manner of the Biblical patriarchs […,]” the report relates that “we allow our vision of 
Judaism’s or Christianity’s true message to dominate over the literal text, which we regard 
as history and legend.”279 Like the Nixon Center report, this communal assertion of a “Judeo-
Christian” interpretive tradition precisely expresses the Kantian hermeneutical method, 
which as discussed above claims that all scripture is simply the “crude” historical 
manifestation of the human moral predisposition and thus must be interpreted “to yield a 
meaning that harmonizes with the universal practical rules of a pure rational religion.”  
                                                
275 Benard, Civil and Democratic Islam, 3 (emphasis mine). 
276 Ibid., 46. 
277 Ibid., 37. 
278 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
279 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
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 One of RAND’s recommendations to help instill such a modern hermeneutic is to  
“strongly” encourage “Sufi influence over school curricula, norms, and cultural life […].”280 
As if in response to this prescription, an essay entitled “Imaginal Transformation and 
Schooling” was published in a 2008 scholarly volume dedicated to the mythopoetic 
hermeneutical tradition in curriculum studies. Here, James Bradbeer deploys a Corbinian 
inspired reading of Ibn ‘Arabi to “illuminate” his and his colleague’s teaching practice at an 
Islamic secondary school in Melbourne, Australia.281 Bradbeer believes that Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
conception of “God authentically experienced” in opposition to the God created in the formal 
religions can serve as an appropriate Islamic model for “mythopoesis and mythopoetic 
transformation” in the modern classroom.282 Here, Bradbeer juxtaposes the idea of an 
“authentic” God who resides in the heart with Corbin’s reading of Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse on 
belief, i.e., what Corbin calls “the God created in the faiths.”283 As I argue in chapter 1, what 
Corbin and others interpret as “faiths” or “religions” here is an anachronistic translation of 
“beliefs” (iʿtiqādāt).284 In such interpretations, Ibn ‘Arabi’s intra-religious critique on the 
                                                
280 Ibid., 46 (emphasis mine). 
281 Although Abdul Ghafoor Abdul Raheem is generously listed as the essay’s second author, Bradbeer writes in 
the first person and simply refers to Abdul Raheem’s ideas and quotes his statements. Throughout the chapter, 
rather than a second author, Abdul Raheem is presented as Bradbeer’s intellectual interlocutor and confidant. 
James Bradbeer and Abdul Ghafoor Abdul Raheem, “Imaginal Transformation and Schooling,” in Pedagogies 
of the Imagination: Mythopoetic Curriculum in Educational Practice, ed. Timothy Leonard and Peter Willis 
(New York: Springer, 2008), 148. Bradbeer is the author of the “mythopoetic” exploration of curriculum, 
Imagining Curriculum, in which he mentions his debt to Corbin’s work on Ibn ‘Arabi and Corbin’s claim that 
imagination “provides a secure foundation for the radical autonomy of the individual […].” See James 
Bradbeer, Imagining Curriculum: Practical Intelligence in Teaching (New York: Teachers College Press, 
1998), 55. 
282 Bradbeer, “Imaginal Transformation,” 141, 149.  
283 This is Corbin’s translation of al-ḥaqq al-makhlūq fī al-iʿtiqādāt or “the Real created in the beliefs,” which is 
analogous to “the divinity of beliefs” (al-ilāh al-muʿtaqad). Bradbeer, “Imaginal Transformation,” 141. 
284 See chapter 1, pp. 42-48; and 42n68. 
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rational limitation of the divine in Islamic theological speculation easily slides into a modern 
universalist position against religious exclusivity and exoteric religion.285  
Yet, in the discourse of reasonable Sufism, Ibn ‘Arabi’s idea of the divine created in 
“the beliefs” is taken one step further to argue for autonomous reason against irrational 
religious beliefs, such as “God” itself. Thus, Bradbeer notes that in the “realm of imaginal 
realities” of Ibn ‘Arabi “‘God’ was meaningful because it designated those elaborations of 
mind in which humanity—even ‘ordinary’ humanity—discovers what humanity is for 
itself.”286 Here Bradbeer echoes Kant, whose “central reflections on God,” as Palmquist 
notes, “ends up being channeled into anthropology, in an effort to help human beings 
understand who we are and how our lives should be lived in a religiously authentic way.”287	  
Thus, according to Bradbeer, the person who worships the “God created in the faiths” 
remains veiled to the true God in themselves.288  
As Bradbeer notes, “faith seems often to entail a suspension of rationality, a setting 
aside of one’s powers, and a damn-it-all commitment to strange stuff.”289 Here, Bradbeer 
offers a concise Kantian conception of historical religion as irrational, heteronomous, and 
based upon untrue myth. Bradbeer therefore implies that the commitment of his Australian 
Muslim students to such heteronomous tradition keeps them from experiencing their 
“authentic” selves: “There is an impulse in religious organizations,” Bradbeer notes, “that 
                                                
285 E.g., see Corbin, Alone with the Alone, 118. 
286 Bradbeer, “Imaginal Transformation,” 152. 
287 Stephen Palmquist, introduction to Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, xvi (underline mine). 
288 Bradbeer, “Imaginal Transformation,” 141. 
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runs counter to anyone ever becoming capable of anything as oneself.”290 Indeed, according 
to Bradbeer, “religious belief itself, so sacrosanct a conception in modern religiosity, may 
indeed not be the same thing as making oneself capable of God.”291 Thus, Bradbeer notes 
that the normative Islamic belief in a transcendent God has made it a heresy for Muslims “to 
explicate him.” Echoing Pfleiderer and Smith above, Bradbeer thus asserts that “Islam has, 
therefore, always frowned upon theology.”292 “The fact of the matter,” Bradbeer strikingly 
states, “is that Islam had a problem with Allah, and still has.”293 	  
Thus, after describing a recent school talk given by a local imam that “might have 
been delivered whole and entire in AD 1200” and “which the students attended with flat 
docility […],” Bradbeer contemplates what he views as an incongruity between the young 
“journeying” minds of his Western Muslim students and their servile attendance at the 
imam’s premodern address.294 As a discursive aid, Bradbeer offers a textbook Orientalist 
chart inspired by Joseph Campbell that compares “the eastern psyche […] with the 
western.”295 While the “orient” is said to represent “Tradition” and “Faithful obedience,” the 
“occident” conversely symbolizes “Revolution” and “Intelligent striving.”296  
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Situating Ibn ‘Arabi’s account of a hadith asserting God’s presence in the heart of the 
believer as “God authentically experienced,” Bradbeer thus concludes that the hearts of his 
Australian Muslim students “contain the spiritual adventure of the occident.” As such, 
Bradbeer exclaims that “their Lord, the one to be found there in the temple of the heart, the 
spiritual Kaaba, is occidental, too.”297 With no little irony, Bradbeer thus returns Ibn ‘Arabi 
from his Corbinian Oriental pilgrimage to his “earthly homeland” in the Occident, only to 
further de-Semitize him in European terms—what Deleuze and Guattari identify as 
Eurohegemonic “facialization,” i.e., the projection of “the White-Man face” on the non-
European Other.298  
Towards the end of his essay Bradbeer thus depicts Ibn ‘Arabi as precisely 
representing the modern religion of conscience: “Ibn ‘Arabi developed to its logical end 
point this idea of seeing God in the mirror of one’s own soul: the God to be found on the 
imaginal plane is, one might say, oneself.”299 Thus, when Bradbeer finally asserts that “Ibn 
‘Arabi’s conception declares the curriculum,”300 he is (whether consciously or not) asserting 
a Kantian rhetoric of conversion geared to help his Muslim students throw off their historical 
(i.e., “oriental”/ Semitic) accretions of heteronomous “Tradition” and “Faithful obedience” 
and find within their “authentic” (i.e., “occidental”) selves “Revolution” and “Intelligent 
striving” (i.e. Western reform and reason). 
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Jeffrey Kripal, Ibn ‘Arabi, and Kantian Reform as “Mystical Denial of Difference” 
Around the same time of the publication of Bradbeer’s above essay, the University of 
Chicago Press published The Serpent’s Gift: Gnostic Reflections on the Study of Religion by 
the well-known comparativist and Indologist Jeffrey Kripal. Like Bradbeer’s “mythopoetic” 
essay on Ibn ‘Arabi and education, Kripal similarly invokes “the ethical, the mystical, and 
the mythical” in an attempt to engage the thought of premodern mystics, like that of Ibn 
‘Arabi, within postmodern frameworks of deconstruction.301 While similar to the above 
discursive projects of liberal reform, The Serpent’s Gift is notable for its self-conscious 
adoption of a Kantian humanist approach geared towards influencing global religious 
evolution. Like Graham who almost two centuries before beheld his own image as a 
European “free-thinker” in the mirror of Sufism, Kripal sees himself as a “(post)modern 
gnostic intellectual” reflected in the “contemporary mystical practice” of the deconstructive 
mysticism he elaborately constructs.302 
At the start of his book, Kripal notes that he wants “to recover […] some of the 
mystical depths of our modern Enlightenment and its attending humanism.”303 Kripal situates 
this so-called recovery within what he calls a “Gnostic (Post)Modernity.” According to 
Kripal, postmodernism itself “can be read as an extension or development of Kantian 
modernity” in that “what we call truth is really a function of the power and the perspective of 
the knower and not an accurate reflection of some ‘objective’ external reality independent of 
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the human observer […].”304 It is from within this Kantian postmodernism that Kripal 
engages what he calls “a kind of secularized or rationalized mysticism, that is, […] a kind of 
logos mystikos, or gnostic rationalism.”305 
 Although Kripal asserts that the “critical study of religion” is based upon a “highly 
developed secular sense,” he suggests that the discipline of religious studies itself can be 
regarded “as a modern mystical tradition”: 
[T]he modern study of religion displays numerous qualities or dimensions that can be 
classified as a kind of modern or postmodern “mysticism” […]. Put most simply, then, 
“mysticism” and the modern study of religion are inseparable because they are largely about 
the same set of modernist and now postmodernist convictions, forms of self-reflexivity, and 
theoretical approaches to religious plurality.306 
 
In a move reminiscent of W. C. Smith’s above humanistic embrace of the “science of 
religion” to help world religions reveal their “essential core,” Kripal describes this “critical-
mystical” tradition of religious studies as a “hermeneutical practice that works in the here and 
now to ‘melt down’ the dualisms of orthodoxy established to delay salvation, liberation, or 
enlightenment interminably.”307 Thus, for Kripal “the critical study of religion is to religion 
as mystical deconstruction is to orthodox creed, ritual, or law.”308  
In Kripal’s postmodern “mystical” practice of religious studies, the “masters of 
suspicion” of modern philosophy are invoked “as heroic figures whose ideas are as 
necessary to mature religious faith as the disillusionments of childhood are to growing 
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up.”309 Once again we are confronted with the Kantian teleological metaphor of religious 
evolution and the growth of rational religion out of its immature childhood. Indeed, in a 
similar move to Bradbeer’s Kantian call for an “authentic” expression of the rational self in 
opposition to “the God created in the faiths,” Kripal states: 
Put mystically, the reductionistic methods of religious studies often function as apophatic 
techniques to deconstruct a fraudulent demiurge posing as God. They thus free us for more 
genuine, more mature, and less dangerous forms of spirituality. They tell us what “God” is 
not and how human, all too human, so many of our religious ideas truly are.310 
 
Again, a Kantian teleological narrative of reform is clear: the formal religions and their 
purported ideas of “God” are untrue; in their place, a rational understanding of “religion” can 
provide a “more genuine,” “mature,” and “less dangerous” spirituality. Here, the Kantian 
hermeneutical understanding is proffered that “our religious ideas” are historical fictions that 
we have created. Thus, Kripal cites the Protestant theologian Paul Tillich’s (d. 1965) 
insistence “on the radical rationality of mystical writers,” and thus quotes Tillich’s 
interpretation of “the category of mysticism as ‘God fighting religion within religion’”—i.e., 
a Kantian pure rational religion fighting historical faith.311 
 According to Kripal, “such a mystical-critical rereading” of religious studies can be 
useful for “the cross-cultural influence of religious systems toward a safer, more humane, 
and more religiously satisfying world.”312 Kripal further defines this mode of religious 
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reform, which he claims is the “unacknowledged normative aim” of scholars of comparative 
religion, as “a kind of esoteric universal humanism.”313 “In this gnostic light,” it is possible  
to draw on the symbolic and ritual resources of a tradition without being slavishly bound to it 
[…], to imaginatively internalize and unite the depths of other religious traditions in one’s 
own mystical body and its erotic energies. This is something similar to what Ibn al-‘Arabi 
wrote toward in fourteenth-century [sic] Andalusia […].314 
 
Here, Ibn ‘Arabi represents the Kantian transcendence of historical faith, upon which the 
heteronomous Other is “slavishly bound.” Following the Corbinian inspired French literary 
critic Abdelwahab Meddeb, Kripal states that Ibn ‘Arabi internalized all forms of belief 
without reducing or discarding them 
in order to deconstruct the archaisms, criminal monstrosities, and gross contradictions of 
Islamic fundamentalism, a move that only furthers the point being made here, namely, that 
one of our best hopes for cross-cultural influence lies through our religions’ mystical 
traditions and their radical hermeneutical practices and pluralistic sensibilities.315 
 
Here, Ibn ‘Arabi is invoked precisely as the representative of Kripal’s “gnostic rationalism” 
and as a vehicle of so-called “cross-cultural influence” through “radical hermeneutical 
practices and pluralistic sensibilities.” While we have already seen that Kripal positions such 
“radical hermeneutics” and “pluralism” in a Kantian teleology of religious reform, Kripal 
follows this statement with a fuller description of such reform in political terms.  
 Citing Meddeb and his Lewisian entitled work The Malady of Islam, Kripal asserts 
that he follows Meddeb’s embrace of “the broader historical context,” which Kripal describes 
as “the rise of modernity and the Enlightenment and the internal failures of Islam to answer 
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or fully participate in them […].”316 Kripal immediately notes how Meddeb “goes on to 
develop a richly dialectical model of Islam as an intimate part of the West and its history.”317 
As such, Kripal asserts that in refusing to see Islam as separate from the West, Meddeb 
enacts a “mystical denial of difference.”318 Yet, Kripal’s assertion of such an ostensibly 
universal “denial of difference” within the “broader historical context” of the failure of 
“Islam to answer or fully participate” in “the rise of modernity and the Enlightenment” is a 
denial of history itself. Such a brand of essentializing pluralism, as Wendy Brown notes, 
confirms “the superiority of the West” through a simultaneous depoliticization of “the effects 
of domination, colonialism, and cold war deformations of the Second and Third Worlds” and 
portrayal of “those living these effects as in need of the civilizing project of the West.”319  
Thus, Kripal’s assertion of “mystical denial of difference” is a hegemonic Kantian 
universalization of sameness. As the sociologist Ulrich Beck notes, in such universalist calls 
for the dissolution of difference “the other’s voice is permitted entry only as the voice of 
sameness, as a confirmation of oneself, contemplation of oneself, dialogue with oneself.”320 
Here, Ibn ‘Arabi is identified as having the same values and qualities as European Kantian 
religious subjectivity, while his not-yet-liberated co-religionists are in need of the “cross-
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cultural” influence of Kripal’s “gnostic rationalism” to make Islam “safer, more humane, and 
more religiously satisfying”—not necessarily for Muslims, but for those who feel threatened 
by the existence of non-liberal Muslim beliefs and practice.  
Conclusion: Ibn ‘Arabi qua Father of Reasonable Sufism and the End of Semitic Islam 
This chapter began by noting Steven Schwartz’s 2008 invocation of Ibn ‘Arabi in The 
Other Islam as “the earliest example of an illustrious, truly European Muslim […].”321 Like 
the examples given above marking Ibn ‘Arabi’s rise as the master of reasonable Sufism, Ibn 
‘Arabi is once again de-Semitized—his Arab identity effaced through an anachronistic 
identification of Muslim Spain with Western Europe. Ibn ‘Arabi thus serves as the progenitor 
of reasonable Sufism itself, which is variously represented as “Christianized” and 
“European” Islam.322 In Schwartz’s metanarrative, Ibn ‘Arabi transmits “the beauty of his 
own personality” to Rumi.323  Yet, the discourse of reasonable Sufism is so totalizing in The 
Other Islam, that even Rumi ultimately loses his connection to Persia or Seljuk Anatolia. 
Instead, Rumi’s toponymic association with Anatolian Rome, or “Rūm,” is purposefully 
interpreted as “a man living in a place still filled with Christian influence,” “an individual 
turned toward Europe,” “the European,” and “the Greek.”324 Indeed, Schwartz goes so far as 
to say that Rumi “represents a generation of Sufis drawn to Western culture.”325 
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At the enlightened telos of Schwartz’s genealogy of reasonable Sufism are the 
European Bektashis of Kosovo and Albania, whom he traces spiritually back to Ibn ‘Arabi.326 
“Rather than a narrow observance,” Schwartz informs us that the Bektashis “boast an 
openhearted form of Islam […].”327 According to Schwartz, the Bektashis “are extremely 
opposed to any expression of radical Islam,” and, as such, they consume alcohol, allow 
women to participate as equals without veils in their rituals, and “do not perform the normal 
daily prayers prescribed for Muslims.”328 Thus, the “joyful libertarianism of the Bektashis” 
and their “march” (as opposed to “straying”) away from “sober” and “Shariah-centered 
Sufism” has made them “proud to call themselves the most open and forward-looking 
community in Islam and the closest in heart to Jews, Christians, and Buddhists.”329 
While the Bektashis are “the ‘most progressive’ element in world Islam,” the 
“Mideast Arab Sunni” Muslims are the least.330 According to Schwartz, “All of Sunni Islam 
is traditionally conformist” and is “dominated by clerics and ‘official’ theologians […].”331 
In Schwartz’s discourse, such Arab-Sunni “extremism” is associated first and foremost with 
the heteronomous observance of Islamic law. Indeed, as opposed to the “wild and free” 
Bektashis, the Naqshbandi Sufi adherence to the sharia, along with their traditional 
involvement in politics, is what, for Schwartz, defines them as “Sufi fundamentalists.”332 
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The Other Islam thus represents a culmination of the discourse of reasonable Sufism 
and its Kantian teleological history of rational religion. In this discourse, Ibn ‘Arabi is the 
father of a particular Sufi tradition that has completely dissociated from its Arab-Semitic 
roots and attendant heteronomous law. In Schwartz’s “universal” discourse, like that of 
Kant’s, recourse to such law and ritual observance is depicted as fanatical, anti-modern, 
oppressive, and in need of reform. Thus, as Kant asserts above in The Conflict of the 
Faculties, “freedom” of religion is only good if there is a “universal agreement on the 
essential maxims of belief […].”  
While Kant understood the various denominations of Christianity as holding such 
universal agreement, Judaism on the other hand did not. The only recourse for Jews, in 
Kant’s mind, was that of inner conversion to a rational and autonomous universal faith. As 
Mack notes, Kant “attempted to remove Christianity’s Judaic foundations. He did so by 
endowing Christian scripture with a radically anti-Jewish meaning.”333 Indeed, Judaism for 
Kant was a religion of slavery to external authority and thus represented a typology of the 
“heteronomous.” As such, Mack importantly notes: 
By means of the construction of a group that chose to be heteronomous, [Kant] accounted for 
the fact that, although the ability to transcend the empirically intuited world resides in every 
human being, it needs to be socially enforced. It depends on social normativity and, as a 
result, autonomy presupposes a civil society that metaphysically prescribes freedom from 
materialistic inclinations.334  
 
Indeed, it is precisely this Kantian notion—that modern civil society necessitates a 
metaphysics of autonomy—that fuels the consistent project of internal conversion and reform 
found within all of the discourses surveyed above, but most notably within those post-World 
                                                
333 Mack, German Idealism, 36. 
334 Ibid., 40. 
 315 
War II where Semitic Islam has replaced Judaism, while Judaism has merged with 
Christianity and transmogrified into the regnant Kantian “religious” model of “Judeo-
Christian” civilization.  
The discourse of reasonable Sufism explored in this chapter is thus based upon a 
specific genealogy of European metaphysics—what Pacini has identified as the modern 
religion of conscience, which places the onus of moral legislation upon the autonomous 
subject. Kant’s Religion self-consciously aims to define modern authentic religious 
subjectivity through the universalization of epistemological presuppositions formed within a 
teleological metanarrative. While Kant’s claims to civilizational universality are made for the 
ultimate betterment of the world and its eventual enlightenment in sociopolitical and 
religious terms, his conception of universal human subjectivity, as Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze 
notes, “colonizes humanity by grounding the particularity of the European self as center 
[…].”335 Such centering of humanity within a Western universal mold is what Beck calls a 
hegemonic “universalism of sameness”—i.e., the assertion of a common humanity at the 
expense of ethnic difference.336  
This chapter has thus sought to throw into relief how the idea of universal “reason” 
has been mobilized within the discourse of reasonable Sufism to efface an irrational Muslim 
Other. As has been shown above, Ibn ‘Arabi’s gradual emergence as reasonable Sufism’s 
progenitor and exemplar not only happens through a process of de-Semitization, but the 
discourse that he comes to represent is in itself a conversion narrative that seeks to de-
Semitize Islam through the eradication of heteronomy—and thus history, culture, race, and 
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tradition. Like Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of European racism as the effacement of 
difference through the projection of the Western self-image, i.e., the “White-Man face,” the 
discourse of reasonable Sufism projects the Kantian notion of self-rule upon the Sufi while 
ironically demanding the submission of the “slavish” Muslim to freedom.337 If for Kant, “the 
euthanasia of Judaism is pure moral religion,” then here the euthanasia of Semitic Islam is 
reasonable Sufism.
                                                
337 As Rousseau stated, “whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the whole 
body; which means nothing else than that he shall be forced to be free […].” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social 
Contract and The First and Second Discourses, trans. and ed. Susan Dunn (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2002), 27 (emphasis mine). 
  
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
MAKING IBN ‘ARABI FROM ZERO DEGREES: 
THE QUESTION OF AUTONOMY AND THE WESTERN IDEA OF UNIVERSALISM  
 
 
[I]t is power, and not inherent qualities of openness or rigidity, moral relativism or 
orthodoxy, that produces the universal and the particular, the tolerant and the 
tolerated, the West and the East, the pluralist and the fundamentalist, the civilized 
and the barbaric, the same and the other.1 
 
Lazarus Bendavid, the “intelligent Jew” mentioned by Kant in The Conflict of the 
Faculties, as discussed in the last chapter of this study, began his 1793 anthropological work 
Notes Regarding the Characteristics of the Jews (Etwas zur Charakteristik der Juden) with 
the question: “What must the Jews do to make themselves fit for a civil reform?”2 Indeed, 
Kant praised Bendavid precisely because he was willing not only to accept the validity of 
Christianity, but to abandon the heteronomous law and practices of Judaism for what 
Bendavid called “the pure teaching of Moses,” i.e., the Kantian pure rational religion.3 While 
Kant afforded the Jews their right to remain outwardly as Jews, his teleological metanarrative 
of rational religion envisioned the eventual casting off of all “statutes and observances,” 
which were once necessary for humanity in its infancy but now had become “a fetter.”4 Thus 
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in his praise of Bendavid’s progress towards such ends Kant would state in visionary fashion: 
“The euthanasia of Judaism is pure moral religion, freed from all the ancient statutory 
teachings […].”5  
It is indeed through Kant’s theoretical intervention that the idea of “autonomy” 
emerges from its almost exclusive denotation of political independence into the additional 
realm of subjective freedom.6 According to Wendy Brown, Kant’s definitive theory of 
modern autonomy “presupposes independence from others, independence from authority in 
general, and the independence of reason itself.”7 Conversely, those mired in heteronomy are 
like slaves who have no independent power, reason, or morality. As Brown notes, the modern 
liberal devotion to autonomy along Kantian lines disparages the heteronomous traditional 
subject as uncontrollably saturated with culture and religion—or “culture as religion, and 
religion as culture”—while culture and religion are for the autonomous liberal subject 
extrinsic rather than constitutive.8 
Yet, the Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas has skeptically asked if it is possible 
to separate “‘moral consciousness’ […] from a certain heteronomy, from a relation with the 
Other, with exteriority?”9 This question points to a similar problematic that binds the 
preceding chapters. In the first half of this study, I have argued that although much of the 
Western interpretive tradition surrounding Ibn ‘Arabi has tried to separate his “mystical 
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consciousness” from traditional heteronomous authority, such a dissociation is not possible. 
Indeed, Ibn ‘Arabi’s metaphysical supersessionism, which is grounded within classical 
Islamic legal and theological doctrine, is in many ways an example of the Levinasian 
challenge to the Nietzschean—and thus Kantian—categorization of heteronomy as self-
enslavement.10 Levinas argues that when the religious subject accepts a divine command, 
rather than subordination, the subject engages a “consciousness of responsibility” that not 
only signifies the status of receiving a command, but that of empowerment. Here, Levinas 
uses the dual sense of the French “ordonné” (ordained/ordered) as an example: “when you 
become a priest, you are ordained, you take orders; but in reality you receive powers. The 
word ‘ordonné’ in French means both having received orders and having been 
consecrated.”11  
It is in this sense of “consecration” qua empowerment that we can understand Ibn 
‘Arabi’s engagement with the heteronomous tradition of Islam. As noted at the start of 
chapter 1, Ibn ‘Arabi holds that the implementation of the sharia unveils “divine knowledge” 
that is concealed within it.12 Thus, according to Ibn ‘Arabi, it is precisely through such 
obedience that the Muslim subject becomes “consecrated” in the Levinasian sense. Indeed, 
Levinas himself notes that “heteronomy is somehow stronger than autonomy,”13 and it is 
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again in a strikingly similar way that Ibn ‘Arabi states that the “outwardly manifest (al-ẓāhir) 
is stronger than the inwardly hidden (al-bāṭin)” because of the outward’s “greater 
comprehensiveness” and the more extensive nature of the divine-human relationship over 
that of the divine alone.14 Here, as in Levinas’s example of “ordination,” power is a 
concealed and paradoxical element within subordination—i.e., the nature of accepting 
responsibility necessitates a bestowal of power. 
Thus, as fleshed out in chapter 1, Ibn ‘Arabi’s heteronomous subjectivity as the “Seal 
of the Saints” (khātam al-awliyāʾ)—i.e., the supreme “spiritual” manifestation of the logoic 
Muhammadan Reality—entails both his claim of responsibility as protector of the sharia and 
claim to the supreme spiritual power of prophetic comprehensiveness. Rather than 
interpreting Qur’an 3:84 (which calls for faith in all previous revelations without distinction 
between them) as an appeal for religious pluralism, Ibn ‘Arabi claims the verse “key to all 
knowledge” and an indication of his triumphal attainment of the Muhammadan station as the 
logoic totality of prophetic consciousness.15 It is indeed through such a heteronomous 
framework that Ibn ‘Arabi comprehends himself to be “consecrated” in a strikingly similar 
way to the Levinasian notion above—as he plainly asserts: “I am holy.”16 It is just such a 
logoic identification with revelation that leads Levinas to rhetorically ask elsewhere, “Is the 
human word not the very modality of the manifestation and resonance of the Word?”17  
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And yet, the problem with such heteronomous identification is precisely the 
exclusivism involved in such “manifestation and resonance” with the external command. For 
such resonance exhibits an immediacy that Levinas describes as “[a]n obedience preceding 
the hearing of the order […].”18 Such obedience, according to Levinas, is marked by an 
“extreme urgency […] by which, ‘to the exclusion of everything else,’ the imperative is 
categorical and subservience irreversible […].”19 It is just this exclusivity that the 
Perennialist portrayal of Ibn ‘Arabi as a religious pluralist attempts to neutralize.  
As was shown in the first part of this study, Ibn ‘Arabi is anachronistically portrayed 
as holding to the Schuonian Perennialist construction of “universal validity” that 
acknowledges all contemporaneous “orthodox” religions as equally valid paths to the divine. 
A key element in such a portrayal is the denial of Ibn ‘Arabi’s adherence to the classical 
doctrine of abrogation (naskh) and the textual corruption (taḥrīf al-naṣṣ) of pre-Qur’anic 
revelations. As was argued in chapter 2, the Schuonian Copernican turn towards multiple 
religious solar systems—each having a prophetic sun that while absolute for its particular 
religion is relative in comparison to all the other solar systems—is an obviously modern 
construction. While the preeminent Ibn ‘Arabi scholar William Chittick has claimed this to 
have been Ibn ‘Arabi’s own position, I have shown that this claim cannot be discursively 
sustained.  
Although Schuon and those who follow him assert that such a “Copernican” 
perspective respects the absolutism of each religion, such claims rest upon the acceptance 
that each system’s religious laws are not absolute. Yet, as the first part of this study attests, 
                                                
18 Levinas, Entre Nous, 151. 
19 Ibid. 
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Ibn ‘Arabi’s entire metaphysical cosmology and cosmography are built upon the notion that 
the religious laws of Islam are abrogative and thus absolute. While the People of the Book 
are allowed to remain upon their own religious laws, they do so only through submitting to 
the Qur’anic command of 9:29, which demands their humiliation and subjugation through the 
payment of the poll-tax (jizya). Even though Ibn ‘Arabi concedes to the possibility of their 
redemptive felicity (saʿāda), the People of the Book are granted this only through their 
obedience to the Muhammadan sharia and not through the contemporaneous validity of their 
own revealed scriptures, which—pace Chittick and Reza Shah-Kazemi—Ibn ‘Arabi held to 
have been textually corrupted. 
While Perennialist portrayals of Ibn ‘Arabi’s adherence to the sharia are convincingly 
categorized as “traditional,” the notion of a classical Islamic “heteronomous” tradition that 
acknowledges multiple heteronomies denies the very basis of premodern heteronomy—i.e., 
its absolutism. Thus, the Perennialist portrayal of Ibn ‘Arabi as universally accepting all 
contemporaneous religious laws as equally valid transmogrifies heteronomy into proto-
autonomy. In other words, if each revealed legal tradition from every religion is equally 
absolute, as the Perennialists claim, then all exclusivist doctrines are effectively relativized. 
While such relativization is mobilized in the name of universalism and the “validity” of all 
religious laws, it nevertheless discursively excludes the exclusory discourse it claims to 
embrace. As Hugh Nicholson observes, “The effort to dissociate religion from exclusionary, 
‘us’ versus ‘them’ relations ends up merely transposing the act of exclusion to a meta-level 
where the excluded ‘other’—in the form of exclusivist theologies—is not immediately 
recognized.”20 
                                                
20 Hugh Nicholson, Comparative Theology and the Problem of Religious Rivalry (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 8. 
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For example, in his recent universalist work on the Qur’an and interfaith dialogue, 
which overtly incorporates a Perennialist interpretation of Ibn ‘Arabi, Shah-Kazemi 
confidently claims that his brand of Schuonian universalism “upholds as irreducible the 
differences of outward religious forms, for these differences are seen as divinely sanctioned: 
they are diverse forms reflecting the principle of divine infinity, not just accidental 
expressions of human diversity.”21 Yet when he attempts to situate Ibn ‘Arabi’s thought 
within such universalism, Shah-Kazemi qualifies his above assertion: 
The oneness of the message […] implies a diversity of formal expressions, these expressions 
not being reducible to each other on the formal plane, even if they are considered, in their 
formal aspect, as ‘accidental’ in relation to the ‘necessary’ import of the supra-formal 
substance.22 
 
Shah-Kazemi thus contradicts himself by admitting that the different religious forms are 
indeed “accidental” compared to the “supra-formal” essence of religion itself, i.e., the religio 
perennis. It is through such a drift in categorization between religious form as non-accidental 
to accidental that Shah-Kazemi can thus state in the same work with no apparent irony:  
No one interpretation can therefore be put forward as right and true to the exclusion of all 
others. One must repeat: to exclude the exclusivist reading is in turn to fall into a mode of 
exclusivism. Thus, a truly inclusivist metaphysical perspective must recognize the validity of 
the exclusivist, theological perspective, even if it must also—on pain of disingenuousness—
uphold as more compelling, more convincing, and even more ‘true’, the universalist 
understanding of Islam.23 
 
Here, Shah-Kazemi claims the universal validity of all religious subjectivities. He then 
emphatically asserts that such a claim must include exclusivism—yet he does so only to 
again contradict himself in the very next sentence. While Shah-Kazemi claims that no 
particular interpretation can be said to be “right and true to the exclusion of all others,” at the 
                                                
21 Reza Shah-Kazemi, The Other in the Light of the One: The Universality of the Qur’ān and Interfaith 
Dialogue (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2006), xxv (emphasis mine). 
22 Ibid., 162 (emphasis mine). 
23 Ibid., 157 (emphasis mine). 
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end of the day it must be admitted that the universalist position is “more compelling, more 
convincing, and even more ‘true’” than the exclusivist one. Thus, even Shah-Kazemi’s 
careful attempt to embrace the exclusivist in order to avoid falling “into a mode of 
exclusivism” fails. Such failure lies precisely in the need to reiterate difference and enunciate 
superiority. As Wouter Hanegraaff observes, this type of a perennialist position views 
exclusivist theologies as representing “‘lower’ levels in a hierarchy, or stages in a process of 
evolution towards genuine spiritual insight, which means that they are imperfect.”24 “[I]t is 
difficult to see,” Hanegraaff thus trenchantly notes, “how this should be distinguished from 
other forms of exclusivism or, in some cases, dogmatism.”25 Indeed, Slavoj Žižek has called 
such positionality “the privileged empty point of universality” through which the 
acknowledgement of “the Other’s specificity is the very form of asserting one’s own 
superiority.”26 Thus in all universalist discourse, the apparent absoluteness of religious forms 
must be accidental and thus less true than the universal essence that unites them, otherwise 
“universalism” ceases to have meaning as a truth claim.  
While Perennialism is based upon a discourse of decline from an ancient golden age 
and hope of a palingenetic renewal, the Kantian vision of “pure rational religion” that forms 
what I call reasonable Sufism in chapter 4 is a progressive teleology. Yet, both modes of 
universalism acknowledge a transcendent religious a priori that relativizes historical 
religious form. Thus, the histories, cultures, and ethnicities connected to them are also 
relativized. The truth is universal, i.e., the transcendent a priori (religion as such, pure 
                                                
24 Wouter J. Hanegraaff, New Age Religion and Western Culture: Esotericism in the Mirror of Secular Thought 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 329. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Slavoj Žižek, “Multiculturalism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism,” New Left Review 225 
(1997): 44 (emphasis original). 
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esotericism, pure metaphysics, pure reason, etc.), while outward religious forms only serve as 
symbols or palimpsests for universal meaning—i.e., “mythologies” in Frithjof Schuon and 
“inventions” in Kant.27 Like the Kantian position, Perennialism holds that authentic religious 
subjectivity is independent from religious form and is not constituted by it. Since “the truth” 
has nothing to do with the externals—i.e., the external religious forms are not spiritually 
determinative—they are accidental, secondary, and less true. As Kant states, the different 
religions and revelations are “nothing more than the accidental vehicles of religion and can 
only thereby be different in different times and places.”28  
The idea that there exists a “universal beyond time and space” has been a seminal 
conceit in European imperialism since the end of the fifteenth century.29 The modern 
European attempt to find an objective, “universal” perspective “independent of its ethnic and 
cultural center of observation” has been dubbed by Santiago Castro-Gómez “the hubris of 
zero degrees.”30 Building on the work of Enrique Dussel and Walter Mignolo, Castro-Gómez 
observes that the European hubris of zero degrees emerged as the result of the Spanish 
conquest of America and the imperial need for cartographic precision. Like the Copernican 
                                                
27 See Frithjof Schuon, Gnosis: Divine Wisdom, ed. James S. Cutsinger, trans. Mark Perry, Jean-Pierre Lafouge, 
and James Cutsinger (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006), 20, 63; and Immanuel Kant, Religion within the 
Bounds of Bare Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing  Company, 2009), 123 
28 Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 2003), 24 (emphasis mine). 
29 Ramón Grosfoguel and Eric Mielants, “The Long-Durée Entanglement Between Islamophobia and Racism in 
the Modern/Colonial Capitalist/Patriarchal World-System: An Introduction,” Human Architecture: Journal of 
the Sociology of Self-Knowledge 5, no. 1 (2006): 8. As Grosfoguel and Mielants note, 1492 was formative for 
modern categories of knowledge in that it marks both the fall of Granada and the Spanish re-conquest of 
Andalusia and the expulsion of Jews and Arabs from Iberia and the simultaneous “discovery” of the Americas 
and the colonization of its indigenous peoples. Through these events, “Jews and Arabs became the subaltern 
intern ‘Others’ within Europe, while indigenous people became the external ‘Others’ of Europe” (ibid., 2). 
30 Santiago Castro-Gómez, “(Post)Coloniality for Dummies: Latin American Perspectives on Modernity, 
Coloniality, and the Geopolitics of Knowledge,” in Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial 
Debate, ed. Mabel Moraña, Enrique Dussel, and Carlos A. Jáurequi (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 
278. 
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turn, European cartographers transcended the medieval depiction of an ethnocentric realm  
contained within a circular limit. Through the use of the new mathematics of perspective, 
such innovative cartography transposed itself from its ethnic location to an Archimedean 
meta-position—“a sovereign gaze external to the representation.”31  
While Kant’s universalism is famously marked by his self-acknowledged Copernican 
turn away from the multiplicity of heteronomous empiricism to a transcendent a priori of 
autonomous reason,32 Schuon’s universalism is similarly inscribed by a self-conscious 
Copernican turn away from a premodern hierarchical religiocentrism to a heliocentric model 
of religious unity made possible through a transcendent religious a priori.33 While it can thus 
be argued that both Kantian and Schuonian universalist cosmologies reflect a similar 
“Copernican” perspective, following Castro-Gómez I argue that they also—and in terms of 
discursive function, more directly—reflect the imperial subjectivity of the Copernican age 
itself and the hegemonic universalism it produced. As Castro-Gómez notes, the shift in 
perspective of European universalism, and its attendant hubris of zero degrees, is not a 
product of the Copernican revolution, but rather it is the product of the imperial designs of 
the nascent Spanish empire.34 While claiming scientific “objectivity,” European 
cartographers pictorially and discursively colonized geo-political space through normalizing 
                                                
31 Ibid., 278. 
32 As discussed in chapter 4; see p. 252 and 252n62.  
33 As discussed in chapter 2; see p. 122. As Schuon notes: “It has become impossible to provide an effective 
defense for a single religion against all the others […]; to persist in doing so […] is a little like wishing to 
maintain the Ptolemaic system against the evidence of verified and verifiable astronomical data.” Frithjof 
Schuon, Logic and Transcendence: A New Translation with Selected Letters, trans. Mark Perry, Jean-Pierre 
Lafouge, and James S. Cutsinger, ed. James S. Cutsinger (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2009), 4. 
34 Castro-Gómez, “(Post)Coloniality for Dummies,” 279. 
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hierarchies of civilizational and religious difference in Euro- and Christocentric terms.35 Like 
the Žižekian notion of the “empty point of universality” above, the hubris of zero degrees 
concealed its own situated position of enunciation and exported local European history as 
universal truth. Thus universalized, such world-ordering “would become the epistemological 
base that gave rise to the anthropological, social, and evolutionist theories of the 
Enlightenment.”36  
The dawn of the Copernican age and sixteenth century imperialism also marks the 
beginning of a shift from premodern religious exclusivity and the inferiorization of different 
religions to modern racism and the inferiorization of the human beings who practice them.37 
Like the cartographical point of zero degrees, race arises “as one of the central conceptual 
inventions of modernity.”38 Indeed, European imperialism and the “objective” hierarchical 
world-ordering it produces is coterminous with the rise of racial difference between 
conquered and conqueror.39  
Yet, while sixteenth century European imperialism was crucially important in the 
conceptualization of racial difference, it was the paradigm shift of Cartesian mind-body 
dualism in the seventeenth century that reduced social subjectivities “to physical dimensions 
and correlates.”40 Indeed as James Byrne notes, the privilege that Cartesian mind-body 
dualism gives to the rational over the physical “reinforced the trend in Western thought – a 
                                                
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Grosfoguel and Mielants, “The Long-Durée,” 4.   
38 David Theo Goldberg, Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 3. 
39 Ibid., 53. 
40 Ibid. 
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trend which had roots in a particular Christian anthropology – to view the body as the locus 
of error, weakness and sin.”41 Along with the conceit of European universalism, Cartesian 
mind-body dualism and the primacy of reason over physicality proved to be a major 
influence on Kant.42 Kant thus understood rational autonomy, i.e. the “pure a priori,” as 
freedom from all empirical and subjective sources of reality. In Critique of Pure Reason, 
Kant calls such subjective sources “practical concepts,” which include “objects of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction, i.e., of pleasure or displeasure, and thus, at least indirectly, to 
objects of our feeling.”43  
Through such a prism of Cartesian dualism, Kantian autonomy thus contends that 
there is a universal truth shared by all humanity that is unconstituted by external forces, that 
it is hermetically sealed from its environment, from history, religious tradition, laws, and 
practice. In such a Cartesian view, consciousness itself is disembodied and dissociated from 
the outward world. As Michael Mack notes, “Kant in fact established an idealist 
anthropology in which human achievements always involve the overcoming of a dependence 
on the material world.”44 Recourse to the material world in opposition to such idealism was 
thus racialized by Kant, who “saw in the Jews the opposite of reason’s purity: they embodied 
the impurity of empirical reality, of ‘matter.’”45  
                                                
41 James M. Byrne, Religion and the Enlightenment: From Descartes to Kant (Louisville: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 1997), 67. 
42 See Byrne, Religion and the Enlightenment, 67, 207.  
43 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 675. 
44 Michael Mack, German Idealism and the Jew: The Inner Anti-Semitism of Philosophy and German Jewish 
Responses (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 104. 
45 Ibid., 3. 
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Such Kantian typologies of autonomy and heteronomy would indeed play a seminal 
role in nineteenth century German anti-Semitism.46 Indeed, Houston Stewart Chamberlain (d. 
1927)—the notorious “seer of the Third Reich”47 whose discourse was compared with 
Schuon’s in chapter 3—was heavily influenced by Kantian idealist anthropology.48 
Chamberlain thus echoes Kant’s racialized idealism when he claims, “Wherever the Semitic 
spirit has breathed we shall meet with […] materialism.”49 Thus, Chamberlain would state in 
characteristic Kantian terms: in the Semitic “view of religion only practical ends are 
pursued, no ideal ones.”50 The “practical ends” to which Chamberlain here refers are none 
other than what Kant calls “practical concepts,” which as mentioned above denote 
empirically experienced and observed elements of consciousness.  
Indeed, such a Kantian-based typology of Semitic heteronomy is also strikingly 
echoed in Schuon, who in chapter 3 was shown to consistently portray Aryans as 
“objectivists” and Semites as “subjectivists.” Here, Schuon’s use of the term “subjectivist” 
(subjectiviste)51 refers to an ontological state that lacks intellectual objectivity and is instead 
subsumed by personal experience and feeling.52 In Schuon’s deployment, Aryan objectivity 
                                                
46 Primarily through his philosophical successor Johann Gottlieb Fichte (d. 1814). See Paul Lawrence Rose, 
Revolutionary Antisemitism in Germany from Kant to Wagner (Princeton: New Jersey, 1990), 117-132. 
47 Roderick Stackelberg, “Chamberlain, Houston Stewart (1855–1927),” in Antisemitism: A Historical 
Encyclopedia of Prejudice and Persecution, ed. Richard S. Levy (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005), 113. See 
chapter 3, p. 181n82. 
48 Mack, German Idealism, 104. 
49 Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, trans. John Lees, vol. 1 (New York: 
Howard Fertig, 1968), 422 (emphasis mine). 
50 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
51 E.g., Frithjof Schuon, Le Soufisme: voile et quintessence (Paris : Dervy-Livres, 1980), 38. 
52 As was noted in chapter 3, the German Indologist Christian Lassen (1876) similarly held that the Semitic 
nature was too “subjective” since it was dominated by empirical senses and emotions. Not only did such 
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“is none other than the truth,”53 while Semitic subjectivity is marked by what is accidental 
and thus “enclosed in a dogma.”54 Here “objectivity,” like Kantian “pure” reason, is a 
transcendent intellectual mode that is distinct from empirical, material, and “subjective” 
deceptions such as the passions and emotions.  
While Schuon claims that Semitic intelligence “takes on the color of obedience,”55 
“Aryan thought” perceives the universal “nature of things” itself.56 Schuon thus posits Aryan 
“objectivity” as the transcendent opposite of Semitic heteronomy and its recourse to 
jurisprudence and ritual practice—what Schuon refers to as the Semitic “need for external 
activities.”57 Like Kant and Chamberlain above, Schuon also associates “the material” with 
the typology of the Semitic as evinced in his description of the “Semitic” attachment of 
Muhammad “to human things” in contradistinction to Jesus’s “Aryan” tendency “toward the 
idealistic simplification of earthly contingencies.”58 
Although the metaphysical perspectives of Schuonian Perennialism and Kantianism 
are situated at polar ends of a continuum regarding the human potential for knowledge of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
subjectivity, according to Lassen, result in the Semitic incapacity for higher objective thought, it also was the 
cause of Semitic egoism and religious exclusivity. See chapter 3, p. 178. 
53 Schuon, Echoes of Perennial Wisdom, trans. Mark Perry and Jean-Pierre Lafouge (Bloomington: World 
Wisdom), 60 (emphasis mine). 
54 Schuon, Logic and Transcendence, 128 (emphasis mine). See chapter 3, pp. 206-207. 
55 Schuon, Sufism, 21. 
56 Frithjof Schuon, Islam and the Perennial Philosophy (London: World of Islam Festival Publishing Company, 
1976), 146.  
57 Frithjof Schuon, Castes and Races, trans. Marco Pallis and Macleod Matheson (Bedfont: Perennial Books 
Ltd., 1982), 24.  
58 Frithjof Schuon, Form and Substance in the Religions, trans. Mark Perry and Jean-Pierre LaFouge 
(Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2002), 24 (emphasis mine). See chapter 3, p. 194. 
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divine,59 they not only share philosophical and religious antecedents,60 they functionally 
converge in their insistence on the primacy of individual autonomy for “pure” religious 
subjectivity over all forms of traditional heteronomy. It is this functional equivalence that 
links their discursive practices to a common European intellectual genealogy through 
recourse to Eurocentric and racialized discursive formations denigrating Semitic heteronomy 
in opposition to Indo- and Greco-European autonomous superiority.  
As was discussed in chapter 4, Kant’s teleology of autonomous religiosity envisions 
“religion finally to be detached gradually from all empirical determining bases, from all 
statutes that rest on history […].”61 Brown describes the contemporary secular-liberal 
equivalent of such constructions as “the autonomy of the subject from culture—the idea that 
the subject is prior to culture and free to choose culture […].”62 It is indeed through such a 
conceit of autonomy that post-Kantian Western thought has tended to remove itself from the 
map of history and universalize Western epistemology as truth. Denuded of all trace of 
historical particularity, autonomy thus becomes a modern marker of religious, ethnoracial, 
                                                
59 While Schuonian Perennialism discursively appropriates various modes of intellectual mysticism found in 
Stoicism, Platonism, and Neoplatonism (including their Christian and Islamic variations) in which unitive 
knowledge of the divine, Intellect, Logos, etc. is attainable through inward “gnosis,” Kantian rationalism 
decidedly rejects any notion that knowledge of the “noumenal” realm (i.e., the divine) is attainable. Yet, 
Kantian metaphysics draws on the same sources as Schuon (see following note). 
60 As discussed in chapter 4, Kantian metaphysics draws heavily upon the intellectual mysticism of the 
Christian Platonic/Neoplatonic tradition that Schuonian Perennialism is based upon. Moreover, the German 
Pietist tradition not only heavily informed Kant’s understanding of religion, but served as an important basis of 
German Romanticism, which as noted in chapters 2 and 3 influenced Schuon. Pietism stressed a radical inward 
spirituality that de-emphasized the place of ritual within Protestantism, which was already notable for its 
marginalization of ritualism from Catholicism. Regarding Kant’s response to Pietism see Stephen Palmquist, 
Kant’s Critical Religion (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 140. Regarding the debt that German Romanticism has to 
Pietism see Richard Littlejohns, “Early Romanticism,” in The Literature of German Romanticism, ed. Dennis F. 
Mahone (Rochester: Camden House, 2004), 63. Regarding Pietistic de-emphasis of ritual, see F. Ernest 
Stoeffler, “Pietism,” Encyclopedia of Religion, 2nd ed., vol. 10 (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005), 
7143. See also chapter 4, pp. 259-60. 
61 Kant, Religion, 135 (emphasis mine). 
62 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 167. 
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and civilizational superiority, while heteronomy represents those inferior Others still 
epistemologically burdened by their own socio-historical baggage, i.e., their ethnoracial 
selves. In such racialized discourse, the sixteenth century sanctification of European 
subjectivity as an invisible “sovereign gaze”—or what Castro-Gómez also refers to as “the 
power of a Deus absconditus”—emerges as universalized truth.63 
Ashwani Sharma has called this Eurocentric paradigm “whiteness as ‘absent 
presence’,” which “seeks to stand for and be a measure of all humanity. It operates as a 
universal point of identification that strives to structure all social identities.”64 Indeed, Kant 
himself asserts that “Humanity exists in its greatest perfection in the white race.”65 Moreover, 
as discussed in chapter 4, Kant’s teleological metanarrative posits the emergence of “pure 
rational religion ultimately to rule over all,” but only if humanity divests itself of its doctrinal 
“cloaks” of theology and its accompanying legal and ritual practice.66 Schuon too holds a 
similar position of “whiteness as ‘absent presence’.” While he claims, as noted in chapter 3, 
that the “pre-eminence” of “the white race” is marked by its superior “contemplativity,” 
Schuon also asserts that the goal of his esotericism is to shed the outward forms of religion 
(religio formalis) and attain to the pure internal religion (religio perennis).67 Thus, in both 
                                                
63 “[T]he power of a Deus absconditus,” according to Castro-Gómez, “can see without being seen and can 
observe the world without having to prove to anybody […] the legitimacy of that observation.” Castro-Gómez, 
“(Post)Coloniality for Dummies,” 282. 
64 Ashwani Sharma, “Postcolonial Racism: White Paranoia and the Terrors of Multiculturalism,” in Racism 
Postcolonialism Europe, ed. Graham Huggan and Ian Law (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009), 123 
(emphasis mine). 
65 Kant quoted in Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, “The Color of Reason: The Idea of ‘Race’ in Kant’s 
Anthropology,” in Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader, ed. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze 
(Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 118. 
66 Kant, Religion, 135 See chapter 4, pp. 260-61, and similarly 266-67. 
67 See chapter 3, pp. 164-65; 212, 214. 
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Kant and Schuon, such calls to cast off external form are tied to the assumed superiority of an 
imagined “white” European autonomous subjectivity over and against the slavish 
heteronomy of Semitic religious subjectivity. 
Such clear discourse conflating autonomy with racial superiority is thus a stark and 
ironic indication that Kantian and Schuonian so-called modes of “pure” universalism and 
“objectivity” are in fact quite the opposite—i.e., historically situated European 
presuppositions regarding what counts as authentically religious. Moreover, such 
situatedness calls into question the entire conceit that these modes of thinking are 
“autonomous” in the first place. If universalist claims to autonomy are built upon premises 
that follow discursive “rules” established within longstanding genealogies of discrimination, 
then how truly autonomous are they? Thus, Levinas’s question quoted above comes to the 
fore: can “moral consciousness” be separated from “heteronomy, from a relation with the 
Other, with exteriority?” If, as Brown asserts, “the pure principle of pluralism […] rests on 
autonomy,”68 and autonomy is shown to rest upon exclusivist premises, where does that 
leave universalist claims to religious pluralism? 
While Ibn ‘Arabi enunciated the absolute supersession of Islam over all other 
religions, both Schuon and Kant posit an interior religious essence or disposition found 
within the primordial consciousness of all humanity and thus free from religious exclusivism 
and prejudice.69 Yet, as was shown in chapter 3, Schuon understood that his idea of 
esoterism, i.e., the religio perennis, was out of all religions the only path that “is absolutely 
                                                
68 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 201. 
69 As noted in chapter 4, Kant recognized a “moral predisposition” of the human being where “the will of God 
is originally inscribed in our hearts.” Kant, Religion, 114. See chapter 4, p. 261, 261n105. 
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monotheistic, it alone recognizing only one religion under diverse forms.”70 As such, Schuon 
replaced the Muhammadan Logos with the Virgin Mary, who as the logoic representative of 
the religio perennis holds “celestial supremacy” and “spiritual and cosmic supereminence.” 71 
Similarly, as mentioned above, the Kantian religious metanarrative envisions a final telos of 
“pure rational religion” that will ultimately render all other historical religions void and thus 
“rule over all.” As Paul Rose notes, Kant’s call for the “euthanasia of Judaism” (as quoted 
above and discussed in chapter 4) through an inner conversion to “pure moral religion” was 
“in effect nothing more than a secularization of the old Christian idea that the Old Testament 
and the Jewish religion had been superseded by the New Testament and Christianity.”72 
 Thus, in ironically similar ways to the absolute religious discourse of Ibn ‘Arabi, 
Kant and Schuon offer their own versions of supersessionism. Yet unlike Ibn ‘Arabi, their 
discourse is additionally racialist in particularly modern terms. Where Ibn ‘Arabi is open 
about his exclusivism, Kant and Schuon conceal their exclusivism within discourses that 
claim the exact opposite. In the face of such schemas that obscure and thus normalize their 
exclusivist presuppositions, Kantian and Schuonian universal assertions can only be 
construed as ideological.73 The radical incongruity inherent within these discourses also calls 
into question the entire premise of religious universalism and the possibility of non-
exclusivist religious identity. Such paradoxical inconsistencies are indeed an indication that 
exclusivism is inherent within the construction of any claim to truth. Thus, in observing such 
                                                
70 Schuon, Sufism, 41 (emphasis mine). 
71 Schuon, Logic and Transcendence, 101. 
72 Paul Lawrence Rose, Revolutionary Antisemitism in Germany from Kant to Wagner (Princeton: New Jersey, 
1990), 96. 
73 I.e., as a concealed means to control or dominate a discursive domain. See Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An 
Introduction (London: Verso, 1991), 5, 11. 
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contradictions in other related examples of universalist theology, Nicholson observes that 
“[t]he entirety of religious discourse and practice […] would appear to be implicated, either 
directly or indirectly, in relations of religious rivalry.”74  
As I have argued throughout this study, religious knowledge is constituted by its 
discursive context—it is produced through historical contestations and is thus perspectival. 
As Michel Foucault thus asserts, “One can speak of the perspectival character of knowledge 
because there is a battle and knowledge is the effect of this battle.”75 Just as Castro-Gómez 
argues that the universal taxonomical categories that emerged in the sixteenth century were 
the products of local European epistemology in the service of imperial designs, Kant’s own 
discourse of universalism “pertains not,” as Ian Hunter puts it, “to universal truth, but to a 
particular regional way of acceding to truth as ‘universal.’”76 As with universal truth, so then 
with the presupposition of autonomous thought itself. Indeed, as the cultural theorist 
Raymond Williams noted regarding the figure of the individual author/subject: “No man is 
the author of himself […].”77 Thus, according to Williams, “not only the forms but the 
contents of consciousness are socially produced.”78  
 Yet, universalist discourses that claim access to a transcendent religious essence, and 
thus disavow religious difference, do so not only through the modern conceit of autonomy, 
                                                
74 Nicholson, Comparative Theology, 10 (emphasis mine). 
75 Michel Foucault quoted in Arnold I. Davidson introduction to Society Must be Defended: lectures at the 
Collège de France, 1975-76, by Michel Foucault, ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David 
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76 Ian Hunter, “Kant’s Regional Cosmopolitanism,” Journal of the History of International Law 12, no. 2 
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but also through its twin contemporary concept of equality. As David Theo Goldberg notes, 
the “shift of discourse from the insistence upon religious principle to the modernist value of 
individual equality” is first indicated in the sixteenth century Spanish Dominican missionary 
Bartolomé de Las Casas (d. 1566).79 Las Casas eloquently defended the humanity of the 
Amerindians and argued that all people whatever color or culture were ruled by the universal 
laws of nature and humanity. Yet, Las Casas’s notion of equality, as Goldberg points out, 
was “ultimately the equality of each to become Christian.”80 Indeed, according to Las Casas, 
the resistance of Muslims to convert to Christianity justified their condemnation “as the 
veritable barbarian outcasts of all nations.”81 Like his contemporary Spanish cartographers, 
Las Casas’s universalism was based upon a hegemonic perspective of “humanity” that 
reflected his European superiority—those that would not accede to it were simply beyond the 
pale of civilization. As Talal Asad trenchantly notes, “It is often said that the Renaissance 
‘discovered man,’ but that discovery was in effect a psychological reconstruction of 
European individuality.”82 
As discussed in chapter 4, an excellent example of such hegemonic universalism is 
articulated by Jeffrey Kripal who employs Ibn ‘Arabi as representative of the “mystical 
denial of difference.”83 While such an assertion ostensibly claims equality as its concern, it is 
deployed in order to make the Muslim subject fit strictures of Western “universal” 
                                                
79 Goldberg, Racist Culture, 25. 
80 Ibid., 26 (emphasis mine). 
81 Las Casas quoted in Goldberg, Racist Culture, 26. 
82 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Disciplines and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 20. 
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presuppositions and thus take so-called Islam to task for its failure “to answer or fully 
participate” in “the rise of modernity and the Enlightenment.”84 Such discourse emerges as 
an imposition of a particular European discursive formation in combination with a 
simultaneous disavowal of the effects of Western domination and colonialism—i.e., a 
disavowal of socio-political, historical, and cultural difference.85 Thus, Kripal’s so-called 
“mystical denial of difference” ironically achieves its goal through an imposition of Western 
civilizational superiority—what I refer to in chapter 4 as a coercive discourse of “saming.” 
Yet, as Goldberg perspicaciously observes, such a hegemonic and paradoxical deployment of 
“difference” is intrinsic to the so-called universalism of liberal modernity:  
The more abstract modernity’s universal identity, the more it has to be insisted upon, the 
more it needs to be imposed. The more ideologically hegemonic liberal values seem and the 
more open to difference liberal modernity declares itself, the more dismissive of difference it 
becomes and the more closed it seeks to make the circle of acceptability.86 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this study and further discussed in chapter 4, the 
discursive imposition of such modern universal identity was readily apparent in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century European debates over Jewish emancipation. In order to be 
compatible with “the new universal state,” as Brown notes, “Jewishness could no longer 
consist in belonging to a distinct community bound by religious law, ritualized practices, and 
generational continuity; rather, it would consist at most in privately held and conducted 
belief.”87 If the second half of this study has shown one overarching relationship between 
modern universalist discourses on Sufism and Ibn ‘Arabi, it is recourse to the Semitic as 
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representative of heteronomy. The distinctive difference between Kant’s discourse opposing 
heteronomy and the anti-heteronomous discourse explored throughout this study is the 
modern Western shift from Judaism to Islam as emblematic of the heteronomous Other.88  
Today, Islam has replaced the typology refined within nineteenth century European 
discourse regarding the Jewish Question. As evinced in Bernard Lewis’s juxtaposition of 
“Judeo-Christian” religious subjectivity with “standard” Islam in chapter 4, there has been a 
shift in European acceptance of Judaism after the end of the second World War and its 
political effects.89 The Kantian hermeneutical tradition has become part of the heritage of 
“Judeo-Christian” humanism that reads the Ten Commandments according to the universal 
principles of autonomous morality in opposition to a supposed irrational Islamic textual focus 
on obedience to heteronomous law. In such discourse as enunciated by Lewis, the 
commandments of the Decalogue are humanized and thus civilized in terms of Kantian 
autonomous morality, while the heteronomy of “standard” Islam is representative of what 
Brown refers to as “the putative rule by culture or religion” that threatens to thwart 
“individual autonomy with religious or cultural commandments.”90  
Countering such threats of heteronomous “rule” is similarly the aim of the RAND 
Corporation’s program of “religion building,” also discussed in chapter 4, which promotes 
Sufism against Islam(ism) as a means to achieve the modern “necessity to depart from, 
modify, and selectively ignore elements of […] original religious doctrine.”91 Like Kripal’s 
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“mystical denial of difference,” Sufism is thus mobilized to endorse an autonomous 
religiosity that transcends religious form, culture, and history. As Asad notes: 
[t]he idea that people’s historical experience is inessential to them, that it can be shed at will, 
makes it possible to argue more strongly for the Enlightenment’s claim to universality: 
Muslims, as members of the abstract category “humans,” can be assimilated or […] 
“translated” into a global (“European”) civilization once they have divested themselves of 
what many of them regard (mistakenly) as essential to themselves. The belief that human 
beings can be separated from their histories and traditions makes it possible to urge a 
Europeanization of the Islamic world.92 
 
Thus, the result of the Kantian imposition of universalism through the assault on heteronomy 
is precisely the effacement of historical difference through the European universalization of 
its own truth claims. In such discourse, as demonstrated in chapter 4, Sufism becomes simply 
a reflection of the European self-image of autonomy posed against a Muslim heteronomous 
Other—what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari identify as the European racism of 
“facialization” through the projection of “the White-Man face.”93  
As Saba Mahmood importantly notes, it is not only Islamic militants who are the 
object of current Western projects of liberal reform, “but all those Muslims who follow what 
are considered to be nonliberal, orthodox, and conservative interpretations of Islam […].”94 
As evinced in the discourses analyzed in chapter 4, ideological programs for the 
universalization of “authentic” Islam through the supposed autonomous universalism of 
Sufism necessarily project an anti-universal Muslim Other whose heteronomous discursive 
and social practices are equated with anti-modern fanaticism and the cause of irrational 
violence. As Brown notes, such opposition is based upon the asymmetrical conceit that while 
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non-liberal peoples are imagined to be “ruled and ordered by” culture and religion, secular-
liberal universalism imagines itself as inherently outside of culture, religion, and history—
i.e., the asymmetrical hubris of zero degrees. Such asymmetry, Brown thus observes, “turns 
on an imagined opposition between culture and individual moral autonomy, in which the 
former vanquishes the latter unless culture is itself subordinated by liberalism.”95 The 
asymmetry between heteronomous tradition and universal autonomy further produces 
Manichean binaries positing heteronomous tradition against political freedom and equality.96 
It is precisely this hegemonic, ideological logic that creates the equivalence between 
fundamentalism and heteronomous Islamic practice, resulting in current political attempts to 
make the lifestyles of Muslims who engage in such heteronomous practice “provisional if not 
extinct through a process of gradual but incessant reform.”97  
 This study began in assessing claims about Ibn ‘Arabi’s religious universalism 
through comparative discourse analysis in combination with a historicization of Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
positions on the religious Other within his Islamic intellectual milieu. I have shown that a 
discursive image of Ibn ‘Arabi as a universalist has been constructed by Western scholars 
who are indebted to, or have been informed by, universalist discourses that mobilize 
longstanding Western discursive practices choked with Eurocentrism and its attendant 
hegemonic ideology of racism. A key element of such discourse maintains that authentic 
religious subjectivity is transcendently independent from religious form and is not 
constituted by it or subject to its attendant exclusivity.  
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Such recourse to a transcendent religious a priori that dissociates religious truth 
(rational or suprarational) from the map of worldly hierarchies strikingly parallels the conceit 
of “objectivity” formed through the invisible “sovereign gaze” of sixteenth century European 
cartography and its Archimedean location point of zero degrees. It is this assumed “power of 
a Deus absconditus,” as Castro-Gómez asserts, that fueled the universalization of European 
truth claims through the process of hegemonic imperial power and a presumed racial, 
religious, and civilizational superiority. Refined through Cartesian dualism and Kantian 
idealism, similar assumptions of superiority in the name of “universal” ideals have 
discursively denuded Ibn ‘Arabi of his Semitic tradition, forced him into the Procrustean 
mold of Western universalism, and made him into an image of a proto-European Muslim. 
Not only are such anachronistic discursive images inaccurate, but they authorize ideological 
and hegemonic programs of Western reform that seek in the name of Sufism to efface the 
very same heteronomy that Ibn ‘Arabi himself asserted.  
While this study has shown that Ibn ‘Arabi’s mysticism was heteronomously 
constituted by his religious tradition, it has also shown that the modern Western conceit of 
“religion” as a universally transcendent essence cannot exist in vacuo. Although the long-
standing European discursive tradition of autonomy claims a universal “empty” space, it 
would appear that not only nature but also the nature of human discursivity abhors such 
emptiness. As the history of European epistemology shows—and the discourses on Ibn 
‘Arabi and Sufism analyzed in the foregoing chapters corroborate—it is none other than the 
self-image of Western subjectivity that so often fills the void left by the transcendence it 
claims to attain. 
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